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Neat lines on an
organizational
chart don’t
always reflect
untidy, but
undeniable,
operational
realities. Or,
as military
strategists put
it: most plans
do not survive
first contact
with reality.
The plan to
subsume the
Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency (FEMA)
into the
Department of
Homeland
Security (DHS)
made hard
contact with the
reality of
Hurricane
Katrina last
year, and the
plan clearly
failed.
That failure
compels us to
confront the
question: What
caused FEMA’s
inability to
marshal federal
resources
effectively in
support of state
and local
responders
struggling to
overcome
catastrophic
losses? Was it
simply
“deliberately
uncooperative
senior
leadership” at
FEMA that
hobbled the
federal
response, as DHS
Secretary
Chertoff
asserted? Or was
FEMA undone, not
by the
undisciplined
actions of a
few, but by the
deliberate
machinations of
many at DHS
following the
inevitable
dynamics of a
flawed
structure?
Exhaustive
investigations
by the House
Select Committee
on Katrina,
which I chaired,
by the Senate,
and by the White
House all found
FEMA suffered
profound
problems in
planning,
personnel,
logistics,
communications
and other
areas. Critical
failures in
these essential
mission
functions lead
many, including
former FEMA
Director James
Lee Witt, to
conclude only
structural
changes would
restore the
agency’s
capabilities and
effectiveness.
Cosmetic or
merely marginal
adjustments to
the status quo
will not fix the
root causes of
FEMA’s
dysfunction.
Renaming it,
adding critical
infrastructure
protection to
its mission
portfolio and
burying
essential
disaster
management
functions deeper
within DHS, as
proposed by
some, would only
compound the
original error
of merging FEMA
into the new
Homeland
Security
Department.
It’s no shame to
admit a mistake.
It would be a
tragedy if we
failed to
correct that
mistake because
neither DHS nor
the
congressional
homeland
security
committees could
see beyond
parochial turf
interests to the
obvious, proven
solution: an
independent FEMA.
There’s a reason
fire departments
have not been
merged into city
or county
transportation
or public works
departments.
While it might
look good on
paper, and even
offer the
promise of
efficiencies and
synergies,
highly
speculative
benefits just do
not outweigh the
very real risks
that essential
resources and
capabilities
will be siphoned
off by the
larger
enterprise.
That’s what
happened to FEMA.
Crammed into a
sprawling and
conflicted
mission
portfolio at
DHS, the
national
emergency
response tools
fell out of
favor as other,
trendier
priorities drew
funding and
leadership
focus. According
to FEMA
veterans, the
agency was
steadily bled to
anemic
incapacity by
its many new
siblings in a
parent
organization
focused on
terrorism to the
detriment of the
broader
emergency
management
mission.
National
all-hazard
preparation and
response
capabilities
constitute a
discrete and
perishable asset
that has to
stand alone to
thrive. FEMA was
founded on the
principle that
all federal
efforts to
prepare for,
respond to,
recover from and
mitigate against
the impacts of
major civil
emergencies
should be housed
together and
supervised by
just one
official
responsible
directly to the
President. We
should go back
to that basic
configuration
that enabled
FEMA to
succeed.
Conceding the
inherent
conflict between
the terrorism
prevention
mandate and the
all-hazard
response
mission, the
Senate recently
proposed to
create “an
independent FEMA
within DHS.”
It’s a telling
admission that
the nation’s
emergency
response
function must be
stand-alone. But
they would only
“fence off ” the
agency, arguing
similar
protections have
kept the Coast
Guard intact.
The analogy is
inapt. The Coast
Guard has a well
established
identity,
reinforced by
its parallel
military roles.
FEMA can’t sail
away or shoot
back. To thrive,
FEMA needs to be
beyond the
potentially
eviscerating
reach of an
inconstant
landlord
distracted by
the ever
changing shape
of the terrorism
threat. Any
so-called fence
separating FEMA
from DHS should
be statutory
cement, not the
flimsy fabric of
a cubicle
divider within
the DHS maze.
That barrier was
breached once
before, to our
national
detriment, and
we should make
sure the
temptation to
bury or neglect
FEMA will not be
an option going
forward.
Arguments about
how hard it
would be for DHS
and an
independent FEMA
to function
together are
based on worst
cases and straw
men. No on is
proposing to
send FEMA off
shore or into
space.
Independent,
cabinet level
status would
simply give FEMA
the stature and
tools essential
to its core task
to coordinate
all federal
response assets.
Coordination
with DHS
elements would
be close and
constant, just
as HHS and DOD
coordinate with
DHS now. If
everything
necessary to
meet the threat
of large scale
disasters has to
be inside DHS to
work, large
pieces of those
departments
would need to go
there too. DHS
is big enough.
It took Katrina
to get DHS to
pay attention to
FEMA. Until the
next large scale
natural
disaster, DHS
will inevitably
get distracted
again trying to
address myriad,
pressing
vulnerabilities
to terrorism.
Prevention ought
to be their full
time job. Leave
the response to
the emergency
management
professionals
who, in an
independent FEMA,
will be ready to
answer the call.
RF
Tom Davis
represents the
11th District of
Virginia in the
U.S. House of
Representatives.
He is the
Chairman of the
House Committee
on Government
Reform. |
