


Daniel J. Elazar: The Dilemmas of Revenue Sharing

**RIPON
FORUM**

MAY, 1972

Vol. VIII No. 9

ONE DOLLAR



Why Nixon Still Can Lose

Articles by Josiah Lee Auspitz and George F. Gilder

LETTERS

Ratings Errata

Please refer to the Ripon FORUM dated March 15, 1972, which shows a listing of Congressional ratings.

You have either confused my voting record with William Steiger of Wisconsin or manufactured one for reproduction purposes.

I deeply resent the high rating which you have attributed to me as it is quite inaccurate. This certainly is one of the greatest blows to my political career.

In the future, I would appreciate receiving a more accurate rating.

Rep. SAM STEIGER,
(R. Ariz.)

EDITORS NOTE: Rep. Steiger is correct in supposing that his high Ripon rating was a typographical error. In fact, Steiger rated 44 percent (8/18), well ahead of most Southern Democrats but low for a Republican. He was 12 percentage points below minority leader Gerald Ford, 12 below fellow Arizonan John Rhodes, new GOP platform chairman, and 27 below Conference Chairman John Anderson. He was also 44 percentage points below Rep. William Steiger of Wisconsin (15/17, 88%), who erroneously received the Arizonan's rating, and 27 percentage points below Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut (12/17, 71%), who erroneously received William Steiger's rating. We apologize to the two Steigers and to Rep. Steele.

In another error, Senate vote #284 was not listed in the key:

284. The bill to authorize fiscal 1972 appropriations for the foreign assistance programs. (Vote yea)

Busing Issue

As a long-time Ripon member and FORUM reader, I have been both pleased and dismayed by certain positions taken by the Society on various national issues and by the quality of the research on which such positions have been based.

The April issue of the FORUM, in my mind, must rank with the best the Ripon Society has produced. The busing issue (or non-issue) has been examined forthrightly, alternatives evaluated on their merits, and a politically and morally responsible position outlined. I hope it receives the wide attention, particularly among Republican officeholders, it deserves.

I might add that if the Nashville Chapter's paper is representative of the research being produced by new Ripon groups throughout the country, the future of the Society (and of responsible Republicanism) is bright indeed.

WILLIAM J. MCKINNEY, JR.
State College, Pa.

- continued on page 25

CONTENTS

Ripon Suit	3
Editorial Notes	3
Toward a GOP Governing Strategy Josiah Lee Auspitz	6
Jefferson and the GOP John McClaughry	14
Republicans and Youth Linda Hannaway	15
Ripon Poll	18
The Dilemmas of Revenue Sharing Daniel J. Elazar	20
14a Elliot St.	27
Not in my Neighborhood Howard L. Reiter	28

THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in thirteen cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of subchapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor \$25 or more; Sustainer \$100 or more; Founder \$1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

NATIONAL GOVERNING BOARD

Officers

- *Howard F. Gillette, Jr., President
- *Paul F. Anderson, Chairman of the Board
- *Patricia A. Goldman, Chairman of the Executive Committee
- *Howard L. Reiter, Vice President
- *Edward W. Miller, Treasurer
- *Ron Speed, Secretary

Boston

- *Martha Reardon
- *Martin A. Linsky
- *Michael W. Christian

Cambridge

- *Joel P. Greene
- *Bob Stewart

Chicago

- *Bruce D. Fraser
- *Gene L. Armstrong
- *Jared Kaplan

Detroit

- *Dennis Gibson
- *Stephen Selander
- *Mary E. Low

Hartford

- *Nicholas Norton
- *Stewart H. McConaughy
- *Ralph Loomis

Los Angeles

- *Michael Halliwell
- *Thomas A. Brown
- *Edward McAniff

Minneapolis

- *John Cairns
- *Kati Sasseville

Nashville

- *Robert H. Donaldson
- *Jerry H. Smith
- *Cary Miller

New Haven

- *Peter V. Baugher
- *Hayward L. Draper
- *Deke Karzon

New Jersey

- *Richard Zimmer
- *Nancy Miller
- *Al Felzenberg

New York

- *Werner Kuhn
- *Richard Rahn
- *Richard Scamlan

Philadelphia

- *Robert J. Moss
- *William Horton
- *Ken Kaiserman

Ex-Officio At Large

- *Robert D. Behn, National Executive Director
- *George Gilder, Editor of the Ripon FORUM
- *Daniel J. Swilling, National Political Director
- *Richard E. Beeman, Policy Chairman
- *Peter J. Wallison, Finance Chairman
- *Robert Gulick, Counsel
- *Clair W. Rodgers, Jr., Counsel
- *National Executive Committee Member
- *Past President, Chairman of the Board, or Chairman of the Executive Committee

THE RIPON FORUM is published semi-monthly by the Ripon Society, Inc., 14a Elliot Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Second class postage rates paid at Boston, Massachusetts. Contents are copyrighted © 1972 by the Ripon Society, Inc. Correspondence to the Editor is welcomed.

In publishing this magazine the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for a spirit of criticism, innovation, and independent thinking within the Republican Party. Articles do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Ripon Society, unless they are explicitly so labeled.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES are \$10 a year, \$5 for students, servicemen, and for Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteers. Overseas air mail, \$10 extra. Advertising rates on request. \$10 of any contribution to the Ripon Society is credited for a subscription to the Ripon FORUM.

Editor: George Gilder

Contributing Editors: Clifford Brown, Glenn Gerstell, Howard Reiter.

Washington Correspondent: Linda Hannaway

Circulation Dept.: Judith H. Behn.

Editorial Assistant: Priscilla Sapienza.

Art: Leslie Morrill, David Omar White.

Correspondents

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Stephanie Mc Conaughy, Conn. | Deryl Howard, North Carolina |
| Mrs. Barbara Mooney, Conn. | William K. Woods, Ohio |
| Mike Halliwell, California | Stephen Jones, Oklahoma |
| James F. McCollum, Jr., Florida | Eric R. Blackledge, Oregon |
| Michael McCrery, Idaho | Richard Ober, Jr., Pennsylvania |
| Ben Violette, Illinois | Donato Andre D'Andrea, R. I. |
| J. Kenneth Doka, Indiana | Bruce M. Selya, Rhode Island |
| C.R. Connell, Iowa | Harris Beach, Jr., So. Carolina |
| Eric Karnes, Kentucky | Stanford M. Adelman, S. D. |
| James Harrington, Maine | Patrick W. Dunn, Vermont |
| Julia M. Renner, Michigan | W. Stuart Parsons, Wisconsin |
| William Harding, Nebraska | Fred O'Brien, West Virginia |
| Al Felzenberg, New Jersey | Robert R. Murdoch, Virginia |
| Charles O. Ingraham, New York | Linda Hannaway, Wash., D.C. |
| | Ken Nikolai, Wisconsin |

Ripon Wins Suit on Delegate Formula

The delegate allocation formula for the Republican National Convention has been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. District Court in Washington.

In an April 28 decision on a suit brought last November 8 by the Ripon Society and nine individual plaintiffs, the court struck down the bonus delegate portion of the formula as in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

The court enjoined the Republican Party "from adopting at the 1972 convention a formula for apportionment of delegates to the 1976 convention which would allocate a uniform number of bonus delegates to qualifying states, with no relation to the state's electoral college votes, Republican votes cast, or some combination of these factors."

The decision does not directly affect the validity of the 1972 convention, since the suit was aimed at the formula to be adopted for 1976.

The part of the formula declared unconstitutional gave each state won by the Republican candidate or candidates for President, governor, senator or a majority of the U.S. House seats, six bonus delegates, without regard to the population or Republican voting strength in the state.

The court pointed out that as a result of the bonus system, both Alaska and California received six additional delegates for being carried for the President — thus doubling Alaska's delegation but only increasing California's by 6.7 percent.

The present system would allot only 37 percent of the 1972 delegates to the eight most populous states, which have 48 percent of the population, and cast 52 percent of Nixon's vote in 1968.

In its opinion, the court said, "The present bonus system rewards states which have *in the past* consistently produced Republican victories by giving them greater influence in nominating candidates and determining party policy at the national convention. The present bonus system, however, does not provide a corresponding incentive to the larger states to produce consistent Republican victories, despite the proportionately greater number of electoral college votes and elective offices that such victories would bring within the Republican camp."

The court went on to say that a bonus system based on the electoral college vote, or Republican votes, or some combination of these factors, "would have greater rationality both in terms of the decisions of the courts . . . and the very policies which defendants [the Republican Party] wish to promote by awarding bonus delegates."

"We have felt we were right on this issue, and we are very pleased with the court's decision," Ripon President Howard Gillette Jr. said. "This is really a victory for the concept of an open party, a party which is responsive to its constituency."

"I am confident that the Rules Committee of the National Committee will develop, and the Convention Rules Committee and the Convention itself will adopt, a constitutional formula consistent with Judge Jones' opinion. Ripon stands ready to assist in any way it can."

The Republican Party has thirty days from April 28 to file a notice of appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. It is not known at this time whether an appeal will be filed.

— DANIEL J. SWILLINGER

EDITORIAL POINTS

THE PHANTOM PUBLIC

This is the season — mid-election year — of spring fever. Mature people, even ostensible "experts" on politics, display an eager credulity most akin to adolescent love. The faith is directed toward what Walter Lippmann in 1918 called the "phantom public." *Time*, for example, sets up a "citizens" panel, demographically proportionate by sex, race, profession, and age to the national pattern, and consults it on complicated political issues. Political candidates, from the President on down, dispatch pollsters across the land to determine what to say — or do — on subjects

as momentous as Vietnam bombing policy. Newspapers perform their own oracular devotions and reprint those of Gallup and Harris. Television stations ambush construction workers with microphones and questions about inflation. And since this process is cyclical — one gets out what one puts in — the best historical antecedent is the haruspex, who in Roman times predicted the future by examining the entrails of the pigeons that hung around the forum (the ancient analog of the TV).

Most observers, of course, sense there is something wrong with this polling process. But they also

imagine that it is somehow democratic. They believe that the views of an arithmetic majority of the people on a specific issue — busing, Vietnam or wage price controls, for example — are a crucial datum of the political process. So men like George Gallup and Daniel Yankelovich become household names as they consult the households; intelligent pundits speculate solemnly about the attitudes of “Archie Bunker;” and important politicians like Senator Muskie, averse to sounding stupid, wring their hands and don’t know *what* to say.


Progressive Republicans, on the other hand, tend to take a different stance. They maintain that unless the President assumes politically responsible and intellectually coherent approaches, he will further erode the Republican minority and bring electoral disaster. The implication of our advice is that what “Archie Bunker” thinks is almost irrelevant politically; that to orient one’s appeals chiefly toward ignorant voters is to focus on precisely the least influential segment of the electorate. We might further suggest that public opinion polls on complex issues are in general worth their weight in pigeon entrails.

Our electoral spring fever — our trust — tends to go elsewhere. We predict disaster unless the party appeals — in a spirit of elevated statesmanship — to people like ourselves. Some of us have been writing these things for more than a decade; and although we have almost always been right, we have become neither rich nor President, and are at an admitted disadvantage in competing with those who have.

By contrast, our most influential competitors for the attention of the powerful do not usually advocate appeals that they themselves would respect. As sophisticated political observers they could immediately see through the approaches they recommend. But they maintain that the *people*, the *other* people, are not so smart; and though it might be nice to wage a campaign full of high-minded programs and elegantly sophisticated political rhetoric, what the public wants is a series of platitudinous affirmations of prejudice. Republican political advisers tend to smile cynically at Ripon style analyses and recommend Southern strategies, backlash appeals, social issue bluster and other approaches we might condemn as demagogic.

Psephological Phantoms

In defending their positions, Nixon political advisers continually cite public opinion polls. The polls indicate that increasing numbers of Americans identify themselves as conservative. On the racial issue, canvassers find large majorities who regard black progress as too rapid, disparage black claims of discrimination, and oppose “busing” and “forced integration.” Public opinion also massively condemns student demonstrations and gives the benefit of the doubt to policemen in every confrontation with radicals, black or



white. Crime is feared everywhere and the courts are widely regarded to be excessively lenient with criminals. The Vietnam war is seen as a mistake and early withdrawal is demanded. But majorities oppose early departure if it would immediately relinquish South Vietnam to the Communists. 45 percent of the people were willing to “risk nuclear war” in the Pueblo crisis. Large majorities distrust the media.

Overall, moreover, huge majorities reveal themselves as uninformed about most public issues. Not only are there large “don’t know” categories in response to most poll inquiries; it also turns out that most Americans have scarcely heard of many high level politicians and only a small minority can identify their Congressmen.

Nixon’s strategists thus can find support in public opinion polls for their belief that the electorate is generally ignorant, impressionable, and instinctively “conservative” and that a silent majority agrees with almost every one of the Administration’s motifs — almost every one of Spiro Agnew’s speeches. With such evidence at hand, sophisticated Nixon aides like Henry Kissinger and Raymond Price and reportorial observers like Stewart Alsop find it easy to persuade themselves that only the President stands between the Constitution and a savage right wing revulsion in which our civil rights and liberties would be dissolved. In fact, the polls seem to suggest that the President would be more popular if he were more demagogic

in playing to the national prejudices against militant blacks, student demonstrators, hippy draft dodgers, permissive judges and "liberal" commentators. The President, that is, would be more popular if he were more like Agnew or Wallace.

We know that this assumption is preposterous, that in fact Agnew's mere presence on the ticket will be an almost insuperable burden for the President and other 1972 candidates. It is not simply that there are other polls which afford a more "liberal" view of public opinion. It is that public opinion as usually presented by the polls is politically irrelevant. The opinions of voters are not equal and any tabulation that treats opinions as units will not be just marginally wrong. It will project a fantasy world that will betray any politician who enters it. Most are wise enough not to.

A few obvious points: Only a small minority, of knowledgeable voters, has resolute or durable positions on most public issues. This vital minority changes from issue to issue; but only in the most extraordinary circumstances does a majority have a meaningful public opinion. Most poll results on matters of any complexity thus are meaningless. On most issues politicians would do as well consulting an astrologer as consulting Dr. Gallup. Every time a politician affronts a knowledgeable and resolute minority opinion in order to pursue one of the pollsters' psephological figments, he suffers a setback in the real arena of effective public opinion. Yet the Nixon Administration has eagerly and repeatedly exchanged the real currency of Presidential credibility and prestige among informed and articulate minorities for the ephemeral tokens of impressionable majority approval.

Hence, Nixon might regard his intervention in the Calley case as a great public opinion coup. It was approved by 80 percent of the voters and his popularity jumped in the surveys. In the arena of real public opinion, however, it was probably a disaster because following the Carswell appointment and the declaration of Charles Manson's guilt, the President's action extended a pattern of disregard for legal proprieties that has offended one of the nation's most influential and articulate minorities: the legal profession. Similarly on busing and the media, by groping for the Gallup phantoms, the President estranges the influential minority of professional and community leaders who appreciate the complexities.

The delusion of the phantom majority is nowhere so vividly displayed as in regard to Vietnam. For years huge majorities supported the war; in justifying opposition, the peace movement was always erroneous in emphasizing U.S. public opinion polls rather than the real futilities of the conflict. Yet when the segments of U.S. public opinion most knowledge-

able about the war turned against it, Lyndon Johnson's Presidency became untenable despite the continued support of Gallup majorities for U.S. war aims as defined by the President.


Now President Nixon is said to take great solace in polls that show wide approval of his bombing policy. White House sources indicate to the press that such data were influential in shaping the President's televised defense of his actions. But these majorities are of little consequence in an election in which the electorate is mobilized by both sides and the decision is determined in large part by the atmosphere created by opinion leaders in every community.

The ultimate irony of the style of politics that might be called Gallup groping is that it leads the President to orient his television speeches to precisely those voters who tend to switch to another channel when he begins to speak. These voters will be governed in their electoral choices in large degree by the attitudes of those whom they respect in their unions, churches, businesses, schools or social circles. Their public opinions will not be determined in a direct, vertical relationship with the President; their views will be *mediated* — in the broadest sense of the term — by the institutions of American society that lend stability to our democratic processes. The President may think he can communicate with these voters directly, *immediately*, and the polls will give him the illusion that he is succeeding. But as Barry Goldwater discovered in 1964 before he was driven to launch attacks on all the mediating institutions of our democracy, from the businesses and unions to the churches, the majority of voters ultimately listens to others — to people who will influence them more deeply than the flickering images which they may not even bother to watch on the television screen.

A final problem of the President's quest for transitory majorities is that by continually gauging his appeals to what the polls suggest is the lowest common denominator of public sentiment, Nixon also reduces the Presidency to lowest terms. He thus degrades what is his greatest potential asset: the dignity and prestige of his office. And because most people can sense that the President is a sophisticated man who cannot really believe in his own crude formulations, he damages his credibility as well.

This problem of public opinion is one of the key reasons the President still can lose the coming election unless he adopts a progressive Republican strategy and unless he resolves the kind of substantive problems that Lee Auspitz describes in the following article. It happens to be true that the best strategy for the President to follow is to appeal to the intelligent center — if you wish, to people like us.

GEORGE F. GILDER



Toward a Republican Governing Strategy

by Josiah Lee Auspitz

There is a cheerful view of public administration that glories in the untidiness of governmental processes; it holds that beneath the seeming disorder, the lack of plan and system, there are reasonable men making small adjustments to each other's actions so that the whole activity can move forward in an integrated, purposeful way. But beneath the seeming order of the Nixon Administration, beneath its clear strategies and well-defined purposes has been a fundamentally schizoid character for which there is no self-correcting mechanism, no invisible hand, until at the last moment the President wrenches himself loose from the competing designs of his aides, retires to the contemplation of his yellow pad, and then intervenes. His tenacity and resourcefulness make this mode of operation possible. But its personal cost to him may be measured by the substantial degree he differs from the shabby Machiavellian caricature of him that is current in political polemic. To the country the cost is greater still; and to the Republican party it may ultimately be fatal . . .

— JLA

I. A Presidency Divided Against Itself

Six months before the election, after the President's telethon in China, and despite the disarray of his opposition, it is a remarkable fact that Richard Nixon, with all the advantages of incumbency, is politically vulnerable. Even if the Vietnam war is quiescent, the economy is satisfactory, and the electorate is treated to yet more diplomatic razzle-dazzle, the President must plan on nothing more than a close election. For the American voters, always slow to change their habits, have had twelve years to form firm opinions about Richard Nixon. In 1960, 34.1 million gave him a narrow plurality.* In 1968, a smaller absolute number, 31.7 million gave him a close victory. In his term as President, he has not made converts in anything like the number necessary to give him more than a close race in 1972.

Heaven knows he has tried. His Administration has prided itself on having developed "strategies" — coherent, far-reaching approaches to government and politics. He and his aides have spoken proudly of having a Vietnam strategy, a global foreign policy strategy, an anti-inflationary economic strategy, a strategy of reform, a strategy of effective government, a strategy of international economic competition, a Congressional strategy, a law enforcement strategy, and, to refute those who charge them with pandering to the South, a "national" political strategy. This clear preference for policies cast in systematic, activist and long-range terms is a healthy change from the restless showmanship of the Kennedy Administration or the wheeler-dealer habits of LBJ.

But in producing many such strategies, the Administration has failed to develop a governing strategy, an overall vision that could join the separate programs with a political scheme for carrying them through, attracting support not only for the President but also for his management of the government. The absence of such a unifying vision means that instead of the usual pattern in government, in which merely personalities are pitted against each other, strategies are pitted against each other in a way that systematically undercuts the credibility of the President and the base of the Republican Party. The President's strategy for re-election, his political strategy — no matter how ingenious and sophisticated in its demog-

raphic calculus — will fail if it subverts the fulfillment of his official responsibilities.

The 1970 elections provided a good showcase of how Mr. Nixon's strategies, each defensible in its own sphere, can pull him apart. In areas of policy, the President's major strategies had many tensions between them, but they all shared one major feature: they all had natural appeal to various segments of the moderate, college-educated middle class constituency that since 1948 has been the most volatile swing group in presidential elections. A fight against inflation, reforms in welfare, criminal justice, environmental affairs and conscription, cuts in defense spending, a gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, and a foreign policy which sought to press America's interest firmly but without stoking crises — all these Nixon policies were developed by men whose intuitions were disciplined by the applause and criticism of an informed, reasonably progressive, and generally Republican constituency that is an important arbiter in national politics between elections.

This constituency is not "liberal," not "conservative," not the media, the Eastern Establishment, the Ivy League, or the proliferating public interest lobbies in Washington. It consists of the numerous small opinion leaders, most of them invisible to the television camera, who follow issues closely enough so that their views carry weight with colleagues and friends. Since most of Mr. Nixon's policies were cerebral and involved important conceptual reorientations, they would have to be explained before such knowledgeable audiences if they were to be sold effectively to the public — much as the Marshall Plan or the Peace Corps or the volunteer army were explained and sold. Unfortunately, the Nixon political strategy required a tenor of discourse that made such a process difficult.

Mr. Nixon became convinced, in part by Kevin Phillips' work, that he had a chance to win important segments of the Southern Wallace vote and the votes of northern blue collar workers who flirted with voting for Wallace in 1968 but eventually cast their ballots unenthusiastically for Humphrey. Since the Wallace voters were heavily Southern Baptists and the union members were heavily Catholics and since

* "The 1960 national popular vote is usually totaled with a plurality of 110,000 to 120,000 for Kennedy. The *Information Please Almanac 1968*, for example, gives Kennedy a margin of victory of 119,450. All such totals credit the Kennedy-Johnson ticket with some 324,000 votes in Alabama, but only 147,295 votes, less than half of the widely cited total, were actually cast for the official Democratic ticket. The remainder, 176,755 votes, were cast for 'unpledged electors' who voted for Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia in the Electoral College. When bonus votes were awarded for the 1964 Democratic National Convention, Alabama was credit-

ed with only 147,295 votes, less than half of the widely cited total, not with the 324,000 needed to give Kennedy-Johnson a national victory over Nixon-Lodge" (Christopher W. Beal, "Nixon, the Loser Who Won," *Ripon FORUM*, September, 1958). For a fuller discussion of popular and electoral vote anomalies in 1960, see *Nixon, A Political Portrait*, by Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess. It seems fair to conclude that had there been direct popular election of the President in 1960, Nixon would have been declared the winner with a 50,000-vote plurality, a conclusion reaffirmed by the 1964 Democratic National Convention.

both were lower middle or working class, the strategy was not really so much a Southern Strategy as a blue collar, Baptist-Catholic strategy.

As such, it could be justified in more than opportunistic terms, for both the future of the Republican Party and the good of the country require that the GOP break loose from its Northern Protestant biases. The Republican Party is not merely, in Richard Scammon's phrase, a party of the unyoung, unpoor, and unblack. It is also a party of the unCatholic, unJewish, unSouthern Baptist, unworking class voter. If it is to become a majority party it must become generally identified in the public mind as more than the vehicle of the older members of the more affluent Protestant denominations and the Chambers of Commerce.

Regardless of religion, moreover, the lower middle class voter has an honest gripe. He suffers most from the regressive features of the social security system, the tax structure, and the draft laws. Nor is he compensated for this in intangible ways. For honor and glory seem increasingly reserved to producers of paperwork and financial manipulators rather than for those who die on battlefields or produce industrial goods. To bring new groups into the Republican Party and to recognize their dignity in the national scheme of things can inspire some idealism, even if it is also opportune politically. But, by divorcing it from positive policies, the Nixon Administration in its first two years allowed this project to be portrayed as shabby, trivial and racially demagogic. Lacking the programs that attract blue collar workers — and with an anti-inflationary program that raised their fears of unemployment — Mr. Nixon, after some experimentation, decided to let them eat rhetoric.

The Vice President of the United States was dispatched with a bevy of presidential assistants to devise rhetorical whipping boys that might unite supporters of Lester Maddox and Mayor Daley behind the banner of middle class Nixon Republicanism. Mr. Agnew, taking what he called "a calculated political risk," tried using the foundations, the media, college students, Yale, "radiclibs," Mayor Lindsay, the Eastern Establishment, rock music, pornography, demand feeding of infants (before a businessman's audience in Albuquerque, N.M.), and (in Las Vegas, Nevada), the drug scene.

What emerged was a sort of militant Babbitry which helped to raise money for Republicans, raise the turnout among Democrats and scare enough women, college graduates, and affluent suburbanites to defeat many Republicans who had seemed likely winners a few months before. The President entered into the spirit of the thing by going on an unconvincing search for his Irish ancestry and participating

in an even more synthetic martyrdom in San Jose. (This, incidentally, was the same President who had spent the pre-election months working quietly and successfully to avert a major blowup in the Middle East).

Orphan Victory

Though the campaign of 1970 was proclaimed as an "ideological victory" by the White House, it was not long before the President was shifting responsibility for it elsewhere, and today one cannot find anyone in the administration or the party willing to take credit for it.

Nevertheless, let us give credit where credit is due. The election was in an sense an ideological victory for that part of the conservative movement which has specialized in influencing the Republican Party. Conservatives succeeded in airing some favorite themes and in getting White House help to elect two conservative senators as third party candidates. Though the base of the Republican Party was shrunk by the departure of liberally oriented college-educated voters — so that in 1971 only 25 percent of the electorate and a mere 31 percent of the business and professional community called themselves Republican — the conservative share of the base became proportionately larger.

A consciousness of this trend — as well as a more praiseworthy effort to build trust in new working class constituencies — made conservatives the most active proponents of a campaign strategy that joined blue collar rhetoric with white collar policies, with the result that neither was taken seriously by the electorate. That their effort was damaging to the party as a whole is not solely the fault of the conservatives; it could not have happened without the tight-lipped gutlessness of leading Republican moderates who remained silent while the middle class audiences essential to *their* programs were systematically alienated.

The moderates, however, could not have been so ineffective politically had it not been for a perverse division of labor between the two factions. At the time of the 1970 election the key Republican publicity and political staffs, notably those in the White House and the Senate, were dominated by men who considered themselves allied with the conservative movement or friendly to it, though non-ideological views were represented and occasionally prevailed (as in the Congressional campaign committee). Meanwhile, personnel for the governing apparatus of the Administration were drawn overwhelmingly from the center and left wings of the party. In part, this division of labor was the natural product of historical circumstance. The so-called left wing of the party, having been based in the governorships and having staffed

the Eisenhower administration, inherited governing cadres, while the demise of the Dewey-Brownell machine had caused its national political network to lapse. The so-called right wing as a more recent movement, formed to outflank the Dewey-Brownell ascendancy, had invested heavily in politics but had only elected one governor of a major state prior to 1968, and even Ronald Reagan had to draw on his own left wing for staffing.

Policy vs. Politics

But Nixon's pitting of policy against politics was not inevitable. It was encouraged by the managers of the White House who during the nomination campaign had learned from their boss the trick of playing off one Republican faction against the other. Because they were managers and not intellectuals they were uncomfortable with spirited debate over ideas — especially if it would ultimately involve bringing too many bearers of conflicting policies face-to-face with the President. Hence they were drawn to patterns of staffing that made internal debate in the administration one of politics *versus* policy. This would reduce all questions to matters of technique and limit the risks inherent in their own mediating role.

Thus the Domestic Council was conceived by the Ash Council as an arena where questions of general direction could be discussed, with memoranda provided by a staff equipped to handle conceptual problems. But instead this group has concentrated on its more technical aim of expediting the development of new programs without examining interrelations between them or their political implications. Rather than narrowing the gap between strategies it has thus increased them.

The discipline of facing reelection in 1972 has now begun to reduce the gap between electoral strategy and domestic policy, but it can be expected to open up new and gaping holes between the areas of policy themselves. In this election year various groups in the administration are now given a freer franchise to sell their pet strategies directly to interested constituencies; the result is a regime whose rhetoric will impress observers as more pragmatic and moderate than that of 1970, but whose actions will be increasingly balkanized and fragmented. Given the narrow political base of the administration and the difficulties of its battle-scarred President in broadening his personal appeal, every group capable of organizing for leverage and dramatizing its sense of grievance will have a heightened claim for some chunk of administration policy. And Mr. Nixon, like a punchdrunk fighter without an opponent, will weave this way and that, striking a blow now in one direction, now in another, hoping always to look as if he has the upper hand. Since the Democrats will present five



punchdrunk fighters mauling each other, Nixon may expect to look good by comparison — until they settle on a champion.

It has been said, and it will be said more frequently as the election draws near, that the shortcomings of the Nixon administration are a product of the shallowness of the man, of the inadequacies of his managers, of personal rivalries in his official family, of a disdain for intellect, or of difficulties in dealing with a Democratic Congress, a hostile press or a recalcitrant bureaucracy. I take a different view. As Presidents go, it is fair to say that Nixon is not shallow and unprincipled. Consider Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower, Truman and Roosevelt. Nixon is the most cerebral of any since Wilson, and in office the most swayed by arguments of principle of any since Hoover. As keepers of the gate go, Mr. Haldeman and his associates are not less honest, straightforward, energetic, intelligent, or loyal than their predecessors. Nor, in jobs that do not always bring out the best in people, are they as a group more self-important petty, arbitrary and vindictive. The personal rivalries, inevitable when aggressive politicians must operate at close quarters, are muted in comparison to previous Administrations, and such men as Kissinger, Schultz, Weinberger, Laird, Rush, Peterson, Rogers, Irwin, Romney, Van Dusen, Burns, Connally, Volpe, Richardson, and Veneman are as a group perhaps superior

in intellect and decency to those assembled in past regimes.

Nor are President Nixon's problems attributable to those great institutions which affect any President's performance — the Congress, the bureaucracy and the national press. It is a case of sniveling paranoia to view them as bent on undermining the Republican cause. Each institution obeys a more complicated logic, and a major component in each is the need for a sometimes sycophantic working relationship with the President. When the President has had a clear sense of purpose and a well-staffed project — such as the China trip — he has been able to influence others and gain overwhelmingly favorable media attention. When, however, he fails to communicate anything but tactical dexterity, and when his men then blame malevolent outsiders for thwarting goals that they themselves have failed to define, one must conclude, Dear Brutus, that the fault is in themselves.

Mr. Nixon's shortcomings, then, are the product of an Administration working at cross-purposes with itself. These shortcomings have been exacerbated by the President's ingrained habit of playing off the wings of his party against each other — made systematic by his otherwise laudable taste for strategic approaches to government, and deprived of any unifying assumptions by his inability to develop a governing strategy which might unite policy and politics. Since the Democrats in office will have somewhat worse problems in managing their own conflicting interests and programs, Mr. Nixon can make a plausible case for re-election. His whispered campaign slogan might well be: "America cannot afford another first term President." But what if — and there are now no compelling reasons to assume otherwise — the second term is like the first? What if Mr. Nixon is re-elected narrowly with much of his second term policies brokered away and what remains for freedom of maneuver constricted by the continuing warfare

of the two wings of his party to gain the advantage for 1976?

Were the country on a good track politically, this would be tolerable, if not inspiring. We could all read Edmund Burke and follow our habitual political practices in the confidence that these would see us through. But in fact America is in a period that is uncertain and fluid in its politics, its mores and its external relations. It is, as Peter Drucker has said, an Age of Discontinuity, when tested prejudices and practices often prove inappropriate and when one's ability to think reflectively may be of more service to the country than one's desire to react instinctively.

This kind of a time is not without precedent. After all, a generation before there could be a Burke to celebrate the virtues of continuity, there had to be an astute, calculating Walpole to assemble the elements of a stable political tradition. To demand of Richard Nixon that he inspire in us Burkean intimations of the best and deepest in our traditions is unreasonable in our country as we find it today. But it is not unreasonable to expect that he lay the ground so that this can be done in the future — so that the President of the United States, any President, will be able to assume some agreement on the terms of political discourse. The President should try to leave a legacy of symbols that both affirm a national solidarity and help the country to cope with its future.

Among those who make demands on Richard Nixon for their support in 1972, then, let there be some who require of him not some plum or bargaining advantage, but simply some prospect for greatness. Let him be required to turn the sense of realism that has been honed to so fine an edge in his political career and in his dealings in foreign affairs to the cause of leading the country in a coherent way, to the cause of making it the beautiful, just and free land the promise of which has been neither fulfilled nor foreclosed during the past decade.



II. The Need for a Dialogue with the Right

A lofty note on which to conclude, but not quite a sufficient one. For if the analysis here is anywhere near correct, the President cannot produce a governing strategy unaided. The ingrained habits of the White House are to fragment rather than to synthesize its strategies, and to play allies and adversaries alike off against each other rather than to seek a common ground on which to unite them. The exigencies of the election campaign, as well as the President's negotiating positions *vis à vis* the Russians and Chinese, are likely to reinforce and reward these habits.

There is a need for a governing strategy that cannot be met by the President alone or designed for him by those whose high hopes for his success lead them to overstate his accomplishments. Nor is the need likely to be met by the left or right wings of the party acting on their own, for though direct pressure tactics can certainly modify isolated strategies, such efforts cannot alter the general context in which these strategies are pitted against each other. One can expect the White House to learn from its mistakes and to implement sound proposals. But any creative or unifying impulse must come from without. If there is to be a Republican governing strategy, or indeed any distinctively Republican contribution to the country, it can only begin when both wings of the party discuss common aims with each other, instead of each separately addressing their grievances to the President. This is all the more vital if one adopts the view of David Broder's latest book that responsible national parties are essential to the continued viability of our political system.

I am told that this is an inappropriate time to suggest a left-right dialogue, that many conservatives are so furious with the President over issues of foreign and economic policy as to make them ill-disposed toward any step that might be interpreted as a softening of their bargaining stance, least of all a dialogue with those who rejoice at some of the very initiatives that they condemn. Their attitude is as understandable as the current dissatisfaction among progressive Republicans on busing and the war.

Many of the criticisms which the Ripon Society made of the 1970 campaign *have* made their way with surprising ease into the mainstream of the party; now it is conservatives who, though grateful for the President's realignment of the judicial branch, are upset — at his overture toward the People's Republic of China, his optimistic talk on arms control, his experimentation with bureaucratic controls on the economy, and his continuing commitment to the Family Assistance proposal and the "Open Communities"

plan in housing. It may be that just as the White House excluded valid criticism of political strategy because it came from the Republican left, it is now blinding itself to important critiques of policy because they come from the right.

Whether it come early or late, public discussion between the party factions of the broader directions for a Republican presidency is needed if the party is to hold any prospect for growth during the coming two decades (it is already assured of minority status in the House of Representatives through 1980 and probably in the Senate as well). This discussion cannot be done through confidential memoranda or private correspondence, since it involves developing ideas on which many must act. It cannot be done amidst paeans to party unity, since this merely discourages new and independently minded people from joining. Nor can it demand, as a precondition for participation, the spartan toadyism towards the administration that is so valued a trait in today's GOP.

Republicans pride themselves on their ability to be forever closing ranks, even in the absence of a battle; they fancy this a sign of strength, and feel superior to the feuding Democrats. What they fail to realize is that the Democratic Party can tolerate a greater measure of factional rivalry because, when all is said and done, the Democrats do stand for a set of ideas that have proved capable of governing the country.

Democratic Statism

These ideas are not best summarized under the label of "liberalism," but rather under that of "statism;" as such, they can appeal to various shades of ideological opinion, depending on the areas in which the state intervenes. Above and beyond the intrinsic needs for state action, there are natural constituencies to applaud any movement towards a welfare state, a warfare state, a police state, a Byzantine bureaucracy or towards innumerable programs for protecting and rewarding self-serving business, labor and professional practices. The Democratic coalition, born at a time when any government action seemed justifiable to promote economic recovery, has depended on sustaining forward motion on as many interventionist fronts as possible. The motto of the coalition was well summarized in the words of its greatest living exemplar, Lyndon Johnson: "guns and butter."

The view of government implicit in this motto has an enormous hold on the public imagination. It is associated with recovery from the depression, victory in World War II, compassion toward minorities,

Republicans pride themselves on their ability to be forever closing ranks, even in the absence of a battle; they fancy this a sign of strength, and feel superior to the feuding Democrats. What they fail to realize is that the Democratic Party can tolerate a greater measure of factional rivalry because, when all is said and done, the Democrats do stand for a set of ideas that have proved capable of governing the country.

These ideas are not best summarized under the label of "liberalism," but rather under that of "statism;" as such, they can appeal to various shades of ideological opinion, depending on the areas in which the state intervenes.

safeguarding of equal rights, progress in the arts and sciences. To every crisis, it has a ready response: whenever a problem arises, a bureaucracy will be set up to wage war on it. Success will be measured not by results in dealing with the problem itself but by the amount of money spent, the stringency of regulations promulgated, and the flights of rhetoric that accompany them. The only way to fail is to spend too little or show too little "commitment." In the past, the beneficiaries of interventionist policies could be expected to finance Democratic campaigns and vote enthusiastically for the national candidates. Since politics must be founded on a bedrock of self interest, this has long been a winning approach.

But for better or worse, it no longer suffices for the exercise of national power. The economy has become so tightly integrated that government intervention in one sector sets up contradictory pressures in another. The effect of national communications has made it impossible to disguise this fact or even to separate constituencies one from another. Preferential treatment for one group, such as textile manufacturers, sets up immediate demands by others and thus loses for government the moral authority to say no. In any case, improvements in government contracting procedures, the burden of past commitments, budgetary stringency and the glare of publicity now reduce any single party's ability to service a preponderant coalition of interests. There just is not enough payola to go around.

The Mass Aristocracy

But what is most disqualifying about interventionist policies is that they cannot satisfy the growing mass of citizens who try to vote independently of their pecuniary or group interests. In the past, such voters have been limited to a few high-minded ticket-splitters in the suburbs. But now the culture of the suburbs has extended to the better paid blue collar worker, while the ethos of higher education impinges not only the 50 percent of the eligible age group that now spends at least a year in college but also on an increasing number of blue collar and service

occupations as they try to professionalize their jobs. (The current in-service educational movement in police forces is one sign of the trend.)

I have elsewhere written of the emergence of a "mass aristocracy," a class of voters with aristocratic aspirations for disinterested public service yet susceptible to the volatile and rootless action of mass movements. These middle class voters are not of any simple ideological stripe — they are at the heart of the conservative movement as well as the Democratic insurgencies, of the Ripon Society as well as the Philadelphia Society. But they all have a common yearning for principled politics and a common interest against an over-centralization of political power.

It is said that there is a realignment of parties going on. But no new majority party was ever built without also having a conception of the role of government to meet new realities. The new need is for a constitutional, decentralizing, and libertarian role of government. It should correct the imbalances in our system between bureaucratic and voluntary initiative, subsidized and competitive activity, centralized and decentralized authority, executive and participatory action. It has to be presented with more than slogans, and a lot of people have to share a new vision for it to succeed. That vision also applies overseas, where the United States needs, in addition to an adequate defense establishment, a less paternalistic, less interventionist attitude toward other people's governments.

How would such a strategy work? Confident of its own purpose, it would regard the press as a forum, not as an enemy. It would regard the federal bureaucracy as a necessary tool, for it is impossible to reverse the drift towards statism without using government itself. It would use the Republican party as a whole as a resource, and this would require an end to the push-me pull-me habits of the Nixon staff. It would emphasize issues and programs that strike at a level of common Republican agreement.

Such unity may be less difficult to achieve than it might seem. The GOP is not very big or heterogeneous. It is strongest in those states where white-Protest-

ants preponderate. (Of the 26 most white, Protestant states, Nixon won all but 4 in 1968, losing only the home states of Humphrey and Muskie and the two most heavily unionized states, Washington and West Virginia).

The trick for the party is to reach out to new people. Because these will be different kinds of people in different parts of the country, there must not be the slightest hint that any ethnic, racial, or religious group is unwelcome, nor any attempt to impose any single ideological label on the Republican view of government.

Since the country as a whole is becoming better educated, middle class and suspicious of big government, a revival by Republicans of the decentralizing themes that come naturally to their party is well suited to the future. These themes may legitimately be denoted conservative, but they have also become progressive in that they point a direction toward change and reform of our institutions. I expect that those of my readers who call themselves conservatives know that they have been right about many such issues. But one thing about which they have been mistaken is the country's appetite for ideological politics. If America is to prove governable, it will only be because people starting from differing first principles are able to agree on a middle ground of practical measures that enable them to retain their moral integrity and the possibility of future disagreement.

It goes without saying that for such a middle ground to be feasible, a governing party must recruit

governing cadres from the universities, businesses and professions who are familiar with government yet not wedded to New Deal dogma. These people often require different appeals from those necessary to recruit political workers: whereas the latter respond to a candidate's personality and his ideals, the former also need evidence of his seriousness in following an idea through to its practical realization.

The Need for Outside Help

Mr. Nixon's inability to turn conception into reality in the domestic sphere is the reason Roland Evans and Robert Novak have subtitled their study of his first two years in the White House "The Frustration of Power." They erred only implying that the frustration has been the President's alone or that it stems from personal rivalries in his entourage.

Rather it stems from the failure of the Republican Party to build a broad national coalition and from the President's exploitation of this failure as a means to make himself indispensable. Though Mr. Nixon may prolong guns and butter government for a few more years, he will not right himself, his party or the country without concerted outside help.

The clear need is for left-right discussion to develop ground rules of party competition, rhetoric and programme. The extent to which this now seems unfeasible and disagreeable to the intellectuals who must begin the process is a symptom of the sickness of the Republican Party and of its inability to serve as an effective instrument of national majority government during the coming decade.

Josiah Lee Auspitz, a tutor in Government at Lowell House, Harvard College, has been President of the Ripon Society and Research Director of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization.

Republicans and Jefferson

by John McClaughry

Thomas Jefferson died twenty-eight years before the birth of today's Republican Party. But we Republicans tend to forget that the founders of the GOP — the tradesmen and farmers and schoolmasters and working men who assembled in spontaneous meetings throughout the Northern states — came together to build a new political party designed, in the words of the first national Republican platform, to "restore . . . the principles of Washington and Jefferson."

Why? Because the so-called Democratic Party of 1854, the lineal descendant of Jefferson's Republican Party, had come under the complete control of the slave power of the South. Unlike Jefferson and his contemporaries, who viewed slavery as a temporarily necessary but happily expiring evil, the Southern Democrats of the 1850s arrogantly defended slavery as the best condition for the inferior black man, a positive influence on his white masters, and vastly to be preferred to the "wage slavery" of Northern industrialism. In fact, though George Fitzhugh, the South's leading intellectual apologist, was skeptical toward socialism, he discovered it to have so many benign resemblances to slavery that he regarded it worthy of consideration as an alternative to Northern free enterprise.

The pre-Civil War Republicans were so inspired by the memory of Jefferson, long since interred by the rival Democratic party, that they sponsored two great Jefferson Day dinners in 1859. As Republican Senator Francis P. Blair said in opening the Washington dinner, "There never was a more propitious moment than the present to revive the recollection of the principles and Administration of Jefferson." Unhappily, those words again ring true today.

Certainly the present-day Democratic party is unlikely to provide any leadership in this direction. These are the wonderful folks who gave us an unwinnable foreign war, the annual budget deficit, the overpowering of state and local governments, new highs in taxation, the undermining of individual liberty in a thousand ways, and, in the case of President Johnson, an example of moral leadership scarcely matched since the days of Henry VIII, if not Nero.

Nor has the GOP under Richard Nixon been active in perpetuating our Jeffersonian legacy. In fact we have two political parties whose leaders seem dedicated to subverting the principles of the man who inspired the founding of both. The Democrats are probably beyond repair, but it is to be hoped that Republicans will still turn toward salvation.

First, Republicans must pledge, in the words of Jefferson, to restore the central government to its proper role. "A wise and frugal government," said Jefferson in his first inaugural, "shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. The way to have good and sage government is not to trust it all to one, but to divide it among the many, distributing to every one exactly the functions he is competent to." The per-

nicious trend toward centralization must be effectively reversed.

Second, Republicans must rededicate themselves to restoring decency, integrity and honor to national leadership. "Nothing is so mistaken as is the supposition," Jefferson wrote, "that a person is to extricate himself from a difficulty by intrigue, by chicanery, by dissimulation, by trimming, by an untruth, by an injustice." The Republican rank and file should get the message across to President Nixon that it will not tolerate such actions by members of his Administration.

Third, Republicans must devote considerable attention to securing and preserving the institution of private property, and extending access to it to the millions of Americans who own little or nothing. Jefferson's dream was a nation of freeholders, owning a tangible stake in America. "It is not too soon to provide by every possible means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land," Jefferson wrote in 1785. If it was not too soon then, it can hardly be too soon now to devise means of distributing more widely the current forms of property. Republicans must stoutly defend and promote the rights of private property, used by and under the effective control of its owners.

Fourth, Republicans must recapture the Jeffersonian faith that free government will take root throughout the world. Jefferson's view of the American Mission was couched not in terms of intervention, but of example. He had faith in the power of the American idea. It would be tragic indeed if our national purpose, once so lofty and inspiring, came to mean no more than the crude manipulation of power for its own sake.

Foreign policy, like domestic policy, cannot be divorced from principle. Nor can the invention of principle to disguise the manipulation of power substitute for a steadfast adherence to the creation of a world order based on law, in which every nation and every people may have the opportunity to flourish in freedom.

Fifth, Republicans must respond to the nation's yearning for liberty. Republicans have a special duty to protect and secure the liberties for which Jefferson so earnestly spoke; not just economic liberty, but also the liberty of thought, of speech, of press, of assembly, and of dissent. Let these be eroded away, and the erosion of every other sort of liberty will soon follow. Let them be held in reverent respect, let them be the bright constellation that guides us on our national course, and America need never fear for the vitality of its institutions.

Around principles such as these a true Republican majority can be built — not a transient majority built around transient personalities, or around issues opportunistically embraced for short run benefit, but a genuine majority of loyal and true Republicans. Nothing could please the Sage of Monticello more.

**Contrary to widely circulated reports, John McClaughry exists in the Twentieth Century, as State Representative in Vermont.*

The Republicans and Youth

by *Linda Hannaway*

WASHINGTON — The 26th Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified last year, extending the voting franchise to 11.4 million 18-to-20 year-olds and sent chills down the spines of GOP politicians. Early predictions were that the young would register heavily Democratic and obliterate the President's 1968 plurality of 510,000 votes. One Administration official was quoted as saying that the President's decision not to veto the related legislation "will go down as Richard Nixon's major political blunder."

The statistics of youth opinion, however, support such Republican pessimism toward young voters only if the party is frightened by their spirit of independence and skepticism. Intelligent and progressive appeals can win a large proportion of their votes.

There are 25 million potential voters in the age group 18-to-25 who have never voted in a Presidential election. A study conducted by The Youth Citizenship Fund, a Washington-based foundation-organization which had registered predicts that at least 60 percent will register by November and approximately 42 percent will actually vote (a significantly lower proportion than 62 percent turnout of all voters in 1968). About 70 percent of the new voters fall in the non-student category.

According to a *Newsweek* survey published last Fall, the bloc of newly registered voters contains 38 percent Democrats, 18 percent Republicans, and a whopping 42 percent Independents. The poll also showed that, while the group as

a whole is significantly more "liberal" than the rest of the population, a plurality, 45 percent, call themselves "middle of the road."

These figures disprove the widely held notion that all new voters are liberal and are swarming to the Democratic party. In fact, Democrats are losing, proportionately, to Independents, and Republicans are holding within 5 percent of their already low percentage for the total population. These findings confirm those of a study conducted by the Nixon re-election committee in mid-1971. They pose a major but hardly hopeless challenge to the party.

Contrary to most media reports, moreover, the party is not ignoring the young. Shortly after ratification of the 26th Amendment, some Republican officials publicly quaked at the thought of registering young voters. And former Attorney General John Mitchell didn't help by his slack attitude toward the Voting Rights Amendments of 1970 that eased absentee balloting and registration. In fact, by early March 1972, about half the states had failed to comply, in part because of less than enthusiastic encouragement from the Attorney General. None the less, as Ken Reitz, Youth Director at the Committee to Re-Elect the President, points out, the media have ignored the many meaningful efforts of Republicans.

A Mitchell Mandate

Reitz has a staff of 16 at the Nixon Re-election Committee and insists he has a mandate from Campaign Manager John Mitchell to go after the youth vote. He will

start a major registration effort in the next two to three months which will concentrate on the 70 percent non-college group. Reitz believes the Republican party as a whole may not win the youth vote, but the President will. He stresses the fact that the Nixon youth campaign in New Hampshire this year was larger than the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire in 1968. "We had 1000 young people in New Hampshire, all of them volunteers," he said, "and we organized 11 of the 12 major campuses in the state." According to Reitz, the President won every mock election taken in schools throughout New Hampshire. [In fact, McCloskey won several. Ed.]

"When you get out of Washington and into the major media centers in the states, you find that the President is very popular," said Reitz. He feels that "the reason for a positive response to the President is that the young see Richard Nixon as sincere and they see he has tried very hard to bring peace to the world."

Reitz believes the high number of Independent voters among young registrants is a boon for Republicans. He feels Republican registration will remain stable while the Democrats will lose more to the Independent category, and he attributes high Democratic registration to interest in the Democratic primaries, "where the action is," but believes youth will return to the GOP in November.

Reitz is busily setting up state organizations and putting them to work on voter registration drives, but he stresses that his is not typical of past Republican campaigns in

which young people were used for "bodies at rallies" "We don't want young people at our meetings for show, but for basic political work, such as voter registration and getting out the vote on election day."

Reitz, who claims to have organized 10,000 young people for Senator Bill Brock's 1968 Senatorial campaign, will work with Brock in 1972 also. The Senator is chairman of the Congressional Advisory Committee to the Young Voters for the President. In fact, the extent of the Senator's involvement in 1972 youth activities is widely considered a portent of a Presidential effort in 1976. Brock's enthusiastic prospecting for Republican youth across the country on party funds has already produced a Brock for President movement in YAF.

Rep. Ed Biester of Pennsylvania, a member of the Committee who campaigned for the President in New Hampshire, stresses the importance of the youth vote, particularly the non-student group. He said, "The party should not lose sight of the fact that the majority of young people are working and are fully familiar with taxes, they are building families, looking for decent housing, sharing in the general starting of life. We have

to get across the message that the President has a record of concern for problems that are closest to them. It would be a tragedy if we don't get a solid and significant portion of the young vote. The President has done a lot of real things that are important to the lives of young people."

The Young Voters for the President group boasts as members such luminaries as Brenda Box, Miss Texas; Janene Forsyth, Miss Teenage America; Charles Postels, past V.P. of the Future Farmers of America; the Starbucks, 1970-72 U.S. Pairs Figure Skating champions; Bob Griese, Miami Dolphins quarterback; and Clint Eastwood.

Over at the Republican National Committee, the youth effort is run by Fred Slight, Director of Special Programs, who is gearing up for a major registration drive at the precinct level during the spring and the summer. Slight stresses that the National Committee's efforts are built around giving the young a piece of the action in what he calls the Senior Party (as opposed to College Republicans, Young Republicans, and Teen-Age Republicans). In particular, he cites the DO Committee — for Delegates and Organizations — which recommended to the RNC that voters under 25 be represented on state

delegations in numerical equity to their voting strength within the states.

DO Recommendations

This recommendation is not yet binding on the states, but several have moved to involve youth, according to Slight. (A slightly different view of the RNC's interest in youth was expressed to one registration group official who was surprised and happy to see the Committee devote an entire issue of its publication, *First Monday*, to youth. He eagerly called the Committee to suggest that they cooperate in youth registration activities and was somewhat impolitely told "Bullshit.")

Slight is not at all dismayed by the relatively small percentage of new voters designating the GOP as "their party," and doesn't have much faith in party labels anyway. "When you compare the number of people who approve of the way President Nixon is handling his job — about 50 percent — with the number of registered Republicans — about 25 percent — you can see that labels are really not so important."

Slight also believes that registration efforts and polls so far have concentrated on campuses where you are likely to find a high concentration of liberal and Democrat-inclined young people. He stresses the importance to the party of the non-student group, and believes it is proper to direct RNC registration efforts toward working young people who are more likely to register Republican.

While Slight's enthusiasm for bringing all types of youth under the Republican banner was somewhat less than overwhelming, there is a young man buried in the bowls of the RNC building who is effervescent in his enthusiasm. Karl Rove, Executive Secretary of the College Republican National Committee, inhabits a small office next



to the Xerox room in the second basement. He describes himself as a former Goldwater fan now for Nixon and believes that if Republicans don't register young voters "we might very well blow the whole thing."

Rove's office sends mailings to 1000 campus newspapers and 400 campus radio stations every week via their Washington Campus News Service which "provides virtually the only regular national news service directed to the campus press which displays confidence in the operations of the American political system," according to a CR pamphlet.

Rove believes that Republicans have nothing to fear from youth and agrees that the most hopeful aspect of voter registration is the large number of young Independents, who usually "don't like to identify with a party, are issue oriented, highly selective, and have an interest in the electoral process. Those are the kind of people who are attracted to President Nixon." (Rove said the RNC works closely with the Committee to Re-elect the President.)

Rove attributed the view that Republicans are ignoring the young, particularly on campuses, to party progressives "who like to claim they are being persecuted and written off." "Just take a look at the Dole, Armstrong and Nixon statements and you'll see that we are far from writing off the youth vote. In fact, Anne Armstrong has gone out on a limb for us and is very active in registration activities." (Robert Dole and Anne Armstrong are Co-Chairmen of the RNC.)

Rove, too, agrees that the registration effort is rightly directed toward the 70 percent non-student group but feels there is also a role for an effort on campuses. That is what his job is all about and the College Republicans, along with Young Republicans and Teen-age Republicans will be mobilizing for

grass roots registration efforts in the spring.

Republican Pete McCloskey is the Republican figure who has been most personally involved in registration efforts. He appeared at numerous rallies last summer and was even spotted enticing a young lovely out of the California surf to encourage her to register.

In his early registration efforts, McCloskey found Senator George McGovern, not President Nixon, to be his major opponent in attracting young people. He also found college students are less responsive than high schoolers. McCloskey and his staff have attended a number of youth registration meetings and conferences held in more than 20 states last year, but they have found few other Republicans in attendance.

"The Worst Thing"

McCloskey's staff has noted an interest among young people in registering but not in voting Republican. They believe the problem in California is that young people think Republican, see Nixon and Reagan, while elsewhere they think Republican, and see Nixon. Chris Topping, Assistant Campaign Manager for McCloskey and D.C. Ripon Chapter Vice President, said "the worst thing for our attempts to register young people Republican was winning the 1968 election."

Ohio Congressman John Ashbrook's youth campaign is operated largely by the Young Americans for Freedom. Charlie Black, Director of Chapter Services and Speaker's Bureau Director for YAF, headed up the Ashbrook effort in Florida and hints at some resentment within the Ashbrook campaign toward the Republican National Committee to Re-Elect the President. "We don't have much to do with them," he said, "the Republican National Committee is blatantly pro-Nixon in a primary situation."

Black feels that the most important effect of the Ashbrook cam-

paign so far has been its impact upon the Nixon Administration's policies. He cited the veto of child care legislation and the renewed prominence of Vice President Agnew as attempts by the Administration to mollify conservatives who are turning to Ashbrook, particularly since the China trip. Black says they have lined up Youth for Ashbrook chairmen in all the states.

The Republican National Committee emphasizes the uncertainty which surrounds young voters, but it also recognizes their potential they also recognize their potential for influencing electoral politics for many years to come. All agree that that they cannot be ignored, and Republicans are consequently engaged in persistent efforts to attract young voters.

The Nixon partisans seem disposed to pursue the non-student sector of the youthful population, ostensibly on the basis that they represent 70 percent of the potential new voters. This is simply practical politics, but another factor seems to be the less liberal tinge of non-student youth. Party moderates, however, should not be alarmed by a lack of attention by the party to students, because the young new voters as a group are more liberal than their elders and a large proportion of the non-students have been to college at one time or will go at some time.

Considering all the unknown factors surrounding voters who have not voted in a Presidential election before, the most that can be said is that Republicans take a greater risk by trying to ignore young people than by trying to bring them to the polls. Everyone seems to accept this, as well as the comforting fact that the young are independent minded and are hardly likely to vote as a bloc. The response of young people to Republican candidates so far proves that there are enough young people to go around.

Ripon Poll Results

(taken January - February, 1972)

The Ripon poll for 1971 shows an upswing of support for President Nixon from 1970, although falling short of his record in his first term of office.

58 percent of those who voted for Nixon-Agnew in 1968 rate the President's performance as excellent or good, compared to 23 percent a year ago and 68 percent in 1969.

28 percent of those responding who did not vote for the Nixon ticket in 1968 give the President a good or excellent rating, compared to 2 percent a year ago.

75 percent of Nixon's '68 supporters and 72 percent of his non-supporters indicate they expect to vote for Nixon-Agnew this fall. Virtually every remaining respondent would support the ticket if Agnew were replaced with a progressive.

81 percent of the President's '68 supporters think he will be re-elected this year, compared to 40 percent a year ago.

71 percent of the same group approve the Nixon economic policies, compared to 10 percent last year.

The President has not yet fully recovered the support of Ripon members from his disastrous decline in the 1970 campaign.

Even among his '68 supporters only 34 percent approve of his political strategy, while only 27 percent like his record in building the G.O.P.

The same respondents give the President an anemic 44 percent approval rating on civil rights, 32 percent on urban problems and 34 percent on agriculture.

Among those who did not vote Republican in 1968 the President receives a 99 percent approval rating on China policy, but only 35 percent approval on Vietnam. 66 percent of '68 supporters endorse the President on Vietnam.

For the Vice Presidential nomination Ripon respondents registered a decisive preference for Senator Edward Brooke, who received more votes than all the ten other recipients combined. Brooke registered 49 percent among 1968 Nixon supporters to Governor Rockefeller's 17 percent, and 59 percent

among 1968 Nixon nonsupporters to Rockefeller's 18 percent.

None the less, Vice President Agnew surged upwards in the favor of all respondents, rising from an F rating in 1970 to D in 1971. He retains his distinction, however, as the only member of the Nixon team with an overall rating below C-.

The highest ranking Administration member and the only one receiving an overall A- was Presidential counsellor Henry Kissinger.

The top vote getter, overall, as the one national leader of either party "most worthy of your enthusiasm and support" was Representative Paul N. McCloskey, who edged out the President 13.5 percent to 11 percent.

58 percent of the respondents supported Nixon in the 1968 election. This proportion, however, was rendered artificially low by the inclusion of all 1972 first time voters in the 1968 non-supporter category. Most of the poll responses were written in February, before the March busing speech and the renewed bombing.

Nixon Supporters in 1968

Rate Nixon's overall performance as President so far:

	1971 poll	1970 poll
Excellent	13%	1%
Good	45	22
Average	27	18
Fair	6	36
Poor	6	23

THE CABINET

	A	B	C	D	E	AVE.
Connally	27%	47%	15%	3%	4.5%	B
Morton	11	34	39	5	1.5	B-
Laird	20	36	25	8	6	B
Mitchell	10	18.5	30	21	16	C-
Rogers	10	47	28	5	5	B-
Romney	23	39	24.5	4.5	4.5	B
Schultz	18	40	22	3.5	1.5	B
Stans	6	27	34	15	5	C+
Volpe	11	49	25	4.5	1.5	B-
Erllichman	6	16	27	18	12.5	C
Haldeman	4.5	11	27	19	14	C-
Richardson	38	43	7	1.5	3.5	B+
Hodgson	3	28	36	4.5	3.5	C+
Rumsfeld	13	46	20.5	1.5	3	B
Kissinger	44	32	12	4	3	A-

THE VICE-PRESIDENT

	1971	17	12	18	22	27	D+
1970	2	10	10	18	60		F+

If he continues as he has, will the President be renominated?

Yes 94%

Leaving aside the many "ifs" and giving just a "gut" reaction, do you think Nixon will be re-elected?

Yes 81%

Would you vote for the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1972 (Assume Muskie and a Southerner as the Democratic slate)

Yes 75%

If you would not support Nixon-Agnew, would you support Nixon and a progressive?

Yes 39%

Who would you prefer as a Vice-Presidential candidate:

Brooke	49%	Baker	1%
Rockefeller	17%	Taft	1%
Connally	4%	Holton	1%
Reagan	4%	Rumsfeld	1%
Agnew	4%	McCloskey	1%

Of the national leaders of both parties, which one do you personally view as the man/woman most worthy of your enthusiasm and support?

Nixon	17.5%	Agnew	3	Holton	1.5
McCloskey	9	Mathias	3	Romney	1
Rockefeller	9	Lindsay	3	Bush	1
Brooke	6	J. Buckley	3	Reagan	1
Richardson	5	Chisholm	3	Muskie	1
Gardner	5	Scott	1.5	McCarthy	1
Hatfield	4.5	McGovern	1.5	Proxmire	1
Scranton	4.5	Nader	1.5	W. Buckley	1
Percy	3.5	Milliken	1.5	Schweiker	1

ISSUES	POSITION	IMPLEMENTATION
	Approve	% of those who approve position who also approve implementation
Vietnam	66	70
China	95	82

Foreign Aid	60	62
Defense Spending	48	59
Middle East	77	78
Welfare	80	36
Open Communities	50	56
Revenue Sharing	80	49
Law Enforcement	56	65
Civil Rights	42	62
Internat'l Eco. Policy	79	81
Inflation/Wage-Price	71	61
Urban Problem	32	55
Agriculture	34	71
Environment	64	56
Court Appointments	42	62
Political Strategy	34	50
Building the GOP	27	66
Volunteer military	78	60
Government reorganization	82	57

Nixon Non-Supporters in 1968

Rate Nixon's overall performance as President so far:	1971 poll	1970 poll
	Excellent	2%
Good	26%	2%
Average	32%	6%
Fair	21%	57%
Poor	17%	35%

Who would you prefer as a Vice-Presidential candidate:			
Brooke	59%	Cahill	1%
Rockefeller	18%	McCloskey	1%
Baker	2%	Milliken	1%
Connally	1%	Goodell	1%

Of the national leaders of either party, which one do you personally view as the man/woman most worthy of your enthusiasm and support?

McCloskey	18.5%	Brooke	3
Gardner	11.5	Mathias	3
Percy	8.5	Scranton	3
Nader	7.5	Chisholm	2
Rockefeller	6.5	Humphrey	2
Hatfield	5.5	McCarthy	1
Lindsay	5	Finch	1
Muskie	4	Holton	1
Nixon	4	Packwood	1
Kennedy	3	Mondale	1
Richardson	3	Bush	1
Milliken	3	Laird	1

THE CABINET

	A	B	C	D	F	Ave. Gr.
Connolly	19%	41%	24%	7%	6%	B-
Morton	6	30	42	7	5	C+
Laird	9	22	34	19	14	C
Mitchell	0	9	17	20	54	D
Rogers	7	44	36	7	2	B-
Romney	18	53	21	2	2	B
Schultz	13	36	29	8	4	B-
Stans	2	12	42	16	16	C
Volpe	4	36	38	7	9	C+
Erllichman	3	7	30	26	19	C-
Haldeman	7	3	30	30	22	D+
Richardson	22	52	10	2	2	B+
Hodgson	2	25	33	4	4	C+
Rumsfeld	13	29	32	5	4	B-
Klissinger	29	27	17	9	4	B+

THE VICE-PRESIDENT

	A	B	C	D	F	Av.
1971	0%	2%	9%	28%	61%	D-
1970	1	0	4	14	81	F

If he continues as he has, will the President be renominated?
Yes 95%

Leaving aside the many "ifs" and giving just a "gut" reaction, do you think Nixon will be re-elected?
Yes 73%

Would you vote for the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1972?
(Assume Muskie and a Southerner as the Democratic slate)
Yes 72%

If you would not support Nixon-Agnew, would you support Nixon and a progressive?
Yes 44%

ISSUES	POSITION	IMPLEMENTATION
	Approve	% of those who approve position who also approve
Vietnam	35%	63%
China	99	65
Foreign Aid	50	50
Defense Spending	23	69
Middle East	75	61
Welfare	35	40
Open Communities	34	50
Revenue Sharing	69	39
Law Enforcement	26	15
Civil Rights	13	50
Internat'l Eco. Policy	60	66
Inflation/Wage-Price	64	44
Urban Problem	12	33
Agriculture	13	50
Environment	46	41
Court Appointments	10	80
Political Strategy	10	50
Building the GOP	9	33
Volunteer military	67	34
Gov. Reorganization	66	50

The Dilemmas of Revenue Sharing

The unfettered sharing of federal revenue with the states and localities has been part of the Ripon canon since July, 1965, when we made a joint statement with the Republican Governors Association. As a device for promoting the decentralization of power, the accountability of government, the more efficient delivery of government services, and the reordering of national priorities, the concept embodies several themes of progressive Republican ideology. Although often spuriously credited to Walter Heller — on the evident assumption that no idea truly exists until it has been adopted by a Democrat intellectual — the program has numerous origins, including the Distribution Act of the pre-Civil War period, and was first introduced in the House by several Republican Congressmen, prominently including Charles Goodell and Melvin Laird.

Now the proposal has been adopted by Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and long a bitter opponent of the concept. In the last year, however, the purposes of revenue sharing have changed to some extent. From a device to support state and local government — and incidentally to distribute federal revenue more fairly than Southern Democratic Committee chairmen like Mr. Mills have permitted in the past — the program has been reshaped as a device to aid the financially stricken cities. This goal seems eminently desirable and we ardently support it; but we acknowledge that the question of how intensive aid for the cities can best be transmitted — whether revenue sharing is the best instrument — remains open to legitimate question. Daniel J. Elazar, Director of the Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University, here examines the development of the revenue sharing concept and explores some of the dilemmas of pass-through formulas, included in the bill recently approved by Ways and Means. He was assisted by Barnaby Wittels, an associate at the Center.

by Daniel J. Elazar

This nation is committed to a federal system which places primary responsibility and power for the solution of domestic problems in the hands of the states and their political subdivisions. States and their localities spend approximately two thirds of the monies spent each year on domestic programs by government. In addition, nearly eighteen percent of the Federal funds spent for domestic purposes are channeled through grants-in-aid to the states and localities.

This pattern has its roots in several basic American presuppositions about government. Americans have been willing to abandon their pri-

mary reliance upon local government only when they were assured of a reasonable degree of local control. We have used governmental diversity to preserve our national variety.

For its part, throughout the history of American federalism, the Federal government has used its available domestic resources largely "in aid" of functions determined at the state and local level. In the early nineteenth century the Federal government began lending expertise, in the form of Army engineers to assist in the building of roads and railroads; later, grants of land were offered for the building of railroads,

colleges and other facilities; and finally with the closing of the frontier and the depletion of available Federal territory, the Federal government turned to cash grants — from modest beginnings to today's four hundred odd categorical grants totaling some \$25 billion in fiscal year 1970. Washington has used its greater fiscal resources to push, prod and advise the states and localities in the direction of national standards and policies set by Congress. But the Federal government remained more often a partner than a boss.

Among the techniques has been revenue-sharing, albeit in a limited way.

The first revenue-sharing programs were connected with Federal ownership of the public domain. Beginning in 1802, Congress provided for sharing a fixed percentage of the receipts for the sale of Federal public lands with the states in which the lands were located. Starting with two percent of the receipts, the figure was increased by stages to five percent. The public land states thus acquired a stake in a major source of governmental revenue of that period and funds to carry out needed internal improvements. The only condition attached to this revenue-sharing program was use of the funds for internal improvements — the accepted term for public works in the nineteenth century. The program thrived for fifty years, until the Homestead Act of 1862 committed the federal government to give away most of the saleable parts of the public domain. Sharing of revenues derived from the public lands continues today, primarily in the distribution of proceeds from the exploitation of lands still in federal ownership.

In sum, the Federal government has always recognized an obligation to share the benefits of its superior revenue-gathering capacities. This attitude has its roots in a belief that problems in American society are the concern of governments on all levels.

To help states and localities meet the constantly rising demands and needs of our growing twentieth century urbanization, population and affluence, however, the pattern of aid shifted sharply in favor of cash grants. As a device to raise the level of services while achieving national priorities and solving specific problems with specific measures, the categorical grant-in-aid has accomplished a great deal. In fact, largely because of such programs over the last two generations, state-local standards have reached the point where the overwhelming majority of these governments seem quite competent to devise their own ways of meeting their own unique and diverse needs.

With the swelling demand for public services ordinarily regarded as mainly the responsibility of the state and local governments, the rise in their expenditures has in fact been spectacular. In 1953, state and local governments spent \$27.9 billion dollars. By 1963, this figure had risen to \$64.8 billion, and by 1966 had

Table 1
State-Local Expenditures By Function: 1953-1975 (projected)

	1953	1963	1966	1967	1975*
Education	9.4	24.0	33.2	37.9	77.9
Highways	5.0	11.1	12.8	13.9	22.3
Public Welfare	2.9	5.5	6.7	8.2	18.7
Health & Hospitals	2.3	4.7	5.9	6.5	13.1
Police and Fire	1.6	3.5	4.2	4.5	N/E
Sewerage and Sanitation	0.9	2.2	2.57	2.52	N/E
Natural Resources	0.7	1.6	2.0	2.3	N/E
Housing and Urban Renewal	10.6	1.2	1.40	1.46	N/E
Other	3.5	11.0	13.4	17.87	N/E

Sources: George S. Break, p. 138
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964, p. 413
Committee for Economic Development, "State-Local Projections to 1975."

* projected

risen to \$94.9 of which \$13.1 was intergovernmental revenue. Since then it has expanded apace.

Actually, this rising curve of expenditure under-represents demand. If we take expenditure as a rough and possibly minimum estimate of demand, we find that in recent years the Gross National Product has grown at something less than five percent, while state-local spending has risen at the rate of eight to nine percent a year. And demand always has seemed to outrun expenditure. All around this nation one sees unmet needs, unfulfilled hopes, wants and aspirations. Certainly the war in Vietnam has served to stifle expenditure, while failing to curb demand.

In partial response to this growth of demand, we have rapidly expanded the grant-in-aid system. But we have reached a point where the continued expansion of this system has begun to suffer from the law of diminishing returns, largely because its methods of targeting specific needs and meeting them with specific programs cannot cope with the vast numbers and kinds of different needs which now present themselves. Moreover, the categorical system has grown so vast and complex that it requires substantial reform even to meet the goals already set for it.

The purpose of the categorical system is two-fold: to achieve minimum levels of service throughout the nation in specific program areas, while strengthening the states and their local governments in the process. But as the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations noted in its study, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, the system itself, and particularly:

... some of its newer features

are causing problems that handicap these objectives. State and local governments, bewildered by the proliferation of grants, complexity of requirements, and actual or seeming duplication and overlapping, complain of an "information gap." Multiplying and different planning requirements foster confusion rather than co-ordination. States feel that they are losing their grip over public affairs within their jurisdiction due to the increasing practice of direct Federal-local grants . . .

The sheer number, variety and complexity of the grants available is enough to perplex even the most adept of state and local government officials. Most are simply not aware of all they are entitled to, or how many grants might suit their needs. In the area of co-ordination, the record is no better. There is such a wide variation in the matching ratios and the apportionment formulas used in grants, that one wonders whether there is any overall rationale, or even a rationale for each program. In *Fiscal Balance and the Federal System*, the ACIR found that for 180 grants administered by the Department of Health Education and Welfare, documented explanations could be found for only 21 of the 180 matching ratios and for 4 out of 64 apportionment formulas. This sort of evidence strongly suggests that grants in aid are in no position to be extended to meet new needs.

If this were not enough, one can find numerous examples of programmatic rigidity, red tape and obsolescence in the existing grant-in-aid system. The rigidity stems from the near impossibility of devising a grant program which takes into account the diversity in need and circumstances

of all potential recipients. The red tape stems from the fact that programs are enacted on a piecemeal basis, which leads to a fragmentation of interests and an over-specialization in function and approach. Obsolete programs are retained largely because of the support of groups with vested interests in "their" program. It is extremely difficult to eliminate any grant categories regardless of need.

Other problems exist. Matching requirements absorb a greater share of funds in poorer states than in rich ones. Legislatures in poorer states thus may be induced to divert funds from non-aided programs to meet the matching requirements and favor categorical programs over all others regardless of merit.

Expanded reliance on the categorical approach might well endanger the balance of the federal system for an even more important reason: the tendency of categorical grants to stifle state and local initiative, innovation and creativity. The inclination to respond to local problems by seeking yet another program from Washington has already turned most reformers away from their states and local communities. Further reliance on this device would only strengthen the growing tendency of state and local leaders to follow the reformers' lead to Washington rather than stimulating innovation in their own jurisdictions.

None of the foregoing criticisms should be construed as criticism of the categorical grant-in-aid *per se*. It is the very success of this system which should discourage its extension. As a device to raise the level of services, of technical competence, of personnel standards, of governmental and programmatic procedures, it has been very effective. As a device to force planning, program growth, and fulfillment of national goals in specific areas it has in fact brought the states and localities to the point where they are competent to apply untied federal money. Revenue-sharing, then, should be viewed as a necessary supplement to the categorical approach, not as a substitute for it.

Functional aid through block grants, proposed as an alternative to categorical aid, can serve to broaden the range of state discretion and lessen the problems inherent in the categorical system. In a very real way, it represents a res-

toration of the kind of federal aid supplied in the nineteenth century through the various land grant programs. "Block grants" such as the "Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Services Amendments of 1966", the Subsequent "Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967" and the "Law Enforcement and Crime Control Act of 1968" are steps in the right direction, enabling the states and localities to show how well they can do in planning comprehensive programs within the framework of Federal standards. Still, functional assistance simply broadens the grant category while retaining many of the restrictions associated with traditional grants-in-aid. The 1966 health act, for example, does much to encourage comprehensive state planning and the integration of state, local and private health care systems, but still gives the Surgeon General great power to approve or disapprove state plans. Moreover, the inclusion of requirements (e.g. "At least 15 per centum of a state's allotment under this subsection shall be available only to the state mental health authority for the provision under the state plan of mental health services") represents a reintroduction of categorical conditions through the backdoor.

This tendency of controls to seep into block grants is common under Congressional pressures. Examination of the "Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967," reveals the extent of this tendency. In addition to the above restriction, the 1967 Act adds the following "channeling" provision: "at least 70 per centum of the remainder of amount reserved for mental health services and at least 70 per centum of the remainder of a state's allotment under this subsection shall be available for only the provision under the state plan of services in communities of the state." To the extent that there is a serious interest in giving the states the wherewithal to expand their roles as autonomously innovative polities, assistance provided in this way is likely to fall short of expectations.

In sum, functional assistance in "block grants" could do a great deal to clear up the confusion, rigidity and complexity now extant in categorical aid. But to meet all of the needs now present in our federal system, to give states and localities the ability to meet

their own problems by themselves, untied revenue-sharing is needed.

The Fiscal Bind

The states and localities are unlikely to raise adequate money themselves. As Walter Heller points out, "of the 28 billion increase in state and local tax revenues between 1955 and 1975, 44 percent came from increased property taxes, 34 percent from increased sales and gross receipt taxes, and only 14 percent from individual and corporate income taxes." The reasons are closely related to the size of the Federal income tax "bite".

As long as the states and localities must rely most heavily on the property tax, the general sales tax, and the other use taxes, self-sufficiency is improbable. Those taxes rise at a rate equal to or less than the growth in the Gross National Product, while expenditures are rising at nearly eight to nine percent a year, nearly double the annual growth rate of the GNP. In fact, the elasticity ratio of state and local sales taxes—their responsiveness to economic growth and demand—is estimated by Selma Mushkin at 0.9, with general sales taxes having an estimated elasticity of 0.7. The personal income tax, on the other hand, has an elasticity coefficient of 1.7. When we compare these with the elasticity coefficients of state functions we see that those requirements are far higher than the fiscal tools can meet.

TABLE 2
Elasticity Coefficients of
State Functions

Functions	Elasticity Coefficient
Higher Education and Special Education	3.1
Highways	0.8
Public Welfare	1.5
Health and Hospitals	1.3

Source: William Robinson "The Fiscal Implications of Revenue Sharing" presented to the 1969 Annual Conference to Public Administration May 20, 1969 (Miami Florida). p. 8.

Local governments rely chiefly on property taxes. This tax is estimated to barely keep pace with the rise in the GNP, with an optimistic estimate of its responsiveness to growth being 0.9. These units are called upon to meet services with the following elasticity coefficients.

TABLE 3
Elasticity Coefficients of
Local Functions

Functions	Elasticity Coefficient
Local Schools	1.4
Police and Fire Protection	1.0
Sewerage and Sanitation	0.7
Local Parks and Recreation	1.1
Housing and Urban Renewal	0.8

Source: Robinson, p. 7.

Viewed in other terms, this means that taxes have had to rise in order to keep pace with expenditure needs, and will continue to go up unless we can find a more equitable and efficient way to meet the fiscal needs of states and localities. Lower level governments are making real tax efforts, but the increases are insufficient in relation to need, and often regressive to boot. While it is impossible to say just how high taxes can go, it is becoming clear that further increases in property and sales taxes will produce little positive benefit, and much hardship for the poor and the middle class.

One might ask why the states and localities don't resort to the income tax since it has a high productivity and would therefore provide more income for less tax effort. This form of taxation has been virtually pre-empted, however, by the Federal government. While it is true that states *could* (in the fiscal sense) increase their effective income tax rates, it is highly unlikely that they will find it politically feasible to do so. Every legislator and Governor is quite aware of the dangers inherent in raising taxes, and therefore tends to shy away from enacting new ones or radically expanding existing ones—particularly a highly visible and heavily used levy such as the income tax. Despite the spurt of income tax enactments in the sixties (caused largely out of desperation and at great political risk), few elected officials are willing to risk the storm of protest that would undoubtedly erupt from the taxpayers if the tax rates were radically raised.

Perhaps as significant as the fear of a taxpayer revolt, states and localities are reluctant to raise taxes for fear of driving out business. Whether this apprehension is grounded in reality or not, it acts as a significant deterrent on tax increases.

Even if some states and localities could raise the necessary revenues, others—including some already making great efforts at revenue-raising, and

some heavily impacted by the national problems of migration from the South—simply do not have the resource base to match money with needs. For them, the Federal Government still has an equalizing role to play. Consequently, it would be just as unwise to force the states and their localities to "go it alone" as it would be to rely solely on categorical grants. Either tendency fails to capitalize on the resources of both the Federal government and the states and localities.

To the extent that equalization of resources among the states is a goal of Federal aid, functional grants will be less effective than a properly constructed revenue-sharing program. The record of the present grant-in-aid system is mixed as an equalizing agency. At the same time, interstate equalization has been increasing as a result of trends in the nation's economic development since World War II. A good revenue-sharing formula can give appropriate impetus to those trends while stimulating more equitable state and local tax effort, by inducing reforms in state tax structures.

Critics of the states claim that the states and localities will not spend their general support funds wisely. Most critics, however, do not claim that categorical grant monies are misspent. Yet no clear distinction can be made between the two funds once they enter state hands. Since these new funds will act as supplements to old grants, the funds will be largely commingled. Consequently they will be protected by the requirements that surround the categorical programs. Just as it is now difficult to isolate state funds in programs receiving Federal aid, it will be difficult to isolate general support funds. And just as the indistinguishability of categorical grant funds from state funds has brought a general improvement in the handling and spending of all funds, so will the inseparability of general support and categorical grants.

Beyond that minimum, an examination of past expenditure records shows that the overwhelming majority of the states and localities are not likely to misuse the funds. Their largest expenditures, those for education, health, welfare, and highways, are in those areas which also show the greatest and fastest increasing needs. In every likelihood, the states will have to use their

new money as they have in the past. On the whole, sheer necessity makes the states and localities responsive to real domestic needs, and public pressure will make them at least as responsible and prudent agents for dealing with those needs as the Federal government, preoccupied also with foreign policy and defense.

There are those who would argue that a system of general support payments unwisely divorces tax and expenditure responsibilities. But the general program is neither massive enough nor comprehensive enough to drive out categorical grants, or to lessen the strong pressures for continued state and local efforts. Strong incentives built into the system for increasing tax effort and major tax reform ought to more than offset any untoward effects of general support money acting as "free money".

These benefits, in fact, may be best secured if revenue-sharing funds are combined in a single package with credits against state and local taxes. This combination will reinforce the fiscal independence of state and local tax systems by supplementing and strengthening their tax base. Revenue sharing will act as a supplement, and tax credits will reduce the effects of Federal preemption of the income tax, enabling states to raise or introduce this progressive levy without substantially increasing the tax burden on its citizens. In effect, the Federal Government is surrendering some of its income tax revenues to encourage an already strong trend in the states.

The amount of money that will be collected under the proposed incentive system will far exceed the sum the Federal government would have collected if there were no tax credit. For under the proposal an increase in state tax rates creates a somewhat lesser increase in the amount deductible from Federal tax returns. The gap between rate increases and amounts deductible under the tax credit, however, is small enough not to significantly diminish the real income of the taxpayer. Since major revenue gains are dependent on economic growth, moreover, the higher tax receipts will be accompanied by increases in real income that should reduce adverse taxpayer reactions.

Some critics contend that the use of Federal tax credits is coercive. However, combining such credits with a general support measure would tend to

mitigate any coercion. In any event, a good case may be made in favor of inducing states to use more progressive and productive taxes to strengthen their own fiscal bases, especially since the major impediment to the use of the income tax is the existing intergovernmental fiscal arrangement, reserving this most progressive and productive revenue source chiefly for the Federal government.

The Pass-through Dilemma

A major stumbling block to revenue-sharing has been the question of how the funds are to be distributed within states, given the great needs of the big cities. It would be most in keeping with the spirit of revenue-sharing as well as most effective to have each state devise a pass-through program based on its own state-local projections and plans. The diverse and unique needs of each state, the variety in levels of aid to localities, and the diversity in methods used for meeting needs and solving problems suggests that it is inadvisable to set any general requirements in this regard. Thus, if a state chooses to use the funds to assume financial responsibility for a program previously left to its local subdivision — or, if a state chooses to support a metropolitan regional government rather than specific cities and counties — it will have those options unimpaired.

The desire to insure that funds go to cities and counties, especially in urban areas, is understandable in light of the very real needs and sizable problems facing these governments. We believe, however, that state governments have now shown a definite commitment to aid their localities: they already transfer more money to local governments than they receive in grants-in-aid. In 1966, states granted over \$16.8 billion to local governments while receiving \$11.9 billion in grants from the federal government. Of the \$16.8 billion granted, \$10.1 billion went for education, and \$2.8 billion for welfare. States have focused on the major established functions of local government since the 1930's; but there is no demonstrated reason to believe that they will not support newer functions and encourage innovation if the resources are available. The longtime problem that state malapportionment will skew aid loses validity in light of *Baker v. Carr*.

The "pass-through" requirements

suggested in the various proposed measures are motivated by a fear that the biggest cities may not get the funds they need unless some method is devised to compel states to give them more. Thus, the formulas proposed are generally based on some arbitrary dividing line based on population. But the distinction between cities and counties of various sizes seems to assume a uniformity in urban style and problems which runs counter to what we know about American cities. This approach simply does not take into account the full range of local differences such as the amount of need, the level of state aid, the potential resources of the urban area, and the exact nature of the problems there. The formulas tend to focus on population, poverty, general state entitlement and local revenue ratio. Yet no one specific formula can equitably apply to all the implausible multiplicity of local problems, efforts, and jurisdictions.

We conclude that the amount of aid ought to be determined in light of the situation in each state and the best agencies for making such a determination are the states themselves.

The fact that urban areas will experience a far heavier demand for public services than non-urban areas does not dictate mandating general support funds for this purpose. Indeed, it is inefficient to attempt to provide the massive special aid certain local governments need largely through revenue-sharing funds. The best way to meet specific urban problems and to provide the bulk of specialized urban services is through a mixture of revenue-sharing, categorical grants and bloc grants. Most of the really difficult urban problems are best solved through directing large sums of money to specific targets as under Model Cities, the various anti-poverty programs, and the like, not revenue-sharing.

The "pass-through" requirement also inhibits state creativity and innovation in designing new methods and structures for dealing with the urban situation. Inasmuch as the proposed "pass-through" requirements assign funds to local governments as they are currently structured, it fosters, indeed enhances the present local division of civil functions, effectively "freezing" them in perpetuity. Recently, many states have made changes in the allocation of those functions and are now considering us-

ing blocs of counties for the distribution of aid and the solution of common problems. Since 1966, most states have divided counties into planning districts, and some have begun using these counties and cities as single units for funding purposes.

Minnesota has created a metropolitan council for the eight-county Twin Cities region which is in the process of assuming many functions of metropolitan wide significance that will require additional financing and which could legitimately draw from the revenue-sharing funds now to be earmarked for individual cities, counties, and school districts in the metropolitan area. In fact, Minnesota has developed similar regional councils for the non-metropolitan parts of the state that may someday provide a real measure of local government reorganization. Similarly, the Governor of Michigan has proposed state assumption of all education costs and Massachusetts is already moving to absorb all local welfare costs. An earmarked and rigid pass-through scheme would inhibit the state's ability to conduct such experiments. Existing governmental jurisdictions would be assured of funds regardless of state policies even though many people now favor new experiments in jurisdiction and responsibility. In sum, both traditional constitutional arguments and the logic of present needs militate for giving the states the option of dispersing aid to their localities functionally and governmentally, or in any combination of the two.

There are other benefits in allowing states to determine the character of any "pass-through." If state legislatures are permitted to determine the intra-state distribution of the funds, then considerable public attention may be drawn to the political process at the state level. Too often, our state and local governments are harmed because they labor in relative obscurity. Many of our brighter and more critical citizens tend to focus attention on Washington, while ignoring crucial issues at home. State and local office holding seems unattractive to such people because few of their peers attach any importance to such offices or the issues that may envelop them. The creation of interest in state and local politics engendered by revenue-sharing could thus have a beneficial effect on state

and local politics in general and make an additional contribution to the health of the American body politic by encouraging greater citizen participation in the policy-making process.

Furthermore, by transferring decision-making powers unfettered to the states, the generalists in state government—the governors and legislators—will have a major tool for regaining control of state policy-making that has passed into the hands of the functional bureaucrats as a result of federal grant-in-aid programs, thereby serving to somewhat redress the balance.

Summary

The states and their political subdivisions have experienced a sharp increase in the demand for the public services they provide. At the same time, and not necessarily as a result of their

own deficiencies, these governments find themselves saddled with revenue systems which are largely insufficient and inadequate. In an attempt to provide states and localities with the necessary funds to supply needed public services, the categorical grant-in-aid system has been severely overextended, causing severe strains and creating sizable problems in the provision of services recognized to be of national concern. To rely exclusively on the methods of intergovernmental sharing would only increase those problems and further enfeeble the federal system. It has been shown to be equally implausible to turn to increased state and local taxes alone. The problems inherent in the present state-local tax structure and virtual Federal preemption of the income tax requires major

reform of state and local tax systems before their productivity can be substantially increased. Given the limitation of the present systems of aid and taxation, a new form of intergovernmental sharing needs to be adopted.

The combination of revenue-sharing with a Federal income tax credit for state and local income taxes offers the best program for meeting the fiscal needs of the states and localities. It also provides useful incentives for tax reform and increased tax effort. Such a combination rests on the fundamentally American premise that the states and localities are the proper and most competent entities for dealing with domestic problems and seeks to strengthen and invigorate them as viable partners in the American federal system.

LETTERS *continued from page 2*

Ireland "Trouble"

I agree completely with your point (Doris White, "Kenedy's Romantic Futilities," FORUM, December) that the I.R.A., and indeed the Troubles in general, are more the result of economic stagnation and boredom, and the intransigence of the Unionists, than anything else. Westminster has tried to ignore the issue for fifty years, and Heath's majority would drop by 24 if he lost the Unionists (important at present as it only stands at about 30, with the contentious Common Market legislation to come). Dublin, too, has ignored the I.R.A. and the divisive result of having a second armed force in the country, but it is questionable how much longer this can go on, as the opposition could win the next election in the South. Certainly the trouble in the North could be seen as directly related to the unemployment figures (now over 1,000,000, about 35-40 percent higher than in the summer of 1970 and proportionately very high in Ulster, especially in Belfast and Londonderry).

I also agree that those "Irish" no longer living in Ireland see far more romance in the I.R.A. and Irish freedom than those living there. Ireland should be reunited, but Christ knows how. For hundreds of years the Irish had a dream of independence, and when that came not all Ireland wanted it. It seems that many "Irish" could not reconcile themselves to it. Perhaps the further away they were the more romantic they became: just as the Palestinians seem more romantic from further away, and the squalid death of a particularly incompetent guerrilla in Bolivia has assumed an emotional aura out of proportion with events. Those who see romance in this or any other revolution might read W. B. Yeats:

"Was it for this the wild geese spread
The grey wing upon every tide;
For this that all this blood was shed,
For this Edward Fitzgerald died
And Robert Emmet and Wolfe Tone
And that delirium of the brave?
Romantic Ireland's dead and gone
It's with O'Leary in the grave."

MICHAEL GOODWIN
London, England.

Daycare Controversy (cont.)

George Gilder's analysis of the child care controversy (FORUM, February) surpassed even the January editorial in cogency. Mr. Gilder displayed a capacity rare among Liberals, in my experience, of analyzing the probable impact of a new program on employment patterns, psycho-social relationships and the economic situation.

It may be true that in arguing against "new Democratic social schemes" Conservatives have in the past laid themselves open to the charge of obstructionism. As a Conservative myself, I have always felt that we had sufficient evidence. But even if we didn't, I think we felt the "discipline of scarcity" in our hips.

One small correction. Gilder refers to the vetoed bill as "the Democratic daycare bill." Yet the bill is correctly identified elsewhere in the magazine as the "Javits-Mondale Bill." Does Ripon know something I don't?

GORDON S. JONES
Alexandria, Va.

When will people give up the myth of the protective, supportive, totally woman-fulfilling image of the male? The breakup of the marriages of the 40's generation should tell you the young women of this generation can not settle for being just wives and mothers. There is no job security for them, no divorce insurance. They will not accept the you-made-your-bed-now-lie-in-it philosophy of their grandmothers.

There is an army of women who've been working these last 20 years who are and were the sole support of their children. There was no opportunity for them to get re-education or further education or even to apply their college educations. They took the jobs they could get, nearly always under-paid, passed-over for promotions. Their daughters are not as naive — they are demanding and getting education and the opportunity to compete equally in the job-market.

The male population can no longer decide what is best for the female population!

Besides, most people today agree that children are better off with a part-time mother (as well as father) who gives love, understanding and attention than with the housewife-servant dullard mother who is bored and boring, at home all day with the children.

So get on with that comprehensive day care bill to cover all economic and cultural levels of society. In the meantime, as Rep. Orval Hansen noted (FORUM, February), women are going to work even if the odds are high and adequate childcare is hard to find.

Ms. MARY W. SULLIVAN
Memphis, Tenn.

"We The People"

By November 7th voters will have been deluged with 30 and 60 second radio and TV spot commercials designed to sell candidates.

Candidates' steering committees and managers will have spent months studying polls and trends and statistics of recent voting patterns to determine what words and deeds will bring about a winning combination.

As government becomes more complex and more remote from the people, it is becoming apparent that a politician's work is less and less involved with benefits

for the individual citizen, and more and more involved with manipulating the electorate so as to preserve the office-holder in his seat of power and influence.

It is becoming more and more risky for a politician to focus his intelligence, conscience and energy on matters that concern people. If he wishes to retain his public office, a politician must cater to the advantage of the larger campaign contributor. If, along the way, some progress is made toward eliminating inequities in the public interest — fine. The politician can "point with pride" at the public gain he helped bring about.

The confusion, distrust and apathy of the people is easy to understand. What is a citizen to believe? Who can he believe in?

Maybe, when November 7th is behind us, we grass-roots voters will take stock of the political words and deeds of 1972, and demand that our public servants cease looking upon "We, the People" as voter statistics.

Maybe, by 1974 and 1976, "We, the People" can find and work to elect candidates who understand that we are not statistics — that we are living, breathing, hoping individuals who believe in the pledge to the flag.

CLARA LINK
Pasadena, California

A U.S. Attorney's View of "Crimes Without Victims"

On the whole, I find Peter Baugher's "Crimes Without Victims" (FORUM, February) to be a worthwhile effort and I'm in substantial agreement with most of the viewpoints that you express. The following comments are meant to sharpen certain aspects of the argument from the point of view of one involved in the law enforcement process on a day-to-day basis.

1. In dealing with the criminal justice system as with most other phenomena of American society, we are all guilty of a tendency to "play games" with statistics. I must confess that I am frequently guilty of this offense myself. Arrest statistics are a particularly vulnerable area in which to draw conclusions. For example, comparing a number of arrests for drunkenness, prostitution, gambling or drug offenses with a single arrest for murder and finding an imbalance in the allocation of resources by the police solely on this basis is simply a non sequitur. The activities are "apples and oranges" since a murder investigation leading to an arrest or arrests may involve hours, days, or even months, of effort and expenditures of resources while "dragnet" types of arrests in the other areas may take only a matter of minutes. This is not meant to detract from the point that enforcement efforts directed against so-called "crimes without victims" may be misguided, but merely to state that the quantifying of the disparity is extremely difficult.

2. Perhaps an allied point can be made by examining some of the statistics set forth in your paper. If we accept Arlen Specter's thesis that clearance rates for major crimes would be higher "if the police were not busy with drunks," such clearance rates in St. Louis should have improved spectacularly during the period when police "virtually discontinued" arrests for drunkenness and should be well advanced in the cities of Washington, D. C. and Atlanta. No such data is included, however, in your paper. Theoretically, perhaps even more spectacular results should have occurred in the District of Columbia with the recent complete repeal of criminal penalties for intoxication as against the earlier period, but the data is lacking. Similarly, New York City having "virtually discontinued" arrests for drunkenness should show a better clearance rate than other metropolitan areas not having followed suit. This, I suspect, not to be the case. In fact, none of the above is probably demonstrable. The assessment of the efficacy of changes in emphasis by police is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure and makes the task of advocacy which you have undertaken just that more difficult. Perhaps a "case study" with respect to the communities you mention, might well be undertaken on a "before and after" basis which would offer some support in this regard.

3. More likely, however, the "disturbingly high percentage of major violations that remain unsolved" to

which you refer is not due to "drunk chasing," but relates instead to underlying deficiencies in our police establishment. In this regard, based on my experience as Chairman of the Allegheny Regional Planning Council for the Governor's Justice Commission (the Pennsylvania LEAA funding vehicle), I must disagree with your suggestion that the problem is strictly one of "money . . . to finance the multitude of improvements" needed. The improvement of the criminal justice system is an effort requiring a massive political commitment as well, just as is the needed reform in our criminal laws which you have addressed yourself to. I find parochial attitudes and a desire to continue the status quo and protect various vested interests the major obstacle to improvement of the local criminal justice system with which we must deal in the Pittsburgh area. In fact, we have a difficult time finding worthwhile projects to which we can in good conscience distribute federal largesse under the Safe Streets Act. More often than not, funds are sought merely to continue the old ways and the system which has proved so inadequate in the past. Mere dollars will not suffice without the accompanying progressive political leadership to guide their expenditure.

4. In connection with your proposals regarding the gambling problem, our conclusions appear to be substantially the same, except that I am not so sure that the effect of state lotteries will be merely to shift the "play" from the organized crime syndicates to the state and make the "benefactors . . . the citizenry rather than the Mafiosi." I think it more likely that a state lottery will attract a whole new clientele while the racket-run operations will continue to flourish with the bulk of its "old" customers. This is due to the inherent non-competitive nature of all existing state lotteries when compared to the numbers operations.

5. Insofar as the fall-out from illegal gambling goes, I think the major price by far that we pay is through the corruption of public officials who "look the other way" while multi-billion dollar businesses are carried out under their nose. This mass condoning of illegal activity effects a kind of morality backlash insofar as, particularly, blacks, the disadvantaged and the young are concerned.

6. With respect to narcotics and dangerous drugs, your points are very well taken. I, for one, am appalled at the number of arrests made by local law enforcement officials and characterized as "narcotics arrests" when they are, more often than not, "busts" of young people for mere possession of marihuana. Somewhat by way of confession and avoidance, I must note that police activities in this regard are in many cases the result of tremendous pressures exerted upon them for "results" by a hysterical public — largely uninformed about the problem of drug abuse.

7. While I agree with your suggestion with re-

spect to rehabilitation and treatment of alcoholics and drug abusers, the problem of "how" is overpowering. In the Greater Pittsburgh area, for example, we have funded with \$2.2 million in LEAA funds a comprehensive rehabilitation program for drug abusers incorporating all of the recognized modalities for treatment of different kinds of abusers. This program will extend over a 2-year period and be the subject of an intensive evaluation to determine which, if any, of the programs we have funded have made any headway at all towards reducing the problems of the drug abuser. I am not very sanguine, as you might gather, as to whether any significant impact will be made, but at least we are not "putting all our eggs in one basket" and succumbing to the blandishments of the various pitchmen for one treatment modality or the other. I mention this only to diminish a little bit your characterization of various drug rehabilitation and treatment programs.

There is, in short, no easy answer to this vexing problem and we must beware of all those who indicate otherwise.

As to the "practicalities of reform" I am somewhat puzzled again as to the "how" of another of your proposed solutions. You suggest that "the federal government should take the lead in carrying out the programs suggested above." Unfortunately, most of the areas wherein you justly find fault with the law enforcement process are solely within the province of state and local government. Federal law enforcement activities derive strictly from the limited legislative mandate given by the Congress. While much more can in fact be done to "take the lead," there are practical limitations on how far the federal government can proceed.

RICHARD L. THORNBURGH
United States Attorney
Pittsburgh, Pa.

14a ELIOT STREET

● The February 15, 1972 FORUM reported that Congressman Charles A. Mosher of Ohio would opt for the Merchant Marine Committee, rather than the Science and Astronautics Committee on which he is now ranking, if he is the senior Republican on both committees come next January. Mosher has said that he wishes to retain his current position as ranking member on Science. We regret this error.

● More than 100 people attended the ten issues seminars sponsored by Ripon in conjunction with the Society's National Governing Board Meeting in Detroit, April 21-23. Representatives of Detroit's civic, industrial and governmental communities joined with NGB members in the two hour sessions to analyze eight new policy papers and to discuss new approaches on 14 public policy issues.

Papers from the seminars and tape recordings of the discussions will form the nucleus for a special platform issue of the FORUM to be published this summer. Ripon members who have policy analyses or recommendations for the platform should send them to Dick Beeman, Policy Chairman, c/o 14a Eliot Street.

HUD Secretary George Romney's speech to the gathering will be published in part in a future issue of the FORUM.

● Lee Huebner, Deputy Special Assistant to the President, was the featured speaker at the Annual Ripon Republican Club Anniversary dinner held in Ripon, Wisconsin April 8.

● Ripon Governing Board member, Mrs. Kati Sasseville of Minneapolis, was elected the first woman president of the Minnesota Law School Council. Mrs. Sasseville is interested in government and would like to run for public office.

● New York Ripon member, Malcolm McKay has been recently promoted to First Deputy Superintendent of Insurance of New York State.

● The Ripon Society's national president Howard Gillette moderated a panel on the 1972 elections on April 12 at George Washington University. Included on the panel were Congressman Lewis Stokes (Chairman, Black Caucus), Doris Mizner (Executive Director, National Women's Political Caucus), Jeff Bell (American Conservative Union) and Sandy Dement (Youth Citizenship Fund).

● Dennis L. Gibson, president of the Detroit/Ann Arbor chapter, and Deputy Director for the Department of Licensing and Regulation of the Michigan Selective Service System, was appointed as Community Relations Advisor to the State Director.

CAMBRIDGE: On April 5 the Annual Boston-Cambridge Chapter Dinner, held at the Parker House in Boston, heard Mr. John Gardner of Common Cause speak on Secrecy and Money in Politics. In a recent chapter election Robert Stewart became the new president, replacing Joel Greene, who now serves as vice president. Mr. Gus Southworth was elected secretary, and Evelyn Ellis, former editor of the FORUM, was elected treasurer.

CHICAGO: On March 8 the Chicago Ripon chapter had as its guest speaker James Nolan, Governor Ogilvie's running mate for Lieutenant Governor.

DETROIT/ANN ARBOR: The Hon. Edward F. Bell, Judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court, spoke March 14 on the topic "Can the Problem of the Cities be Solved?" Elections for new officers were also held at this meeting, and the results were: Dennis L. Gibson, Jr., President; Wilma Goldstein, Vice President; Mary Low, Secretary; and William Halbert, Treasurer. The scheduled speaker for the May meeting is Mr. Barry Brown, Director of the Michigan Department of Labor.

NEW HAVEN: A reception and dinner for Congressman John Anderson, Chairman of the House Republican Conference, was held March 9 at the Yale Law School.

NEW YORK: Ripon's John B. Price, Jr., who served as chief aide to Daniel P. Moynihan and Executive Secretary to the President's Council for Urban Affairs, spoke March 7 to the chapter on his experiences on the White House staff. Scheduled speakers for upcoming meetings include Congressman Charles B. Rangel who will discuss narcotics addiction and his approach to heroin control; and Louis J. Lefkowitz, New York's Attorney General, a leading spokesman on consumer frauds.

Four new committees have been recently formed within the chapter: The Housing and Community Development Committee, under the chairmanship of Bill Noe, and a Youth and College Activities Committee, led by Joel Rosenthal.

A Financial Planning Committee and a Community Health Problems Committee have also been formed, under the leadership of Maurice T. Moore and Joel A. Bennett.

On March 1 three Ripon members Patricia Ann Jurek, Joel Rosenthal and Werner Kuhn, spent the day in Albany lobbying and testifying before the Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Law concerning Senator Gordon's No-Fault Insurance Bill.

PITTSBURGH: In a recent chapter election Murray Dickman, a Master's candidate in Urban Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon University and a political consultant with Politicon, was elected President; Jim Groninger, an attorney with Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchison, was re-elected Treasurer; and Sue Taischoff was elected Secretary. The April meeting hosted McKeesport mayor, Zoran Popovich, a Congressional candidate from the Monongahela Valley, and Bernie Markovitz, candidate for the Republican nomination in the Twenty-third Legislative District. And plans are underway for a legislative seminar to be held May 20 to which all Republican candidates for the fall election will be invited.

WASHINGTON, D.C.: At a meeting of the D.C. chapter on March 16, Congressman Bill Frenzel and Susan King, Washington Director for the National Committee for an Effective Congress, spoke about the Congressional bill which limits campaign spending and requires detailed reporting of contributions and expenditures. Frenzel and King were instrumental in the passage of the first comprehensive campaign spending and disclosure bill since the Corrupt Practices Act of 1924.



Reiter Discovers Nixon Source

We in the Ripon Society have always identified with the Lincoln tradition of Republicanism. We use his profile on our letterhead, and we invoke his name and his wisdom from time to time.

Because of this, it will be of interest to Ripon members that an important new piece of Lincolniana has recently been unearthed by scholars. It is an address which Lincoln prepared on the day he was assassinated, intended for delivery the following week. I'd like to offer a few excerpts, both for their own sake and because I think they shed light on the problems of our own day. — HOWARD L. REITER

Tonight I want to talk to you about one of the most difficult issues of our time. The issue of slavery.

Across the nation, in the North, East, West and South, states, cities, and localities have been torn apart in debate over this issue.

My own position is well known. I am opposed to emancipation for the purpose of achieving an end to slavery. I have spoken out against emancipation scores of times over many years.

I believe most Americans, white and black, share that view.

What we need now is not just speaking out against emancipation, but action to stop it. The reason action is so urgent is because of a number of recent decisions of the lower Federal courts. Those courts have gone too far; in some cases beyond the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in line with the Thirteenth Amendment.

The decisions have left in their wake confusion and contradiction in the law; anger, fear and turmoil in local communities; and worst of all, agonizing concern among hundreds of thousands of people for the welfare and safety of those slaves who have been forced to go miles away from their plantations.

There are those who say we need another Con-

stitutional amendment to stop more emancipation, but that would take too long. There are those who say, carry out the Thirteenth Amendment to the letter. No, my friends, that would be the easy way.

In short, some say, obey the Constitution. Others say, disobey the Constitution. I shall take a middle course.

First, I shall propose legislation that would call an immediate halt — a moratorium — on all new emancipation.

Next I shall propose a companion measure — the Equal Slave Opportunities Act of 1865. It will concentrate Federal funds in the area of greatest need. My personal Secretary, Mr. John Hay, has already donated a portion of his salary to start this fund, and we will be soliciting voluntary contributions elsewhere.

Now, the purpose of emancipation is to end slavery. But experience in case after case has shown that emancipation is a bad means to a good end. The frank recognition of that fact does not reduce our commitment to ending slavery. It simply tells us that we have to come up with a better means to that good end. Let me close with a personal note. There are right reasons for opposing emancipation, and there are wrong reasons — and most people, including large and increasing numbers of blacks, oppose it for reasons that have little or nothing to do with race. It would compound an injustice to persist in emancipation simply because some people oppose it for the wrong reasons.

The way we handle this difficult issue is a supreme test of the character, the responsibility and the decency of the American people. Let us handle it in a way we can be proud of — by uniting behind a program which will make it possible for all the slaves in this country to enjoy a better life — but *not* in my neighborhood.

RIPON FORUM

CUMULATIVE ALPHABETICAL INDEX

Volume VII Number 1 through Volume VII Number 18

Entries have been made by subject, author, and article. As a final convenience for the user of this index, Ripon is making available reproduced copies of any pages at 25 cents per page for orders of four or fewer pages and 20 cents per page for orders of five or more. Simply specify volume, number, and page and address orders to:

Circulation Manager
Ripon FORUM
14a Eliot Street
Cambridge, Mass.
02138

- Agnew, Spiro T.; Article on politics of, by Howard Reiter, No. 3, pp. 13-16, 18-20. At Republican Governors Conference, No. 2, p. 5. Buckley, William on, No. 6, pp. 5-6. Decline of, No. 7, p. 3. Excerpts from speech to Republican Luncheon, Sioux Falls, S.D., No. 3, p. 17. Illinois visits in 1970 campaign, No. 1, p. 5. In results of Ripon 1970 poll, No. 2, pp. 7-9. Janeway, Sen. calls for replacement of, No. 3, p. 9. Quoted in Battle Line, No. 5, pp. 3-4. Spot on 1972 ticket, No. 3, pp. 3-4. Supports William Cowger, No. 1, p. 8. Supports Cole McMartin, No. 1, pp. 6-7. YAF votes support, No. 12, p. 1.
- Alabama; 1972 Senatorial race preview, No. 6, p. 6, No. 11, p. 8.
- Alaska; Post 1970 election politics in, No. 9, pp. 6, 20. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 9.
- Allenberry Assembly; Two Ripon chapters discuss activities. No. 6, pp. 13-14.
- Allott, Gordon; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 9.
- Americans for Democratic Action; Criticized for partisanship. No. 17, p. 24.
- Amnesty; Sen. Charles Goodell on, No. 5, p. 6. Taft bill, No. 18, p. 2.
- Anderson, John; Campaign financing bill proposal, No. 1, p. 22.
- Anderson, Clinton; 1972 election race, No. 11, p. 11.
- Andrus, Cecil D.; Performance evaluated, No. 7, p. 7.
- Arkansas; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 9. Young Republicans League broken up, No. 7, p. 4. Reapportionment in, No. 8, p. 3.
- Ashbrook, John; Opposes Nixon, No. 18, p. 1.
- Askew Reubin; Corporate income tax approved, No. 16, p. 5.
- Attica; Riot investigated by state officials, No. 15, p. 18.
- Auspitz, Josiah Lee; Article by, on Nixon's domestic programs, No. 3, pp. 11-12. Co-author of article on Pakistan, No. 5, pp. 10-12, 8. Editorial statement by, No. 4, p. 4.
- Baker, Howard H.; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 12. Re-election and busing, No. 5, p. 5.
- Bayh, Birch; Presidential candidacy of, No. 11, pp. 16-17.
- Bayley, Christopher; Indictments made by, No. 10, p. 1.
- Behn, Robert D.; Article by, on the ADA, No. 17, p. 24. Article by, on Monday Magazine, No. 9, p. 24.
- Berkowitz, Stephen; Article by, on John Connally, No. 2, pp. 12-14, 23.
- Biafra; Article on, by William G. Rogers, No. 5, pp. 13-21.
- Boggs, J. Caleb, Guest Editorial by, on job training, No. 7, p. 12. 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 9, No. 18, p. 2.
- Brock, William; Influence on Tennessee politics, No. 7, p. 6.
- Brooke, Edward, Sen.; Re-election chances evaluated, No. 1, p. 4, No. 11, p. 10.
- Brown, Clifford; Articles by, on Democrats, No. 9, pp. 9-19, No. 11, pp. 13-18, No. 15, pp. 20-22.
- Buckley, James; And Republican campaign debts, No. 3, p. 4. Attacks Nixon's defense program and SALT strategy, No. 11, p. 4. Wooing the GOP, No. 6, pp. 6-7.
- Buckley, William; On Agnew, No. 6, pp. 5-6.
- Bumpers, Dale; Reapportionment and black support, No. 8, p. 3.
- Burger, Warren, Chief Justice; Issues busing opinion, No. 12, p. 14.
- Busing; Burger, Warren, issues opinion on, No. 12, p. 4. Nixon, Richard, statement on Austin desegregation, No. 10, pp. 1, 4. No. 12, p. 4. HEW Austin desegregation plan, No. 8, pp. 1, 4.
- Cahill, William; Performance evaluated in light of VP nod, No. 17, p. 17. Popularity of, No. 12, p. 3.
- California; Analysis of 1970 election, No. 1, p. 7. Democrats failure to minorities in, No. 13, pp. 21, 20. Legislature's relations to Gov. Reagan, No. 3, pp. 5-6. OEO agency investigated, No. 6, p. 11. Reapportionment in, No. 6, pp. 24, 21. Republican convention delegation, No. 15, p. 24. State Senate reform urged, No. 7, pp. 20, 13. State Senate special election, No. 11, p. 6.
- Campaign financing; Bill proposed by John Anderson, No. 1, p. 22.
- Capra, Paul; N.H. Mayoral race, No. 14, p. 4.
- Carter, Jimmy; Challenged, No. 13, p. 20.
- Case, Clifford; 1972 re-election chances evaluated, No. 1, p. 4, No. 11, p. 11.
- Chapman, Bruce; Seattle City Council race, No. 14, p. 2. Electee, No. 16, p. 6.
- Chavez, Cesar; Opposition to Taft-Hartley Act, No. 17, p. 21.
- China; Nixon, Richard initiative towards, No. 10, p. 2. Nixon Policy favored, No. 16, p. 3.
- Clark, Ramsey; Attacked by Sen. Dole, No. 4, p. 12.
- College Republican National Committee; Factionalism in, No. 4, pp. 5-6.
- Colorado; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 9.

- Common Cause; Criticized by Monday, No. 5, p. 8. Ripon praises reform efforts of, No. 1, p. 3.
- Conable, Barbara; Republican Task Force on Seniority, No. 3, pp. 6-7.
- Conference on Youth; Report resolutions obscured by Administration, No. 17, p. 16.
- Connally, John; Appointment as Secretary of Treasury, No. 2, p. 4. As advisor on international economics, No. 8, p. 3. Editorial on appointment of, No. 6, p. 12. Editorial on economic policies of, No. 12, p. 2. Examined as Nixon running-mate, No. 17, pp. 15-16. Reaction to appointment by Republican Governors Conference, No. 2, p. 5. And Southern Military Industrial Complex, No. 2, pp. 12-14, 23.
- Connecticut; General Assembly's controversies, No. 9, p. 5. Governor Meskill's control of state party, No. 7, p. 8. Reapportionment of General Assembly ordered, No. 15, p. 18. Mayor Ucello appointed to Transportation Department, No. 5, p. 3.
- Conventions (Political); Deadlock dynamics, No. 15, pp. 20-22. Cooper, John Sherman; Retirement effects, No. 11, p. 10.
- Cotton, Norris; Opposition to Vietnam War, No. 14, p. 2.
- Crane, Philip; As Percy challenger, No. 1, p. 4. 1970 election, No. 1, p. 5.
- Curtis, Carl T.; 1972 election race, No. 11, p. 11.
- Daley, Richard; Control of delegates, No. 9, p. 11. Affect on 1970 election, No. 1, p. 5. Mayoral race, No. 4, pp. 8-9. Results of mayoral election, No. 5, p. 3.
- Danforth, Jack; Barred from Mo. gubernatorial race, No. 6, p. 10.
- Davis, Mendel; Elected to River's seat, No. 6, p. 9.
- Day Care; Assistance plan, No. 15, p. 12.
- Decentralization; Article on, by Patricia Lines, No. 1, pp. 15-22.
- Delegate apportionment; Recommendations of DO Committee, No. 10, p. 4, No. 11, p. 7. Within Democratic Party, No. 9, p. 10. McGovern Commission, No. 11, p. 7. Procedures of R.N.C., No. 12, p. 2. Ripon Suit over, No. 16, p. 6, No. 18, p. 1.
- Delaware; Gubernatorial race, No. 17, p. 16. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 9, No. 18, p. 2.
- Democrats; Articles on candidates, conventions, strategies of, by Clifford Brown, No. 9, pp. 9-19, No. 11, pp. 13-18, No. 15, pp. 20-22. Presidential candidates, No. 7, p. 3.
- Department of Defense; Chart from Report by Melvin Laird, No. 5, p. 7.
- Dewey, Thomas E.; Impact on American politics, No. 4, p. 3.
- District of Columbia; Delegate election for House seat, No. 3, pp. 7-8, No. 5, p. 3.
- Dole, Robert; Decline of popularity in Kansas, No. 15, p. 19. On Agnew, No. 3, p. 3. On Ramsey Clark, No. 4, p. 12. Withdraws sponsorship of undeclared war bill, No. 10, p. 2.
- Dunn, Charles; Article by, on Illinois' new constitution, No. 1, pp. 10-14.
- Dunn, Winfield; Article on, by Sam Williams, No. 4, pp. 21-24. Position in state GOP, No. 7, p. 6. Tax proposals of, No. 4, p. 6.
- Eastland, James; 1972 election race, No. 11, p. 11.
- Ellender, Allen; 1972 election race, No. 11, p. 10.
- Emberton, Tom; Gubernatorial campaign of, No. 14, pp. 1, 3, No. 7, pp. 7-8.
- Family Assistance Plan; Moynihan, Patrick on, No. 15, pp. 4-7. Ripon editorial on, No. 15, p. 3. Passed by House, No. 8, p. 3.
- Farmworkers; Article on, by Ruth L. Glushien, No. 17, pp. 19-23.
- Finch, Robert; Defends Administration, No. 1, p. 3.
- Florida; Performance of Sen. Ed Gurney, No. 13, pp. 5-6.
- Foley, Duncan; Article by, on unemployment, No. 1, p. 24.
- Flournoy, Houston; 1970 election race, No. 1, p. 7.
- Gambrell, David H.; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 9.
- Gardner, John; Criticized by Monday, No. 5, p. 8; Ripon praises reform efforts, No. 1, p. 3.
- Georgia; Appeal by, on party delegate apportionment, No. 12, p. 2. Challenge to Gov. Carter, No. 13, p. 20. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 9.
- Gerstell, Glenn; Article by, on Rockefeller, No. 6, pp. 15-16. Article by, on N.Y. Budget, No. 4, pp. 9-10.
- Gilder, George; Article by, on Financing Politics, No. 17, pp. 3-4. Article by, on Defense Spending, No. 6, pp. 3-5. Article by, on Nixon's swing districts, No. 7, pp. 17-19.
- Gillette, Howard; Book review by, on Republican party history, No. 17, pp. 8-9. On Nixon's domestic policy, No. 3, pp. 10, 20. On John Lindsay's switch of parties, No. 11, p. 3. On Miller's Vietnam proposal, No. 5, p. 9. On cities, No. 13, p. 24.
- Glilian, John; Ohio reapportionment errors, No. 14, p. 2.
- Glasgow, Leslie, Dr.; Dismissal from Department of Interior, No. 1, p. 3.
- Gleason, Jack E.; Secret fundraising of, No. 18, p. 1.
- Glushien, Ruth L.; Ripon Prize essay of, on Farm Workers, No. 17, pp. 19-23.
- Goodell, Charles; As lesson to Republican progressives, No. 1, p. 4. Speaker, on Amnesty, at Cambridge/Boston Ripon dinner, No. 5, pp. 6, 23.
- Griffin, Robert P.; 1972 election race, No. 11, pp. 10-11.
- Gurney, Ed; Performance of, No. 13, pp. 5-6.
- Hall, E. Jack; Book Review by, No. 17, pp. 13-14.
- Halliwell, Mike; Article by, on Reapportionment in California, No. 6, pp. 24, 21. Article by, on Democrats, No. 13, pp. 20, 21.
- Hansen, Clifford P.; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 18.
- Harris, Fred; Presidential candidacy of, No. 11, p. 17. Retirement of, No. 11, p. 12. Seniority hearings, No. 3, pp. 6-7.
- Harris, Louis; Poll on "Southern Strategy," No. 2, p. 5.
- Hatfield, Mark; Guest Editorial by, on Vietnam, No. 15, p. 16. As key 1972 election figure, No. 1, p. 4. 1972 Senate race, No. 1, p. 8, No. 7, pp. 4-5, No. 11, p. 12.
- Hays, Wayne; Funding proposal of, No. 6, p. 7.
- Heinz, H.J.; Endorsed by Ripon, No. 13, p. 5. Favored in special election, No. 6, p. 11, No. 12, p. 3. Elected, No. 16, p. 6.
- Hess, Stephen; Administration appointment stopped, No. 15, p. 17.
- Hickel, Walter J.; Book (Who Owns America) reviewed, No. 17, pp. 13-14. Firing of, No. 1, p. 3. Selected as Ripon Republican of the Year, No. 5, p. 23. NBC coverage of speech denied, No. 6, p. 8.
- Howell, Henry; Election of, No. 16, p. 5.
- Humphrey, Hubert; Rural development program, No. 12, p. 3. Political leanings, No. 7, p. 4. Presidential candidacy of, No. 9, pp. 12-19. (See also Democrats)
- Hunter, Robert E.; Article by, on Foreign economic policy, No. 9, pp. 7-8, 20.
- Idaho; Republican Governors Conference in, No. 2, p. 5. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, pp. 9-10, No. 18, p. 3. Under Democratic Administration, No. 7, p. 7.
- Illinois; Analysis of 1970 election results, No. 1, pp. 4-5. Battleground for Nixon in 1972 election, No. 1, p. 4. New Constitution of, No. 1, pp. 10-14. GOP leaders visits Washington, D.C., No. 7, p. 6. Gubernatorial race in, No. 17, p. 16. Results of Chicago mayoral election, No. 5, p. 3. Senate race reviews, No. 11, p. 10, No. 18, p. 3.
- Indiana; Lugar, Richard, victory examined, No. 17, p. 18. Mayoral races in, No. 7, pp. 5-6. Unigov system, No. 13, p. 6.
- Integration; Results of a Harris poll on, No. 2, p. 5.
- Internal Security Act of 1950, Title II; Repeal of, No. 13, p. 6.
- Iowa; Analysis of 1970 elections in, No. 1, pp. 6-7. Factions in Republican Party, No. 5, p. 5. 1972 gubernatorial campaign, No. 11, p. 6. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 10, No. 18, p. 3.
- IRA; Book Review on, by Doris White, No. 17, pp. 12-13.
- Jackson, Henry; Influence on Presidential contest, No. 9, pp. 12-19. As Presidential candidate, No. 11, pp. 15-17. (See also Democrats)
- Jordan, B. Everett; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, pp. 11-12.
- Jordan, Len; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, pp. 9-10.
- Kansas; Republican leadership in, No. 15, pp. 18-19. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 10.
- Kellogg, John; And U.S. Military Court of Appeals, No. 7, p. 4.
- Kennedy, Edward M., Sen.; Influence on Presidential Primary Law in Mass., No. 6, p. 5. Convention role of, No. 15, pp. 21-22. As potential Presidential candidate, No. 9, pp. 13-15, 18-19, No. 11, pp. 13-18. Resolution on Ireland, No. 17, pp. 12-13. (See also Democrats)
- Kentucky; Analysis of 1970 election, No. 1, p. 7. Gubernatorial campaign in, No. 6, p. 8, No. 7, pp. 7-8. Political future of, No. 11, p. 6. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 10, No. 8, p. 2.
- Kilberg, William; Book Review by, No. 17, p. 7.
- Kissinger, Henry; Open letter to, on intelligence in S.E. Asia, No. 4, pp. 13, 25.
- Kleindienst, Richard; Endorses Richard Thornburgh; No. 14, p. 2.
- Knowles, John; Political plans of, No. 8, p. 2.
- Lamar Society; Symposium on "The Urban South," No. 6, pp. 9-10.
- Law Enforcement; Grading System, No. 9, pp. 21-22.

- Lindsay, John V.; As presidential candidate, No. 11, p. 17. Budget proposals, No. 7, pp. 9-10. Feud with Rockefeller, No. 9, p. 5. At National Conference of Mayors, No. 9, p. 4. Party switch, No. 2, pp. 3-4, No. 10, p. 4, No. 12, p. 4, No. 8, p. 3. Statement on, by Howard Gillette, No. 11, p. 3. Urban renewal, No. 13, p. 24.
- Lines, Patricia; Article by, on decentralization, No. 1, pp. 15-22.
- Longstreth, Thacher; Candidacy of, for Mayor of Philadelphia, No. 5, p. 4. Aand black voters, No. 14, pp. 1, 3. Ripon endorsement of, No. 13, p. 5.
- Louisiana; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 10. Conservatism in state party, No. 4, p. 10.
- Lowi, Theodore, J.; The Politics of Disorder reviewed by William S. Noble, No. 17, p. 14.
- Lugar, Richard; Mayoral victory examined, No. 17, p. 18. (See also Indiana) President of National League of Cities, No. 9, p. 4.
- McCall, Tom; At Republican Governors Conference, No. 2, p. 5. Challenge to Hatfield, No. 7, pp. 4-5, No. 10, p. 3.
- McCarthy, Eugene; Presidential candidacy of, No. 11, pp. 17-18. (See also Democrats)
- McCloughry, John; Book review by, No. 3, p. 21. Book review by, No. 11, p. 20.
- McCloskey, Paul; California delegation opportunities, No. 15, p. 24. Guest Editorial by, on Congress, the Constitution and the War, No. 4, p. 28, 24. N.H. campaign, No. 14, pp. 1, 4, No. 7, p. 16, No. 8, p. 3, No. 16, p. 3 and Repub. L.T.S. meeting, No. 4, p. 5.
- McGovern, George; Analysis of presidential candidacy, No. 7, p. 3, No. 9, pp. 14-19, No. 11, pp. 13-18. McGovern Commission, No. 11, p. 7. Income Maintenance proposal, No. 15, p. 3. (See also Democrats)
- McIntyre, Thomas J.; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 11.
- McLaughlin, Father John; As Nixon speech writer, No. 8, p. 2.
- Maine; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 10. Governor-legislative relations, No. 4, pp. 10-11.
- Marglin, Stephen; Co-author of article on Pakistan, No. 5, pp. 10-12, 8.
- Maryland; Election in First Congressional District, No. 7, p. 8. Desegregation plans for, No. 11, p. 6. A Governor for 1974, No. 8, p. 5.
- Massachusetts; National Review on Politics in, No. 5, p. 7; Presidential primary laws in, No. 6, p. 5. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 10.
- Mathias, Charles, McC.; Guest Editorial by, on the "Optional Congress," No. 13, pp. 3-5. Seniority reform hearings, No. 3, p. 7. Speaks at Ripon dinner, No. 18, p. 1. Campaign financing bill, No. 18, p. 2.
- Meskill, Thomas J.; Control of Conn. state party, No. 7, p. 8.
- Michaelson, Wes; Article by, on Nixon's Vietnam policy, No. 2, pp. 18-21.
- Michigan; Ripon-black coalition started, No. 6, pp. 10-11. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, pp. 10-11, No. 18, p. 3.
- Middle America; Political views of, No. 7, p. 7.
- Miller, Jack R.; Resolution on Vietnam War, No. 5, pp. 8, 9, No. 8, p. 2. 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 10.
- Milliken, William; Guest Editorial by, on role of the states in National Politics, No. 2, pp. 10-11. On Emerging Republican Majority, No. 2, p. 5. On open Republican party, No. 18, p. 2. Chairman of Republican Governors Assoc., No. 18, p. 4.
- Mills, Wilbur; Presidential candidacy analyzed, No. 11, pp. 13-18. (See also Democrats)
- Minnesota; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11.
- Mississippi; Gubernatorial primary in, No. 11, p. 5. 1972. Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11.
- Missouri; Constitutional amendment defeated, No. 6, p. 10.
- Mitchell, Martha; And YAF's Project Appreciation, No. 12, p. 2.
- Mitchell, John; Nixon campaign, No. 18, p. 4.
- Mondale, Walter F.; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11.
- Monday Magazine, Ideology of, No. 9, p. 24, No. 8, p. 3. Criticizes Common Cause, No. 5, p. 8.
- Monks, Robert A.G.; Role in Maine elections, No. 9, p. 4.
- Montana; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11, No. 18, p. 3.
- Morton, Rogers C.B.; As successor to Hickel, No. 1, p. 3, 9. At Republican Governors Conference, No. 2, p. 5.
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick; Interviewed by Ripon on Family Assistance Plan, No. 14, pp. 4-7.
- Mundt, Carl; Retirement of, No. 11, p. 12.
- Muskie, Edmund; Article on, by Daniel Swillinger, No. 4, p. 12. Convention position of, No. 15, pp. 21-22. At National Conference of Mayors, No. 9, p. 4. Ratings in Harris poll (Nov. 1970), No. 1, p. 4. As a presidential candidate, No. 7, p. 3, No. 9, pp. 12-19, No. 11, p. 16. Speech at Lamar Society symposium, No. 6, pp. 9-10. (See also Democrats)
- National Conference of Mayors; Presidential candidates appear at, No. 9, p. 4.
- National League of Cities, President of; No. 9, p. 4.
- National Women's Political Caucus; Republican representation in, No. 1, pp. 4-5.
- National Youth Caucus; Formed, No. 18, p. 4.
- Nebraska; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11.
- Nevius, John A.; Candidate for D.C. delegate seat, No. 3, pp. 7-8, No. 5, p. 3. Appointed to HUD, No. 8, p. 2.
- New Hampshire; Primary preview, No. 7, p. 16, No. 9, p. 14. McCloskey campaign in, No. 7, p. 16, No. 14, p. 1, No. 8, p. 3. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11.
- New Jersey; As Nixon battleground in 1972, No. 1, p. 4. Moderate politics in, No. 17, p. 17. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11, No. 18, p. 3. Reapportionment in, No. 8, p. 3.
- New Mexico; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 11, No. 18, p. 3.
- New York; Primary races in, No. 13, p. 6. State investigation of Attica riots, No. 15, p. 18.
- New York City; Budget gaps and strikes, No. 7, pp. 9-10. Conflict with Albany, No. 9, pp. 5-6.
- Nixon, Richard; And blue collar workers, No. 17, p. 7. Cahill as running mate for, No. 17, p. 17. 1972 campaign, No. 18, p. 4. Challenges within own party, No. 7, pp. 16-19. Connally appointment, No. 12, p. 2. Connally as running mate for, No. 17, pp. 15-16. China initiative of, No. 10, p. 2. Conservative support of, No. 6, pp. 7-8, No. 11, pp. 4-5. Defense spending policies, No. 6, pp. 3-5, No. 11, p. 4. Desegregation policy, No. 2, p. 5. Statement on Austin desegregation No. 10, p. 1, 4. No. 12, p. 4. Domestic program of, No. 3, pp. 11-12. Economic policy of, No. 12, p. 2. Foreign economic policy of, No. 9, p. 3, 7-8, 20. Evans and Novak book on reviewed, No. 17, pp. 5-6. Hickel dismissal, No. 1, p. 9. Iowa college students opinion of, No. 1, p. 7. Message to Governor Scranton, No. 3, p. 17. Judicial appointments, No. 2, pp. 15-17. Supreme Court nominations, No. 16, pp. 1-3. Ripon poll opinion of, No. 2, p. 7-9. Vietnam policy of, No. 2, pp. 18-21, No. 5, p. 9. Visits to Illinois in 1970 campaign, No. 1, p. 5. Welfare reform urged by, No. 12, p. 1. YAF votes to dump, No. 12, p. 1. Youth campaign, No. 8, p. 2.
- Noble, William S.; Book Review by, No. 17, p. 14.
- North Carolina; GOP participation in, No. 3, pp. 8-9. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, pp. 11-12.
- North Dakota; Congressional seat loss in, No. 11, p. 5.
- Nunn, Louis; Politics of, No. 7, pp. 7-8. Future of, No. 11, p. 6. Elected chairman of Rep. Governors Conference, No. 2, p. 5.
- O'Doherty, Kiernan; Appointed to Department of Commerce, No. 7, p. 5.
- Office of Economic Opportunity; California Rural Legal Assistance, No. 8, pp. 1, 4, No. 3, p. 10. Community Action Programs, No. 3, p. 10. Legal Services Program, No. 1, p. 9.
- Ogilvie, Richard B.; Guest editorial by, on building Rep. party, No. 3, p. 24. Re-election chances, No. 17, p. 16.
- Ohio; Party factionalism, No. 13, p. 8. Reapportionment errors, No. 14, p. 2. Tax reform in, No. 5, p. 6.
- Oklahoma; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 12.
- Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC); Job training programs of, No. 7, pp. 12-13.
- Oregon; 1970 election analyzed, No. 1, p. 8. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 12.
- Panetta, Leon; Review of Bring Us Together, No. 6, pp. 20-21. Resigns from Lindsay Administration, No. 16, p. 3.
- Papaneck, Gustav; Co-author of article on Pakistan, No. 5, pp. 10-12, 8.
- Pakistan; Article on, by Auspitz, Marglin, Papaneck, No. 5, pp. 10-12, 8. Sen. Saxbe on aid to, No. 8, p. 4.
- Pearson, James B.; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 10.
- Pell, Claiborne; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 12.
- Pennsylvania; Special election in, No. 6, p. 11.
- Pentagon; Foreign policy chart, No. 5, p. 7.
- Percy, Charles; Arranges GOP trip to D.C., No. 7, p. 6. 1970 election results, No. 1, p. 5. 1972 re-election chances evaluated, No. 1, p. 4, No. 11, p. 10.

- Peterson, Russell W.; Editorial by, on State Government, No. 1, p. 23. Pollution fight, No. 8, p. 2.
- Philadelphia; Mayoral election race examined, No. 5, p. 4. No. 14, pp. 1, 3.
- Phillips, Kevin; 1972 election analysis (Human Events), No. 13, p. 2. Urges YAF to support conservatives, No. 12, p. 1. On Emerging Republican Majority, No. 2, p. 5.
- Poff, Richard; Withdraws as Supreme Court nominee, No. 14, p. 2.
- Political Financing; Editorial on, No. 17, pp. 3-4.
- Powell, Lewis; Nominated to Supreme Court, No. 16, pp. 1-3.
- Rafferty, Max; Review of book by, No. 11, p. 20.
- Randolph, Jennings; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 18.
- Ray, Robert; Re-election chances of, No. 11, p. 6, p. 10. 1970 election results, No. 1, p. 6.
- Reagan, Ronald; Poll choice for GOP nominee, No. 7, p. 18. Relations with 1971 legislature, No. 3, pp. 5-6. Relations with OEO, No. 3, p. 10, No. 8, pp. 1, 4. Welfare proposals, No. 4, p. 7. No. 4, p. 8.
- Rehnquist, William; Nominated to Supreme Court, No. 16, pp. 1-3.
- Reichley, A. James; Book review by, No. 15, pp. 5-6.
- Reiter, Howard; Article by, on Agnew, No. 3, pp. 13-16, 18-20. Article by, on Republican Insurgency, No. 7, pp. 14-15. Book Review by, on history of American elections, No. 17, pp. 10-11.
- Reitz, Kenneth; Nixon Youth campaign, No. 8, p. 2.
- Republican Governors Association; Conference proceedings of, No. 2, p. 5. Agnew at, No. 2, p. 5. Milliken chosen as chairman, No. 18, p. 4.
- Republican National Committee; Delegate apportionment procedures, No. 12, p. 2. Delegates and Organizations Committee, No. 10, p. 4, No. 11, p. 7. Hickel firing, No. 1, p. 4. Mid-year meeting of, No. 10, p. 4. Ripon suit against, No. 18, p. 1, No. 16, p. 6.
- Republican Party; History examined, by Howard Gillette, No. 17, pp. 8-9.
- Revenue Sharing; Article on, by Murray Weidenbaum, No. 4, pp. 14-15. As part of Nixon's domestic program, No. 3, p. 12.
- Rhode Island; Analysis of 1970 election, No. 3, p. 9. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 12, No. 18, p. 3.
- Richardson, Elliot; Austin desegregation plan, No. 8, pp. 1, 4. Austin desegregation plan undermined, No. 12, p. 4. Committed to welfare reform, No. 12, pp. 1, 4.
- Ripon Society Annual Dinner; Mathias speaks at, No. 18, p. 1.
- Ripon Society Annual Report (1970); No. 2, pp. 24, 22.
- Ripon Society Poll; 1970 Results of, No. 2, pp. 7-9.
- Ripon Society Public Policy Prize; Announced, No. 5, p. 24.
- Ripon Society Ratings; 91st Congress, No. 13, pp. 14-20.
- Ripon Society Republican of the Year; Announced, No. 5, p. 23. Award presented, No. 6, p. 23.
- Ripon Society; Sues RNC for delegate allocation, No. 16, p. 6, No. 18, p. 1.
- Rizzo, Frank; Candidacy for mayor of Philadelphia, No. 5, p. 4. And black voters, No. 14, pp. 1, 3. Influence on convention delegates, No. 9, p. 10.
- Rockefeller, Nelson A.; Article on, by Glenn Gerstell, No. 6, pp. 15-15, 22. Feuding with Lindsay, No. 9, p. 5. Support of Nixon policies, No. 10, p. 3.
- Rogers, William G.; Article by, on Biafra, No. 5, pp. 13-21.
- Romney, George; Ripon policy analysis of, No. 13, pp. 9-13.
- Roos, Robert; Ripon Prize essay by, on welfare reform programs, No. 15, pp. 3, 8-15.
- Sabre Foundation; Grant awarded to, No. 3, p. 22.
- Saxbe, William; On aid to Pakistan, No. 9, p. 4.
- Scott, Hugh; And campaign broadcast reform bill, No. 1, p. 22. Praising Sen. Buckley, No. 6, pp. 6-7.
- Scranton, William; Nixon's Message to, on campus unrest, No. 3, p. 17.
- Seniority; Reforms, No. 3, pp. 6-7.
- Shafra, George; Race for Lt. Governor, No. 13, p. 7.
- Sienkiewicz, Stan; Article by, on SALT talks, No. 6, pp. 17-19, 22.
- Smith, Margaret Chase; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 10.
- South Carolina; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 12, No. 18, p. 3. Special election in, No. 4, p. 11. No. 6, p. 9.
- South Dakota; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 12, No. 18, p. 2. State GOP in, No. 12, pp. , 4.
- Sparkman, John J.; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 8.
- Spong, William B., Jr.; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 18.
- Stafford, Robert T.; Appointment of, No. 12, p. 4.
- State Government; Reorganization of, Editorial by Russell Peterson, No. 1, p. 23.
- Stevens, Ted; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 9.
- Stone, Jeremy J.; Article by, on Military expenditures, No. 7, p. 11.
- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; Analysis of arms negotiations, by Stan Sienkiewicz, No. 6, pp. 17-19, 22. James Buckley on, No. 11, p. 4.
- Student-Worker Relations; Article on, by Carl Wagner, No. 1, p. 25.
- SST; Debate over and votes on subsidy for, No. 4, pp. 3-4.
- Supreme Court; Swann decision, No. 8, pp. 1, 4. Nixon nominations to, No. 16, pp. 1-3. (See also Burger, Warren)
- Swillinger, Daniel; Article by, on Senate-White House relations, No. 2, pp. 6, 23. Article by, on Muskie, No. 4, p. 12.
- Taft, Robert, Jr.; Amnesty bill, No. 18, p. 2.
- Tennessee; Analysis of 1971 legislature, No. 3, p. 6. Article on Governor Dunn's impact on, No. 4, pp. 21-24. Budget hearings in, No. 5, pp. 4-5. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 12.
- Texas; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 12, No. 18, p. 2. Thornburgh, Richard L.; Wins pollution suit, No. 8, p. 2.
- Thurmond, Strom; 1972 Senate race, No. 11, p. 12.
- Topping, John; N.H. Primary Preview, No. 7, p. 16.
- Tower, John; Accused of dispensing funds unequally, No. 6, p. 10. 1972 election race, No. 11, p. 12.
- Ucello, Ann; Appointment to Department of Transportation, No. 5, p. 3.
- Unemployment; Relation to numbers of Republicans elected to House, No. 1, p. 24.
- Utah; Lawrence Burton's campaign, No. 5, p. 7.
- Varner, Robert E.; Appointed to U.S. District court, No. 2, pp. 15-17, No. 6, p. 6.
- Vermont; Sen. Janeway's call to replace Agnew, No. 3, p. 9. Politics after Prouty, No. 14, p. 4. Lowers age of majority, No. 6, pp. 8-9.
- Vietnam; Sen. Cotton's opposition to, No. 14, p. 2. Sen Hatfield on ending war, No. 15, pp. 16-17. Sen. Miller's proposal for troop withdrawal, No. 5, p. 8. Nixon's policy to end, No. 2, pp. 18-21.
- Virginia; Election preview, No. 8, p. 6. 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 18, No. 18, p. 3.
- Volunteer Military; Administration proposal for, No. 2, p. 10.
- Wagner, Carl; Article by, on student-worker relations, No. 1, p. 25.
- Wallison, Peter; Article by, on Independent Regulatory Commissions, No. 4, pp. 16-20.
- Washington; Democrat's delegate apportionment system, No. 3, p. 8.
- Wednesday Club; Propose economic agencies, No. 10, pp. 1, 4. Meeting with Republican business leaders, No. 14, p. 2.
- Weidenbaum, Murray; Article by, on Revenue Sharing, No. 4, pp. 14-15.
- Welfare; Reform proposals, by Robert Roos, No. 15, pp. 8-15.
- West Virginia; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 18, No. 18, p. 3.
- White, Doris J.; Book Review by, No. 17, pp. 12-13.
- Williams, Sam; Article by, on Tennessee's Governor Dunn, No. 4, pp. 21-24.
- Wilson, Lyndon A.S.; Article by, on Grading Law Enforcement, No. 9, pp. 21-22.
- Wilson, Pete; Elected San Diego mayor, No. 18, p. 5.
- Wisconsin; Primary in, No. 9, pp. 13-17.
- Wyoming; 1972 Senate race preview, No. 11, p. 18.
- Young Americans for Freedom; Compared with Ripon, No. 3, p. 22. Project Appreciation, No. 12, p. 2. Vote to dump Nixon, support Agnew, No. 12, p. 1.
- Young Republican National Federation; Convention platform, No. 8, pp. 1, 4. Factionalism in, No. 4, pp. 5-6.
- Young Republican Leadership Training School; McCloskey speech dropped, No. 4, p. 4.