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Author
and Professor
Theodore Lowi is
widely credited
with being the
“father” of
federal Sunset
laws, having
first suggested
a “Tenure of
Statutes” act in
his 1969 book,
“The End of
Liberalism.” In
recognition of
his role in
originating the
idea,
The Ripon Forum contacted Professor Lowi with a request that
he write an
essay discussing
the genesis
behind it. We
expected a
discourse on the
need to make
government
smaller and
smarter. What
we received
instead was a
discussion that
revealed his
original intent
had less to do
with government
efficiency than
how our laws are
made. Professor
Lowi’s letter is
below:
Thank you for
the opportunity
to set the
record straight
on my proposal
for a "tenure of
statutes" act.
It received a
good bit of
attention in the
1970s, due
particularly to
Common Cause, a
prominent
reformist
group. They
improved on it
and, innocently,
stole the idea
from me by
giving it a new
and more
quotable name:
"Sunset
legislation."
What's in a
name? Damn near
everything. I
lost control of
it, but took
solace from
Henry Adams, who
observed, in his
“Education of
Henry Adams,”
that you haven't
arrived as an
author until
you've been
stolen from. I
did occasionally
receive some
praise and more
criticism,
mainly from
reformers of
state
legislation.
I
improved on it
in the second
edition of “The
End of
Liberalism” in
1979, and in
fact adopted the
"Sunset" label
with a footnote
of explanation
as an essential
part of my
appeal for
"juridical
democracy" as
ammunition for
my chosen enemy:
"interest-group
liberalism."
Thanks to Common
Cause, Sunset
got a lot more
attention, but,
alas, with
almost nothing
of me in it.
However, my
frustration was
not in the loss
of my
intellectual
property. The
frustration was
that the idea
lost substance
as it became
popular. The
reformers
concentrated on
efficiency and
short life – or,
as the
Ripon Forum
put it, to make
government
smarter and
smaller. My
purpose was not
at all to reduce
the government,
but to make each
law real
law –
juridically
sound law, laws
with legal
integrity.
Today we see it
all over again,
on a larger
scale, with the
last of the Bush
administration
and the
beginning of the
Obama
administration.
First, President
Bush and the
Democratic
Congress granted
the Secretary of
the Treasury
$800 billion for
"bailouts," as
he saw fit.
Then, President
Obama and the
Democratic
Congress
followed suit,
with requests
for still more
money on top of
the $800 billion
and with no
stipulation, no
legislative
guidelines –
nothing but the
designation of
the Vice
President as the
overseer,
coupled with the
President's
assurance that,
"No one messes
around with Joe
Biden!"
How's that for a
government of
laws? These
guys aren't
socialists.
They're
interest-group
liberals.
Unfortunately,
interest-group
liberalism
thrives on bad
legislative
drafting. My
antidote, then
and now, has
been revision by
codification and
clarification,
guided by the
wisdom of the 10
years of usage
that revision is
forced upon the
agency as its
statute
confronts its
demise.
Interest-group
liberalism,
however, always
wins because it
has so many
soldiers in the
fight. The
biggest enemies
of good
legislation are
the law school
professors, the
rational choice
philosophers,
the relevant
interest groups,
the recent
presidents, and
the appellate
courts. Law
school
professors and
rational
“choicers”
thrive on
"dispute
resolution," out
of court and out
of sight.
In fact, bad
legislation has
created a whole
new subdivision
of law schools,
with a
highfalutin
name:
statutory
interpretation.
Interest groups
thrive on bad
legislation
because
bargaining
always favors
well-heeled,
well-organized,
highly
specialized
interests.
Presidents also
prefer bad laws;
they see broad
delegation
(without need of
signing
statements) as
the source of
"presidential
power," when in
fact it is the
source of mass
expectations,
making every
president a
failure. (I
wrote a whole
book about this
in 1985 called,
“The Personal
President –
Power Invested,
Promise
Unfulfilled.”)
And appellate
courts accept
bad legislation
because they
need a
constitutional
source if they
intend to veto a
statute when in
fact (following
Schechter
and Panama)
all a court
needs is to say
that the
legislation is
impossible to
implement
because Congress
gave the
Executive no
guidelines.
In
sum, I remain a
frustrated
reformer. But
I'm not a
pessimist. I'm
a disappointed
optimist.
--###--
Theodore Lowi is
the John L.
Senior Professor
of American
Institutions at
Cornell
University. He
is the author or
co-author of 18
books.
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