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Conversation
with Charles Mathias
and Bill Frenzel

Keeping Track of
Special Interests

OP Rules:
The Need for Reform

ACs Americana

Washington's Fifth Estate:

Special Interest
Lobbies




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Editor's Column

The press's presence in Washington has often been referred to as the "Fourth Estate." But today there seems to be a "Fifth Estate" developing: special interest groups. Much attention, in fact, has been focused on a particularly important aspect of special interest groups: political action committees. Better known as PACs, their influence in Washington and on the campaign trail has created considerable controversy.

*To determine the actual influence had by PACs, as well as to provide a thorough review of the electoral system, this edition of **Ripon Forum** hears from a number of moderate Republicans who have been deeply involved with this issue. This includes Senator Charles Mathias, Representative Bill Frenzel and Ripon chairman Jim Leach, each of whom provides a different perspective. In addition, a former editor of this magazine and an expert in Republican Party rules, Lee Auspitz, presents a comprehensive critique of the GOP's nominating structure, calling for immediate reform. Plus, a chart is included to demonstrate the voting patterns produced by special interest groups, the bottom line of which is that the Fifth Estate, while lacking final control, does wield an enormous amount of power.*

—Bill McKenzie

RIPON FORUM

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Profiles and Perspectives

Moderate Republicans for some time have been on the forefront of reforming the campaign system. Dating back to 1974, when Republicans like John Anderson were instrumental in developing campaign finance legislation, GOP moderates have concerned themselves with devising an open, accountable election system.

Two moderates who have been especially involved in this are Representative Bill Frenzel, R-Minn., and Senator Charles McC. Mathias, R-Md. Interviewed by **Forum** editor Bill McKenzie for this installment of "Profiles and Perspectives," Frenzel, the ranking minority member on the House Administration Committee, and Mathias, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, offer two distinctively different views on a subject which promises to be of considerable interest this legislative session.



Representative Bill Frenzel

A Conversation with Bill Frenzel

Ripon Forum. In 1979 you wrote that political action committees (PACs) have been the "greatest, in fact, the only institution in our society that has encouraged and expanded political participation by the public." Could you please elaborate upon this?

Frenzel. In politics there is only one source of contribution and that is from individuals. PACs provide a reference point for individuals and their contributions. In fact, in the hearings held on PACs by the House Administration Committee, we invariably found that most PAC contributors are people who have never contributed to a political party, candidate, issue or campaign. What we have is a new place for people to begin or to find an ingress into the political process. We would hope that some would progress into political parties or into actual campaigns. But at least this gives them a means of getting in. PACs also have provided a way for people who might not have been interested in some of the social issues both parties were selling, but who, as a member of a union, corporation or association, were more interested in their economic condition. This has been an enormous force for good and has broadened the political base in the United States.

Ripon Forum. The argument has been made, though, that while PAC contributions to candidates in 1982 totalled \$87 million, up from \$23 million just six years ago, PAC decision-making is not democratically controlled. Rather, it is controlled centrally by representatives here in Washington.

Frenzel. Well so what? So are contributions to political

parties. As long as the contributors contribute voluntarily, I don't see that it makes any difference who decides how it is spent.

Ripon Forum. Along these same lines, do you think that Washington's lobbyist-lawyers, as one observer recently commented, set the national agenda?

Frenzel. The lobbyist-lawyers probably have always been involved in trying to set the national agenda. Today they will hold a fundraiser for Senator Mondale, or for that matter anyone else running for election, and then invite a lot of PACs. But in the old days they would have done it much more quietly, with bigger checks and probably smaller numbers of people. Under the rules now, all those actions are disclosed. Everybody knows who the players are, which seems to me a far better system.

Ripon Forum. Does their role lead to inefficient legislation? For example, the safe-harbor leasing provision in the 1982 tax bill was the product of intense lobbying efforts. But today there seems to be a growing consensus in Washington that this must be rescinded.

Frenzel. Sure. I think the lobbyist-lawyers have always done that to us. Just as they laid on us the Appalachian programs and Great Society programs, they are always trying to muscle in to get a dam hearing here or a defense facility there. But those people have always been with us. The good thing is that under the election law political activities and contributions are now revealed, and everybody knows where everybody else is.

Ripon Forum. You mentioned during the debate over Obey-Railsback, the 1979 legislation which attempted to limit candidates to \$70,000 in PAC receipts during a two-year election cycle, that labor would be left with "enormous legal advantages to spend involuntary contributions of its members." If labor was restricted, would you be more likely to favor restricting PACs?

Frenzel. I guess I'm not sure why labor should be restricted. If a group of people wish to get together and espouse certain philosophies, they should have a chance to elect the people they perceive as their friends. I guess I also find it very hard to understand why people who are supposed to believe in representative government and are supposed to reject elitist concepts of telling others how to live are the very ones who want to restrict political action. To say to the doctor who contributes to AMPAC (the American Medical Political Action Committee) or to the union member who contributes to the Teamsters that he'll have to find a better way to participate smacks of exclusivity.

Ripon Forum. If limiting PAC contributions would mean wealthy candidates have an electoral advantage, as some contend, then isn't the logical alternative a form of public financing for congressional campaigns?

Frenzel. No, I wouldn't think so. First, you have to figure out what's wrong. If the system isn't broke, then don't fix it. Certainly there would be a problem if wealthy individuals were able to spend as much money as they would like to buy an election. That, however, is a question that has to be taken up with the Supreme Court. And I am not wholly persuaded that going to a partial system of public financing would induce the Supreme Court to believe that a person has less rights about promoting his candidacy under

that system than he has under the present one.

Second, I believe that public financing is a far worse situation than individuals being able to spend a lot of money. At least you can occasionally defeat a wealthy candidate. [Senator] David Durenberger, R-Minn., did so in Minnesota, thanks to a lot of PAC contributions. I'm not so sure that you would ever upset the privileged spender under a public financing scheme.

Ripon Forum. You mentioned that you have to look for a way to fix the system.

Frenzel. If you see a break.

Ripon Forum. Do you see a break?

Frenzel. No, I really don't. I am always amazed that my friends find PACs such a pernicious influence. I rather feel they're a pretty good influence. I find that all of those arguments seem to be made principally as an attempt to bring about using the taxpayers' money to finance elections. I just basically and categorically reject that as a useful element in our democracy. I have trouble following the arguments of people who try to build these great straw men of corruption. Find me one person that's corrupt, and I'll be glad to deal with that dilemma.

The problem is that they have gotten it backwards. The folks who are nervous about corruption believe that a person votes a certain way because somebody gives to his campaign. I believe just the opposite. People give to a certain campaign because they are basically assured that the candidate is going to vote a certain way. My friends on the Democratic side do not vote organized labor because organized labor gives them some money. Organized labor gives them money because they know how they're going to vote.

Ripon Forum. Some make the argument, however, that campaign expenditures buy access. Is this true?

Frenzel. First show me the congressman that denies access to any constituent or person with a legitimate claim on his time. I haven't heard anyone tell me that he locks people out of his office.

But some of my Republican friends do feel that they have to contribute to a few leading Democrats so that they will have "access." They're out of their gourds, though. There is nothing that a Democrat would rather see than a fancy businessman, just like we Republicans would break our neck to have labor people come into our office.

Ripon Forum. Do you think it gives priority in access? Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., said recently that while his door is open to anyone, he knows that if a contributor calls, he would most likely return that call first.

Frenzel. Would the Republic fail if you returned the other guy's call second? I just see that as being the strangest argument in history. I am just so overwhelmed by this issue that I have my belly full of it. We've got 40% of the eligible voters turning out in elections, our parties have no more volunteers, there's no enthusiasm for election participation, and here are a bunch of people trying to circle the wagons, building tighter fences so we can do less.

Ripon Forum. Those tighter fences certainly seem to be being built during this particular legislative session. What do you see coming to the House floor during the next two years?

Frenzel. A real practical-political problem exists. Previously whenever an election bill has been passed, there have been one, two or three central points on which everybody wanted to take some action. This year we don't have anything to rally around. The Senate wants some

reforms, but the House probably doesn't want the same ones. Maybe the president wants something else. I think it's going to be extraordinarily difficult to put together any legislation. A public financing bill may pass the House, but it is extremely unlikely that it will be enacted into law.

Ripon Forum. With a more reform minded, Democratically-controlled House, do you think a measure could pass that chamber but break down in the GOP-controlled Senate?

Frenzel. It's hard to describe what would go. For example, the one thing that the Senate wants is larger individual contributions. The House doesn't need these; we're not a bit sympathetic to that. Another example is that Republicans want parties to be able to raise and spend more. But Democrats don't; they can't raise more money than Republicans. On the other hand, they would like to limit PACs because they see them as a losing battle. Although they now get more money out of PACs than do Republicans because of union support, Democrats see unions being outstripped by the combination of other PACs; they would just as soon limit them. Republicans, however, probably wouldn't.

I guess I would see this session as a chance for plain and fancy demagoguery. Fine people will be standing up saying that this system is corrupt and that the only way we can solve it is this way. But I don't see many bills being passed, not at least until the presidential election cycle is over.

"This year we don't have anything to rally around. The Senate wants some reforms, but the House probably doesn't want the same ones. It's going to be very difficult to put together any legislation."

Ripon Forum. What about placing limits on campaign money raised by candidates who seemingly do not need the funds for reelection? For example, Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., received \$445,000 in 1982 PAC contributions but won with 84% of the vote. 24 members of Congress faced no general election opponent or had either a minor or no primary opponent, yet received at least \$50,000 in PAC contributions. Do you see any conflicts of interest?

Frenzel. I really don't. It seems to me that these are the people who would be out seeking campaign funds whether they were from PACs or from someone else. They feel comfortable with that great big war chest.

But let's not talk about some of my colleagues. I'll talk about myself. I now have \$100,000-plus in the bank. That has an effect on peoples' interest in running against me in primaries. It's probably my best political weapon.

It might be more appropriate, however, simply to limit the amount of money a campaign could carry over or to limit the kinds of expenses. Currently, campaigns can make unlimited contributions to other campaigns. So maybe there ought to be a ruling that campaigns can spend only for the campaign one is contributing to. Limiting the amount of carryover a candidate could have in off-election years might also be a good idea.

Ripon Forum. Something else that has been talked about is allowing individuals to give greater contributions to parties and parties greater contributions to candidates. Do you think that this would be a good plan, or do you think that it only gives certain individuals indirect influence over congressional incumbents?

Frenzel. Only if you believe in the devil-theory of history, that anybody giving money to anybody else creates some kind of great influence and pressure. But I don't really believe that. I think that both parties, even in their reduced states, are pretty broad based and don't subject anyone to undue influence.

I would like, and have as part of my reform bill, a greater ability for the parties to spend on their own on candidates of their choice. There is no limit on how much you can raise except the limitation on how much an individual can contribute. The problem with that is the Democrats oppose it, saying "we don't raise enough money so we are troubled by any limits on contributions." But we Republicans are able to give the maximum amount to many of our candidates. A better alternative is to give the parties a little more latitude. They should be made into special political committees, different from other committees.

Ripon Forum. Some observers are now concerned with the use of "soft money" by national parties. Although once raised by state parties and spent on behalf of bumper stickers, buttons and even TV advertising, this money is now most frequently collected by the national parties and distributed in part at their direction. One Democratic activist was quoted recently as saying that these funds are "illegal as hell." What is your opinion of this?

"There are important reforms needed in the system. The most important of these is a larger role for the political parties. The second most important is in the operation of the FEC and how it treats those people it examines."

Frenzel. I think that what they are doing now is in conformity with the law. In 1979 we tried to make sure that national, state and local parties could cooperate to promote candidate slates. In fact, the original question was raised by Mayor Ed Koch when he wanted to have a Koch-Mondale button. That, however, was declared illegal.

Let's remember that what we are trying to do is put people into the political process. But under the first publicly-financed presidential election — one of the most bland elections in history — there was no presence of any of the political candidates in the states. One of our reactions to that was to try to expand the party, allowing national parties to spend some money within the state on a whole slate of people. We tried to get some excitement and some zip into the elections by putting in these slate card exemptions. I think they've been effective and while somebody thinks they're "illegal as hell," I hope we don't take them out.

Ripon Forum. Elizabeth Drew wrote recently in *The New Yorker* that "the quest for money has distended and distorted this political system to the point where it bears little or no resemblance to what it was supposed to be." To

what extent has fundraising become a preoccupation, even a "fever" as one member of Congress said recently, among your colleagues?

Frenzel. Elizabeth Drew's article could have been written 10 years ago, 50 years ago or 100 years ago. For that matter, it could have been written any time during our country's history. We have always had those who think the system is going to hell. I'm not exactly sure why this is. Neither do I know how you promote a person's candidacy without advertising, direct mail, or a straightforward approach to constituents. I think that whenever a lot of money is spent on both sides, it means that you have sharply contested elections. These, in turn, are good for democracy. For a job which has control over the spending of trillions of dollars, a few hundred thousand dollars on a campaign is not a waste.

Ripon Forum. If Bill Frenzel's back was to the wall, and he absolutely had to argue for campaign finance reform, what approach would he take?

Frenzel. With the beginning caveat that I don't believe in any use of the taxpayers' money to elect candidates for federal office, obviously the kind that I would propose under great pressure would be that which interfered least with private financing mechanisms. This would involve a minimum-match from the federal treasury. The kindest thing I can say is that the match would be a tiny fraction of funds raised privately. There are so many problems with it, such as those we've found in the presidential races of John Anderson and Eugene McCarthy. Gene was not a party because the Democrats on the Federal Election Commission (FEC) didn't like him. John was a party because they figured he wouldn't disrupt the elections.

Inventing a fair system using public funds is difficult. It's hard to keep the real squirrels out of the cage. And yet, in trying to keep the worst of the squirrels out, you're going to keep some good songbirds out, too. Drawing the line is difficult.

But I do believe that there are important reforms needed in the system. The most important of these is a larger role for the political parties. The second most important is in the operation of the FEC and how it treats those people it examines. It occasionally discourages political participation. Beyond that I think I'd be very reluctant to make major changes in the system.

Ripon Forum. How does the FEC discourage political participation?

Frenzel. The amount of reporting forms one must complete and the FEC's response to the outside world need changing. Plus, some of their investigations scare people to death. Rights are not as jealously guarded as they are under our normal judicial system.

I do understand, though, that it is very difficult to reconcile a scheme of full disclosure with simplicity. Just as in the tax code, perfect equity and simplicity are not always feasible. But we can do a better job in reporting. For example, Congress was very wise to declare the *de minimis* \$5,000 rule, meaning that a candidate trying to make a point rather than win an election is not required to fill out forms unless he or she raises more than \$5,000. We must not discourage people at the beginning with a lot of forms just as we should not discourage individuals about becoming campaign treasurers or campaign chairmen. Many people would like to take these positions, but the responsibility of it, as well as the election law, are more than their financial circumstances will allow.



**A Conversation
with Charles Mathias**

Senator Charles McC. Mathias

Ripon Forum. Isn't it true that political action committees enhance the democratic process, allowing more people to contribute to political campaigns?

Mathias. First, there is a fundamental question we need to ask: does a problem exist? Maybe everyone likes the system as it is. But the 1982 elections did cost us nearly \$900 million and if you add to that \$100 million in congressional mass-mail, which is in part political, you get a billion dollar election. It seems to me that when you cross that mark, just as when you cross the trillion dollar mark in the national debt, it is a moment to stop and reflect.

My opinion is that that amount of money swirling around in the electoral process creates a problem both perceptually and substantively. It certainly makes people more cynical about the electoral process. From the perception of the average citizen, it seems that one billion dollars taints the political process. From the substantive point of view, it is very difficult to say that big money doesn't have some influence in public life. I have said that I would never change a vote because a big contributor asked me to do it, but I am equally free to admit that if a big contributor called me up I would probably take his call and talk to him. Any member of Congress who would not admit at least to that, is not being frank.

This perhaps brings us to your question: do PACs contribute to the democratic process? In a theoretical way, of course they do. The citizen who might be timid about contributing five dollars to a presidential or congressional campaign will contribute five dollars to his company or neighborhood PAC and feel good about it. He is participating and has a little bit of the action. But his five dollars soon loses its identity and becomes part of the collective PAC. A citizen's participation is merged into collective action.

Ripon Forum. Does the access had by PACs and their Washington representatives to elected officials outweigh any positive contribution they might make, such as broadening the democratic process?

Mathias. The guy who chips in five bucks, unless it's a very tightly organized and narrowly-directed PAC, won't have much say in where that five bucks goes. The people making that decision are the handful of individuals who lead the PAC and determine where the money will be spent. You really have concentrated political power in the hands of those few people who organize, administer and lead PACs.

Ripon Forum. One argument says that we should limit PACs. If we do this, are we merely shifting the influence back to wealthy contributors, who once had an undue amount of electoral control?

Mathias. At the moment, of course, there is a strong

argument being made that we should increase the limits on personal and individual contributions. The argument states that this would decrease the influence of PACs because one wouldn't be so dependent on them.

Ripon Forum. Would this lead us back to an era where a single individual could exercise unchecked power? If so, is this really a well-advised move?

Mathias. I don't think it would be the same. Every situation is new and the fact is that PACs would still be in existence. They would simply be in a slightly different situation.

Ripon Forum. What is the better alternative then: to restrict PACs or to institute public financing of congressional campaigns?

Mathias. The better alternative is the old progressive Republican concept advanced by Theodore Roosevelt — public financing. He saw no other way to drive the corrupting influence of money out of elections than to pay an adequate amount out of the public treasury. I think this is a sensible solution for the present, notwithstanding that we are running a huge federal deficit. A billion dollar election still is costing money. It comes out of the peoples' pockets whether through higher prices for consumer goods in the industries putting up the money or through other various indirect means. The billion dollars then would be no more of a charge on the general economy than if it came out of the public treasury. In fact, I think it would be much less than a billion dollars.

"The better alternative is the old progressive Republican concept advanced by Theodore Roosevelt — public financing . . ."

Other things can be done, too. For example, it is somewhat difficult to explain why broadcasters should double their rates for political broadcasting. A part of any public financing system, since it would come out of the public treasury, should be to require broadcasters to limit their rates. Perhaps more than that, they should contribute as a condition of their licensing, the time in which political candidates carry their messages to the people.

Ripon Forum. Would this run contrary to judicial interpretations on freedom of speech?

Mathias. You would have various problems under the First Amendment, but some of them are far-fetched. Some decisions should be subordinated to the specific powers which regulate elections, although these are thorny matters of opinion.

But there are also technological problems. We may lose a grip on broadcasting with the growth of cable television since the theory on which broadcasters might be asked to carry political messages — at either standard, reduced or free rates — is based on the fact that they are granted the use of a finite resource. Of course, that theory does not pertain to cable TV, which uses a different method of transmission. How we handle such broadcasts certainly creates a new problem — one I don't have an instant answer for.

Ripon Forum. This leads us to the next point: name recognition. Do you think that in devising a public financing

scheme, incumbents would be sorely tempted to set low public spending limits, trading in on their own high name recognition, their access to the media, and the various other congressional privileges available to them?

Mathias. Incumbents will be sorely tempted to do many things. The question is whether they will resist the temptation.

Ripon Forum. Will they?

Mathias. It has to be recognized that incumbents, under any conceivable system, are going to have some advantages. They also have some liabilities. As a member of Congress for twenty years, I must have cast many thousands of votes, any one of which can be dredged up and hurled back in my face without warning or notice.

Ripon Forum. Does this balance the advantages incumbents may write into law?

Mathias. No, I don't think so. It is not a question of advantages incumbents may write into the law for themselves. There is a sense of political decency which isn't totally extinct in this country. I think that incumbents will try to write fair laws and that it is up to the political action groups, not political action committees, to play an active role in formulating these laws, getting them on the books and making sure they are fair.

Ripon Forum. Would public financing further reduce the dependence on party organization?

Mathias. It wouldn't have to because the money could be contributed to parties, or the parties could have some share in the control of it. That was Theodore Roosevelt's original idea; the money would be contributed by the U.S. Treasury to the political parties.

Ripon Forum. How would this be financed?

Mathias. There have been various alternatives, but I think it simply has to be appropriations out of the general revenue.

Ripon Forum. And those revenues would be raised through?

Mathias. Taxation.

Ripon Forum. What about a voluntary contribution on income tax returns? Would that bring enough into the federal treasury?

Mathias. If we're going to do it, we ought to do it right. What we're talking about is an essential function of democracy: choosing the people who hold public office. It is not immoral to make some expenditure for that purpose.

Ripon Forum. How else could parties assist in reforming the campaign system?

Mathias. The parties themselves, without any participation by Congress, could make a major revolution in presidential politics. For example, if they would state that no delegate would be seated in a national convention except those chosen in a particular month, the number of primaries would be limited while the primary season would be shortened. This means concentrating the efforts of the candidates, concentrating the effort of the parties, concentrating the attention of the people.

Second, they could seat incumbent governors and members of Congress as delegates-at-large during conventions. This would provide a continuity and a link between the twelve month, 365-day working party and the convention. Since delegates often find it is the only active party work they do in the course of the year, or even every four years, it would be a useful linkage.

Ripon Forum. With a more reform-minded, stronger Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, chances are greater that a campaign finance bill will

emerge. What prospects do you give for the Senate passing such a bill, even if it has nothing to do with Senate campaigns?

Mathias. I doubt that it will be possible to pass a public financing bill in the Senate during this Congress. But I think it will happen someday, and from my point of view, the sooner the better.

Ripon Forum. What would you favor in lieu of publicly financed campaigns: Lifting the ceilings on individual political contributions? Monitoring the limits on PACs? Liberalizing tax credits for small contributors? Or, as is this case in Oregon, public funding for voter pamphlets for each registered voter?

Mathias. I would be willing to consider any of those measures and believe we will be considering a great many of them in the next few months. But I would reserve judgment until then.

One of the things not on your list that is most disturbing is how do you control the independent PAC? Senator Slade Gorton, R-Wash., has suggested that candidates be allowed to simply adopt the independent PAC and incorporate it within the overall campaign structure, whether they want to be incorporated or not.

"The parties themselves, without any participation by Congress, could make a major revolution in presidential politics. This includes not seating any delegates chosen outside of a designated primary season and seating incumbent governors and members of Congress as delegates-at-large during conventions."

Ripon Forum. What about lifting the ceilings on contributions, on all contributions, to opponents of any candidate whose contributions or loans to his or her own campaign exceed the existing contributor ceilings?

Mathias. That's another of Senator Gorton's proposals which has a great deal of merit. Personally, I think the Supreme Court is wrong; we could place some limits on what a candidate spends on his or her own campaign. But as long as the court's opinion stands, that this is a restriction of the First Amendment, we're not going to do it.

Ripon Forum. Would each of these be seen as an end in itself, or as the means to an inevitable end: public financing?

Mathias. No, they would not mean that.

Ripon Forum. Recently there has been a great deal written about political action committees. In fact, there have been some very inflammatory comments made about the power money has over elected officials. As a member of this nation's most prestigious electoral body, would you care to dismiss as myth the belief which 84% of the American public share, that those who contribute large sums of money have too much influence over government?

Mathias. I think this is a perceptual problem. As I said at the outset, a big contributor usually has access. He may not have influence, but he has access.

Ripon Forum. Is there a one-PAC, one-vote system in operation?

Mathias. I think that's a little too strong.

Ripon Forum. Not yet?

Mathias. Not yet. ■

KEEPING TRACK OF SPECIAL INTERESTS

Washington's special interest lobbies have become a whipping boy for every malaise from high milk prices to incomprehensible tax laws. In part, these accusations are true. But as Madison wrote, this is a nation of factions requiring the sensible balancing of competing interests.

Whether such an equilibrium has been reached, of course, is open to debate. But to understand the influence had by factions on the political process, one must first understand the voting patterns determined by special interest legislation. Thus, this **Forum** special interest voting chart has been compiled with that in mind. Particular thanks must go to Carol Wimble, a Ripon Society staff member, for her invaluable assistance in tabulating these votes, which include bills sponsored by business, labor, and agricultural interests, among others. While they fall short of predicting the moves of any elected official, they do make one thing clear: Washington's special interests make themselves heard.

House Special Interest Votes

1. H J Res. 341. *Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System Waivers*. Passage of the joint resolution approving the president's waivers of various stipulations in the 1977 decision to build a pipeline to carry natural gas from Alaska to the continental United States. The waivers were aimed at securing private financing for the pipeline. Passed 233-173: R — 119-67; D — 114-106. December 9, 1981. Ripon vote: Nay.

2. *Veto of FTC Used Auto Regulation*. Adoption of concurrent resolution to disapprove the Federal Trade Commission rule requiring used car dealers to inform customers of known defects in used automobiles. Adopted 286-133: R — 167-18; D — 119-115. May 26, 1982. Ripon vote: Nay.

3. HR 6995. *Federal Trade Commission Authorization*. Luken, D-OH, amendment to exempt state-licensed professionals from FTC jurisdiction until Congress specifically grants that authority. Adopted 245-155: R — 151-27; D — 94-128. December 1, 1982. Ripon vote: Nay.

4. H J Res. 287. *Infant Formula*. Zablocki, D-WI, motion to suspend the rules and pass the joint resolution expressing congressional "dismay" at the U.S. vote at a World Health Organization (WHO) assembly May 21, 1981, against a voluntary international marketing code for infant formula and urging the administration to notify WHO that the United States will cooperate fully to implement the code. Motion agreed to 301-100: R — 85-93; D — 216-7. June 16, 1981. Ripon vote: Yea.

5. HR 3603. *Food and Agriculture Act of 1981*. Shamansky, D-OH, amendment to repeal the tobacco allotment system and tobacco price support loans. Rejected 184-231: R — 107-75; D — 77-156. October 21, 1981. Ripon vote: Yea.

6. HR 3191. *North American Convention Tax*. Passage of the bill to allow certain business tax deductions for conventions held on North American cruise ships. Passed 227-172: R — 69-105; D

— 158-67. December 16, 1982. Ripon vote: Nay.

7. HR 5133. *Automobile Domestic Content Requirements*. Passage of the bill to require automakers to use set percentages of U.S. labor and parts in automobiles they sell in the United States. Passed 215-188: R — 44-130; D — 171-58. December 15, 1982. Ripon vote: Nay.

8. HR 6211. *Transportation Assistance Act of 1982*. Stenholm, D-TX, amendment to waive the Davis-Bacon Act wage requirements for federally funded transportation projects. Rejected 174-223: R — 138-41; D — 36-182. December 6, 1982. Ripon vote: Yea.

9. HR 4612. *Dairy Price Supports*. Passage of the bill to set dairy price supports at \$13.10 per hundredweight until November 15, 1981, and to delay until that date the wheat producer referendum. Passed 328-58: R — 157-15; D — 171-43. October 1, 1981. Ripon vote: Yea.

10. *Futures Trading Act of 1982*. Conable, R-NY, amendment to the Futures Trading Act to provide for fees on futures and options transactions, and to authorize the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to reduce or suspend the fees in certain circumstances. Rejected 170-216: R — 99-78; D — 71-138. September 23, 1982. Ripon vote: Yea.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Alabama											
Edwards (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Dickinson (R)	Y	Y	?	N	N	N	N	?	Y	Y	50
Nichols (D)	?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	22
Bevill (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	?	Y	N	22
Flippo (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	20
Smith (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	40
Shelby (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	30
Alaska											
Young (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?	N	Y	N	22
Arizona											
Rhodes (R)	Y	#	Y	N	N	N	?	?	N	?	0
Udall (D)	Y	N	?	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	38
Stump (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	40
Rudd (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	X	N	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Arkansas											
Alexander (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	#	?	Y	N	25
Bethune, Jr. (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	70
Hammerschmidt (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	30
Anthony (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
California											
Chappie (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Clausen (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Matsui (D)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	40
Fazio (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	10
Burton, J. (D)	N	?	N	Y	N	Y	#	N	Y	?	50
Burton P. (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	56
Miller (D)	X	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Dellums (D)	N	N	N	Y	?	?	Y	N	Y	N	63
Stark (D)	X	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	56
Edwards (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Lantos (D)	Y	Y	Y	+	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	N	33
McCloskey (R)	?	Y	?	Y	?	Y	N	?	?	Y	60
Mineta (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	20
Shumway (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	N	33
Coelho (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	10
Panetta (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	40
Pashayan (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	30
Thomas (R)	Y	Y	Y	?	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	56
Lagomarsino (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Goldwater (R)	#	Y	?	?	Y	?	?	Y	?	Y	80
Fiedler (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	70
Moorhead (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Beilenson (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	60
Waxman (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	90
Roybal (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Rousselot (R)	Y	Y	?	N	P	?	N	Y	?	?	40
Dornan (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	?	38
Dixon (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	50
Hawkins (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	50
*Danielson (D)	N								Y		
Martinez (D)			?	Y	N	Y	Y	N		N	18
Dymally (D)	#	Y	N	Y	N	?	Y	N	Y	N	33
Anderson (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	50
Grisham	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Lungren (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Dreier (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Brown (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	?	N	Y	N	44
Lewis (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
Patterson (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	56
Dannemeyer (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Badham (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	?	44
Lowery (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Hunter (R)	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	50
Burgener (R)	Y	Y	?	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	56
Colorado											
Schroeder (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	?	N	Y	Y	89
Wirth (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Kogovsek (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	20
Brown (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	70
Kramer (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	40
Connecticut											
*Cotter (D)				?							
Kennelly (D)			N	Y			N	Y	N		N 33
Gejdenson (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	60
DeNardis (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	50
McKinney (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	50
Ratchford (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	60
Moffett (D)	N	N	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	?	67
Delaware											
Evans (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	50
Florida											
Hutto (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Fuqua (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Bennett (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	50
Chappell (D)	Y	Y	N	-	N	Y	N	Y	Y	?	44
McCollum (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	?	67
Young (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	80
Gibbons (D)	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	Y	56
Ireland (D)	Y	Y	Y	?	N	Y	N	?	?	?	17
Nelson (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	N	Y	+	N	56

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Bafalis (R)	Y	?	Y	Y	N	?	N	?	Y	?	50
Mica (D)	N	Y	?	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	33
Shaw (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	70
Lehman (D)	Y	C	?	?	Y	?	?	?	Y	?	67
Pepper (D)	#	N	N	Y	X	N	Y	N	?	N	44
Fascell (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	?	Y	?	43
Georgia											
Ginn (D)	?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	22
Hatcher (D)	N	Y	Y	?	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	33
Brinkley (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	40
Levitas (D)	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	60
Fowler (D)	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	40
Gingrich (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	50
McDonald (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	+	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Evans (D)	N	Y	?	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	?	44
Jenkins (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	40
Barnard (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	?	44
Hawaii											
Heftel (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Akaka (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	20
Idaho											
Craig (R)	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	56
Hansen (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
Illinois											
Washington (D)	N	N	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N	?	N	63
Savage (D)	N	N	N	?	Y	?	Y	N	?	?	67
Russo (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	60
Derwinski (R)	N	Y	?	?	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	75
Fary (D)	X	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	?	N	44
Hyde (R)	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	70
Collins (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	?	78
Rostenkowski (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	60
Yates (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	?	?	Y	?	100
Porter (R)	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	78
Annunzio (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Crane, P. (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	N	44
McClory (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	?	Y	56
Erlenborn (R)	Y	Y	N	?	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	67
Corcoran (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	+	N	60
Martin (R)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	60
O'Brien (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Michel (R)	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	50
Railsback (R)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	?	Y	67
Findley (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	?	Y	Y	N	44
Madigan (R)	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	30
Crane, D. (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	50
Price (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Simon (D)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	N	44
Indiana											
*Benjamin (D)	Y	Y		Y	N				Y		40
Hall (D)			Y				Y	Y	N		0
Fithian (D)	?	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	38
Hiler (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Coats (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	70
Hillis (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	30
Evans (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	20
Myers (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
Hamilton (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	40
Sharp (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Jacobs (D)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	60
Deckard (R)	N	Y	?	N	Y	?	N	Y	Y	?	63
Iowa											
Leach (R)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	90

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Tauke (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	X	Y	Y	N	60
Evans (R)	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Smith (D)	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	70
Harkin (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	60
Bedell (D)	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	70
Kansas											
Roberts (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Jeffries (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	30
Winn (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Glickman (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	60
Whittaker (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	70
Kentucky											
Hubbard (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	?	Y	N	Y	N	11
Natcher (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Mazzoli (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	+	N	60
Snyder (R)	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	40
Rogers (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	50
Hopkins (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	50
Perkins (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	40
Louisiana											
Livingston (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	40
Boggs (D)	#	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	?	N	11
Tauzin (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	?	N	0
Roemer (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	50
Huckaby (D)	Y	Y	Y	?	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	44
Moore (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	20
Breaux (D)	Y	Y	?	?	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	25
Long (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	10
Maine											
Emery (R)	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	N	67
Snowe (R)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	90
Maryland											
Dyson (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Long (D)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	70
Mikulski (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Holt (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	N	Y	Y	Y	56
Hoyer (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Byron (D)	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	44
Mitchell (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Barnes (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	78
Massachusetts											
Conte (R)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Boland (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Early (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	67
Frank (D)	N	N	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	78
Shannon (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	?	N	56
Mavroules (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Markey (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	?	Y	N	Y	Y	67
O'Neill (D)											
Moakley (D)	?	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	56
Heckler (R)	N	N	?	Y	Y	?	?	N	Y	Y	86
Donnelly (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	70
Studds (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Michigan											
Conyers (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	?	75
Pursell (R)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	?	?	Y	Y	Y	88
Wolpe (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Siljander (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	30
Sawyer (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	60
Dunn (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	70
Kildee (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Traxler (D)	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	20
Vander Jagt (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	30

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Albosta (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	10
Davis (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	40
Bonier (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	60
Crockett (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Hertel (D)	Y	N	N	Y	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N	56
Ford (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	?	Y	N	N	?	25
Dingell (D)	?	Y	N	?	N	Y	Y	N	?	?	17
Brodhead (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Blanchard (D)	N	Y	?	Y	N	?	#	?	?	N	33
Broomfield (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	?	Y	44
Minnesota											
Erdahl (R)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	70
Hagedorn (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	?	Y	Y	N	50
Frenzel (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Vento (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	60
Sabo (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	50
Weber (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	50
Stangeland (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	20
Oberstar (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	40
Mississippi											
Whitten (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Bowen (D)	Y	Y	?	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	33
Montgomery (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
*Dowdy (D)	Y	Y	Y		N	Y	Y	N	N	N	0
Lott (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Missouri											
Clay (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Young (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	?	N	11
Gephardt (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Skelton (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	?	N	?	13
Bolling (D)	?	N	?	Y	N	Y	?	?	?	Y	60
Coleman (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	70
Taylor (R)	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	40
Bailey (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
Volkmer (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	30
Emerson (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Montana											
Williams (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	40
Marlenee (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	?	Y	N	44
Nebraska											
Bereuter (R)	Y	C	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	89
Daub (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	80
Smith (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Nevada											
Santini (R)	#	Y	Y	?	Y	N	N	?	Y	N	50
New Hampshire											
D'Amours (D)	N	Y	?	?	Y	Y	?	N	Y	Y	57
Gregg (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	70
New Jersey											
Florio (D)	N	N	N	Y	?	Y	Y	?	?	Y	63
Hughes (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	#	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	50
Howard (D)	?	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	44
Smith (R)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Fenwick (R)	N	X	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	100
Forsythe (R)	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	N	?	+	Y	?	56
Roukema (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	80
Roe (D)	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	40
Hollenbeck (R)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Rodino (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Minish (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Rinaldo (R)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	50
Courter (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	60
Guarini (D)	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Dwyer (D)	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	50
New Mexico											
Lujan (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Skeen (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
New York											
Carney (R)	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Downey (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	60
Carman (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	60
Lent (R)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	40
McGrath (R)	N	Y	N	Y	?	Y	N	N	Y	N	56
LeBoutillier (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?	?	N	Y	N	25
Addabbo (D)	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	?	?	38
Rosenthal (D)	N	N	N	?	N	?	Y	N	Y	Y	63
Ferraro (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Biaggi (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Scheuer (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Chisholm (D)	N	X	N	Y	N	Y	Y	?	?	?	57
Solarz (D)	Y	N	?	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	44
*Richmond (D)	N	N		Y	N					Y	80
Zeperetti (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	?	N	Y	?	50
Schumer (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Molinari (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	60
Green (R)	Y	N	N	?	Y	P	N	N	Y	Y	67
Rangel (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Weiss (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?	67
Garcia (D)	X	N	N	Y	Y	?	Y	N	?	?	57
Bingham (D)	Y	X	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	70
Peyser (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Ottinger (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Fish (R)	N	Y	N	Y	?	Y	Y	N	Y	?	50
Gilman (R)	N	N	N	Y	+	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
McHugh (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	60
Stratton (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	22
Solomon (R)	Y	Y	?	N	?	Y	Y	N	Y	?	14
Martin (R)	Y	Y	?	?	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	50
Mitchell (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	50
Wortley (R)	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	?	22
Lee (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	?	N	?	43
Horton (R)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Conable (R)	Y	Y	Y	C	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	67
LaFalce (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	?	75
Nowak (D)	?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	67
Kemp (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	?	Y	N	56
Lundine (D)	?	N	N	Y	?	Y	Y	N	N	Y	50
North Carolina											
Jones (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	Y	?	N	25
Fountain (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	50
Whitley (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	30
Andrews (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	50
Neal (D)	N	Y	?	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	44
Johnston (R)	Y	Y	Y	?	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	44
Rose (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	?	22
Hefner (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	50	
Martin (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Broyhill (R)	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	70
Hendon (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
North Dakota											
Dorgan (D)	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	40
Ohio											
Gradison (R)	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	80
Luken (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	10
Hall (D)	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	44
*Oxley (R)	N	Y	Y		Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	78

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Latta (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	60
McEwen (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	40
Brown (R)	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	44
Kindness (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	40
Weber (R)	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	50
Miller (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	30
Stanton (R)	N	?	?	Y	N	?	N	?	Y	Y	83
Shamansky (D)	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Pease (D)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Seiberling (D)	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Wylie (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	50
Regula (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	60
*Ashbrook (R)	N		Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	?	Y	50
Applegate (D)	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	50
Williams (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	#	Y	Y	N	?	Y	44
Oakar (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	60
Stokes (D)	?	N	N	Y	N	Y	#	N	Y	N	44
Eckart (D)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	60
Mottl (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	N	67
Oklahoma											
Jones (D)	Y	Y	?	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	33
Synar (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	40
Watkins (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	30
McCurdy (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	30
Edwards (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
English (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	30
Oregon											
AuCoin (D)	X	N	N	?	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	67
Smith (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Wyden (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	80
Weaver (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Pennsylvania											
Foglietta (I)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Gray (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	40
*Smith (D)	Y	Y	?		N	?	Y	N	Y	?	14
Dougherty (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	40
Schulze (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?	?	N	Y	N	25
Yatron (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Edgar (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Coyne, J. (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	N	Y	Y	60
Shuster (R)	Y	Y	?	N	N	?	?	Y	N	Y	29
McDade (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	?	N	?	Y	N	Y	56
Nelligan (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	40
Murtha (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	20
Coughlin (R)	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	70
Coyne, W. (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	60
Ritter (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	30
Walker (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Ertel (D)	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	?	67
Walgreen (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Goodling (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	?	Y	56
Gaydos (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Bayliss (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	30
Murphy (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	33
Clinger (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	60
Marks (R)	Y	Y	?	Y	N	?	Y	?	Y	Y	43
Atkinson (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	50
Rhode Island											
St. Germain (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Schneider (R)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
South Carolina											
Harnett (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Spence (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	60

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Derrick (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	?	N	33
Campbell (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	?	Y	N	22
Holland (D)	Y	#	Y	Y	N	?	N	Y	?	N	38
Napier (R)	Y	Y	Y	?	N	Y	N	Y	Y	?	38
South Dakota											
Daschle (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	?	N	N	N	22
Roberts (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	40
Tennessee											
Quillen (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	?	N	11
Duncan (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	30
Bouquard (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	30
Gore (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	50
Boner (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	22
Beard (R)	?	Y	Y	?	N	?	X	Y	?	?	40
Jones (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	20
Ford (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50
Texas											
Hall, S. (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	?	N	N	22
Wilson (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	20
Collins (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	?	56
Hall, R. (D)	Y	Y	Y	P	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	22
Mattox (D)	Y	?	Y	Y	N	N	Y	?	Y	?	43
Gramm (D)	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60
Archer (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Fields (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	44
Brooks (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	10
Pickle (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	30
Leath (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	?	N	33
Wright (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	20
Hightower (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Patman (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	30
de la Garza (D)	Y	Y	?	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	33
White (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Stenholm (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Leland (D)	Y	N	N	?	N	Y	Y	N	?	N	25
Hance (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	?	44
Gonzalez (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	50
Loeffler (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
Paul (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Kazen (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	30
Frost (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	10
Utah											
Hansen (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?	N	Y	+	Y	56
Mariotti (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	50
Vermont											
Jeffords (R)	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	N	60
Virginia											
Trible (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	?	N	33
Whitehurst (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	50
Bliley (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Daniel, R. (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	30
Daniel, D. (D)	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	40
Butler (R)	?	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	56
Robinson (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	30
Parris (R)	N	C	Y	?	N	Y	N	?	Y	N	43
Wampler (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	50
Wolf (R)	C	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	44
Washington											
Pritchard (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	?	Y	67
Swift (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	40
Bonker (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	-	Y	N	78
Morrison (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	50
Foley (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	30

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Dicks (D)	Y	Y	N	Y	?	Y	Y	N	Y	N	33
Lowry (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	50
West Virginia											
Mollohan (D)	N	Y	?	Y	N	Y	Y	?	Y	N	38
Benedict (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	40
Staton (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	50
Rahall (D)	Y	#	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	?	N	11
Wisconsin											
Aspin (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	50
Kastenmeier (D)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	?	N	Y	6
Gunderson (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	40
Zablocki (D)	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	30
Reuss (D)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	70
Petri (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	?	56
Obey (D)	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	70
Roth (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	?	Y	67
Sensebrenner (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	60
Wyoming											
Cheney (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	60

*George E. Danielson resigned from office March 9, 1982. Matthew G. Martinez was sworn in as his replacement, July 15, 1982.

*William Cotter died September 8, 1981. His office was assumed by Barbara Kennelly.

*Adam Benjamin died in office, September 4, 1982. He was replaced by Katie Hall.

*Wayne Dowdy was sworn in July 9, 1981, after the resignation of Jon Hinson on April 13, 1981.

*Fred Richmond resigned from office on August 25, 1982.

*John M. Ashbrook died April 24, 1982. His wife, Jean, assumed the office on June 6, 1982.

*Joseph F. Smith was sworn into office on July 28, 1981, replacing Raymond F. Lederer who resigned May 5, 1981.

*Eugene Atkinson changed his party membership from Democratic to Republican, effective October 14, 1981.

Senate Special Interest Votes

1. S J Res. 115. *Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System Waivers*. Passage of the joint resolution approving the president's waivers of various stipulations in the 1977 decision to build a pipeline to carry natural gas from Alaska to the continental U.S. The waivers were aimed at securing private financing for the pipeline. Passed 75-19: R — 44-6; D — 31-13. November 19, 1981. Ripon vote: Nay.

2. S Con Res. 60. *Disapproval of Federal Trade Commission Used-Car Rule*. Adoption of the concurrent resolution to disapprove a proposed Federal Trade Commission rule to required used-car dealers to inform customers of major known defects in used automobiles. Adopted 69-27: R — 40-12; D — 29-15. May 18, 1982. Ripon vote: Nay.

3. S 1193. *State Department Authorization/Infant Formula*. Durenberger, R-MN, amendment expressing congressional "concern" at the U.S. vote against the voluntary international code for marketing infant formula adopted May 21 by the World Health Organization. Adopted 89-2: R — 47-2; D — 42-0. June 18, 1981. Ripon vote: Yea.

4. S 884. *Agriculture and Food Act of 1981*. Helms, R-NC, motion to table (kill) the Hatfield, R-OR, amendment to repeal the tobacco acreage allotment, quota and price support programs. Motion agreed to 53-42: R — 25-25; D — 28-17. September 17, 1981. Ripon vote: Nay.

5. S 898. *Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation*. Passage of the bill to deregulate much of the telecommunications industry and allow the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., through the formation of a fully separated subsidiary, to enter unregulated markets. Passed 90-4; R — 50-0; D — 40-4. October 7, 1981. Ripon vote: Yea.

6. S 509. *Milk Price Supports*. Passage of the bill to eliminate the April 1, 1981 adjustment in the parity price support for dairy products. Passed 88-5; R — 47-2; D — 41-3. March 25, 1981. Ripon vote: Yea.

7. S 1408. *Military Construction Authorization*. Jackson, D-WA, amendment to delete a provision of the bill that exempted military construction projects from the so-called Davis-Bacon Act, which required building contractors on federal construction projects to pay locally prevailing wages. Adopted 55-42; R — 16-35; D — 39-7. November 5, 1981. Ripon vote: Nay.

8. S 509. *Milk Price Supports*. Melcher, D-MT, amendment to establish a quota on the importation of casein products into the United States. Rejected 38-60; R — 7-45; D — 31-15. March 24, 1981. Ripon vote: Nay.

9. S *Unprinted Amendment No. 1488*. Motion to table the McClure amendment temporarily limiting the expenditure of funds by the Federal Trade Commission against state-regulated professions. Tabled 59-37; R — 31-21; D — 28-16. December 16, 1982. Ripon vote: Yea.

10. *Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982*. Eagleton, D-MO, amendment to restore \$400 million to the trade adjustment assistance program, which provides benefits to workers who lose their job due to imported goods. Rejected 31-64; R — 5-46; D — 26-18. June, 1982. Ripon vote: Nay.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	
Alabama											
Denton (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	60
Heflin (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	30
Alaska											
Murkowski (R)	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	67
Stevens (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	?	?	N	N	43
Arizona											
Goldwater (R)	?	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	N	?	N	83
DeConcini (D)	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	50
Arkansas											
Bumpers (D)	Y	Y	?	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	56
Pryor (D)	Y	+	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	60
California											
Hayakawa (R)	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	67
Cranston (D)	Y	N	Y	?	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	44
Colorado											
Armstrong (R)	?	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	78
Hart (D)	Y	N	?	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	44
Connecticut											
Weicker (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	70
Dodd (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	?	Y	?	Y	Y	60
Delaware											
Roth (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	60
Biden (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Florida											
Hawkins (R)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	+	N	N	Y	N	80
Chiles (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	40
Georgia											
Mattingly (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	80
Nunn (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	70
Hawaii											
Inouye (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	N	N	Y	33

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
RIPON VOTE	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	
Matsunaga (D)	+	+	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	50
Idaho											
McClure (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	40
Symms (R)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	50
Illinois											
Percy (R)	Y	?	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	56
Dixon (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	40
Indiana											
Lugar (R)	N	N	Y	Y	Y	?	N	N	Y	N	89
Quayle (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	70
Iowa											
Grassley (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	50
Jepsen (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	50
Kansas											
Dole (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	70
Kassenbaum (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	70
Kentucky											
Ford (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	30
Huddleston (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	40
Louisiana											
Johnston (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	40
Long (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	?	N	50
Maine											
Cohen (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	90
Mitchell (D)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	60
Maryland											
Mathias (R)	Y	N	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	67
Sarbanes (D)	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	50
Massachusetts											
Kennedy (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	80
Tsongas (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	90
Michigan											
Levin (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	50
Riegle (D)	N	Y	+	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	60
Minnesota											
Boschwitz (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	80
Durenberger (R)	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	80
Mississippi											
Cochran (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	60
Stennis (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	50
Missouri											
Danforth (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	80
Eagleton (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	50
Montana											
Baucus (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	50
Melcher (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	22
Nebraska											
Exon (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	40
Zorinsky (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	50
Nevada											
Laxalt (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	50
Cannon (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	+	Y	Y	Y	40
New Hampshire											
Humphrey (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	+	N	N	Y	N	90
Rudman (R)	Y	Y	?	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	89
New Jersey											
Bradley (D)	Y	N	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
*Williams (D)	N		Y	N	Y	?	Y	N		?	83
Brady (R)			Y							Y	50
New Mexico											
Domenici (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	50
Schmitt (R)	Y	Y	?	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	67

RIPON VOTE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
New York											
D'Amato (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	70
Moynihan (D)	N	N	?	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	78
North Carolina											
East (R)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	50
Helm (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	60
North Dakota											
Andrews (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	50
Burdick (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	30
Ohio											
Glenn (D)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	56
Metzenbaum (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	70
Oklahoma											
Nickles (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	70
Boren (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	50
Oregon											
Hatfield (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	80
Packwood (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	80
Pennsylvania											
Heinz (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Specter (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	70
Rhode Island											
Chafee (R)	?	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	89
Pell (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	80
South Carolina											
Thurmond (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	70
Hollings (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	40
South Dakota											
Abdnor (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	60
Pressler (R)	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	70
Tennessee											
Baker (R)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	60
Sasser (D)	Y	Y	+	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	30
Texas											
Tower (R)	Y	Y	?	Y	?	Y	N	N	N	?	43
Bentsen (D)	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	N	Y	N	N	56
Utah											
Garn (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	70
Hatch (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	?	N	78
Vermont											
Stafford (R)	Y	Y	Y	-	?	N	Y	Y	Y	N	44
Leahy (D)	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	33
Virginia											
Warner (R)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	80
Byrd (I)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	70
Washington											
Gorton (R)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	90
Jackson (D)	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	60
West Virginia											
Byrd (D)	?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	44
Randolph (D)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	30
Wisconsin											
Kasten (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	50
Proxmire (D)	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	70
Wyoming											
Simpson (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	70
Wallop (R)	Y	Y	Y	N	?	Y	N	N	N	N	67

*Harrison Williams, Jr. resigned from office March 11, 1982. Sworn in as his replacement was Nicholas F. Brady on April 20, 1982.

Key

- Y=Voted for (Yea)
- #=Paired for
- + = Announced for
- N=Voted against (Nay)
- X=Paired against
- = Announced against
- P=Voted "present"
- C=Voted "present" to avoid a possible conflict of interest
- ?=Did not vote or otherwise make a position known
- Blank=Office vacant at time of vote

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REPUBLICAN PARTY RULES: The Mandate for Change

by Josiah Lee Auspitz

Editor's Note: Mr. Auspitz is the country's leading scholar on the development of Republican Party rules. His history and analysis of the Rules presented at the 1980 Convention was specifically cited in a Convention Rules Committee Resolution calling for "careful and detailed study and evaluation" by the Republican National Committee (RNC) and requesting it to report to the 1984 convention on delegate allocation.

This article is adapted from a presentation to the opening dinner of the RNC Rules Committee at its January 1983 meeting. The RNC Rules Committee responded by canceling all discussion of the contents and passing its own resolution closing off all outside testimony on all topics. It now plans no further study of GOP structure and no further action in fulfillment of the Convention Resolution.

According to Rule 19a of the GOP Rules, the RNC is entrusted with "the general management of the Republican Party . . . subject to direction from the national convention," thus it seems that the RNC would be operating outside its published authority in neglecting a study of this issue.

At the national level the basic structure of the GOP has not been given a thorough review since the introduction of the uniform victory bonus and the new national committee structure in the call for the 1924 Convention. Since that time two great changes have occurred — one in political campaigning, the other in party attitudes. Taken together, they should occasion a change in the Coolidge-era philosophy of delegate allocation and national committee structure.

The coming year presents an historic opportunity to reexamine such issues. A similarly suitable opportunity may not recur in this century. In the year remaining before the 1984 Convention the GOP has the good fortune of a sitting president and the prospect that he will continue for another term; there is a Supreme Court with a majority of Republican appointees; one of the two houses of the national legislature is in Republican hands. At the federal level the Republican Party has not been in so strong a position relative to the Democrats since the 1920s. There is, moreover, no divisive factional problem and no pending litigation that might compromise the party's ability to deal with structural matters.

Finally, the Republican National Committee (RNC) is obliged by a resolution of the 1980 Convention to produce a study of its delegate allocation formula. If there is any time to strengthen the long-term prospects of the party this is it.

The Changing Role of State Parties

The most dramatic change in political campaigning since the Coolidge years has been in the role of the state parties. Before the advent of national media state party organizations were the decisive gateway to the electorate. A national campaign consisted largely of drawing the state organizations together to deliver what they could to the national ticket. Manufacturers associations, large corporations and other interest groups worked at the national level mainly through the state GOP leadership, so that the two states that had the most prominent industrial might — New York and Ohio — became the lynchpins of Republican national politics.

The decisiveness of party organization was evident within each of the 48 states. Straight ticket voting was common, so that county-by-county presidential returns bore a close resemblance to the returns in gubernatorial elections. Ticket-splitting was a rare phenomenon.

This is no longer the case. A new pattern was free to emerge with the introduction of the secret or Australian ballot at the turn of the century. It became the clear wave of the future in 1960, the first time there was a nationally televised presidential debate. From that election onward there began a period when ticket-splitting became commonplace and national television exposure increasingly displaced state party organization as a decisive factor in determining victory or defeat for the national ticket. Instead of patterns based on state party strength, presidential returns now fall into broad regional and demographic patterns that show no respect for state lines and no automatic congruence with other state-wide races.

State party organizations continue, of course, to play an important role in increasing turnout, organizing fundraising events, and doing advance work for appearances of the national nominees and their surrogates. But their decisive role in determining victory or defeat is a thing of the past. Instead of a presidential campaign being a from-the-bottom-up affair, where state and county organizations were drawn into a loose national confederation, it is increasingly a top-

down effort, in which a centralized national staff makes the key decisions. The top-down approach now extends to the RNC, whose staff increasingly is occupied with centralized fundraising, advertising and polling. It even targets congressional and mayoral elections in the off-years.

“The most dramatic change in political campaigning since the Coolidge years has been in the role of the state parties. The second big change is the repudiation of nativism — an amalgam of anti-Romanism with ethnic prejudice. [Yet] do the Republican Rules reflect these great changes in campaign realities and party attitudes? Not adequately.”

The Repudiation of Nativism

The second big change since the Coolidge years is the repudiation of nativism — an amalgam of anti-Romanism with ethnic prejudice. Nativist feeling was high in both parties in the early 1920s, though it was also countered with cross-cutting trends. In the Democratic Party, Ku Klux Klan members were estimated to comprise a third of the delegates to the national conventions in 1920 and 1924, though this did not prevent the Democrats from nominating a Roman Catholic presidential candidate by the required two-thirds vote in 1928. In the GOP, where the worth of each individual had always been a leading principle, the Klan was never a large factor. Nevertheless, prejudice took other, more legalistic forms that have remained an impediment to the party, especially in the Northeast quadrant of the country.

Perhaps the most influential idea among Republicans and intellectuals in the early 1920s was a novel theory that divided Europeans into three “races” — the darker “Mediterraneans” stretching from Greece into Wales, the fairer “Nordics” of northern Europe, and the sometimes blond, sometimes brunette “Alpines” of Central and Eastern Europe who could be distinguished from Nordics and Mediterraneans by their cranial measurements. Even without calipers, the “Alpines” could be known from their religion, since the line of division between Catholic and Protestant parts of Germany conveniently corresponded to most versions of the so-called “racial” division.

As part of the campaign for immigration restriction in the years 1921-1924, the view swept such leading journals of opinion as *The Saturday Evening Post* and the *North American Review* that only the long-headed, Protestant Nordics were reliable supporters of American institutions. This theory persuaded Calvin Coolidge, an otherwise liberal-minded and cultivated man, who spent his leisure hours translating Dante. “Biological laws show . . .,” he wrote during this period, “that Nordics deteriorate when mixed with other races.”¹ Such sentiments were the basis of the national origins quota of the Immigration Act of 1924, which attempted to limit future immigration to northern Europe by moving back from 1910 to 1890 the census reports on foreign stock that were to be the benchmark for immigration quotas. The uniform victory

bonus of the 1924 GOP Convention was, as we shall see, a similar attempt to lock in an ethnic balance.

In Coolidge’s day such attitudes were understandable. There had never existed in the history of the world a democratic republic based on the support of many different ethnic, racial and religious groups. Fear as to the prospects of a pluralist experiment could not seem as unfounded then as they appear two generations and one World War later. So the important thing to stress is not the bigotries of the past but the thoroughgoing reversal of them today. This is made explicit in the Preamble to the Republican Rules, which closes the door on prejudices common in both parties two generations ago. The principles enunciated in it mark the second great change from the Coolidge era — the firm and irreversible repudiation of nativism.

Two Throwbacks in the Rules

Do the Republican Rules reflect these great changes in campaign realities and party attitudes? Not adequately.

Two provisions of Rule 30 on delegate allocation remain throwbacks to an earlier age. The first of these is the uniform victory bonus, which was in fact a direct product of the 1924 climate. The second is the presidential victory bonus proportioned to Electoral College vote, which perpetuates the fiction that state party organizations rather than individual voters are now the crucial determinants of Republican victory at the presidential level. In addition, the structure of the RNC has been obviously outdated by the RNC’s own development as the most technically sophisticated party apparatus in the Free World.

The Uniform Victory Bonus

In 1924 three delegates were added to a state’s delegation, regardless of its size, if that state’s electoral votes went to the party nominee in the previous presidential election. The uniformity of the reward skewed the convention toward the less populous non-southern states, whose demographic character coincided most closely with the nativist ideal. This was a standard device replicated at the state level, where counties were represented in party councils regardless of population.

For example, in Maine, the one state where a GOP gubernatorial candidate accepted a Ku Klux Klan endorsement in the 1920s, Cumberland County, which contained the city of Portland with its large Catholic population, was equally represented on the powerful state committee with the rural sparsely populated northern counties. Populous, polyglot Philadelphia County in Pennsylvania suffered from similar imbalance in Pennsylvania, even though the city was run by a Republican machine until 1948. Even within counties, unit systems for precincts of uneven size were common. Since the newer immigrant groups settled in the more populous (i.e., urban) counties of the more populous states, the party systematically under-represented them.

On the state and county levels these provisions are a thing of the past. By a combination of reform and litigation unit devices that discriminate against minorities have either been eliminated from state organizations or subordinated to standards based on population, Republican registration or Republican vote. *The only major survival of a discriminatory

*The only two states whose GOP party conventions have similar devices do not have the same discriminatory effect. In Connecticut, where uniform delegates are awarded, they come from districts of equal population. In sparsely Republican Arkansas, a county can get an extra delegate for electing a GOP justice-of-the-peace.

1. “The Republican Party 1893-1932” by William H. Harbaugh in *History of U.S. Political Parties*, New York, 1973, vol. 3, pg. 2114.

unit bonus device in a GOP convention is in fact the uniform victory bonus at the Republican National Convention. It will account for over 300 delegates to the 1984 National Convention. A state can now win up to nine uniform bonus delegates: 4.5 for a presidential victory, one each for each GOP Senator, governor, or majority control of a congressional delegation. (All fractions are rounded to the higher integer.)

“Two provisions of Rule 30 on delegate allocation remain throwbacks to an earlier age. The first of these is the uniform victory bonus . . . The second is the presidential victory bonus proportional to Electoral College vote.”

Given the discriminatory intent that surrounded the introduction of this device, it is important to ascertain whether it still has a discriminatory effect. The answer is that it most certainly does. Testimony presented to the 1980 Convention Rules Committee shows that it still systematically under-represents states that contain a disproportionate number of so-called “outreach” voters — Roman Catholics, Jews, Asians, Hispanics and northern Blacks. The latter two groups were not originally intended as victims of the device, but have migrated into areas discriminated against.

Even without taking ethnicity or religion into account the current bonus contains an unacceptable deviation from the logic of the federal system. Under an Electoral College standard Republicans in the smallest states would have as much as four times the weight as Republicans in the largest. Under the current delegate allocation formula, however, this advantage regularly reaches seven to one.

The arithmetic is worth understanding. At a GOP convention each state begins with three times its Electoral College vote in delegates, to which are then added various bonuses. A state like Alaska, with three electoral votes can “earn” up to eleven bonus delegates. Its delegation can thus reach twenty (nine base plus eleven bonus), or 6.7 times its Electoral College strength. California, by contrast, with 47 electoral votes, has a ceiling of 178 delegates (141 base plus 37 bonus), or 3.8 times its Electoral College vote. The Electoral College already gives any voter at random in Alaska four times the weight of one in California; the Republican National Convention increases this deviation by a further factor of 1.76 (6.7/3.8) to 7.0. That is, any voter at random from Alaska has seven times the weight at a GOP national convention of a voter from California. On convention committees, where all states have equal representation, this weighting reaches a ratio of 63:1, as it does on the RNC.

The Proportional Victory Bonus

Understandably, the uniform victory bonus has come under legal challenge. The party convention of 1972 was under a federal district court injunction to draft a new formula. The court order was stayed at the eleventh hour by Justice Rehnquist on the appeal of six Western state party chairmen. Nevertheless, the 1972 convention did draft a new formula which improved the legal viability of the old bonus in future litigation. The new feature was to add to the uniform bonus a presidential victory bonus proportioned to Electoral College strength. A state gets a bonus equivalent to 60% of its Electoral College vote for “delivering” to the ticket.

As a defensive legal measure this was a masterstroke. Since federal judges do not run for election, their knowledge of practical politics is invariably a generation out of date. The proportional bonus drew on the textbook picture of a previous generation in which state parties “delivered” victory to the ticket.

“Leaving aside the legal vulnerability of the party’s entitlement to federal funding, is there any serious student or practitioner of American politics who would argue that the current GOP bonuses provide effective incentives?”

The authors of this device gauged their audience well. The Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals in fact cited a college textbook dated in 1960 that described the national parties as no more than “loose confederacies of state parties.” And so they were when the learned judges were in college. But anyone who has studied a national campaign since 1960 understands that they are now centrally planned and orchestrated, with state parties playing a supportive rather than a leading role.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did not entirely neglect such factors. It left open the possibility that campaign realities might change. “We must emphasize that this [the GOP’s right under the First Amendment to choose the formula it did] is only true because the formula advances legitimate party interests in political effectiveness. The same might not always hold true.” The court also noted that the right of the GOP to federal funding might still be open to litigation. It noted (this being 1974) that the case of *Buckley v. Valeo* had not yet been resolved and federal funding had not yet begun, and it then speculated as follows: “If the parties’ conventions, and their candidates are to be so far underwritten by the federal government, then perhaps they must share its constitutional obligations.”

Leaving aside the legal vulnerability of the party’s entitlement to federal funding, is there any serious student or practitioner of American politics who would argue that the current GOP bonuses provide effective incentives? Federal funding itself has accelerated the growth of a very different reality from the “loose confederacy of state parties” the GOP bonuses presuppose. To ignore the new realities in apportioning delegates has an arbitrary, capricious and ultimately a demoralizing effect on party organization. It rewards states for events beyond their control while neglecting the things they can influence — long-term Republican loyalty and turnout.

Nor does it even perform the minimal disciplining function of penalizing a state for third party defections. Compare, for example, Massachusetts with Nebraska, both of which qualify for the proportional bonus this year. In Massachusetts, where Anderson drew 20% of the vote in rural, suburban and exurban GOP counties, there were only two counties in which the Reagan-Bush ticket got more than 50% of the vote. In Nebraska there were only three counties in which they got less than 60% and many where their percentage exceeded 75%. Yet the proportional bonus is blind to these very substantial differences in party strength.

Finally, the proportional victory bonus violates the first requirement for fair rules: that they not be consciously biased against any region or faction. At the 1972 Convention, where the issue of delegate allocation came to a rare roll-call vote, Clark Reed of Mississippi stated publicly that the bonus

would assure control of the party by the South and West indefinitely. The vote on the substitute formula proposed by the late Wisconsin Rep. William Steiger suggested that this perception was widespread.

As it now stands, the proportional bonus is a throwback to a textbook party that no longer exists. It presupposes that the national party is a "loose confederacy of state parties" and rewards a kind of campaign that has not remotely existed for two decades and cannot be brought back.

RNC Structure

The structure of the RNC contains some similarly antique and offensive features. The RNC is the only standing Republican committee in the country in which population, Republican vote and Republican registration are entirely excluded as bases of representation. Regardless of population, every state has three votes. The argument that this structure reflects that of the U.S. Senate neglects the fact that the Senate operates in tandem with the House of Representatives and in balance with the presidency, while the RNC operates "subject to direction from the national convention," which is itself malapportioned with bonus devices.

"... the proportional victory bonus violates the first requirement for fair rules: that they not be consciously biased against any region or faction."

To remedy the marked absence of urban groups that its structure preordains, the RNC has added over the years ex officio non-voting seats on its Executive Committee for one token black, one token Hispanic, and one token "heritage" American (Eastern European or Asian). This year, it is proposed that there be added to this non-voting structure one token Jew, one labor union representative, and one representative of Republicans Abroad. There is, of course, nothing wrong with giving special recognition to GOP auxiliaries that serve special constituencies, but not if the party structure discriminates against the members of these auxiliaries as citizens and as Republicans.

A Party-Building Structure

Let me sketch an alternative structure that meets the issues I have raised. It returns the party to the Electoral College system under which it competes for the presidency and upon which its national convention was founded. It fulfills the requirements of the Preamble to the GOP Rules, which declares:

It is the intent and purpose of these rules to encourage the broadest possible participation of all voters in Republican Party activities at all levels and to assure that . . . we are also the party of opportunity for all; opportunity for everyone of every race, religion, color, national origin, age or sex . . . for minorities and heritage groups, and for all Americans . . . in all sections of the country, North, South, East, and West.

And it sets up a system that provides meaningful incentive to state and local parties.

For the RNC the Electoral College standard has a simple application: expanding the body so that each state has an RNC delegation equivalent to its Electoral College strength.

Thus, Alaska and Vermont would still have three delegates but Illinois would have 24, Tennessee 11, and Maine four. The base of the RNC would be more than tripled from 150 for the fifty states to 535. Since the RNC meets as a body only once a year, this would not pose any logistical problem. But it would mean that the large state delegations would include blacks and Hispanics as voting members. They would doubtless form caucuses to urge issues upon the party as Republicans. At present the party must rely on the press and professional Democrats for an assessment of its performance on issues of concern to minorities.

"The RNC is the only standing Republican committee in the country in which population, Republican vote and Republican registration are entirely excluded as bases of representation."

Moreover, an Electoral College standard would give the RNC legitimacy and dignity befitting its new role as a recipient of federal funds and as a pioneer in centralized fundraising, advertising and campaigning. Its top-down technical role, which has developed in the past decade to the envy of the Democrats, would justify a more representative structure even if the current one were not offensive on other grounds. A legitimate structure for the RNC would also give it the authority to counter the Democratic National Committee, which is now able to set the national fashion for presidential campaigning by using its mid-term convention to rewrite the requirements that state legislatures take into account in writing their primary laws.

Delegate Allocation

For the delegate allocation formula the Electoral College standard provides a similarly straightforward guide: make each state's delegation a multiple of its Electoral College vote. The only open question is how to cast the balance between a "base" component derived from an exact multiple of Electoral College strength and an "incentive" component, in which a state might fall very slightly above or below its Electoral College strength, depending on its performance.

During the period of its greatest success the GOP had no incentive component at all, and there would be no objection in principle to returning to the system under which the majority of the party's successful nominees were selected. But since there now seems to be a deeply rooted feeling that the party convention should contain some form of incentive, let me suggest one that is both meaningful in terms of practical politics and principled in terms of the articulated ideals of the party. To illustrate it, I shall show how any multiple of 535 delegates might be apportioned among the states. (For simplicity of presentation I shall leave to one side the three additional Electoral votes of the District of Columbia, the special status of the territories, and the problem of Nebraska's unicameral legislature, but these can obviously be dealt with in accordance with proposals made by others.)

The proposal is based on a two-pronged substitution for the existing bonus formula:

First, the new proposal substitutes a turnout or "open party" bonus based on Republican vote for president in three elections for the current proportional bonus based on

victory in a single election. Second, it recasts the old nativist uniform bonuses as an "achievement bonus" attuned to the Electoral College standard.

The Preamble to the Rules calls the GOP "the party of the open door." To fulfill this aim it is important that every Republican voter feel that he or she is specifically recognized by the national convention, that loyalty, turnout and participation are directly rewarded, regardless of whether the party carries a state. This reinforces the spirit that state parties can successfully encourage with computerized canvassing techniques, grass roots organization, and attractive local candidates and issues.

"Let me sketch an alternative structure that meets the issues I have raised. It returns the party to the Electoral College standard under which it competes for the presidency and upon which its national convention was founded."

To this end, the current 60% all-or-nothing victory bonus would be replaced with an "open party" or turnout bonus based on Republican presidential vote over three elections. The allocation of delegates would follow the pattern for apportioning seats to the states in the House of Representatives. A fixed number of delegates would be set at 435 (436 if Washington, D.C. is included). The vote for GOP president would be totaled for three elections, and every state would get one delegate for each 1/435th of the total. The rounding would follow the statistical method used for the House of Representatives in the previous decennial reapportionment.

In addition, to reintegrate the current uniform victory bonuses with the federal system, a maximum of 100 at-large delegates, two for each state (102 if a way is found to include Washington, D.C.), would be set aside in recognition of state achievements in the following areas: a Republican majority in each house of the state's legislature, a Republican majority in each state's congressional delegation, a Republican governor, Republican senator(s), and a Republican victory of the state's Electoral Vote in the previous presidential election. This would give each state a total of seven possible ways to earn the two additional at-large votes. Announcing the method by which each state qualified or over-qualified for its bonus could be made part of the call of the roll to recognize state achievements publicly at the Convention.

Advantages

The open party bonus encourages participation, turnout and loyalty. It opens the party to all individuals regardless of areas of residence. It penalizes third party defections. It stabilizes the convention delegations at approximately four times a state's electoral votes, with it being unlikely that any state would fluctuate by more than 5% from Convention to Convention. It militates against the entrenchment of a permanent Convention majority. It implements the aims of the Preamble to the Rules. And it bears a rational relation to current campaign realities.

The achievement bonus, for its part, strips the uniform victory bonus of all prejudicial effects while retaining it as a recognition of party achievements. It adds majority control of state legislatures to the current list of achievements.

"The current 60% all-or-nothing victory bonus would be replaced with an 'open-party' or turnout bonus based on Republican presidential vote over three elections."

Taken together the two aspects of the proposed party-building bonus system encourage balanced, long-term growth of the GOP. They necessarily reduce the proportional stake of small state delegations to comport with the Preamble, but still give them significantly more weight than in the Democratic National Convention, which is skewed to a one person, one vote rather than an Electoral College standard.

The balance between the incentive and base components of this formula can be struck in various ways, depending on the size of the convention. A Convention fixed at five times the Electoral College votes of the states could have three parts base (as in the current formula) and two parts incentive (or double the proportions proposed here). As a practical matter, assuring the small states a delegation no smaller than in the 1984 Convention would probably be useful for putting a new formula in effect in 1988.

The Need for Discussion

But the prior imperative is that the question of allocation must be discussed openly, on the merits and on the record, as called for by the 1980 Convention. There is very little doubt that once the current system, with all its history, legal risks, and contravention of Republican ideals is brought to light it will have to be changed. Republicans are fair-minded people and they will insist on fair-minded rules. Few Republicans are aware of the effects of the current rules. Particularly in the West, where Republicans are continually mystified by the party's reputation for prejudice, few are aware that the Western states have long been over-represented as the legacy of long-discredited bigotries from the years 1921-1924.

Westerners, above all, should lead the fight to demonstrate the party's good will in the one area wholly within their control: the party rules.

Conclusion

At stake is more than the party's success in competing with the Democrats. We are in a time when the party system as a whole must redefine its relation to other institutions. For a century now, the parties have been in steady decline relative to the press and civil service. They are now even more seriously challenged on their own ground by a new kind of political apparatus: the mail-order faction. Whereas a party is organized to moderate and reconcile differences, the mail-order faction thrives on exaggerating them. Moreover, new techniques of communication make it possible to turn a mail-order faction into the semblance of a party within a matter of weeks.

In this new kind of competition, as well as in its longer-standing relations with the press and civil service, a political party's sole claim to legitimacy lies in its representative character. That is why the problems of party structure, technical though they may seem, are crucial to the future of American politics. ■

THE CHAIRMAN'S CORNER: PACs Americana

by Jim Leach

America's political tradition is perhaps best expressed by the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr who wrote that "the temper and the integrity with which the political fight is waged is more important for the health of our society than any particular policy."

Against this cultural backdrop it is difficult for Americans not to be disheartened by the revelations that an estimated \$80 million of special interest money was distributed to candidates in the last congressional election. At issue in an immediate sense is the ability of Congress to effectively address public problems. At issue in the largest sense is how the democratic process works.

Special interest campaign contributions are distributed primarily through legal entities known as political action committees or PACs. While not an unprecedented phenomenon in U.S. political history, PACs through sheer size have taken on a new dimension in the last decade. Now one of America's largest growth industries, PACs have grown sixfold in number and tenfold in dollar contributions since 1972.

Virtually all labor unions and several thousand business and trade associations sponsor PACs, as do many liberal and conservative causes. The vast majority represent only a narrow fraction of the public viewpoint. The wide ranging economic, social and foreign policy concerns of the common citizen are seldom the "raison d'être" of any PAC. The totality of PAC contributions reflect a spectrum of special interests which not infrequently are at variance with one another, but PACs make no pretense of representing a full spectrum of societal concerns. Unmoneied interests simply aren't represented by moneyed PACs.

Several of the largest PACs — those associated with the American Medical Association, the National Association of Realtors, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and the United Auto Workers — contributed several million dollars each in the 1982 election. Oil and gas PACs contributed more money to candidates than did the Democratic National Committee. But it is a myth to assume that the Republican Party is the primary beneficiary of PAC giving. Actually, the primary beneficiaries are one definable group — incumbents. Whereas labor is partisanly oriented, funding Democrats by a 20 to 1 margin, business interests are more power oriented and generally divide their contributions about evenly between the parties. The largest recipients are invariably the most powerful members of

Congress — who for most of the past thirty years have been Democrats.

It may be debatable how nefarious or constructive PAC participation has been in recent campaigns, but if the growing role of PACs is a guide to the future, it would appear that both labor and business are girding for future political campaigns which in quantum magnitude are likely to be more expensive than any Americans have experienced.

Congressional Indebtedness

If this trend towards more expensive races and thus heavier financial obligations for candidates is not curbed, individuals elected to the Congress of the United States will increasingly become indebted to either big business or big labor. Congress will become a legislative body where the small businessman, the farmer, the laborer and ordinary citizen are only

"The roots of economic misery begin in federal spending and federal spending begins in promises and obligations, and all this begins with politicians. It begins in the way campaigns are run, in politics as usual; in commitments to large contributors, no matter who they are."

secondarily represented. In fact, it is no accident today that the middle class frequently bears a heavier tax burden than the rich; that small companies lack the tax advantages of the integrated oil companies; that discussion in Congress of tax policy all too often lack reference to tax equity; and that unemployment is the economic issue of the day.

The last point should be stressed: unemployment is not unrelated to campaign financing abuses.

The roots of economic misery begin in federal spending and federal spending begins in promises and obligations, and all this begins with politicians. It begins in the way campaigns are run, in politics as usual; in commitments to large contributors, no matter who they are.

Currently the most effective way for a congressional candidate to achieve support is to isolate every identifiable group — especially moneyed groups — and announce

support for that group's vested interests. But going along with the most powerful interest groups inevitably leads either to the proliferation of federal programs or the weakening of the tax structure. Fiscal balance and equitability are impossible to maintain after lawmakers, that is, the successful candidates, have committed themselves in advance to support specific tax advantages or government programs favoring those having made generous campaign contributions. America may be a society of individuals, but power groupings — not individuals — are represented in legislatures where money is the key determinant of election outcome.

"If PAC funding battles go unchecked, it is quite conceivable that American political parties could increasingly become copies of European parties, and that group self-interest rather than individual views will be fought out in the electoral process."


Unfortunately, groups seldom reflect the same collective judgment as all their members. This is particularly true in labor unions where labor PAC funds go almost exclusively to candidates of one political party, but where in many instances almost half the actual membership vote goes to candidates of the other. This problem is not exclusively one of labor leadership being out of step with membership. It is also true in many farm and corporate organizations where individual farmers and corporate executives oppose the very candidates who the managers of their PACs support.

This membership-leadership divergence of judgment is natural and largely irreconcilable since uniformity of views regarding political parties and candidates is not a hallmark of any part of the American economic system. If PAC funding battles go unchecked, however, it is quite conceivable that American political parties could increasingly become copies of European parties, and that group self-interest rather than individual views will be fought out in the electoral process.

PAC Power Brokers: Centralized Decision-Making

Moreover, with regard to those who argue that PACs serve to involve more people in the democratic process, one should stress that PAC decision-making is often centralized. Individuals who control other people's money become power brokers in an elitist society. Their views, not those of the small contributors to their PACs, become the views that carry influence.

Most unfortunately, the perspective of power brokers who control PAC funds is frequently that of out-of-state interests which have little to do with the concerns of individual constituents. Our forefathers designed a representative democracy for America — a democracy where the particular views of every state and congressional district would be



reflected in the legislative process. As today's candidates become increasingly dependent on special interest contributions, however, constituencies become gerrymandered along interest group lines. In nationalizing funding sources, PACs have the effect of nationalizing electoral input. In smaller states particularly, Senate races have been disproportionately nationalized by interest groups in recent elections. Those who control PACs understand, for instance, that a South Dakota senator's vote carries as much weight as a California senator's. Thus rural states like South Dakota have found more money spent per voter than larger urban states, and frequently this money reflects interest groups' concerns alien to the state itself. The citizens of smaller states therefore run the risk of becoming disenfranchised as their candidates develop effective indebtedness to out-of-state concerns — an issue often ignored by those defending the constitutional rights of PACs.

Politics for Profit

But attempts to influence the outcome of governmental decisions through the distribution of money is not new to American democracy. What appears to be new is the use, particularly by ideological PACs, of political issues for profit. The ideological PACs have in recent years used mass mail techniques to raise impressive sums of money, the preponderance of which goes to pay overhead rather than to advance the causes espoused.

The New Right PACs run by Jesse Helms (National Congressional Club), Terry Dolan (NCPAC) and Paul Weyrich (Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress) raised almost \$21,000,000 in the 1981-82 election cycle,

but distributed only \$486,028, or 2.3 percent, directly to candidates, and \$2,936,000, or 14 percent, as independent expenditures for or against candidates. The remainder is basically accounted for as overhead costs of the organizations or as the cost of contracting with Richard Viguier's direct mail company. The New Right lacks a Don Quixote. Causes appear to be espoused more as fundraising gimmicks than societal ills to be righted. This bleeding of the body politic by the New Right is a national scandal, as is the ruinously divisive tone set by the sophisticated New Right fundraisers in their direct mail solicitations.

Ideological PACs on the Left, such as the National Committee for an Effective Congress and the League of Conservation Voters, also distributed only a fraction of moneys raised, but their fundraising efforts were substantially more limited in scope. Interestingly, both Walter Mondale and Edward Kennedy operated personal PACs during the last election which raised slightly in excess of \$2 million each. Mondale's Committee for the Future of America Inc. distributed \$166,433 and Kennedy's Fund for a Democratic Majority gave \$177,355 to Democratic candidates — sums equal to about 8 percent of funds raised.

One feature of PACs controlled for presidential candidates giving to congressional and senatorial candidates that touches a sensitive nerve in the political process is the political conflict of interest which develops for those congressional candidates who accept such funds.

In future presidential primaries, they embrace a set of implicit obligations to candidates of their party not dissimilar to the obligations legislators (i.e., the successful candidates) develop to interest groups who contribute to their campaigns. A congressman or congressional candidate is usually the most influential political figure in a congressional district, sometimes to the point of controlling the party structure for the 505,000 people who compose the average district. If a particular candidate accepts a substantial contribution from a presidential candidate's PAC, it becomes difficult if not unseemly for that candidate to support another presidential candidate for his party.

"What is needed is legislation capping, or preferably eliminating entirely, special interest group giving in campaigns. The current fundraising system should be replaced with a partial public financing approach."

In the cases of Mondale and Kennedy, both appeared to be looking over each other's shoulder as they raised and disbursed equal amounts of money to candidates. The interest groups who contributed to their PACs also appeared to be treating each other equally. Now, with Kennedy's withdrawal from the 1984 primaries, Mondale has a significant leg up on all other contenders. Early, well-placed money cannot be underestimated. Candidates remember.

Conclusion

Certainly no legislative process can ever be perfect. Nor can decisions always be wise. But the public interest

demands that restraint be placed on the capacity, through hefty campaign contributions, of a few large interests to influence political decision-making.

What is needed is legislation capping, or preferably eliminating entirely, special interest group giving in campaigns. The current fundraising system would be replaced with a partial public funding approach, perhaps involving a formula whereby public funds are used to match private in-state contributions to candidates. This type of domestic SALT agreement between big business and labor is likely to be disliked by each, but it should work to the stark advantage of the individual citizen and taxpayer.

What is also needed is increased public attention to be focused on the tactics of the ideological PACs. The spotlight of decency and tolerance should be turned on those who attempt to pick the pocket of concerned citizens by accentuating the negative.

America has always stood as a land of hope and opportunity. Those who play on the fears rather than the aspirations of citizens should not be rewarded in the political process. In politics, as in sports, it does matter how you play the game. ■

Jim Leach, a member of Congress from Iowa, is chairman of the Ripon Society. A portion of this column will be printed in a forthcoming article in USA TODAY magazine. © 1983

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Political Notes

Pennsylvania's GOP Governor Richard Thornburgh has called for an emergency reserve of \$300 million over the next two years to assist unemployed workers and distressed family farmers against the "extraordinary hardship" of mortgage foreclosures. Thornburgh's "Hand Up" program is part of a balanced budget he has proposed and will be funded with surplus revenues from the state's Lottery Fund.

What's unique about this is that the moderate Republican's fiscal management has allowed Pennsylvania to meet human needs while still holding sales and income tax rates level. Other Midwestern states under Democratic governors, however, have not been so fortunate. Instead, the citizens of **Ohio** are now faced with their single-largest tax increase ever, a 90 percent rise in the state income tax. The genius of Democratic Governor Richard Celeste, it is similar to tax increases proposed in **Wisconsin** by fellow Democrat Anthony Earl. Just recently elected governor, Earl has already secured passage of tax hikes to meet budget deficits . . .

Wisconsin Republican Tony Roth apparently will be challenged again by Democrat Ruth Clusen for his 8th Congressional District seat. Clusen already has been encouraged by Earl, who recently appointed her to a state commission, thus allowing her to remain in the public's eye. Such moves have caused some to speculate that Clusen will challenge the three-term incumbent in 1984 . . .

Michigan Forum correspondent John Hagen reports that the **Michigan** GOP has finally resolved its leadership woes. Spencer Abraham was recently elected state party chairman, defeating conservative Richard Chrysler and moderate Ranny Riecker. The 31-year pollster now faces a formidable challenge in restoring the **Michigan** party, which has lost its 20-year hold on the governor's office and the patronage available to it . . .

Connecticut's Michael Lewyn reports that the **Connecticut** Republican Party has elected a new state chair of its own, former Lowell Weicker campaign manager Tom D'Amore. It seems **Connecticut** Republicans are uniting behind D'Amore in hopes of binding up some of the wounds left over from last year's senatorial primary. In fact, Republicans in the state Senate have selected a moderate as minority leader. Phillip Robertson of Cheshire will replace George Gunther, minority leader last session who was defeated by Robertson . . .

Minnesota's Rudy Boschwitz will face in 1984 what one local pol has called an "uphill battle" in retaining his U.S. Senate seat. Boschwitz, a moderate Republican, already has tough competition lining up, with the most likely challengers being former **Minnesota** Governor Wendell Anderson, Rep. Jim Oberstar and 1982 Democrat-Farm-Labor Senate nominee Mark Dayton. But some **Minnesotans** think that Dayton is taking a terrible risk in running so soon after he spent seven million dollars in losing to progressive Republican David Durenberger in their 1982 Senate contest . . .

Last November's defeat of **Texas** Governor William Clements was particularly devastating to that state's GOP, reports **Texas** FORUM correspondent Michael Hayes. Thus, the 1984 elections will be especially crucial in determining whether **Texas** will develop as a true two-party state or remain a Democratic preserve with small pockets of GOP strength. This makes the current

struggle over the state's party chairmanship quite important. A majority of the State Republican Executive Committee have requested the resignation of the present head, Chet Upham. But Upham, who announced for Gerald Ford during the 1976 **Texas** primary much to the chagrin of **Texas** Reagan supporters, has said he will remain on until his term ends in Fall 1984. The next eighteen months, therefore, will indicate the direction that party will take. If single-issue conservatives capture the top spot, then the party, some think, will never again gain a serious hearing . . .

Ripon Activities

The Ripon Society's annual Republican of the Year Award Dinner will be held in **Washington** the second week of June. Former executive director Rick Kessler is chairing the event and welcomes suggestions for individuals to serve on the dinner's Steering Committee. If interested, please contact the Ripon national office, (202) 546-1292. More details will be furnished later . . .

The Ripon Society has joined the Citizens Against Nuclear War (CAN), a coalition of 42 organizations in opposition to a nuclear arms buildup. The Society has been active in the organization's activities, submitting a letter in March to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the Conte-Markey nuclear freeze resolution . . .

The **District of Columbia** Ripon chapter met in late March to hear PAC representatives from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Home Builders and the Business-Industry PAC discuss the role of political action committees. Each speaker agreed that it will be harder for business candidates to get money early for 1984 and that Democrats will probably receive more business support during the next election . . .

The Ripon Society of **New York** has elected Bill Lithgow as its president, replacing Mark Uncapher who will become the Society's policy chairman. Lithgow has been quite active in Ripon, serving as national treasurer the last two years . . .

The Harvard Chapter has also concluded its elections with Michael Malamut being chosen president, Douglas Lister vice-president and Jack Robinson secretary-treasurer. The newly elected president of the Drake Ripon Society is Peter Brown. The chapter has been holding weekly meetings, bringing in both professors and local politicians to address the group. The chapter also hopes to begin a nationwide student newsletter reporting on moderate GOP student activities . . .

These activities match interest recently expressed by moderate Republicans in **Illinois** and **Michigan** who wish to form Ripon chapters there. If interested in this, please contact Greg Knopp at the Ripon national office . . .

Masu Dyer of the **Hawaiian** Ripon chapter reports that while **Hawaii's** GOP more closely reflects the state's ethnic population than it did a generation ago, the **FORUM** must stand corrected in reporting recently that the **Hawaiian** GOP has gained in electoral strength. Republicans still comprise less than 20 percent of all elected officials, Dyer reports, and Democrats hold nearly every major office. Our regrets!! ■