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Reforming the
United Nations
is a Sisyphean
task. In the
wake of the
oil-for-food
scandal and the
blow-up in the
U.N. Security
Council over the
invasion of
Iraq, Kofi Annan
appointed a High
Level Panel on
Threats,
Challenges and
Change with a
mandate to
recommend
far-reaching
adjustments.
Much of its
report was then
incorporated
into Mr. Annan’s
own proposals,
In Larger
Freedom,
released in the
run-up to the
2005 U.N.
summit. That
meeting was
intended as a
watershed of
institutional
reform.
Although the
U.S.
administration
and the U.N.
Secretariat had
been at logger
heads over Iraq
and other
issues, the two
were largely on
the same page
regarding U.N.
reform.
The goal of U.N.
reform was not
new. Professor
Edward Luck, the
former head of
the United
Nations
Association,
spoke of the
“déjà vu nature
of U.N. reform,”
noting that
“before the U.N.
could hold its
first meeting, a
number of states
were already
calling for its
reform.” But
although reform
measures have
been adopted
over and again,
they have made
little
difference. For
example, in
1993, a General
Assembly
resolution on
“Restructuring
and
Revitalization
of the United
Nations in the
Economic, Social
and Related
Fields” invoked
in its preamble
no fewer than
fifteen previous
resolutions
toward the same
end. In 1994
the United
States exerted
what our
ambassador to
the U.N.,
Madeleine
Albright, called
an “enormous
diplomatic
effort” to
secure the
creation of
something called
the Office of
Internal
Oversight
Services. Its
mandate was to
assure
transparency and
accountability.
And yet the
oil-for-food
shenanigans
began two years
later. In other
words, when that
scandal
unfolded, the
U.N. had already
been thoroughly
reformed!
The litmus test
of the latest
round of U.N.
reform was human
rights. Rarely
if ever has the
U.N. been so
self-critical as
Secretary
General and his
High Level Panel
in assessing the
record of the
U.N. Commission
on Human Rights,
which Mr. Annan
said had
performed so
poorly as to
cast “shadow”
over the U.N. as
a whole. For
years the
commission had
refused to
breathe a word
of rebuke to
most of the
world’s worst
tyrants, while
gently
chastising a few
offenders,
usually of the
second rank, and
then saving most
of its fire for
Israel. So bad
had this gotten
that Annan
proposed the
radical measure
of abolishing
the commission
entirely and
replacing it
with a Human
Rights Council.
This was to be
designed in a
different format
in order to
assure that it
would turn out
to be more
faithful to its
purposes than
the commission
had been.
Both Annan and
the U.S. were
disappointed in
some of the
provisions for
structuring the
new body, but
both hoped for
the best. Now,
after its first
year of
operation, the
Council’s record
has turned out
to be even worse
than that of its
forerunner. How
many states were
criticized for
their violations
of human
rights? Exactly
one: Israel, of
course. And it
was criticized
at every
session.
Meanwhile, not
one of the
world’s tyrants
or terrorists
was called to
account.
In short, the
record shows
that the U.N.
will not improve
with reform.
And the problem
is not only its
performance on
human rights or
its management
and
bookkeeping. It
has proved
helpless to
perform the
primary function
for which it was
created, namely
to protect
mankind from
“the scourge of
war.”
So what are we
to do? Abolish
the U.N.? We
are powerless to
do that. Few
others would go
along with such
a proposal. To
suggest such a
move would bring
down obloquy on
the U.S.,
something we
already have
more than we
need. The same
would be true
were we to
withdraw from
the U.N. or push
its headquarters
out of New
York.
Rather a sound
plan for
managing the
disappointing
record of the
U.N. would
consist of two
main parts.
First, we should
help to
strengthen those
few functions
that the U.N.
has shown it can
do well.
Second, we
should nurture
other
international
institutions
that may better
achieve some of
the things that
the U.N. does
not do well.
Of the things
the U.N. does
well, one is
post-conflict
peacekeeping.
This is a less
demanding
mission than
wading into a
civil war to
suppress the
fighting or
stopping a war
between states.
Instead, it
arises when the
parties to a
conflict are
ready to settle
their dispute,
but each
distrusts the
other. A U.N.
force that can
patrol ceasefire
lines, collect
weapons, verify
to each side
that the other
is keeping its
commitments,
launch relief
efforts, and the
like can be the
critical factor
that allows a
settlement to
take hold. The
U.N. has done
this in
Cambodia, East
Timor, Namibia,
El Salvador, and
a number of
other places.
This is a more
modest role than
the U.N.
founders
envisioned, but
it is
important.
Another area of
strength is the
work of some of
the U.N.’s
specialized
agencies, for
example the
World Health
Organization.
Assistance to
the very poor,
to refugees, to
women and
children demands
our concern and
our generosity,
and often U.N.
agencies are the
best vehicles
for this.
For more
political
functions, that
ones at which
the U.N. is
generally a
failure, the
alternative is
not to go it
alone. Rather
it is to seek
smaller and
sometimes less
formal
international
mechanisms.
The main purpose
of the U.N. was
to prevent a
third world war
which the
founders feared
might follow the
second just as
the second has
followed the
first, and they
imagined its
cockpit would be
Europe. The
Cold War,
however,
paralyzed the
U.N. from the
start. What did
prevent a third
world war from
breaking out in
Europe was a
different
organization,
NATO. It came
into being
accidentally,
having been
conceived simply
as a treaty.
The
strengthening,
enlargement and
adaptation of
NATO holds much
promise for he
future; and so
may other
regional
organizations.
In addition, the
embryonic
Community of
Democracies
might be
developed into a
more purposeful
alliance that
might play an
effective role
in the
advancement of
global human
rights.
Finally, ad
hoc
coalitions
of small
numbers of
states are
ordinarily
more
effective at
crisis
management
than an
organization
of 193
members. In
practice, we
look to the
Quartet to
work on the
Israel-Palestinian
problem; the
Five Plus
One to deal
with the
Iranian
nuclear
issue; and
the Pacific
Six to
negotiate
the North
Korean
nuclear
issue. In
the 1980s
the
Contadora
Group took
the lead on
the Central
American
crisis and
in the
1990s, it
was the
Contact
Group that
wrestled
with the
Yugoslavia
crisis.
Experience
teaches that
the formal
structures
of the UN
are often a
straitjacket
while
informal
groups of
states with
common
concerns,
interests or
values often
can work
more
effectively.
The true
alternative
to relying
heavily on
the UN for
political
functions is
not
unilateralism.
Rather, it
is more
flexible
forms of
international
cooperation.
--###--
Joshua
Muravchik is
a resident
scholar at
the American
Enterprise
Institute
and the
author,
among other
works, of
“The Future
of the
United
Nations:
Understanding
the Past to
Chart a Way
Forward.” |