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The United
States faces
numerous
challenges in
the Western
Hemisphere. All
demand a
collaborative
response, both
within the
United States –
that is, between
the Congress and
the executive
branch – and
between the
United States
and the
countries of
Latin America.
From immigration
reform to the
pursuit of
economic
development to
stemming narco-trafficking
or exploring
alternative
energy, U.S.
interests will
be difficult to
secure unless
U.S. credibility
in the region
can be
restored. That
requires a
meaningful
embrace of the
social agenda
that is the top
priority of most
of the
governments in
the region.
Indeed, unless
the United
States can made
good on a
renewed
commitment to
address the
massive poverty
and social
injustice that
exist, in
varying degrees
of severity,
throughout Latin
America,
President Bush’s
two terms in
office will go
down in history
as the worst for
hemispheric
relations in
well over a
generation.
Much has been
made of Latin
America’s
so-called “shift
to the left”
since late 2005,
the beginning of
a cycle of over
a dozen
presidential
elections. But
less understood
are the two
general trends
behind such
electoral
outcomes. The
first is
widespread
popular
dissatisfaction
with persistent
poverty and
widening gaps
between rich and
poor in the wake
of two decades
of neo-liberal
reform. Second,
as reflected in
the polls of
Latinobarómetro
and others, is
discontent with
the incapacity
of traditional
political elites
to respond to
growing demands
for greater
equity,
participation,
and economic,
political, and
social
inclusion.
Thus, the “rise
of the left”
owes much to
core problems
arising from the
quality
of democracy as
experienced by
the average
citizen: the
lack of good
jobs and, in
their absence,
the growth of
the informal
sector; a sharp
rise in violent
crime;
disenchantment
with the
institutions of
democratic
governance,
especially
political
parties; and
dislocations –
in Latin America
as well as in
the United
States – related
to the domestic
effects and
foreign policy
implications of
globalization.
Consider the
following: some
40 percent of
all Latin
Americans are
considered poor,
defined as
living on $2 a
day or less. In
one of the
hemisphere’s
poorest
countries,
Bolivia, the
World Bank
reports that one
and a half
million people
(out of a
population of a
little less than
9 million)
subsist on 16
cents a day or
less. Should it
be so difficult
under these
circumstances to
understand the
popular
enthusiasm for
President Evo
Morales, a
grass-roots
indigenous
leader, or for
policies aimed
at ensuring a
greater Bolivian
share of the
profits from its
natural gas
industry?
Similarly, while
Venezuelan
President Hugo
Chávez may be
widely viewed in
the region as an
authoritarian
despot, he has
delivered
billions of
dollars in oil
subsidies, debt
relief, and
infrastructure
financing, all
at a time of
steadily
decreasing U.S.
economic
assistance to
the region.
Rhetorically at
least, the State
Department for
some time has
recognized the
relevance of
poverty and
inequality for
the
consolidation of
the region’s
democracies.
President George
Bush’s speeches
during his
recent trip to
five Latin
American
countries (and
in Washington
just as he left)
also reflect
that awareness,
a welcome change
from an agenda
that for most of
the last six
years has
centered on the
virtues of free
trade and the
linkages between
counter-narcotics
and
counter-terrorism.
But U.S.
instruments for
addressing the
region’s poverty
and social
agenda have been
scant. Some of
the specific
initiatives
announced before
the President
Bush’s trip –
sending a Navy
ship to provide
medical care,
for example –
recall the civic
action programs
of the 1960s, in
which military
teams took over
development
roles, to the
detriment of
civilian
authority.
Other programs –
broadening
opportunities
for Latin
American youth
to study
English, or
expanding OPIC
loan guarantees
– are likely to
be met with
widespread
skepticism in
the hemisphere.
Worse still,
this year’s
foreign aid
budget – drafted
and debated
within the
administration
and presented to
Congress before
President Bush
left for the
region –actually
cuts economic
aid to Latin
America and the
Caribbean, a
trend that has
accelerated
since 2004.
Excluding
Colombia, which
has received the
lion’s share of
U.S. aid to the
region, proposed
development
assistance to
the Western
hemisphere has
been reduced by
about 25
percent.
The jury will be
out for some
time as to
whether the
visits of
President Bush
and other senior
U.S. officials
to the region
can succeed in
overcoming the
damage to U.S.
prestige caused
by the war in
Iraq and
scandals such as
Abu Ghraib.
Joint
initiatives with
Brazilian
President Luiz
Ignacio Lula da
Silva on
alternative
fuels such as
ethanol can go a
long way in
demonstrating a
capacity for
mature
partnership on a
critical issue
of shared
interest. But
getting in sync
with the region
– its presidents
and its public –
will require a
more profound
shift.
It would mean,
first, accepting
that addressing
poverty is a
legitimate
function and
responsibility
of the state and
not simply an
expected outcome
of market
forces. It
would also imply
embracing the
secondary
policies that
are necessary to
enhance the
capacity of free
trade to
contribute to
development.
Failure to do so
is hurting the
cause of free
trade not only
Latin America,
but also in the
United States.
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Cynthia J.
Arnson is the
Director of the
Latin American
Program at the
Woodrow Wilson
International
Center for
Scholars.
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