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Vice President
Richard Cheney
caused a real
stir in Vilnius
in May when he
delivered a
major speech on
the former
communist
world.
In blunt
language typical
for the Vice
President, he
stated, “in
Russia today,
opponents of
reform are
seeking to
reverse the
gains of the
last decade. In
many areas of
civil society –
from religion
and the news
media, to
advocacy groups
and political
parties – the
government has
unfairly and
improperly
restricted the
rights of the
people. Other
actions by the
Russian
government have
been
counterproductive,
and could begin
to affect
relations with
other countries.
No legitimate
interest is
served when oil
and gas become
tools of
intimidation or
blackmail,
either by supply
manipulation or
attempts to
monopolize
transportation.
And no one can
justify actions
that undermine
the territorial
integrity of a
neighbor, or
interfere with
democratic
movements.”
Russian
President
Vladimir Putin
and his
supporters were
“outraged.” A
Kremlin
spokesperson
denounced the
speech as
“inconceivable”
and “subjective”
in its
interpretations
of Russian
internal
affairs. Others
in Moscow, as
well as some in
the West, called
the speech a
return to the
Cold War. One
Moscow headline
suggested that
U.S.-Russian
relations were
at their lowest
level in the
last 20 years.
Cheney’s speech
and the reaction
to it in Moscow
do not mark a
restart of the
Cold War, but
U.S.-Russia
relations are
changing from
the dynamics
that shaped them
for the past two
decades.
Understanding
the difference
between the two
– that is,
between a return
to the Cold War
and a
recognition that
the bilateral
relationship has
changed
fundamentally
since the more
optimistic
period of the
1990s – will be
crucial to
developing a
realistic
relationship
between Russia
and the United
States in the
coming years.
First, let’s be
clear: the
current
interaction
between the
United States
and Russia looks
nothing like the
Cold War. The
Cold War, after
all, was a
battle between
two global
superpowers
espousing two
antithetical
ideologies.
Millions of
people --
Russians,
Americans,
Ukrainians,
Koreans,
Hungarians,
Vietnamese,
Czechoslovaks,
Angolans,
Afghans, and
many others –
lost their lives
in this
so-called “cold”
war, while the
Soviet Union and
the United
States
threatened each
other with
nuclear
annihilation as
a strategy to
keep the peace.
This situation
is not
returning.
Those who invoke
the Cold War as
a historical
analogy for
today’s tensions
either are
ignorant of what
really happened
during the Cold
War or are
nostalgic for an
era when Russia
was considered a
superpower.
Russia today
does not posses
the military or
economic
capacity to be a
second
superpower again
(and the idea of
an “energy
superpower” is a
bizarre one,
since every
other major
exporter of raw
materials in
history was on
the periphery of
the world
economy, not in
its core). Nor,
despite all the
recent worry
about Russia’s
efforts to stop
“colored”
revolutions,
does the Kremlin
have a model of
governance or
ideology that is
in demand
abroad. For
American
strategic
thinkers,
therefore, other
rising powers
such as China,
other ideologies
such as Osama
bin Ladenism,
and other
foreign policy
concerns such as
Iraq, occupy
their attention,
leaving little
time to think
about rekindling
an antagonistic
relationship
with Russia.
Those who worry
about a return
to the Cold War
have an inflated
sense of
Russia’s
importance to
American foreign
policy. What
Cheney’s speech
does signal is
that the Bush
administration
is scaling back
its expectations
about Russia as
a strategic
partner for the
simple fact that
the United
States
traditionally
has more
strained and
limited
relationships
with autocracies
than it does
with
democracies. It
is this
relationship
between Russian
internal
developments and
American
foreign policy
that must be
understood.
Since the latter
part of the
1980s, Western
leaders,
including
presidents
George H.W.
Bush, Bill
Clinton, and
George W. Bush,
believed that
first the Soviet
Union and then
Russia was “in
transit” from
communism to
democracy. To
help this
process of
democratization
move forward,
Western leaders
believed that
Russia should be
integrated into
Western
institutions.
Soviet leader
Mikhail
Gorbachev and
Russian
president Boris
Yeltsin believed
that they were
pushing their
countries
towards
democracy
internally and
towards
integration with
the West
externally.
Putin, however,
has reversed
these trends.
He obviously is
not seeking to
deepen
democracy. Nor,
however, is
Putin pushing
for integration
in the West, in
part because of
frustration with
the limited
results of this
foreign policy
and in part
because Putin
now believes
that a revived,
more powerful
Russia today
does not need
membership into
Western clubs to
be a great and
“sovereign”
international
player. It took
Washington some
time to
recognize
Putin’s agenda
at home and the
end of the
integration
project in
foreign
relations. Now
understood, it
is only natural
that relations
should be based
on a different
set of
expectations.
The United
States can do
business with
autocratic
regimes. Since
the creation of
the United
States, American
leaders have
cooperated with
autocracies,
such as the
French monarchy
during the
American War of
Independence,
when it was
considered to be
in the national
interest. But
this cooperation
always comes
with some
unease.
Relations with
democracies are
always deeper
and more
enduring. As
Russia has
become more
autocratic, the
strains in
bilateral
relations were
therefore
predictable if
not inevitable.
These strains do
not represent a
return to the
Cold War.
Rather, they
represent a
return to how
the United
States has
traditionally,
awkwardly, and
often
hypocritically
dealt with
autocracies of
strategic
importance
throughout
American history
– from Stalin’s
Soviet Union to
Pakistan today.
American hopes
about warmer
relations in the
1990s were
either a
consequence of
a more
democratic
regime inside
Russia or a
misunderstanding
of that regime’s
autocratic
nature. But
whether it is
perception or
reality that has
changed, the
result is the
same—more
friction.
Without
question, Bush
and his
successor should
continue to work
with their
Russian
counterparts on
issues of
national and
mutual interest,
be it
nonproliferation,
the expansion of
energy supplies,
or the fight
against
terrorism. No
one sensible in
Washington
either inside or
outside of the
government is
calling for a
return to
containment.
But as long as
Russia remains
an autocracy,
there will be
limits to
cooperation just
as there always
has been in
American foreign
policy, well
before and after
the Cold War.
If the
trajectory
inside Russia
does change in
the future, then
Washington and
the rest of the
West must be
ready to
reengage more
robustly in a
strategy for
integrating
Russia into the
Western world,
including
seemingly
radical ideas
such as Russian
membership in
NATO and the
European
Union. Such
ideas can only
be entertained
after Russia
recommits to
building a
liberal
democracy and a
genuine market
economy. When
change does
occur, these
ideas must be
considered
seriously, with
real interim
benchmarks for
maintaining the
integration
trajectory and
realistic
timetables that
will have to
stretch decades
long.
The first
attempt to
reintegrate
Russia after
communism
failed. The
second chance,
whenever it
comes, cannot
result in
failure again.
RF
Michael
McFaul is a
senior fellow at
the Hoover
Institution, an
associate
professor of
political
science at
Stanford
University and a
Senior Associate
at the Carnegie
Endowment for
International
Peace. |
