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Political
wisdom suggests
that George W.
Bush’s
presidency will
become infected
with the lame
duck syndrome
during his last
two years in
office.
The
scenario goes
like this: As
soon as Bush
missteps on
Iraq,
immigration or
tax policy, the
media and the
Democrats will
gleefully pounce
and try to
stymie his
initiatives.
Republican
candidates, with
an eye toward
the 2008
elections, will
try to distance
themselves from
the president’s
policies. Career
administrators
will hunker down
and await the
arrival of a new
chief executive.
An irrelevant
Bush
administration
will become an
empty shell
unable to wield
presidential
power and shape
national policy.
The
political
pundits who
espouse this
scenario should
take a closer
look at history.
Contrary to
conventional
wisdom, the lame
duck theory is
more myth than
reality. The
parties in
control of
Congress, the
ability of the
president to
bargain and
persuade as well
as the
occurrence of
exogenous events
are far better
predictors of
presidential
success than are
term limits.
Since the
ratification of
the 22nd
Amendment in
1951, only three
presidents have
served two full
terms in office.
Despite being
lame duck
presidents,
Eisenhower,
Reagan and
Clinton all saw
their support
scores in
Congress rise in
their final year
in office.
Reagan and
Clinton had
higher approval
ratings in their
second term than
in their first,
and each got a
lot
accomplished.
Even with
impeachment,
Clinton’s
support scores
in Congress rose
in his last two
years in office.
A Republican
Senate approved
more treaties in
Clinton’s last
two years as
president than a
Democratic
Senate did in
his first two
years.
In
the fall of
2000, The
Federalist
Society and
The Wall Street
Journal
asked 78
presidential
scholars to rank
the presidents.
Two-term
presidents
dominated the
top ten.
Post-22nd
Amendment
presidents fared
well, with
Reagan ranked
eighth and
Eisenhower
ninth. Bill
Clinton finished
24th, ahead of
14 one-term
presidents. Lame
duck status
seems to have
little impact on
empirically
measurable
standards of
presidential
effectiveness or
perceptual
evaluations of
greatness.
Lame
duck presidents
have
historically not
suffered from
losses of power
as much as they
have from abuses
of power. Their
transgressions
are monuments to
the arrogance
and misuse of
power that have
pervaded lame
duck
administrations.
Term limits
break the chain
of
accountability
and
responsiveness
that link the
presidency to
the people. The
lack of
accountability
can lead
presidents to
resort to
extra-constitutional
means to achieve
their agendas.
Alexander
Hamilton wrote
in Federalist
Paper # 72
that without the
opportunity for
reelection, the
president “has
no inclination
or resolution to
act his part
well.” The
actions of
Eisenhower,
Nixon, Reagan
and Clinton all
came under
congressional
scrutiny during
their second
terms of office,
leading to the
impeachment of
one president
and the
resignation of
another.
In
his last two
years in office,
lame duck status
is the smallest
obstacle that
George W. Bush
needs to
overcome. For
the first time
in his
presidency, Bush
will have to
deal with a
Democratic
majority in
Congress. If the
Democratic
leadership
unleashes the
partisan rancor
it has harbored
since the
Republican
takeover of
Congress in
1994,
presidential
initiatives may
be dead on
arrival.
As
long as Bush’s
approval ratings
hover below 40%,
he will have
difficulty using
the “bully
pulpit” to
gather public
support for his
foreign and
domestic
policies.
The quagmire
that is Iraq
continues to
erode Bush’s
professional
reputation as
well as his
public prestige,
and thus weakens
his bargaining
power in
Washington.
With
two years left
in office, Bush
stands at the
crossroads of
his presidency.
Though the
prospects for a
successful final
24 months in
office look dim,
there is still a
glimmer of
light. That
Clinton could
reinvigorate a
beleaguered
presidency in
1999 should give
hope to Bush in
2007.
To
be successful in
domestic policy,
the president
must move toward
the center of
the political
spectrum and
embrace bridge
rather than
wedge issues. He
may find common
ground with the
Democratic
Congress on such
issues as
immigration and
education. In
domestic
politics, Bush
maintains
powerful weapons
such as the veto
and executive
orders. These
instruments
should be
judiciously
employed to
further his
initiatives
while checking
those of the
opposition.
In
foreign affairs,
the president
remains
constitutionally,
if not
politically,
positioned to
accomplish his
agenda. After
all, despite the
results of the
2006 midterm
elections, Bush
remains the
commander-in-chief
and the chief
diplomat. The
Congress has few
constitutional
powers to
challenge the
president in the
arena of foreign
policy and the
Democrats have
yet to offer a
concrete,
comprehensive
plan to end the
war in Iraq. The
president must
press his
constitutional
advantages in
foreign affairs
to craft and
implement a
policy that will
lead to
stability in
Iraq followed by
the withdrawal
of American
troops.
If
the president
can establish a
bipartisan
rapport with the
110th Congress
and show
progress in
stabilizing the
situation in
Iraq, he may
regain the
public trust
vital to
successful
governance in a
democracy.
In
the end, the
success or
failure of
Bush’s last two
years in office
will hinge
largely on
events in Iraq,
not on his lame
duck status. If
his recent
policy and
command changes
in Iraq prove to
be effective,
this lame duck
might yet soar.
RF
James R. Hedtke
is the
chairperson of
the History and
political
science
department of
Cabrini College
in Radnor,
Pennsylvania and
author of Lame
Duck Presidents:
Myth or Reality
(Mellen Press,
2002). |
