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When North Korea
conducted a
small nuclear
explosion last
October, it was
not only an act
of defiance. It
was also a
confirmation
that Pyongyang’s
nuclear weapons
program poses a
clear and
present threat
to the regional
security of East
Asia, U.S.
national
security
interests, and
the global
nonproliferation
regime.
In the face of
this defiance,
many analysts
and policymakers
believe that
North Korea will
never abandon
its nuclear
weapons program
despite its
previous
commitment to
achieve a
nuclear-free
Korean
peninsula.
North Korean
government
officials and
media frequently
have mentioned
that a nuclear
free peninsula
was the “dying
wish of the
Great Leader Kim
Il Sung,” the
former leader
who was declared
the country’s
“eternal
president” in
September 1998
even though he
had been
deceased for
four years.
While many
discount the
credibility of
Pyongyang’s
statements and
the official
goal of
denuclearization,
North Korean
leaders clearly
recognize that
their country
will never be
secure as long
as it has a
hostile
relationship
with the United
States. Kim
Jong Il and his
advisors
probably prefer
a non-nuclear
peninsula in
exchange for
amicable
relations with
Washington and a
regional
security
arrangement that
credibly
guarantees
Pyongyang’s
security
interests.
However, North
Korea is
prepared to
settle for what
it perceives to
be its second
best outcome – a
deployed nuclear
arsenal and its
concomitant
costs.
In 2001, the
Bush
administration
implemented a
review of U.S.
policy towards
North Korea.
The
administration
basically
rejected the
Clinton
administration’s
“Perry process,”
which did not
begin until late
1999 after the
Congress had
passed
legislation
requiring the
appointment of a
“North Korea
policy
coordinator.”
The Clinton
administration’s
North Korea
policy had been
criticized as
being in
disarray when
former Defense
Secretary Bill
Perry released a
review of U.S.
policy toward
North Korea, the
so-called “Perry
Report,” in
October 1999.
In sum, the
Perry process
recognized that
Washington has a
multitude of
concerns
regarding
Pyongyang’s
behavior, but
Perry
established a
hierarchy of
problems to be
resolved: first
the nuclear
program, then
ballistic
missiles,
followed by
chemical and
biological
weapons,
conventional
arms, political
issues and human
rights, etc.
The Perry
process also
established two
options for
North Korea:
peaceful
co-existence if
Pyongyang were
to address
Washington’s
security
concerns; or,
increasing
animosity, and
the real
possibility of
war, if U.S.
concerns were
ignored.
The Bush
administration’s
subsequent
policy differed
from the Perry
process in three
important ways.
First, it
essentially
abandoned
Perry’s
hierarchical and
step-by-step
approach in
favor of seeking
a comprehensive
“big deal”
covering weapons
of mass
destruction,
missiles,
conventional
arms, human
rights, etc.
Second, the
Bush
administration’s
willingness to
coexist
peacefully with
North Korea was
in doubt for
various reasons,
but particularly
because many
inside and
outside the
administration
viewed the
comprehensive
policy
objectives as
unachievable
without “regime
change.” And
third, the Bush
administration
refused to
negotiate
bilaterally with
Pyongyang,
citing the
Agreed
Framework, which
was signed by
Washington and
Pyongyang in
1994 to
denuclearize
Korea, as the
type of bad
outcome
generated by
U.S.-North Korea
bilateralism.
The Bush policy
was admirable
because it
addressed more
U.S. concerns,
including human
rights, and
North Korea’s
illicit
activities, such
as smuggling and
counterfeiting.
Furthermore,
the
administration
emphasized that
North Korea’s
nuclear weapons
program
threatened not
only the United
States, but all
of East Asia.
Washington
eventually was
able to convince
Pyongyang to
join the
Six-Party Talks
and sign a Joint
Statement in
September 2005
that stipulated
North Korea’s
commitment to
abandon “all
nuclear programs
at an early
date.” The new
agreement was
“more for more”
compared to the
Agreed
Framework, and
it seemed to
make the six
parties – the
United States,
China, Japan,
North Korea,
South Korea, and
Russia – better
off.
However, the
problem with any
such complex
international
agreement is
that it contains
several steps or
transactions,
and the
international
system has no
third-party to
enforce
contracts.
Structurally,
this presents
two issues that
international
negotiators must
address: the
sequencing of
transactions,
and credible
commitment
problems. The
party to any
deal naturally
wants his
receivables
prior to
delivering his
responsibilities
under the
contract. But
with no
third-party
enforcer, how
can the second
party be sure
the first party
will not renege
on his
commitment to
deliver as
promised?
Anyone receiving
his benefits
first has a
strong incentive
to walk away.
To overcome
this problem,
the Agreed
Framework
contained a
number of small
transactions
that were
designed to
build trust
between the
United States
and North Korea
over time so
that
denuclearization
could be
achieved after a
period of at
least 10 years.
The Bush
approach to the
problem was to
form a coalition
and apply
pressure on
North Korea
until Pyongyang
capitulated and
abandoned its
nuclear
ambitions. Make
no mistake --
pressure is
necessary.
Unfortunately,
it is also not
sufficient for
any strategy
designed to
persuade North
Korea to
denuclearize.
The Bush
administration
has been very
successful in
applying
pressure on
North Korea, but
Pyongyang will
never give up
its nuclear
weapons
willingly
without a
face-saving exit
that includes
negative
security
assurances and
some package of
economic
incentives.
Fortunately, the
incentives (both
positive and
negative) now
appear to be
well structured
for the
denuclearization
of the Korean
peninsula. The
deal on the
table is good
for North Korea
and the other
five parties,
but the details
of sequencing
and credible
commitments
remain and must
be negotiated.
The Bush
administration
finally appears
to recognize the
structural
reality of
nuclear
diplomacy with
North Korea, and
we are now “back
to the future”
with an approach
that looks more
like the Perry
process than
anyone would
have expected
when the “second
North Korean
nuclear crisis”
emerged in
October 2002.
The future
denuclearization
process will not
be easy, even
though an
“action plan”
was announced on
February 13,
2007, to begin
practical steps
for North
Korea’s
denuclearization.
Six-party
diplomacy and
the complexity
of “more for
more” exacerbate
the problems of
sequencing and
credible
commitments.
Nevertheless,
U.S.
policymakers and
diplomats must
remain focused
because the cost
of failure is
very high. A
second Korean
War is
practically
unthinkable, so
the fallback
position for
failing to roll
back the nuclear
program will
likely be
containment and
deterrence.
However, this
outcome is also
practically
unthinkable
because it could
lead to the
unraveling of
the nuclear
nonproliferation
regime, the
transfer of
North Korean
nuclear
materials or
technologies to
other states or
terrorists, or
the use of North
Korean nuclear
weapons in a
future conflict.
--###--
Dr. Daniel A.
Pinkston is
the Director of
the East Asia
Nonproliferation
Program and a
Korea specialist
at the Center
for
Nonproliferation
Studies in
Monterey,
California. |
