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

ASSESSING THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY

PLUS:

A Conversation with John Tower

EDITOR'S COLUMN

The Reagan presidency has come under intense examination recently, primarily because of its handling of the Iran-contra affair. Ronald Reagan's broad shoulders, however, still seem to inspire many and he is assured of being a president against whom other chief executives will be judged. That makes assessing Ronald Reagan and his administration a difficult task.

A *Forum* editorial provides commentary on the Reagan presidency by drawing upon a piece written in these pages in 1968. The successes and failures of the Reagan presidency are strikingly similar to those of his governorship, and those ironies are the focus of our editorial. The major difference might be that as president, Ronald Reagan has been adored, particularly by many young Americans. In a review of Garry Wills's *Reagan's America: Innocents at Home*, *Forum* editorial board member Alfred W. Tate examines that phenomenon. He says that "Americans need larger-than-life heroes" and agrees with Garry Wills that the vaulted status of Ronald Reagan is in large part our "demand for illusion."

In a special interview with Senator John Tower, the ramifications of the administration's greatest problem—the Iran arms deals—are discussed. The veteran legislator claims that President Reagan should have notified Congress earlier about the administration's efforts and that the trading of arms to Iran was ultimately a swap for American hostages. But the former political science professor also speaks at length about the manner in which foreign policy is made in a democracy. He says that treaties cannot always be openly arrived at, and that to expect otherwise is naive.

Several members of the Ripon Congressional Advisory Board also speak out on the Strategic Defensive Initiative, a proposal that historians will link to this administration. Other articles include American reporter Paul Cozby's analysis of Germany's centrist party, and a reevaluation of another president—Herbert Hoover—whose presidency Iowan Tom Walsh reminds us did not end in glory.

—Bill McKenzie

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Terrence M. O'Sullivan
Alfred W. Tate Steven B. Klinsky
Gem E. Meyer Gail L. Slocum
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A Conversation with JOHN TOWER

John Tower was first elected to the United States Senate in 1961 and for 23 years he represented his native Texas in those chambers. He retired as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1984, and in 1985 was appointed U.S. Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms at the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union in Geneva. But perhaps his most difficult public role came in November 1986 when he was named chairman of the president's Special Review Board, otherwise known as the Tower Commission. This commission was established by President Reagan to examine the role and function of the National Security Advisor, the National Security Council, and the NSC staff.

In this interview with Forum *editor Bill McKenzie, Senator Tower comments on the Commission's findings and also discusses a number of defense and foreign policy questions. This includes the Strategic Defense Initiative, the arms race, and the United States' relationship to its Western European allies.*

RIPON FORUM: What is your perception of the real goal of the Iran initiative engaged in by the Reagan administration? Was it to open up relations with moderate elements of the Iranian government, or was it to trade arms-for-hostages?

TOWER: I think that those who were involved initially saw it as a strategic opening to Iran which, I think everybody agrees, is ultimately in the interest of the United States. But whatever it started out as, very quickly it became an arms-for-hostage deal.

There is no question that there was an early concern about the Soviets exploiting a power vacuum in Iran, and there still is concern that such could occur in a post-Khomeini government. We should be alert to that fact, but I think our conclusion in the Tower Commission Report was correct: the arms-for-hostage approach actually was counter-productive to establishing long-term normalization of relations with Iran.

RIPON FORUM: What can or should we do to maintain relations with Iran's power structure, particularly given the ordeal of the last seven months?

TOWER: I would have no objections to developing a second channel to Iran, provided there was no arms-hostage transfer. I am strongly opposed to transfer of arms to Iran right now. Our relations must be based on a recognition of reasonable interest. We shouldn't cut off all contact, but it should be based on the long-term.

RIPON FORUM: Is there a currency that would open up such channels?

TOWER: I am not sophisticated enough to know. I'm not an expert on U.S.-Iranian relations.

RIPON FORUM: There are at least three laws which concern the legality or illegality of the Reagan administration's Iran initiative. One is the Arms Export Control Act, another is the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, and a third is the National Security Act of 1947. What is your perception of the bearing those laws have on the initiative?

TOWER: That would require a legal opinion, which, as a non-lawyer, I am not competent to give. One could make a case, I suppose, that, on the face of it, those laws were breached. However, there are those who can argue the other side—that the laws are not sufficiently specific, binding or unambiguous. In our report we did not come down with any hard and fast conclusions. The fact is, those proscriptive laws don't carry criminal penalties. So, there is also a question of enforceability.

RIPON FORUM: Former National Security Affairs Advisor John Poindexter and National Security Council aide Oliver North will soon be called to testify before congressional investigatory committees. Should they be granted any form of immunity to compel them to testify?

TOWER: If those committees want to get maximum benefit from their testimony, they are going to have to grant them some immunity. In fact, that is what we sought when we requested that the president, as commander-in-chief, order them to appear. In our legal view, that would have been tantamount to granting them use immunity for anything they said to us. The White House legal advisers, however, came up with the wrong conclusion. They thought that Poindexter and North were being compelled to give up their Fifth Amendment rights. That is not the way our lawyers viewed it.

RIPON FORUM: Does the granting of immunity create a bad precedent?

TOWER: Such incidences should not be regarded as precedential. Situations of this sort should be considered on an ad-hoc basis. How do you derive the greatest

"If the investigating congressional committees want to get maximum benefit from North's and Poindexter's testimony, then they are going to have to grant them some immunity."

good? Is it more important that we learn the facts and deal with the situation in a timely fashion, or permit it to drag on in a prosecutorial proceeding for one, two or maybe three years, just to make sure that miscreants are punished? The bottom line must be, where does the public interest lie?

RIPON FORUM: The Tower Commission Report used an epigraph from a Latin poet Juvenal, which translated means: "Who shall guard the guardians themselves?" But the Tower Commission also claimed that no structural reforms were necessary. Doesn't that imply that the "guards" were in place, but dubious management left them unemployed?

TOWER: That Latin expression was just designed to set the tone, perhaps to raise the rhetorical question as much as anything else.

RIPON FORUM: So, in this case, some individuals ran around procedural safeguards, but those "guards" remain intact?

TOWER: Those who are guarded must hold the guardians accountable. Now, of course, we did conclude that structural reforms are desirable within the National Security Council structure. We made certain recommendations that the president can implement administratively that do not proscribe his flexibility in how he utilizes the process.

RIPON FORUM: Regarding the process of conducting foreign policy, one reason Congress was upset over the Iran initiative was that its intelligence committees were not informed in a "timely fashion." What is a "timely fashion," and what role can Congress play in determining foreign policy?

TOWER: You shouldn't try to legally describe or define a "timely fashion" any more than you should attempt to statutorially define what is and is not operational. The Commission's fear was that progressive statutory intrusion by Congress into the process of deciding foreign policy might drive the president further toward the utilization of outside resources.

RIPON FORUM: You served in the United States Senate for 25 years, what role do you think Congress should play in conducting foreign policy?

TOWER: Probably an oversight role. It should call a president to account for excessive acts. Congress should not try, as it does, to piecemeal the formulation or implementation of foreign policy. If a president tries to develop a long-term, comprehensive and coherent foreign policy, and Congress picks away at bits and pieces, it tends to erode the whole process.

For example, I had some concerns when I was an arms negotiator that Congress was tempted to mandate acceptance of Soviet proposals that, standing alone, might seem desirable or harmless. When seen as an element in the entire bargaining process, however, they were of enormous importance. This limited our flexibility, and negotiators need a certain amount of latitude.

American negotiators shouldn't be compelled to forsake their negotiating position too quickly. The Soviets are extremely patient. They will wait you out and appear intransigent just to exploit the natural impatience of a democratic society for results. They will try to force you into making concessionary proposals, which give them a superior bargaining position. Imposing restraints on the United States that are not by nature a part of the Soviet system places us at a disadvantage.

RIPON FORUM: So how do we conduct foreign policy in a democracy, where decisions are to be arrived at openly?

TOWER: Not all decisions should be arrived at openly. The Wilsonian notion of open covenants openly arrived at is naive in the extreme. To begin with, you deal with a lot of foreign powers who traditionally conduct diplomacy in an atmosphere of confidentiality. I am not just talking about authoritarian or totalitarian systems, either. This includes our dealings with some parliamentary democracies. Our systems of checks and balances is somewhat unique, even among democratic societies.

We cannot have absolute democracy. You cannot submit every important issue to a federal referendum. That's why we have a representative democracy, where authority is delegated to an elected senator or congressman. And if you don't like what they do, you turn them out of office.

RIPON FORUM: If we do not arrive at covenants openly, then how do we ensure that secrecy does not become an obsession? The Tower Commission concluded, for example, that secrecy had become a factor in the White House's Iran initiative.

TOWER: To do everything openly would have some undesirable consequences. You could never engage in covert action, and the whole intelligence process would be subject to compromise. Your dealings with other countries would be extremely difficult. In diplomatic negotiations, a lot of countries would refuse to deal with you if everything was subject to public scrutiny. During the course of and after the Church Committee investigation into the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, there was a marked diminuition of cooperation with our intelligence agency.

RIPON FORUM: How has the Iran-contra affair affected our image abroad?

TOWER: The Soviets take advantage of the fact that we are an open society. That is why verification in arms negotiations is not terribly important to them. They can learn so much through our open sources. If you open that up still further, it places us at a rather considerable disadvantage.

This gets us into the question of the people's right to know. In a democracy, people should be well-informed. It leads to right decisions. But then you run up against the people's right to be secure. People expect their government to provide them with a certain amount of security. The extreme example is that almost everyone would agree that we should not publish detailed plans of our next nuclear submarine on the front page of the *New York Times*. But what should we publish on the front page, above the fold, of the *New York Times?*

I believe the administration, however, made an error in not consulting with the congressional leadership over the Iran initiative. The administration originally thought that the entire affair would have

been consumated within a few days. All the hostages would have been out, and people would forgive the fact that a few arms flowed to Iran. But they should have contacted Congress within a few days.

Now, there are certain instances where an administration is justified in not talking to anyone. The Iran hostage rescue operation during the Carter administration is an example. The first leak could have led our rescuers into an ambush.

RIPON FORUM: What kind of rating would you give the media in its coverage of the Iran-contra affair?

TOWER: Generally fair. I can't take anyone to task immediately. The press sensationalized it a little more than was necessary, and they would get scraps of information and draw wrong conclusions. From time to time, innocent organizations were implicated. But overall, the coverage was fair.

RIPON FORUM: Let's shift our focus to defense structure. Former National Security Affairs Adviser McGeorge Bundy wrote recently that President Reagan "has a particular attachment to his dream of what he calls a strategic space 'shield' that could 'protect us from nuclear missiles, just as a roof protects a family from rain.' No expert believes in such a leak-proof

"The Wilsonian notion of open covenants openly arrived at is naive in the extreme."

shield." What is your response to that statement?

TOWER: You can't devise a system that is guaranteed to protect every citizen against nuclear attack. The primary function of a missile defense system is to protect your own weapons systems. Then you can have an adequate retaliatory capability which discourages enemy planners from a first strike. The point is to prevent him from thinking the unthinkable. If he launches the first attack, then he is forced into an unfavorable exchange ratio. That gets into the arcane theology of deterrence, but, fundamentally, that is what defensive systems are about. In that context, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a good thing. The president's dream for a shield for the general citizenry, however, cannot be realized.

RIPON FORUM: Ever?

TOWER: I wouldn't say ever, because science's possibilities are hard to conceive. I belong to a generation that grew up without television sets. I saw my first television program when I was a grown man. Some of us old boys are not prepared to say anything is impossible.

RIPON FORUM: Senators William Proxmire and Bennett Johnston recently released a study which concluded that the first phase of a ballistic missile defense system would be effective against no more than 16 percent of the warheads of a Soviet attack and that the cost would be tens of billions of dollars. The authors also said that the defense was "token" and the space-based portion of the defense would destroy no more than 11 percent of the Soviet offensive threat.

TOWER: You could throw out percentages all day long. The question is, how effective would that first phase be against the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force. You don't try to calculate into the bargain all elements of the other two legs of the triad. The essential element of a first strike is the intercontinental ballistic missile force, supplemented perhaps by submarine-launched missiles. We could devise a ballistic missile defense system, but we couldn't do it consistent with the ABM Treaty. Only one system could be deployed under that treaty.

The important thing is to have the technology on hand. We can't ignore the Soviets. We have to hedge against the possibility that the Soviets would unilaterally break out of a treaty. According to the scientists, they are ahead in chemical lasers, particle beam accelerators, and nuclear X-rays. We are ahead in computerization, which is essential to battle management. That is a lead I hope we can keep.

RIPON FORUM: Is it fiscally prudent to advance a system like SDI, which could cost, according to some estimates, over one trillion dollars?

TOWER: What is security worth? What are the outer dollar limits of assuring the United States adequate security against the military capability of potential adversaries? We spend a much lower percentage of our resources on defense than the Soviets, and we have a much stronger economy. They apparently don't think there are reasonable limits on what they ought to do. So how do you calculate cost ceilings on security?

RIPON FORUM: Somebody must, whether it's Congress or the president.

"The primary function of a missile defense system is to protect your own systems . . . The president's dream for a shield for the general citizenry, however, cannot be realized."

TOWER: Yes, but then you say we can only spend so much. And the Soviets say, gee, that's wonderful. We know exactly how far they can go, and we can go a step or two beyond that.

We have to understand that the Soviets are willing to impose enormous privation on their citizens to achieve their military aims. One ray of hope is that Mikhail Gorbachev's published economic objectives are not consistent with the massive dedication of resources to their military posture. Perhaps that means they are more willing to come to terms with arms reduction.

RIPON FORUM: So budgetary considerations are not a principle by which defense decisions should be made?

TOWER: If your national defense is driven by budgetary considerations, rather than the threat, then you have to consider that in the long-term you are going to give up your security. You are going to face a strong, well-disciplined adversary that is willing to make a bigger sacrifice.

The Russians are more likely to come around to the notion of negotiating an arms reduction if you convince them that we will do anything necessary to defend ourselves and that we have superior resources. You marry our resources to those of Western Europe or Japan, or other allied nations, and the economic superiority is enormous.

But they don't think we possess the will.

RIPON FORUM: What defense strategies can be pursued that would allow our allies to assume more of the West's military burden?

TOWER: That's a difficult question because we're dealing with several democracies that come together voluntarily in a mutual interest. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is hardly the kind of monolith that the Warsaw Pact is. The military policy of such nations as Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania is whatever the Soviets say it is. And the Russians have moved very quickly and decisively in suppressing dissent. Contrast that with NATO, where little Denmark can do what it pleases, and we're not going to force them to do otherwise. The smallest, weakest nation is equal to the largest, most powerful in terms of decision-making.

We don't really have the collective will the Soviets impose on the Warsaw Pact. So the United States must demonstrate that its will is superior to that of its friends, if necessary. And, if necessary, even though the other members of our partnership don't pull their weight, we must show we fully intend to pull ours. And certainly, from the standpoint of defending American territory, our will is absolute.

RIPON FORUM: Let's say the Reagan administration accepts the proposal that the Soviets have recently thrown back to them, namely that each side would reduce their intermediate range nuclear missiles that are either located in or aimed at Western Europe. What the West would then need is greater conventional strength, since some experts claim the Soviets hold a three-to-one advantage. Will European allies be willing to pick up a share of that responsibility?

TOWER: Everybody is going to have to pick up a piece of the tab.

RIPON FORUM: In your travels abroad, have you found that Western European leaders understand that?

TOWER: They understand that very well.

RIPON FORUM: They may understand it, but are they going to do something about it?

TOWER: They, of course, are concerned about their domestic support. Governments of the parliamentary democracies are more fragile than in our democracy, where leaders in Congress and the White House are elected for a set term. You can't throw people out at mid-term.

"What is security worth? What are the outer dollar limits of assuring the United States adequate security against the military capability of potential adversaries? How do you calculate cost ceilings?"

The ironic thing about the zero-option, which would take our Pershing II and cruise missiles out of Western Europe and dismantle Soviet SS-20s aimed at Western Europe, is that it was cooked up in Europe as a political handmaiden to deploying the Pershing missiles. To make deployment more palatable in 1983, European leaders could say, look, we're moving toward a zero option and these things will either not be deployed or will be removed soon. Now that such might occur, they are nervous. The political problem has been overcome, but now they must deal with the risk of conventional warfare, which many Europeans remember all too well from World War II and even World War I.

RIPON FORUM: How do we remain competitive with the Soviets?

TOWER: We have to maintain the technological edge. We simply must. In most areas we are ahead, but the technological gap has been rapidly closing. What keeps us in the ball game is our substantial superiority in computer technology.

People must also realize that getting rid of nuclear weapons will not save a lot of money. The savings will be quickly absorbed by a more manpower-intensive conventional force and the accompanying technology.

RIPON FORUM: What will happen to the Soviet Union as the computer revolution develops? It is a society predicated upon secrecy, and computer technology does not lend itself to that.

TOWER: That is exactly the thing that is debilitating to them. We have a proliferation of computers and kids walking around with them in their pockets. The Soviets tightly compartmentalize their society, and save the best technology for the military. They have been stultified by their own system, because the civilian sector has not had great access to computer technology. And it takes a good computer to make a better computer. The Soviets are stuck between their desire to get ahead technologically and their need to control the flow of information.

RIPON FORUM: In some ways, last year's mini-summit in Reyjavik threw open the window on a nuclear free world. Many people, however, drew back from that sight. Is it ludicrous to dream of a nuclear free world?

TOWER: It's like motherhood. It's hard to oppose. But you have no assurance that you could achieve a nuclear free world, even if you destroyed every nuclear weapon. I also have great doubt that you could find and destroy every one. Even if you did, the knowledge of how to construct a nuclear weapon would still exist, and the materials are still available.

RIPON FORUM: The spread of nuclear weapons has become a serious problem. How can we curb that spread?

TOWER: The United States must use its influence where it can, and everyone should be encouraged to be signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation convention. But we should be even-handed. We've put a lot of pressure on Pakistan, for instance, but not on India. We could also possibly threaten to use a nuclear weapon against any country that initiated nuclear use. But I'm just sort of thinking out loud. I don't really have a good solution. Proliferation is a problem with which we have to deal.

RIPON FORUM: Is it possible to negotiate multi-lateral international agreements?

TOWER: We already have done so with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The easiest way to reach multi-lateral agreements is through resolving outstanding arms problems between the major powers. The Soviets and the U.S. can influence anyone in the world.

RIPON FORUM: Are the Soviets deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

TOWER: I don't think they are. I don't think they give a big damn like we do. That's just my impression. ■

MEMBERS OF THE RIPON CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY BOARD *Speak Out On The Strategic Defense Initiative*

Senator David Durenberger

While I do support research into SDI technology, I do not support the administration's funding request. I feel that the administration's request for $5.9 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 is excessive and lacks well-defined program architecture or program goals. Well-paced research will allow us to evaluate the program as it progresses. The SDI program is still in the early stages of that development and may be decades away from deployment. Regardless of the development of an SDI program, negotiations between nuclear super powers will still be the most effective way to reduce the threat of war.

Congressman Bill Green

There are many reasons for my opposition to the president's request for SDI, but perhaps the most basic is financial. This year alone the administration is requesting $5.9 billion for Star Wars—a 59% increase over FY87. It is well known that no defense program can efficiently absorb such an increase and it is clear that other programs—such as conventional defenses—will have to suffer the loss of defense dollars as a result. Furthermore, using Paul Nitze's own criteria, SDI is not a good investment. This criteria, often referred to as "cost-effective at the margins," simply means that if it costs less to create additional weapons than it costs to defend against them, then the defensive system is not practical.

Senator Robert Stafford

The most prudent tack to take on SDI is limited research within the boundaries of current arms treaties. A majority in the Congress approve of basic research, but do not favor any action which would expand the nuclear threat at the present time by authorizing deployment of SDI.

Congressman Sherwood Boehlert

I support SDI, and think the fear campaign against it harms national security. At this point it is only an accelerated program of research to determine the feasibility of ballistic missile defense. Congress hasn't approved a new weapon system, and will not if the research proves missile defense to be impractical, too expensive, or damaging to arms control. A chief reason for supporting SDI is the prospect of new breakthroughs in the non-military use of supercomputers, lasers, and optics.

Congressman James Jeffords

Continued research into SDI has been important in maintaining our lead in defensive weapons technologies, and clearly has been a contributing factor in preventing a Soviet breakout of the ABM treaty. There's little doubt it also has given the president an important bargaining chip during very difficult arms control negotiations. It is reasonable to continue a moderate level of research as long as we recognize federal budget constraints as well as the destabilizing potential that this technology carries, particularly if rushed toward production.

Congressman Jim Leach

SDI represents a Maginot Line mentality which refuses to recognize that there is no shield mightier than the nuclear sword. It undercuts any rationalization for arms control. It leads not only to questioning of the desirability of seeking future arms agreements, but to a reappraisal of past ones. More profoundly, the psychological trappings surrounding the promise that nuclear terror can be stilled by a simple investment in a space-based deterrent implies that the rule of law does not matter.

Congresswoman Claudine Schneider

You'll find no greater supporter for research and technology in this country than I—until it comes to SDI. After the billions of dollars are spent, how much safer will we feel? It seems to me that this complex weapon system in space just makes arms control on earth more difficult. I've got a simpler solution: let's start reducing our nuclear stockpiles.

Senator Lowell Weicker

I have consistently supported proposals to scale back the SDI program, also known as "Star Wars."

The rapid increase in the SDI budget—from $990 million in 1984 to a planned level of $5.9 billion in 1988—far exceeds the growth potential of the technology involved and thus the capacity of industry to apply it sensibly. Secondly, SDI is not consistent with the concept of deterrence, which is the cornerstone of our military strategy. Additionally, its technical feasibility is far from being determined, and no one knows for sure how much SDI would cost to deploy, but the estimates are staggering—possibly as much as $800 billion.

Instead of funding an all-out SDI effort, I favor a more modest, long-term research effort to explore the feasibility of the concept and the technology.

Congresswoman Connie Morella

I support an SDI research budget, although one significantly smaller than that required by the administration. A primary value of this research is that it keeps SDI alive as a bargaining chip, to be traded for an agreement with the Soviet Union that provides for major reductions of nuclear weapons on both sides. ■

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE. . .

As the French are fond of saying, "The more things change, the more they stay the same," and the phrase seems especially apt concerning the nation's fortieth president, Ronald Reagan. In fact, Reagan's rock-solid predictability is widely considered one of the sources of his great popularity.

Given this, we were delighted to rediscover an in-depth profile on Reagan, written by Ripon old-timer Michael C. Smith, and published in the June 1968 *Ripon Forum* in the midst of Reagan's abortive presidential campaign. The report was recalled in a recent op-ed piece by *Washington Post* columnist Haynes Johnson.

Written after Reagan's first year as governor of California, the piece zeroes in on "the Reagan style," a term echoed often in recent months by the Tower Commission report and various commentators. While the modern reader's perspective is enriched by 19 years of subsequent experience, including nearly six years of the Reagan presidency, Smith's observations are still incredibly accurate in many cases; where less accurate, they are still thought-provoking:

He is most certainly not, as some have charged, a puppet on a string, an actor who cannot think for himself, a man who should not be taken seriously. On the contrary, he has shown a capacity to make his own decisions, to write his own lines. . . . He has evolved an effective political style that is in itself a formidable innovation in American politics . . . and he has a way of stating the issues that is unfailingly newsworthy, if not new.

But his lack of experience in the craft of government often shows through his polished style. . . . Reagan has spoken frequently on the dangers of big government, the need for lowering taxes, the desirability of cutting budgets, and the importance of private initiative. He has preached these themes forcefully, illustrating his points with engaging anecdotes and well-turned phrases.

In the actual conduct of government, he has not been able to match his words with performance.

Reagan's speaking ability, wit, and use of symbols mark him as the nation's greatest master of politics as theater. In so many instances, politics is nothing more than theater.

"While Ronald Reagan was not right for the times in 1968, he couldn't have been more cathartic in 1980."

But because there are wide and uneven gaps between Reagan's rhetoric and his accomplishments, moderates in his administration and in Congress have borne the burden of filling those gaps.

* * * *

Foreign policy is an area in which the Governor's better instincts as a platform speaker often desert him. Usually he has a healthy skepticism of "expert advice," but when the "experts" happen to be right-wing military men he endorses their every word.

Need we list examples? It's interesting, however, to note that in another passage the Smith piece notes Reagan's habit of using the code words of right-wing militants while skirting a firm commitment to their agenda. In foreign policy, this means our image abroad is defined by Reagan's saber-rattling reputation, tempered only by his charming personal diplomacy and George Shultz's competence.

* * * *

. . . his unfamiliarity with his own legislative program is striking. . . . Governor Reagan sees himself as . . . the man responsible for setting the basic thrust and direction of government, but he would rather forget the details of government.

As the president explained in his "apology" for the Iran-contra scandal, his hands-off management style "worked successfully for me during eight years as governor of California and for most of my presidency. . . . But when it came to managing the NSC staff, let's face it, my style didn't match its previous track record."

Can we forgive this? Under Reagan, scary characters like Oliver North and James Watt have enjoyed the same free rein as white hats like Shultz, James Baker, or Howard Baker. As a master of politics by theater, Reagan fails when his experts' weaknesses or events turn against him. Contrast this to Jimmy Carter, who promoted himself as a master of substance and took the blame for failures himself. Can we forgive him?

Forgiveness isn't the issue—the new lack of accountability is. Reagan's "teflon" has been so durable because his most striking failures—the fiasco in the Middle East, the '82-'83 recession, the budget deficit—all can be blamed to some

extent on people or forces beyond his control. Meanwhile, the symbols are rearranged for the next battle, the same forces which led to disaster remain unchecked, and we avoid a messy battle pinning superhuman blame on one man.

* * * *

There is a recurrent principle in Reagan's public statements: evil, pain and suffering exist in the world because there are evil forces at work in the world; it is therefore the task of the statesman to define and isolate that evil force and confront it with power. This simple confrontation theory is applied with as much fervor in the case of campus demonstrations, the Vietnam War. . .

. . . the drug problem, spending and taxes, war in Central America, arms control. . .

And in all cases, compromise is unthinkable. Reagan tends to see a Munich analogy behind every issue, domestic and foreign. . . . To suggest that . . . the complexity of a situation may make precise solution difficult is an elaborate heresy promulgated by foggy intellectuals who have not the courage or decisiveness to isolate and destroy the evil force responsible.

A tad strong—Reagan's inflexibility and simplistic perspective are better understood more as part of his political style than as an actual threat to good public policy. Reagan's derision for those who present complex problems as hopeless ironically strikes a pragmatic nerve in America's body politic, and besides, those savvy people around him always seem to fix things anyway.

We noticed that this passage echoes our last editorial, which recognized the president's skillful use of both compromise and confrontation, but argued that overreliance on confrontationists like Donald Reagan and Patrick Buchanan have wrecked what credibility Reagan enjoys, perhaps permanently.

* * * *

. . . We believe that [Reagan] is today unqualified for any national post requiring a high degree of administrative or diplomatic responsibility.

This is one of those areas where Smith's arguments fall short. There is no doubt that Reagan is competent enough to be president; despite his style of governing, his administration has battled its way to several impressive victories and many lesser ones in six busy years. While Carter left people wondering whether one mortal can do the job, Reagan has shifted the course of the nation's government, economy, and national security system, all with that effortless air that is the bane of his detractors.

There are at least two factors beyond Reagan himself which explain away much of his mystique. The polls tell us voters didn't take a sharp turn to the right when they elected the Californian, they simply allowed Reagan and the ideologues the luxury of redefining the agenda. Historic, frightening breaks from tradition are a result of the new agenda, not a resounding verdict about the direction the country should take.

We should also remember that Reagan may become the first president since Eisenhower to serve a full two terms. Since much of the modern political process (including television and government by congressional subcommittee) had sprung up during the intervening years and been nourished by faltering presidents, Reagan's staying power looks even more remarkable than it is.

As the still-accurate profile from 1968 demonstrates, it's hard to say something original about Ronald Reagan. But there is one final lesson to be learned from reflection on the old article. While Ronald Reagan was not right for the times in 1968, he couldn't have been more cathartic in 1980. As we have just argued, much of his real and imagined success rests on a historic turning away from the Democratic majority politics of the past.

In 1988, voters will not be ready to turn back to the old ways; while they may disagree with much of Reagan's prescriptions, they accept his prognosis. Rather, they will be seeking leaders who can implement conservative solutions with pragmatic competence. We urge moderate Republican activists to rise to the opportunity, and voters to listen to what they have to offer. ■

"ELECTRONIC PRIVACY" NEEDED: As the Supreme Court's recent ruling in the Georgia sodomy case has revealed, the Constitution does not provide Americans with a straightforward right to privacy. Most of us, however, cling fiercely to the typically American belief that our personal and business dealings are nobody's business but our own.

That's why a thoughtful, in-depth analysis of the information revolution and its corresponding, alarming decline in privacy, written by Mark O. Hatfield Scholar Robert Ross, offers some compelling ideas about the nature of the threat and how to deal with it.

To begin with, Ross points to a Congressional Office of Technology Assessment report that claims "legislated policy concerning information technology is either ambiguous, nonexistent, or has been eroded by new technologies." Furthermore, the author claims, a balance between the goals of privacy, law enforcement, and efficient protection of information tends to be upset by the passing concerns of the day. For example, Watergate-era revelations of electronic wrongdoing led to a popular outcry for tighter protections, while today's public is more tolerant in the face of terrorist threats, international and industrial espionage, and growing computer networks.

To create an effective, balanced "electronic privacy" policy, Ross suggests that Congress first establish a clear definition of privacy guarantees and the agency responsible for enforcing them. Such a policy must include provisions to protect large, private databases; require on-going revisions to cover the development of new technologies; require comprehensive disclosure to individuals when personal information is released; and encourage the use and development of devices for the protection of items like personal computers, telephones, and yes, even televisions. ■

THE CENTER REBOUNDS IN GERMANY

BY PAUL COZBY

The German Free Democratic Party (FDP), a centrist party which faced political extinction just four years ago, rebounded strongly in January's national elections, and increased their representation in the Bundestag by 31 percent. But political observers in the United States should be cautious about translating the FDP's good fortune into positive signs for the American center.

To be sure, the German and American political landscapes seem strikingly similar. The left in disarray looks for a leader. The scandal-plagued right looks for credibility. Low voter turnout favors the little guy as does a loosening of traditional party bonds.

In fact, by drawing 9.1 percent of the vote on January 25, the FDP reestablished itself as a true alternative to the larger parties. The Free Democrats picked up a fourth cabinet seat and gained a much stronger voice in Bonn for their platform of market economics and detente.

"This is quite easy to explain," said Hans-Rolf Goebel, FDP deputy spokesman. "I think things have stabilized in a way. We are widely accepted as the party that avoids the slide to the right in the German political spectrum."

Centrists in the U.S. will ask two questions: How did the center in Germany make so strong a showing and can it be done in America?

Goebel called the January election results simply a return to the percentage of votes historically held by his party. But to appreciate the drama of the FDP's phoenix-like rise from the flames, flip the calendar back four years to election night 1983.

"By drawing 9.1 percent of the vote on January 25, the FDP reestablished itself as a true alternative to Germany's larger parties."

As results came in after the polls closed on March 6 that year, television cameras broadcast to the nation the very worried face of FDP party chief and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. From all indications, the Free Democrats were about to be booted out of the new government they had helped form.

In German elections, voters cast two ballots. One vote is for an individual to represent a particular district, and a second vote is for one of many political parties. A party must take at least 5 percent of this second vote—the Zweite Stimme—to earn any seats in the Bundestag. Parties whose candidates win no direct elections can still enter the Bundestag through this system of proportional representation. Small parties such as the FDP would not exist without it.

Still in 1982, the Free Democrats were the junior partner in a ruling coalition with Helmut Schmidt's Social Democrats. The FDP helped form the government in 1969 with about five percent of the vote and 31 Bundestag seats. By 1982, the FDP had 54 seats and Genscher had long been looking for an excuse to end the partnership as differing economic philosophies made it an uncomfortable fit.

In October 1982, the FDP supported a no-confidence vote on Schmidt which brought down the government and paved the way for Helmut Kohl, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), to take the chancellorship without benefit of a national election.

But the Free Democrats almost brought down their own house as well by underestimating the negative impact of such parliamentary maneuvering on the German people. By analogy, U.S. voters remember tense days in 1974 when Gerald Ford became the first unelected president in American history. For the Germans, who in the same century faced both the instability of the Weimar Republic and the tyranny of the Third Reich, an unelected government was viewed with deep misgivings. And voters sought a source to blame for those misgivings.

"This was quite an event," Goebel said. "It was quite a difficult situation for the image of the party."

Viewing early returns in the 1983 election, forecasters predicted Genscher and the FDP would trip on the five percent hurdle. On election night, reporters already were asking how the party would survive four years out of power.

Germans viewed the 1983 election as a referendum on support of NATO and on President Reagan's two-track policy for dealing with nuclear disarmament.

Based on early returns, the upstart Green Party, not the FDP, appeared on its way to being the alternative vote in German politics. The Greens, a radical environmentalist party, captured the far left and entered the government with 5.6 percent of the vote.

Paul Cozby is an American reporter living in West Germany.

The Social Democrats (SPD), facing much the same problem as Labor in Britain, lost strength to the left and right. For younger, left-leaning voters, the Greens were the party of action. For more conservative SPD members bothered by the increasing radicalization of the party's left wing, the CDU offered an alternative. The SPD lost a whopping 26 seats in the Bundestag.

Obviously, Kohl and the CDU emerged as the big winner in 1983. Along with their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), they took 48.8 percent of the vote and 255 seats in the Bundestag, a gain of 18 seats.

By the end of the election evening, political winds slightly shifted in the FDP's favor. While German voters did not grant a full pardon, the party at least received a stay of execution. The FDP finished the night with 6.9 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the new parliament. They had lost 19 seats.

Given the German political situation in 1983—an apparent mandate to the right, labor in disarray, a center in disgrace—the FDP staged a remarkable comeback in 1987 by taking 46 seats.

But for the American centrist wondering how it was accomplished, there is no simple answer.

After the party fared poorly again in 1984 European Parliament elections, Genscher stepped down as party chief in favor of Martin Bangemann. From that point on, Free Democrat's fortunes began to rise and more from what they did not do, than what they did.

First, a major scandal rocked the CDU involving the indictment of a cabinet-level official. Second, the CDU/CSU bore much of the ire of German farmers after fear of irradiated food from the Chernobyl disaster forced destruction of crops. Creating a new cabinet post for a minister of the environment after the incident did little to mollify either farmers or anti-nuclear activists.

Most important, the right wing of the CDU/CSU began to assert itself after incorrectly sensing a continued conservative shift in German voters. NATO and nukes were on trial in 1983, but German voters had other concerns in 1987 such as the environment and unemployment. Still the CDU/CSU brimmed with confidence. Their party slogan was "Keep On, Germany," as if no better road existed.

Frans-Josef Strauss is the leader of the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union. Heavy set, combative and conservative, Strauss has long been a favorite target of the German left. He served one stint in Bonn as minister of defense and is commonly known to covet Genscher's foreign ministry post. While Genscher is seen as the embodiment of detente in German politics, Strauss vocally favors a hard line in dealing with the Soviet Union.

"Centrists in the U.S. will ask two questions: How did the center in Germany make so strong a showing and can it be done in America?"

As the January election came closer, the hardline rhetoric increased from both the CDU and the CSU, and that played into Free Democrat hands.

"It was basically an anti-Strauss vote," said Will Gerling, a political analyst for the U.S. military in Germany. "It showed a majority of German voters wanted neither an SPD-Green coalition nor a conservative government dominated by Strauss."

Goebel gives less value to the anti-Strauss movement, but doesn't deny its importance to the FDP. "It's true that we're not going to build a monument to Strauss," he said. "People feel the Liberal (FDP) Party is needed to keep a dialogue (with the Soviets), but we gained quite a lot from the SPD as well."

Problems on the left side of German politics did indeed help the Free Democrats. Since 1983, the SPD has suffered an identity crisis perhaps personified by the recent dumping of Willy Brandt as party chief. While the mood of the country seemed to shift to the right, the party's own base shifted increasingly to the left. The SPD, especially on environmental issues, moved left to lure the young voters it lost to the Greens. In so doing, it continued to alienate its own right wing. Those alienated voters turned to the FDP which had been forgiven for bringing down the government in 1982, Goebel said.

Drawing other factors together—low voter turnout, an increased "floating vote" of last-minute deciders, and CDU/CSU overconfidence—the Free Democratic Party triumphed in January for two main reasons. First, increasing polarization between the two major parties left a vacuum in the center. Physics tells us that nature—scientific and human—seeks to fill a vacuum. Second, German voters apparently forgave the FDP for its coalition-busting activities of four years ago. The party's traditional base of support among middle-management turned out to vote along with the right wing of the SPD and the left wing of the CDU.

Given the similarities in political situations, the FDP's fortunes appear to bode well for centrist hopes in the United States. But the differences are worth noting. A key factor in German politics which has no counterpart in the U.S. is the Zweite Stimme, the second vote. There are no directly elected Free Democrats in the Bundestag. All FDP seats were gained from the second vote.

In Germany, a second-vote party is not a second-class party. On FDP election posters, bright, blue letters on a gold background said, "Second Vote." For centrists in the American system where all candidates compete head to head and are directly elected, there is no such luxury. Also, Germany has no primary. A centrist in a major U.S. party must canvass a majority of his own party's voters, or bolt the organization and run as an independent like John Anderson in 1980. In short, there are no back doors to Congress in the United States. Only majority support gains entrance.

Political observers also can legitimately ask if the FDP philosophy compares to the center of American politics. The Free Democrats are called the Liberals, but the word has a different meaning when applied in German politics. "The FDP was an attempt to revive the venerable German liberal tradition," Aidan Crawley wrote in *The Spoils of War, The Rise of*

Continued on page 17

"HERBERT HOOVER REASSESSED: *Progressive? Conservative? Radical?"*

BY TOM WALSH

In response to a recent mailing soliciting contributions to the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association, a retired American history professor fired off this angry note:

"I am a veteran of World War I," he wrote. "It was President Hoover that used military force to drive World War I veterans out of Washington, D.C. when they were asking for more benefits. He fed the starving Belgians and let hunger stalk the land in the Great Depression. He promised a car for every garage and a chicken in every pot in 1928. . . . After 23 years at the university, I have nothing but bitter memories of Herbert Hoover." As a final gesture, the professor returned the contribution card with a blunt message typed across it: "Not one cent."

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Such harsh reactions to Herbert Hoover are a disappointment, but hardly a surprise to Robert S. Wood, director of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library-Museum. "It's sad," says Wood. "Here's a man with a PhD. in American history who not only embraces all of the common misconceptions about Hoover, but likely spent years perpetuating them in his classroom. With people like this teaching American history, what chance does Hoover have of ever receiving a fair assessment of his accomplishments over 50 years of public service?"

Wood, who has also taught American history on the university level, is quick to combat disparaging Hoover myths with a litany of facts: General Douglas MacArthur, not Herbert Hoover, was directly responsible for the heavy-handed treatment of the World War I "Bonus Marchers"; virtually all of the nation's governors assured Hoover their states didn't need federal help in organizing, administrating or bankrolling relief programs during the Depression; Hoover never made the "chicken in every pot" remark so often attributed to him.

George Nash, a Harvard-educated historian and a Hoover biographer, attributes much of the "intellectual fog" that impairs clear perception of Hoover to his longevity (Hoover died in 1964 at age 90) and the variety of controversial issues in which he immersed himself during 50 years of public service. "Hoover was not a man for one season," Nash notes. "He shaped or commented on vital public policy questions not only in World War I, but in World War II and even the Cold War as well.

"Even so, his image is shaped almost exclusively by the misfortune of serving as president when the Depression struck. For almost a generation after he left the White House, Hoover was portrayed as either the hero, or more frequently as the villain, of a great moral drama culminating in the New Deal. Even now, more than 50 years after he occupied the White House, Herbert Hoover remains in considerable degree a political orphan, unwelcome in liberal and conservative pantheons alike.

"There were many antithetical perceptions about Hoover during his lifetime," Nash concludes. "It was said of him that he was too progressive for the conservatives and too conservative for the progressives."

Assessments and reassessments of this complex Quaker and his storybook orphan-to-president career continue. One of Hoover's most vocal, modern-day defenders is U.S. Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R.Ore.), who considers Herbert Hoover and Abraham Lincoln his "political heroes." In fact, Hatfield's suite of offices in the Senate's Hart Office Building includes an area that is as much a shrine to both Lincoln and Hoover as it is a conference room.

It was Hatfield who in 1979, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Hoover's inauguration, invited leading authorities on Herbert Hoover, including George Nash, to write essays on the general subject of "Herbert Hoover Reassessed." Those essays were later printed in

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Tom Walsh is the assistant director of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association, Inc.. The 800-member private, non-profit association is located in West Branch, Iowa, Herbert Hoover's birthplace.

"Even now, more than 50 years after he occupied the White House, Herbert Hoover remains in considerable degree a political orphan, unwelcome in liberal and conservative pantheons alike."

the Congressional Record between June 1979 and May 1980 and were subsequently reprinted in 1981 in book form by the Government Printing Office.

"Among our presidents," Hatfield wrote in a foreword to the book, "Hoover ranks with Thomas Jefferson in the diversity of his interests and activities. Yet, the general public knows little about him, his colorful and extraordinary varied life overshadowed by the single fact that the Great Depression began during his presidency."

More recently, in a speech given August 9, 1986, in commemoration of the 112th anniversary of Hoover's birth, Senator Hatfield described his Iowa-born hero as "modern history's most underrated and misunderstood president." While that assessment raised few eyebrows, the senator's further characterization did.

"I'm here to pay tribute and honor to a Herbert Hoover who runs contrary to the customary profile accorded him by history," Hatfield said. "I'm here to pay tribute to my political hero, Herbert Hoover the radical."

Herbert Hoover the *radical*? The president with the legacy of being the conservative, stuffy, introverted, insensitive, brooding architect of the Great Depression . . . a radical? Had someone spiked Hatfield's cranberry juice?

"Now, to some of you, hearing the word 'radical' associated with the name Herbert Hoover borders on the comical, if not the outrageous," Hatfield continued. "His persona as a quiet and unassuming man, as a modest and compassionate man, seems inapposite to that attributed to a 'radical.' But I use the term 'radical' as it is defined by Webster's.

"The term 'radical' is derived from the Latin word "radi" which means pertaining to the root. I'm persuaded that Herbert Hoover's life, particularly his political life, can be neatly described as one going to the root of the issues." As an example of this tendency to see the underlying and often overlooked forces behind political ferment, environmental disaster and global instability, Hoover often focused attention on the constant need for food and water.

In working at Versailles to address the root causes of World War I, Herbert Hoover looked past the question of armaments to the question of food, Hatfield said. Through his famine relief efforts during and after the war, Hoover emerged "as the only great hero of World War I . . . He did this not by negotiating a peace treaty, not by negotiating an arms agreement, but by feeding people during a time of global unrest. He simply would not let

"As an example of Hoover's tendency to see underlying and often overlooked forces, he regularly focused attention on the constant need for food and water."

the passions of war barons dictate who to feed and who to starve. He knew the success of treaties would depend on that kind of foundation."

Hatfield believes America could use a "radical" like Hoover to confront what he sees as "a water crisis today as none in the past," a crisis about which, he says, "our nation's political leadership is doing nothing.

"This nation's leadership would be

"The scorn and unrestrained hostility often provoked by even the mere mention of Hoover's name likely wouldn't surprise him if he were alive today."

well-advised to become radicals, not in the sense of being advocates of the extreme left or the extreme right of political philosophy and dogma, but in the classic mold of [Hoover].

"If we fail, then even if we ultimately quell communist aggression in Central America and elsewhere, or negotiate in arms reduction and an end to nuclear weapons, or construct a stable global economy, it will be for naught. Why? Herbert Hoover, the radical, told us why. And it is very simple. You have to have food and water. And that fact, like Hoover's greatness in history, will never change."

While it may be frustrating to Mark Hatfield, Bob Wood, George Nash and others who have charted the personal and political depths of Herbert Hoover, the scorn and unrestrained hostility often provoked by even the mere mention of Hoover's name likely wouldn't surprise Herbert Hoover if he were alive today. The "Great Humanitarian," who directed famine relief efforts between 1914 and 1923 that fed more than 300 million victims of war and drought in Europe and the Soviet Union, knew he could never live up to his early billing.

"My friends have made the American people think of me as a sort of superman, able to cope successfully with the most difficult and complicated problems," he told a friend prior to assuming the presidency. "They expect the impossible of me and should there arise in the land conditions with which the political machinery is unable to cope, I will be the one to suffer." ■

THE IMAGINARY PRESIDENT

BY ALFRED W. TATE

Garry Wills, *Reagan's America: Innocents at Home*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1987.

The role the imagination plays in politics is often underrated. In practitioners of the so-called "art of the possible," the trait most often prized is a pragmatic and calculating realism. Despite lip service paid to its importance, the imagination tends to be relegated to a place on the periphery of politics, away from the substantive to the superficial realm of the projection of an "image."

Garry Wills's audacious book *Reagan's America: Innocents at Home* may help us realize that, in fact, it is just the other way. The imagination is the very stuff of politics, not because of the way in which efforts to manipulate the media in the packaging of candidates has come to dominate its practice, but because it is the imagination that makes our life together possible in the first place.

It does so, on the one hand, by picking and choosing from among the myriad of perceptions with which we are constantly bombarded and ordering these selections into an intelligible whole. As the faculty which integrates our experience, our imaginations are what we use to construct, as it were, the world of meaning in which we live. In the process, it makes possible in turn the creative expressions we give to our notions of that experience's significance.

On the other hand, our imaginations also enable us to understand the expressions others like ourselves give to their perceptions of the meaning of what has happened to them. Through sharing vicariously in their experience in this way we recognize our commonality with them. Understood in this fashion, the imagination becomes the ultimate source of our ability to create a society, produce a culture, and share an understanding of history and a vision of the future.

By extension, if cultivated, the imagination can also make it possible for us to recognize as meaningful the expressions people very different from ourselves give to their understanding of their experience. In this case, it enables us to enter—albeit "imaginatively"—into the worlds of meaning they have constructed and in the process gain an appreciative understanding of their cultures, of their histories and their visions of the future. Viewed in this light, the imagination becomes the source of any hope we might entertain that the disparate peoples and cultures which currently confront each other in our precarious planet can coexist in peace.

Garry Wills has long been a student of the personalities, ideas and forces that have shaped American society. In two recent books, *The Kennedy Imprisonment* and *Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment*, he has reflected on the nature of the personal and political power inherent in the presidency. Now Wills has turned his attention to the source of that power, the human imagination.

The subject of *Reagan's America* is the extraordinary way in which Ronald Wilson Reagan has both captured and been captured by America's collective imagination. The book's structure is that of a conventional biography; it begins with a discussion of the president's antecedents and proceeds chronologically to examine his life and times down to the present. The claims Wills makes for Reagan's relationship with us in the book's introduction signal from the outset, however, that he is attempting something more ambitious than mere biography. What Wills is about



is the explication of a phenomenon who is, he says, "a durable daylight 'bundle of meanings,'" a man who "does not argue for American values; he embodies them." For those for whom this may be a scary thought, this will be a scary book.

Reagan "spans our lives," Wills writes, both "culturally and chronologically." He occupies such a unique place in our hearts and minds, Wills maintains, because his image of America was shaped in the context of his working in radio, newspapers, the movies, and finally television during the period of their maturation when these media were in turn shaping our image of ourselves. He has thus been through all our traumas with us as we have come of age as a nation, but he has gone through them in the movies. He represents for us an idealized and largely illusory past, Wills believes, one which has been

Alfred W. Tate is a member of the Ripon Forum *editorial board.*

sanitized by such censors as the overseers of Hollywood's Production Code.

According to Wills, Reagan's incipient ability to do this for us was first revealed during his beginnings in journalism as a sports reporter. While he did all kinds of announcing during his early years in Des Moines, Reagan became most famous for his "live" play-by-play accounts of Chicago Cubs and White Sox baseball games over radio station WHO. The station would receive schematic pitch by pitch reports by telegraph on which Reagan would elaborate, providing his listeners a simulacrum of what was taking place, just as if he was sitting in the press box, rather than 300 miles away in a broadcast studio.

The work required a quick wit and what Wills calls a "painterly imagination" to conjure up from the bare bones reports coming over the wire a living baseball game in the minds of his audience. Reagan was apparently very good at it, and an incident during a game he was broadcasting in this fashion provides the context for what is perhaps his most well known story from his days in radio.

As Reagan tells it in his autobiography *Where's the Rest of Me*, while describing the action in the ninth inning of a tie game, he saw the telegraph operator begin to transcribe the report of the next pitch and described the pitcher as going into his windup and hurling the ball toward the plate. When he read the slip handed him, however, instead of indicating what had become of the pitch, it said simply that the wire had gone dead. Unable to call the ball back and rather than tell his listeners what had happened, Reagan had the batter do the only thing that would not appear in the official scoring of the game, hit a foul ball.

He then had the batter hit another and another—one of the fictitious fouls he says he described as being caught by an equally fictitious "red-headed kid"—as he waited with increasing anxiety for the telegraph to begin functioning again. This went on for nearly seven minutes, Reagan recalls, "yet I was into it so far I didn't dare reveal that the wire had gone dead." When it was finally repaired, the first report received said the batter had popped out on the next ball pitched. "Not in my game he didn't," Reagan himself concludes the story, "he popped out after practically making a career of foul balls."

This is a neat story, and Wills's retelling of it and similar anecdotes adds much to the sheer pleasure the book provides. What he makes of the incident and the way in which Reagan tells of it reveals Wills's basic thesis. His audacity in articulating his argument in defense of that thesis is breathtaking.

"The existence of 'a complicity in make-believe' between Reagan and his listeners is what Wills believes constitutes the defining characteristic in the unique relationship Americans have with their fortieth president."

To understand the revelatory nature of this story, Wills says it is important to keep in mind that no deception was involved in these "re-creations." Reagan's audience knew he was not present at the ball park, the newspapers praised his skills at "visualizing" them and during the annual Iowa State Fair people were invited to the Crystal Palace on the fair grounds to watch him invent games from scraps of paper. The heart of the matter, Wills contends was the existence of "a complicity in make-believe" between Reagan and his listeners.

It is precisely this conspiracy that Wills believes constitutes the defining characteristic the unique relationship Americans have with their fortieth president.

> What Reagan feared when the line went dead was, at one level, a simple matter of professional pride, that he would not be able to keep up the patter convincingly enough to sustain his reputation as a creator of seamless illusion. But the deeper concern was for what gave rise to those skills, the demand for illusion in the first place.

According to Wills, the tie that binds us to the president is the conjunction of our "demand for illusion" and Ronald Reagan's fulfillment of this demand.

If radio provided the original form for the national illusions which Reagan helped us create, athletics provided their content, and this too, according to Wills, is important for understanding the hold he has on us. Sports reporting, particularly in the 1920s and '30s when Reagan's model Grantland Rice was writing, was not expected to "tell it like it is." Athletics and athletes were expected to provide us with our moral paradigms, especially regarding the value of self-sacrifice.

Americans need larger-than-life heroes. It was in learning to meet this need as a sports commentator that Wills says Reagan took to heart the lesson that the factual details of the story—whether the Gipper, for example, was really a character worth "winning one for"—did not matter, as long as the moral the story conveyed was the right one.

From Des Moines he moved to Hollywood and it is the movies that provided the definitive experiences which Reagan's imagination would shape into his version of America. The movies were, Wills says, "not only a way to make a living for Reagan, but a way of life. . . . Hollywood movies were born, learned coordinated movement, matured a voice, acquired poitical awareness, made social experiments, as Reagan was doing the same things."

The same, of course, may be said of the country as a whole in the first half of the twentieth century and, on the presumption it is the nature of mass entertainment to share the assumptions of its audience, Reagan and the movies provide Wills a laboratory for examining the developing mores of the country. When television supplants the movies in the 1960s, Reagan too will make the change, remaining an intimate part of the media through which our national self-image was being simultaneously expressed and formed. Wills follows him into politics, to the California statehouse, to his unsuccessful and then successful bids for the presidency, and through his first term in the White House.

The Reagan Wills presents is a likable, even admirable, figure. He is virtuous, intelligent, generous with family and friends, and, from his student days as a lifeguard to his bravery before an assassin,

consistently courageous. What we learn from Wills about the Disciples of Christ and the religious context in which Reagan was raised and educated makes the president's piety seem natural and unaffected.

In fact, it is Wills's repeated insistence that Reagan is not a hypocrite, and the consistency of the portrait of the president he offers with that judgment, that is the most troubling aspect of the book. If political leadership is a function of imagination, of being able to see in the stuff of

"According to Wills, the tie that binds us to the president is the conjunction of our 'demand for illusion' and Ronald Reagan's fulfillment of this demand."

our collective experience new meanings and new possibilities, what kind of a leader have we chosen in Ronald Reagan and where is he leading us? The answers to these questions suggested by *Reagan's America* are disquieting.

Using political imagination as the standard by which leadership is measured, it would be tempting to say that Wills's Reagan is not a leader at all. He does not start with the hard realities of human experience, but from an idealized past that never was and a sanitized "Disneyland-like" present that papers over the ugliness and incongruities that characterize much of contemporary life. Precisely because he begins from such starting point, the future to which he points, however idyllic in appearance, is unobtainable.

But this is not, or not entirely, Wills's point. The fault lies not so much with Ronald Reagan as with our eagerness to enter into collusion with him in the creation of this fallacy. To know who we are in the present and thus what we ought to do in the future, it is essential to know the circumstances which have created that present and the possibilities it contains. "That is why," Wills points out, "continuing scrutiny of the real past is so important to human growth." It is a necessary guide to the future.

Wills's claim is that we willingly conspire with Reagan to ignore the hard realities of the real past, and that we do so at our peril. If the real past is ignored—a past, for example, in which the evils of racism and segregation have left residues of institutional bias in the present that only some form of "affirmative action" in the future can overcome—then an imaginary past must be put in its place. This illusory past will lack these evils and thus not require any such action. The problem is that this construction must then be guarded against any evidence of its fallacious nature, and here, Wills says, lies Reagan's special attraction: "The power of his appeal is the great joint confession that we cannot live with our real past, that we not only prefer but need a substitute."

Wills concludes with a disturbing vision comparing this nation's movement into the future with that of a car in which we sit at the wheel alongside Ronald Reagan.

> Since the future has not happened, it is not knowable by the tests we apply to things that have occurred. Driving forward, we see nothing ahead through the windshield. To steer at all, we must go forward looking into the rearview mirror, trying to trace large curves or bending forces in prior events, to proceed along their lines. But what happens if, when we look into our historical rearview mirror, all we can see is a movie?

That is a good question.

Reagan's America is also, of course, a product of the human imagination. The book obviously represents a selection on the part of Wills from the evidence available on Reagan's and America's past. Further, the order and priority given this selection and the commentary offered on it are, equally obviously, the author's. Does the book present even an approximation of the real past, are the Reagan and the American encountered in its pages even close to the actual entities they purport to represent? Are the conclusions drawn about them justified?

These, too, are good questions. While not purporting to offer new evidence about Reagan, the book is dense with exhaustively documented detail. The middle third of the book contains more about labor strife in the movie industry after World War II than many may care to know, and other aspects of Reagan's life, particularly his later career in politics, are passed over quickly. On the whole, however, Wills's argument is brilliantly put and compelling. The book has an unnerving ring of truth.

Moreover, if the past is in fact a guide to the future, then the past the book constructs is very real. Written before the Iran-

"Wills's claim is that we willingly conspire with Reagan to ignore the hard realities of the past, and that we do so at our peril."

Contra scandal broke, the book makes that affair and the problems it has presented the president and the country in response not only predictable but seemingly inevitable.

Not only the president's actions and reactions seem much more understandable in light of what Wills asks us to consider in this book, so does the country's response to the whole affair. Would we feel so ambivalent about all these "true American heroes" turning out to have feet of clay, for example, if Wills was not right about our need for such illusions being by implication the primary cause of Reagan's allowing them free rein? Would we be so seemingly eager to at least partially absolve the president of any wrongdoing if we did not recognize at some level the accuracy of Wills's identification of a "complicity in make-believe" between him and ourselves in this sad episode?

The final measure of the value of *Reagan's America* is the degree to which it enables us to understand ourselves and the president we have chosen to lead us in a new light. By this standard, it is an immensely important book. An astounding indictment of our collective lack of political imagination, paying close attention to the mirror it raises before us holds the promise of real insight and growth. ■

THE CENTER . . .

Continued from page 11

Western Germany Since 1945. "Many of the leaders meant the term 'liberal' in the sense of the Manchester School, with emphasis on a complete free enterprise."

That emphasis clearly is evident in Free Democrats today. The FDP is known as the Tax-Cut Party, Goebel said. A major plank in its 1987 platform was and is tax cuts to stimulate growth.

"We feel it's much better that people have their money in their pockets," Goebel said. That will sound familiar to American centrists as well, but—more as the right-wing's emphasis on tax cuts, not the centrist's support for free enterprise.

Goebel admits the FDP is, in his words, a yuppie party. It is known pejoratively in Germany as the "Three 'A' Party," drawing support from *Anwalt, Artz* and *Apothoteker* (lawyers, doctors and pharmacists).

While factors such as the German political system and FDP economic policy make comparisons difficult, there are clear lessons to be learned for U.S. centrists.

The Free Democrats are not known in Germany for their political loyalty. Shortly before he bolted the SPD coalition in 1982, Genscher was described by *Business Week* as known more for his political acumen than his principles.

"Given the similarities in political situations, the FDP's fortunes appear to bode well for centrist hopes in the United States. But the differences are worth noting."

Regardless of his political connections, Genscher has remained true over time to a simple agenda. The Free Democrats favor tax cuts, detente and legislative protection for the environment. The FDP is a true alternative for the fiscal conservative who opposes head-bashing foreign policy.

Consistent pursuit of those limited aims formed the basis of FDP credibility and allowed the party to restore its flagging image after 1983. And with a narrow set of priorities, the FDP has had an easier time than the large parties accomplishing its goals in the Bundestag.

Whether the FDP's recent good fortune is a trend or a one-time reprimand of the CDU remains to be seen. A strong SPD also would take support from the Free Democrats.

According to Goebel, the future looks bright for the FDP, and for third parties in general. "There is a tendency toward small parties among German voters," he said. "We stand quite a good chance."

While comparing political fortunes in different countries is difficult, U.S. centrists should take hope from German trends showing general support for third parties and the increase of floating votes. The German center profited from troubles on both the right and left, but also from having a popular, clearly defined agenda.

And as the Free Democrats proved, the public has a short memory. ■

PROTECTIONISM: *Good Fences Don't Make Good Neighbors*

BY JIM LEACH

Two incontrovertible ironies stand out in international politics today. First, at a time when weapons of mass destruction have been developed and allowed to proliferate, individual nation-states have become less rather than more interested in expanding international law and building international institutions, and these nationalistic impulses are being driven by a Republican administration. Second, at a time when the world economy is becoming more interdependent, economic policies within nation-states are becoming more parochial, i.e. protectionist, and this protectionist movement is being led by a Democratic Congress.

The last two centuries have taught us that nationalism is a two-edged sword: it serves to unify people in a constructive and uplifting fashion, often accelerating social progress; but, as two world wars in the first half of this century and as the anarchy and terrorism in the second half illustrate, nationalism can also be perverted by demagogues to tear apart basic human values.

The Reagan administration, I would contend, is tapping the dark side of nationalism and making the world less safe in its interventionist policies, particularly in Central America, and in its withdrawal from the full jurisdiction of the World Court. Democrats, on the other hand, in espousing economic protectionism, are attempting to tap similar nationalistic instincts that may be as politically explosive, abroad as well as at home. For, if one assumes that economic deprivation is a fundamental cause of war, it doesn't take much imagination to conjecture that trade wars will inevitably lead to real wars.

We have a crisis in foreign policy accountability, which stems in part from the nature of the issues and the times, and in part from the constitutionally aberrational roles being played out in Congress and within the executive on foreign policy issues. In disdain for Congress, the executive has attempted to take on interventionist powers that defy the Constitution and the law, and, in response, Congress has attempted to take on a new, more assertive and dangerous role in trade legislation.

"Democrats, in espousing economic protectionism, are attempting to tap similar nationalistic instincts that may be as politically explosive, abroad as well as at home."

National security debates of recent years have shown a Congress willing to criticize a popular president, but unwilling to be held accountable for alternative policies. For liberals the political tradeoff for the military buildup has been the exacting from the executive of a commitment to maintain a level of social spending far in excess of the curmudgeonly priorities of the White House. The Great Society's social agenda has been surprisingly ensconced under the Reagan presidency.

Hence there is liberal and conservative complicity in the budget deficits, the decision to ask taxpayers tomorrow to pay for today's living standards. Hence also there is shared responsibility for the trade deficit, which, economists suggest, is directly linked (up to two-thirds in magnitude) to the fiscal deficit.

In its military adventurism it would appear that the administration has been hypocritical on one of its philosophically most important rallying cries—strict construction of the Constitution. To its discredit, the alternative political party has been escapist, failing to focus attention on law and failing to understand that bad economics can drive bad politics. War shouldn't be privatized, nor should its causes. Despite Lone Ranger adventurism within the executive, the administration gets high marks for moving toward free trade zones with Israel, in the Caribbean and with Canada. It is to be commended for pushing new G.A.T.T. rounds, for vetoing textile and other protectionist ploys by Congress. While Vietnam hangs as a spectre over the administration's Central American policy, the ghost of Smoot Hawley haunts the halls of Congress.

By way of perspective, it should be stressed that the Reagan administration inherited the international debt dilemma largely from the Ford and Carter administrations. Ironically the institutions that made the greatest single private sector banking mistake of the century—the wanton recycling of petro-dollars—have largely been held financially harmless in the market place. Areas of the country that have been most devastated by the quantum jump in overseas lending, like the Midwest, or areas of the economy, like producers, farmers as well as manufacturers, wonder how fair it is for them to pay the piper for the financial misjudgments of others.

Through petro-dollar recycling,

Jim Leach is a member of Congress from Iowa and chairman of the Ripon Society.

America's foreign aid policy largely became privatized in the 1970s with Citi-Bank's Walter Wriston replacing General George C. Marshall as the symbolic liberal of the century. The issue that big banks (largely in New York and California) and big government (the Federal Reserve, Treasury and Congress) didn't assess on a timely basis was the effects on the American economy of the inevitable "skewing" which had to occur in our merchandise trade balance if the countries to which capital was lent could develop sufficient dollar resources to pay back the debt incurred.

"Our trade is unbalanced because our budget is unbalanced and because legislators failed to recognize the nature of the world banking crisis precipitated by the run-up of petroleum prices in the 1970s."

The only way this could occur was for grossly indebted countries to export more than they imported or, conversely, for the U.S. to import more than we export. To save the international monetary system the U.S. had little choice in the 1980s except to establish a mix of fiscal and monetary policy that was pro-import and anti-export. To save New York's financial institutions, Iowa farmers and manufacturers paid dearly, both in higher interest rates as well as in lost markets.

Now, extraordinarily unnoticed by the press, the Democrats have come up with a trade bill that contains, among other give-aways to the political establishment, a call for the gold reserves of the World Bank to be used to purchase private sector bank loans to the developing world. The public, in other words, is being asked, albeit indirectly, to bail out the institutions that have over-extended themselves without even a hint of shareholder accountability.

Upon being elected to Congress in 1976, I argued from a rather lonely Midwestern perspective that the most responsible thing that government could do to hold down egregious foreign lending was to require more prudent capital ratios for the money-center banks or cause the institution of reserve requirements for international lending comparable to domestic. As students of banking understand, reserve requirements serve as a brake on inflation and as an indirect tax on banks. To require their existence for domestic deposits and not for the international liabilities of the money-center banks is to provide incentives for the export of capital and thus of jobs.

In hearing after hearing, the Carter administration argued vehemently against the legislation I introduced to require more stringent oversight of international lending practices. They bought the banks' contention that because foreign loans frequently received sovereign guarantees and because risk was more universally spread, the capital requirements of money-center institutions need not in percentage terms be as strong as those demanded of smaller banks which traditionally lent in a more localized American environment. It is my contention that this failure ten years ago of the Comptroller's office and the Fed to exercise prudent regulation of our money-center banks coupled with the failure of State and Treasury to press for similar overseas regulation of foreign banks is the root cause of the current less-developed-country debt-dilemma and a significant cause of our current trade imbalance.

The reason I raise this perspective is that it is simply impossible to solve problems without understanding their causes. Our trade is unbalanced because our budget is unbalanced and because regulators failed to recognize the nature of the world banking crisis precipitated by the run-up of petroleum prices in the 1970s. Lower tariffs were not a cause of the trade imbalance; higher tariffs are thus unlikely to be a solution. There simply is no substitute for fiscal discipline; for prudent banking regulation; for the expansion of rules that govern international trade.

The protectionist sentiment roaring through the halls of Congress is a political cop-out. Just as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was proposed by Republicans as a fictitious nuclear shield, an alternative to serious arms control, protectionist legislation—the Democrats' SDI—is advanced as an alleged jobs shield, the alternative to doing anything serious about the fiscal deficit. In fact, both shields are political charades. The arms race cannot be won by putting shields in space. Neither can a trade war be won by erecting tariff walls. The first spurs the development of offensive arms; the second the spread of countervailing trade barriers.

Two four-letter institutional processes summarize the nature of this political dilemma—SALT and GATT. Ronald Reagan made a career of opposing every arms control agreement ever arrived at with the Soviet Union. In a period of perceived American weakness he was elected president. The Democrats, on the other hand, while sanctifying international negotiations on arms control, are in the process of turning their backs on international negotiations on trade. They understand that when deficits in trade reach $15 billion a month, management as well as labor will seek arbitrary remedies from government.

"To save the international monetary system the U.S. had little choice in the 1980s except to establish a mix of fiscal and monetary policy that was pro-import and anti-export."

To the president's credit, he has moved his administration in recent months along a new track that could—if the new Soviet leadership remains consistent with its rhetoric—lead to arms control agreements more all-encompassing than any that have so far been signed. The question is whether the Democratic Party will find leadership that can similarly grow or whether it will fall hostage to its interest group base, a victim of the political assumption that proposing protectionism, like new armaments, is always popular. If history is a guide, however, good fences don't always make good neighbors. ■

LETTERS

TO: The Editors
RE: March 1987 *Ripon Forum*

Your March issue was excellent. Congressman Leach's "Constitutional Confrontation" piece should have more public notice than the *Forum* readership. It deserves publication in *The New York Times* or *The New Yorker.* It was a most important statement by a respected Republican. Moderates need to be noticed and heard.

Sincerely,

Grace M. Davidson
Bedford, New York

TO: The Editors
RE: A Conversation with Sidney Blumenthal, March 1987 *Ripon Forum*

The interview with Sidney Blumenthal was a fascinating exchange. Handsome magazine it appears in, too.

Sincerely,

Hendrik Hertzberg
Cambridge, Massachusetts

TO: The Editors
RE: Merger Mania: An Insider's Perspective, March 1987 *Ripon Forum*

Steve Klinsky's article on "Merger Mania" was well written and informative but I found three of his policy recommendations rather amusing, if not pathetic.

Mr. Klinsky wants more disclosure by "corporate raiders," a prohibition of "greenmail," and more insider trading enforcement, all involving ever more penetration of government into the securities marketplace.

Let's face it: much of the securities and merger and acquisition business is an elaborate game to create paper values which can be cashed in. I have great respect for the man or woman who launches a great enterprise and devotes his capital, energy and reputation in the making of some product useful to society. I have considerably less respect for the frantic manipulators of paper supposedly representing something of value, but actually representing a large measure of pure speculation by financial gamblers.

Why should government get mixed up in tilting the scales among such exuberant wheeler dealers? Let 'em take their chances, like other gamblers.

On behalf of Thomas Jefferson, John Taylor of Caroline and other classical republicans unable to be with us today, I am,

Yours truly,

John McClaughry
Concord, Vermont

Steven Klinsky replies:

Mr. McClaughry's preference for legitimate businessmen over paper gamblers is certainly correct. However, even legitimate businessmen need efficient and honest financial markets to provide them with growth capital and an opportunity to liquify their holdings. The market reforms proposed would help to achieve this efficiency and honesty.

I appreciate Mr. McClaughry's interest, and would be pleased to discuss the matter with him and Thomas Jefferson personally, if Mr. McClaughry could arrange such a meeting.

TO: The Editors
RE: Revenue Sharing: Looking Beyond a Forsaken Option, March 1987 *Ripon Forum*

I enjoyed reading Jamie McLaughlin's article, "Revenue Sharing: Looking Beyond a Forsaken Option." State Senator McLaughlin's suggested recommendations to remedy the loss of revenue sharing programs deserve closer study. In fact, his first recommendation—the lifting of all constitutional and statutory tax limitations on local governments—deserves immediate enactment by all state legislatures. If some hamlet chooses to soar taxes past an artificial figure set by some public body in the State Capitol, why shouldn't they be allowed to do so? Doesn't it know what is best for the community? The proper and sole check on a locality's taxing decisions should be the municipality's electorate.

Respectfully,

John M. Vorperian
Scarsdale, New York

The Ripon Educational Fund is now accepting Fall applications for the **Mark O. Hatfield Scholarship Fund.** Scholarships will begin in September 1987, and recipients will be expected to:

Produce a paper of publishable quality and pursue interests which reflect the spirit and interests of Senator Mark O. Hatfield. This includes work on issues of war and peace, civil liberties, the environment and the nature of government.

If interested, please send research proposals, writing samples, and curriculum vitae to:

Hatfield Scholarship
Ripon Educational Fund
6 Library Court SE
Washington, D.C. 20003

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A Salute to Republican Women

Come join the Ripon Society and its Congressional Advisory Board in honoring Republican women who have made a substantial contribution to the development of the GOP and who have maintained the party's commitment to providing rights and opportunity. More than two dozen GOP women leaders will jointly receive this year's Ripon Society Republican of the Year Award on:

Thursday, July 9, 1987
The Park Hyatt Hotel
Washington, D.C.

Proceeds from the dinner will benefit the Ripon Society and its Mark O. Hatfield Scholarship Fund. This Fund enables a select number of promising young students from a nationwide arena to further their public policy training while studying and working in the nation's capital. 1987 recipients of Hatfield Scholarships will be in attendance at this year's dinner.

The Ripon Society is a Republican non-profit, public policy research organization. The Society is not an FEC-regulated political committee, and may therefore accept corporate, individual or political action committee funds.
All checks should be made payable to: The Ripon Society, 6 Library Court SE, Washington, D.C. 20003. With questions, please call: 202-546-1292.

Representative Stewart McKinney, In Memoriam, 1931-1987

Ripon Congressional Advisory Board Member Stewart McKinney, an eight-term congressman from Fairfield, Connecticut, died on May 8, 1987. Another member of the Society's Congressional Advisory Board, Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., spoke at Mr. McKinney's memorial service. The following excerpt from his eulogy provides a particularly appropriate tribute:

"Stew had two passions—his congressional duties and his family. He not only loved his family but was also enormously proud of them. Stew also knew his district. No problem was too small. He learned how to communicate complex issues to a highly diversified constituency. He listened. He shared their concerns—transcending party label, ethnic background, and levels of status and power. The poorest and highest responded with affection.

"Stew understood the highest and best uses of the power and resources of the federal government, from which flowed easily his efforts to continually break the bonds of parochialism and regionalism, and enlarge the sphere of freedom and opportunity for the individual. The beneficiaries of Stew's philosophy and efforts were often the least fortunate, the ill-housed, the homeless, the disenfranchised, the world's orphans and the oppressed.

"In Congress he played the difficult and publicly unrewarding role of conciliator in a divided House of Representatives. But he understood the vital difference between a compromise of interest and a compromise of principle. When told a particular position might jeopardize his reelection, he responded—the essential was not his political survival but doing what he knew was right. When he addressed the Chamber which was infrequently it was for a cause to which he was dedicated, and it was from his heart.

"The day Stew died several members spontaneously took to the House floor. What comes across are his conviction, interests, command of the subject matter, and integrity.

"Sam Gejdenson of Connecticut . . . 'Even in his hours of illness, he stood out there on the nightlong watch for the homeless'.

"John Rowland of Connecticut . . . 'Stewart, I think was a teacher to all of us. He taught us about integrity, he taught us about independence. He taught us about compassion and most importantly he taught us about friendship.'

"Bill Frenzel of Minnesota . . . 'When it came time to be different he simply accepted it in the confidence that whatever he was doing was the best for himself or the people that he represented.'

"He was an extraordinary member of this body. A friend that we will all miss, but more importantly, that a lot of people in this country who never knew he existed will miss him because of the things that he tried to do for them unbeknownst to them."

THE FIFTH TRANSATLANTIC CONFERENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JULY 8 – JULY 12, 1987

The Ripon Educational Fund is sponsoring the Fifth Transatlantic Conference with the British Bow Group and The Club 89 of France. Topics will focus on international trade, constitutional governance and the arms race.

Places at the conference will be limited. Registration deadline is June 19, 1987.

Tickets and Registration (not including airfare or hotel accommodations):

General Participation: $200.00 (U.S.) includes all general conference activities.

Transatlantic Gold Sponsor: $1,500.00 (U.S.) includes all conference activities plus select VIP breakfasts with Members of Congress and Members of Parliament. Gold Sponsorship also includes a ticket to "The Salute to Republican Women" Dinner on Thursday, July 9th.

Conference hotel accommodations are being supplied by the Park Hyatt Hotel, Washington, D.C. Room charge is $99.00 double/single occupancy, July 8th - July 12th.

YES! Please register me for The Fifth Transatlantic Conference

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Enclosed is my check for: ☐ $200.00 ☐ $1,500.00

☐ I am interested in taking advantage of Ripon's special $99 per night at the Park Hyatt Hotel. Please call me with more information during business hours at the above number (prices applicable July 8 - July 12, 1987).

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Questions? Please call Alumudena de La Morena, Ripon Educational Fund, (202) 546-1292.

WASHINGTON NOTES AND QUOTES

COMMENTS

At the Republican National Committee's winter meeting a few months ago, GOP Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr. called for a constructive, future-oriented 1988 platform in the following terms: "The Republican Party does not need solutions to problems bound by hard-nosed approaches with little or no concern for people or politics. The American people will rightfully reject a party of inflexible ideology and rhetoric which is not responsive to their real concerns.

GOP Chairman Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr.

"For example, concern over budget deficits will not override the concern of even the most conservative voter worried about losing the family farm; sending a child to college; or the need to clean up a toxic waste site that threatens the health of his or her family or the purity of the environment. . . . The approach is to offer bold new and innovative alternatives that are fiscally responsible, that fulfill the fundamental obligations of government, and that consider the needs of people."

More thoughts from the sensible Fahrenkopf, writing in the *Washington Post* on campaign finance reform: "Is too much time and effort being spent raising funds? . . . The physicians of reform should review past campaign finance practices. Fund raising now consumes more time precisely because of public disclosure and tight limits." Fahrenkopf argues instead for allowing political parties to contribute greater amounts and face stiffer public disclosure requirements.

New York Times columnist James Reston on the protectionist House trade legislation most ardently pushed by Representative Richard Gephardt of Missouri, a candidate for the 1988 Democratic nomination: "What Mr. Gephardt and the majority of Democrats in the House have asked us to believe is that protectionism is a form of patriotism, that it saves jobs by blocking imports, that if it keeps out the cheap-labor products from abroad other nations will buy our high-priced products in return. Even Mr. Reagan never went that far."

Representative Tony Coelho, the House Democratic whip, offered the following statesmanlike comments to the *Christian Science Monitor* on how his party is struggling with competing demands for new social welfare programs and fiscal responsibility: "We'd like to start more of these programs, but there isn't the money." We'd like to start him a subscription to the *Ripon Forum*.

Newsweek magazine recently featured Atlanta's pioneering and successful "Cities in Schools" program, which we commended in RF last October. Based on the notion that businesses must take vigorous leadership in educating tomorrow's entry-level employees, the program places dropout-prone youth in a local department store "school" where they receive integrated attention from employee volunteers, professional teachers, and personal counselors. The idea should be embraced by educators and civic leaders around the country.

ON THE RIGHT

Columnist David Broder on new White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker: ". . . [Baker] will be attacked by the same unforgiving ideologues who sought to humiliate him in Dallas. But he, like [Tower Commission member and former Secretary of State Edmund] Muskie, has demonstrated that the professional politicians—the men and women who respect each other because they respect a process of government that is bigger than any personal ambitions, successes, or setbacks—are the ultimate resource of leadership for this nation."

It's called "Operation Legacy," and it's a low-key attempt by a cadre of White House conservatives and intellectuals to cement the conservative agenda into place in Reagan's final months in office. It's key leaders are Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., president of the Heritage Foundation; T. Kenneth Cribb, a Meese protege and the new White House assistant for domestic affairs appointed by Howard Baker; and Gary L. Bauer, a protege of Education Secretary William Bennett and the new White House assistant for policy development. This trio and others are making a fourth-quarter drive on a variety of issues from the contras, to AIDS, welfare reform, and religion in schools.

Deputy Treasury Secretary Richard Darman, interviewed in the *Washington Post,* on his political beliefs: "Q: You're often described by critics and friends alike as a pragmatist. Is that a fair or complete characterization? A: I think it's fair but not complete. . . . A pragmatist is someone who is oriented toward the test of practical results. I am such a person. . . . The incompleteness of the label is that it doesn't speak to my values and ideals . . . I'm an almost syrupy believer in the specialness of the American ideal, which to my mind means this land of near limitless potential, this land that welcomes the downtrodden from all over the world, this land of enormous opportunity, market-oriented to some extent, missionary in a nonimperialist sort of way."

The Reverend John Buchanan, a former Member of Congress from Alabama, and current leader of both People for the American Way and the Republican Mainstream Committee, recently joked in *Roll Call* about his re-election defeat by New Right forces in 1980: "Christian Voice rated me a 29, which fails in anybody's eyes. As I looked around me, I found that at 29 I was higher than all the clergy in Congress. Every year the Black Caucus flunks, the women mostly flunk, the Jews mostly flunk—which proves conclusively that if one is either black, female, Jewish, or clergy, one is by nature immoral or anti-Biblical or anti-family."

Columnist Cal Thomas, once associ-

ated with the Moral Majority, writes in the *Los Angeles Times:* "The religious right, as the political force that we have known since 1979, is dead . . . Politicians will be reluctant to curry favor with religious leaders, fearing the skeletons that might pop out of closets . . . The situation is further complicated by the theological infighting that has been bubbling beneath the surface for several years and has only recently burst into full view."

Thomas cites Os Guinness, a British writer on religious issues, who says, "a shift in political influence from the fundamentalists to the baby-boomers began more than a year ago . . . the new group will replace the old as the key power brokers in the post-Reagan lineup. . . . Normally, this would be good news for the Democrats, but they seem divided and unsure of where they are going, so the Republicans have a good shot at winning the White House again in '88 as things now stand."

Republican analyst Kevin Phillips has drawn attention to a surprising new polling trend: the overwhelming preference among younger GOP voters for George Bush, while Robert Dole dominates the numbers among middle-aged and older folks.

"It's not surprising that the party's new younger votes opt for a politics of buoyancy and optimism [Bush]," he says, "while a large number of older and more traditional Republicans prefer to line up behind a candidate who shares their skepticism about easy answers to hard problems [Dole]. The pitfall is when majority coalitions break along these lines, it's hard to put the whole thing back together again."

New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, in town for a speech recently, was asked by the *Ripon Forum* if the 1988 GOP nomination fight would be a bloody one: "Well, I don't see any of the serious contenders doing anything to provoke a bloodbath. Kemp is reaching out to new groups—blacks, labor—and Bush and Dole are true conservatives. I think our party will be relatively harmonious next year."

A Roper Poll taken in 12 southern states, presumably a region where the Reverend Pat Robertson might be expected to fare well in his quest for the presidency, showed that while 19 percent of the potential GOP electorate might consider voting for him, 69 percent said they would not. His rating was the worst by far of 20 potential Democratic and Republican candidates named.

In South Carolina, a preview of things to come: using arcane rules, GOP officials backing George Bush for 1988 managed to block Pat Robertson from taking control of a county party convention. The pro-Bush convention chairman attended a meeting of the Robertson forces and compared it to ". . . a Nazi pep rally . . . The group was whipped into a froth. It was a mob mentality." Robertson's lieutenants complained that the party had taken evangelicals for granted, and said he won't forget the efforts by Republican "elitists" to exclude them from the party. Robertson himself added: "I thought politics was the science of inclusion rather than exclusion."

ELECTION NOTES

Whispers of potential Senate candidacies around the country: in New Jersey, former Heisman Trophy winner and Army general Pete Dawkins (now on Wall Street) may take on Democrat Senator Frank Lautenberg; in Ohio, GOP voters will choose between Cleveland Mayor George Voinovich, a moderate, and Representative Bob McEwen, a conservative, to face Senator Howard Metzenbaum. In Minnesota, Attorney General "Skip" Humphrey, son of Hubert, is running hard against Senator Dave Durenberger. In Connecticut, as usual, party leaders are looking for a primary challenger to liberal Senator Lowell Weicker.

In an interview on the C-SPAN TV network, talk-show host Phil Donahue said he's mulling a political campaign, and that the House of Representatives "looks to me to be more fun" than the Senate or White House. Donahue lives in the Upper East Side New York district of Ripon Congressional Advisory Board member Bill Green.

Also in New York, nine of the state's thirteen House Republicans have endorsed George Bush for the presidency. Still uncommitted are Amory Houghton, George Wortley, Joseph DioGuardi, and S. William Green. Senator Alphonse D'Amato is thought to be leaning toward Senator Robert Dole, and while state party leaders are still neutral, the Vice President's brother Jonathan is state party treasurer.

A few months old, yet timely—a letter seen in the Barre-Montpelier, Vermont *Times-Argus* from Mr. Allan N. Mackey, concerning the defeat of the ERA in a statewide referendum vote: "What troubles me most is not the anti-ERA advertising campaign—we expected that. It's the Vermonters of the center, where lasting change must take hold, who have missed the opportunity to create a more just vision for the next generation. . . .

"What can we do now? I think we must accept this tough, narrow loss and move forward, working together as men and women of the "future 49 percent." Change must still come from the center, so let's believe as if the amendment passed and convince the "present 51 percent" that they have nothing to fear from equality." ■