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Four years into
the war in Iraq,
the insurgency,
the civil war
and ongoing U.S.
and coalition
casualties
remain a key
focus of
Administration
attention and a
dominant focus
in the media.
Until recently,
the Washington
policy debate
about what to do
in Iraq
–summarized by
U.S. military
planners as “go
big, go long, or
go home” – was
at center
stage. Despite
the discussion
on Capitol about
setting a
timeline, the
reality is that
large-scale
withdrawal of
U.S. troops from
Iraq is not
going to happen
anytime soon.
Indeed, with
U.S. forces
surging, Iraq
promises to
headline
Washington’s
Middle East
policy agenda
for some time to
come.
The intense
focus on Iraq is
understandable.
After all, the
future
disposition of
Iraq – whether
it is a stable
or chaotic,
democratic or
Islamist,
moderate or
militant state –
will have
significant
policy
implications for
Washington and
its regional
interests. Not
the least of
which is that a
defeat in Iraq
will undermine
U.S. credibility
in the region,
damaging the
position of our
allies in that
part of the
world.
But the
challenges in
the Middle East
for the Bush
Administration
go well beyond
whether the U.S.
can ultimately
bring stability
to a war-torn
Iraq. Indeed,
throughout the
Middle East,
Washington faces
several
confrontations
that could
profoundly
affect U.S.
interests in the
region and
around the
globe.
Topping this
list is the
Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT),
which according
to President
Bush, may take
“decades” to
win. In the
absence of Al
Qaida attacks on
U.S. soil, it
will prove
challenging –
not only for the
Bush
Administration,
but for other
Administrations
that follow – to
maintain popular
support for an
ongoing war in
which the
American public
has little sense
of imminent
threat.
Still other
Middle East
challenges for
Washington
revolve around
the struggle to
define regional
politics as
either pro-West,
with a moderate
democratic
outlook, or
pro-Iranian,
with a militant
Islamist agenda.
Ongoing
developments in
the Palestinian
Authority and
Lebanon are good
examples of the
struggle.
In the West Bank
and Gaza, the
Iranian-allied
Islamist Hamas
and the largely
secular and
ostensibly
moderate Fatah
PLO led by
Palestinian
President
Mahmoud Abbas
are engaged in a
power struggle.
Hamas won a
landslide
victory in the
January 2005
parliamentary
elections and is
now competing
with Fatah,
which signed the
Oslo Accords
with Israel, for
control of the
Palestinian
Authority.
While Fatah is
no panacea (Fatah
itself has
periodically
engaged in
terrorism to
wrest political
and territorial
concessions from
Israel) the
Administration
has nonetheless
backed Fatah
with money and
weapons
vis-à-vis Hamas,
and has led an
international
effort to
isolate the
Islamist
terrorist
organization.
Whether Fatah
will ultimately
emerge
victorious in
its fight with
Hamas remains an
open question.
At present, it
appears that
Hamas has the
upper hand.
Recently, the
groups agreed to
a power-sharing
arrangement and
have established
a “government of
national unity,”
blurring the
lines between
the
organizations
and their
policies. But
Hamas continues
to adhere to its
platform
advocating the
destruction of
Israel and will
not change its
stripes. In
this context,
the
Administration
is hoping –
perhaps ill-
advisedly – to
re-energize the
long-stalled
Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations.
Given the
dynamics on the
ground, the
challenge for
the
Administration
will be
strengthen its
nominal ally
Fatah, without
legitimating
Hamas and
without
compelling
Israel to make
further
territorial
concessions to a
Palestinian
Government that
at least in part
does not
recognize
Israel’s right
to exist.
Along similar
lines, the
Administration
also faces a
formidable
challenge in
Lebanon, where
the pro-West
democratically
elected
government of
Fouad Siniora
has found itself
under siege by
the
Iranian-Syrian
backed Shiite
militia/political
party Hizballah.
Even with the
Lebanese Armed
Forces behind
them, the
Siniora
government is
outgunned by
Hizballah, which
has come to
represent some
35% of the
Lebanese
electorate
(nearly the
entirety of
Lebanese Shiite
community)
through a potent
combination of
provision of
services, a
reputation for
being
non-corrupt, and
an unhealthy
degree of
intimidation.
Hizballah is
using its clout
to press for
more political
power, and to
protect its
Syrian patron
from being
implicated in
the United
Nations
investigation
into the 2005
assassination of
former Lebanese
Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri.
To strengthen
the legitimate
Lebanese
government
against the
Iranian-backed
Hizballah
onslaught, over
the past two
years the
Administration
has pledged
nearly $1
billion in
economic and
military
assistance.
Beyond financial
support, the
U.S. has done
yeoman work in
advocating and
pushing through
several key U.N.
Security Council
Resolutions in
support of the
government. But
more needs to be
done to protect
the one
democratic
success story in
the region.
The Siniora
government has
proven quite
resilient, but
Iran and its
proxies remain
committed to
rolling back the
U.S. allies in
Beirut. In this
regard,
Hizballah might
find it
expedient to
attack the U.N.
peacekeepers in
the South in a
gambit to chase
them out of
Lebanon and
denude the
government of
some of its
international
backing. The
departure of
U.N. forces
would leave
Beirut and
Washington in a
difficult
position.
Of course, much
of what happens
in Lebanon is
dependent on
developments in
Syria. The
Iran-backed Asad
regime in
Damascus
continues to
pursue its
unhelpful
policies of
supporting the
insurgency and
destabilizing
Iraq, supporting
Hizballah and
destabilizing
Lebanon, and
supporting Hamas
and
destabilizing
the Palestinian
Authority, all
the while
repressing the
Syrian people.
Over the past
seven years, in
an effort to
encourage a
change in Syrian
behavior, the
Bush
Administration
alternately
engaged with,
and then led an
international
effort to,
isolate
Damascus.
Unfortunately,
it was to no
avail. Given
the precedent
and the nature
of the Asad
regime, future
attempts at
engagement –
although
recommended by
the Iraq Study
Group – are also
unlikely to
succeed.
Fortunately, the
U.N.
investigation
into the Hariri
assassination
may prove a
moment of
opportunity.
Should top
Syrian officials
be indicted by
an international
criminal court,
Damascus may
look for a deal
ala Libya to
preserve the
Asad regime.
Regardless of
what happens,
the result would
be a
dramatically
weakened Asad
regime
presumably with
less ability to
undermine U.S.
policy goals in
the region. For
Washington,
though, perhaps
the most import
implication of a
diminished
Damascus would
be the
detrimental
effect of this
development on
Syria’s
strategic ally,
Iran.
In defiance of
the
international
community, Iran
– the leading
state sponsor of
terrorism – is
currently making
progress toward
building a
nuclear weapon.
Should Iran
succeed, it
would endanger
the U.S.,
Israel, and
Europe, as well
as moderate
Sunni Arab
states, and
likely spark a
nuclear arms
race in the
Middle East. At
present, the
Administration
is working
through the U.N.
to foster
consensus to
levy economic
sanctions and
raise the price
for Iranian
intransigence.
In the coming
years, the
challenge for
Washington will
be to maintain a
diverse
international
coalition in
opposition to an
Iranian nuclear
weapon. In the
worst case
scenario, this
same coalition
may be called
upon to consider
other measures,
including
military action,
to prevent
Tehran from
acquiring the
bomb.
From Beirut to
Tehran to
Baghdad,
Washington is
facing a broad
range of
challenges. The
Bush
Administration
has tried to
address these
challenges
through military
means, as well
as through
democracy
promotion and
reform – an
effort that to
date has had
mixed results at
best. In the
coming years,
the
Administration
and its
successor will
have to contend
with these
issues.
Complicating
matters is the
fact that
Washington’s
regional allies
are not only
largely weak and
indecisive, but
also sometimes
play both
sides.
Admittedly, it
is a full
agenda. But the
stakes are
high.
Fortunately,
Washington has
demonstrated an
appreciation
that these
problems will
not age well and
require a real
sense of urgency
to resolve.
--###--
David Schenker
is a senior
fellow at the
Washington
Institute for
Near East
Policy. From
2002 to 2006, he
was the Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan,
and
Palestinianaffairs
adviser in the
Office of the
Secretary of
Defense. |
