

RIPON FORUM


DECEMBER, 1969

VOL. V, No. 12

ONE DOLLAR

LINWOOD HOLTON:

Electoral Balancing Act in Virginia



Down on the Farm, Again

James L. Guth

Is Reprivatization

Nixon's Answer?

Josiah Lee Auspitz

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PROFILE

A. Linwood Holton is the fence walker on this month's cover. He is the first Republican Governor in Virginia since the Civil War, and the voters he collected make up a unique but winning coalition. Holton won with the support of the blacks, labor, conservative businessmen and anti-Byrd machiners. His running mates (Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General) lost, and the Legislature is overwhelmingly Democratic. All he has to do now is govern. —5

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REPRIVATIZATION

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THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in eleven cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of sub-chapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor \$25 or more; Sustainer \$100 or more; Founder \$1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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Instead of Exclusion

A popular thesis for a Republican majority in the 70's has been the so-called "Southern strategy" supposedly devised by Attorney General John Mitchell during the Nixon campaign and codified by one of Mitchell's assistants, Kevin Phillips, in *The Emerging Republican Majority*.

There are some aspects of the Southern strategy with which I can agree. I certainly concur, for example, that the South is taking a decided turn in the direction of our party. As a Kentuckian I am very proud of that fact. I happen to think, however, that this was inevitable as we are the more conservative of the two major parties and that section of the country certainly is the strongest bastion of conservatism in the United States.

Phillips suggests, and I tend to agree that,

Generally speaking, the South is more realistic than its critics believe, and nothing more than an effective and responsibly conservative Nixon Administration is necessary to bring most of the Southern Wallace electorate into the fold against a Northeastern liberal Democratic Presidential nominee.

However, it is beyond this that I begin to have serious reservations about the implications of the "Southern strategy" if actively pursued by a national party in power which is also charged with the future direction of the nation.

TO SEEK OR ACCEPT

First, if the Wallace voter of 1968 comes to us because he considers us the more conservative of the two major parties and in a sense the "lesser of two evils" then, of course, as a political organ seeking to perpetuate ourselves in office we should welcome his vote. However, the clear implication in *The Emerging Republican Majority* is that we should pursue policies aimed at "locking up" this vote to the exclusion of at least two major groups in the United States whose views Phillips sees as incompatible with the "Southern strategy."

These two groups are the city dwellers and the young. In regard to the former bloc, he contends, "... Leading big city states like New York, Michigan and Massachusetts are no longer necessary for national Republican victory." And as to the latter he asserts, "Youth is important, but voters under 25 cast only 7.4% of the nation's ballots in 1968."

I concede both of these points to be accurate politically, but what of the country if the party in control of the destiny of the nation pursues policies

which "write off" the young and the city dweller?

The two greatest domestic problems facing us in America today are our decaying cities and our disillusioned young. Can the political party which received a mandate from the people to govern ignore the most perplexing problems of our age simply because they did not vote for us? My answer is an emphatic no. With ascension to power also comes the responsibility to govern effectively and no party in power can govern effectively without a sincere commitment to solving the most pressing problems of our age.

A CAVALIER REMARK

Phillips continues with the incredibly cavalier remark:

One of the greatest political myths of the decade — a product of liberal self-interest — is that the Republican party cannot attain national dominance without mobilizing liberal support in the big cities, appealing to "liberal" youth, empathizing with "liberal" urbanization, gaining substantial Negro support and courting the affluent young professional classes of "suburbia."

I contend that if that feeling is a product of liberal self-interest then Phillips' conclusion about that feeling is a product of conservative self-interest.

Another assertion which I must not allow to pass un rebutted is his claim that "Substantial Negro support is not necessary to national Republican victory in light of the 1968 election returns."

The black vote may not have secured our victory but I can only say in regard to the implications of that remark that it is, in my opinion, morally wrong to "write off" the black vote. The future of this country in the area of human relations demands that there be no difference between the two major parties in the area of civil rights. The founder of our party, Abraham Lincoln, would have had it no other way. If the majority of black Americans choose to affiliate themselves with the other party for policy reasons such as our strong and consistent record for fiscal conservatism, then so be it.

A WIDE EMBRACE

The course of the Republican party for the future must be the middle ground of moderation. We are the historic home for conservatives and we are glad to have them, but we welcome support from all areas of the country and from all walks of life.

Political Notes

ALABAMA: Republican sellout to Brewer

It is becoming increasingly obvious to many Alabamians that George C. Wallace is planning to run for Governor again in 1970, as a prelude to another presidential campaign in 1972.

The present Governor, Albert P. Brewer, has been in office since May, 1968, when Wallace's wife, Governor Lurleen B. Wallace, died of cancer. On numerous occasions in the months that followed, Wallace promised not to run against Brewer, whom many regarded as his protege. But lately, Wallace has been making no promises — except to say that he will come to a decision about the Governor's race early in 1970.

Meanwhile, leading national Republicans have been engaged in a not-very-subtle effort to build up Brewer in the eyes of Alabamians. Vice President Agnew, in Montgomery for a speech to the Alabama State Chamber of Commerce, hailed Brewer as a man of "sincerity, depth and dedication." Earlier, Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel praised the Governor as a "great guy" doing an outstanding job, and Postmaster General Winton Blount, an Alabama native, said Brewer was the best Governor he could remember.

At the same time, it seems to be taken for granted that there will not be a Republican candidate for Governor. At least, none has emerged so far.

There is some question whether Wallace would seek to run as a Democrat or as a candidate of his own American Independent Party. In either case, few observers doubt that Wallace could defeat Brewer, though perhaps not by as much as he would like. While Brewer has streamlined state government and improved the financial picture, Wallace still grabs the headlines every time he opens his mouth. And the state's 270,000 black voters, if anything, think less of Brewer than they did of Wallace, possibly because of the belief that Brewer has been a quieter, more effective segregationist than his flamboyant mentor.

ILLINOIS: the meteoric Mr. Crane

Progressive and moderate Republicans already are planning how to take the newly-won House seat away from Philip M. Crane, 39. Crane, elected to Illinois' 13th District seat on November 25 over State Senator Edward A. Warman, must run for re-election in 1970. He is expected to have opposition in the March 17 Republican primary from Joseph Mathewson, one of six

moderates who splintered the Republican primary vote this year and allowed Crane to win the nomination with 22.8 percent of the vote cast.

The November election was publicized as a clear-cut test of the popularity of President Nixon's Vietnam policy. Warman, who spoke out for more rapid withdrawal (supporting the Goodell bill), lost by 20,000 votes, 41.4 percent to Crane's 58.6. But Crane's total was far below the resounding margin of 72.7 percent that Donald Rumsfeld amassed in the District in 1968. The area has been represented in Congress by the GOP since 1912, and has a two-to-one Republican registration edge.

Crane, who is an ad agent's dream — handsome, photogenic and articulate — may rapidly develop into a younger Ronald Reagan (who was Crane's choice for the 1968 Presidential nomination). He is rumored to be interested in opposing Senator Charles Percy in a primary fight when Percy comes up for re-election in 1972.

MINNESOTA: Bloomington, blacks, and the GOP

Republicans in Bloomington, Minnesota's fourth largest city, swept to victory in the November municipal elections, ousting the Democratic mayor and electing all three aldermen.

One of the new city councilors is Ray O. Pleasant, the first Negro so elected in the state's history.

Pleasant, moreover, won in his first bid for public office in this predominantly white middle-class suburb of St. Paul-Minneapolis.

He ran on a moderate platform emphasizing coordinated planning and traffic studies, more and better park development and better citizen-government communications.

Pleasant is one of thirteen black Republicans elected to office across the country. The others were: (as listed in a Republican National Committee news release)

- Luska J. Twyman, re-elected Mayor of Glasgow, Kentucky.
- Collin Bennett, re-elected City Councilman, Hartford, Connecticut. (Second highest vote-getter in field of twelve candidates.)
- Harold Garner, elected City Councilman, Toledo, Ohio.
- Paul T. Haggard, elected City Councilman, Cleveland, Ohio.
- John Kellogg, re-elected City Councilman, Cleveland, Ohio.
- Stanley Lawson, elected City Councilman, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
- Lillian Burke, elected Municipal Judge, Cleveland, Ohio. (First Black woman elected to a judgeship in Cleveland.)
- Marquette Floyd, elected Judge, Eastern Suffolk County, Long Island, New York.

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GOP Prestidigitator in the Old Dominion

The task facing the Virginia Republican Party — and A. Linwood Holton in particular — at the beginning of 1969 was formidable indeed. The GOP hoped to elect a Governor in Virginia for the first time in this century, and Holton who had captured 38 percent of the gubernatorial vote in 1965, was the most likely Republican candidate. But the Republican Party had to face the fact that, although the breakup of the Byrd machine was almost complete, Democrats still dominated Virginia politics at the state level; and Mills Godwin, who began his rise to power as a leader of “massive resistance” to school integration, had proved to be an enlightened and progressive Governor after defeating Holton in 1965.

Holton had his own problems as well. As a candidate, he left little to be desired. Sandy-haired, square-jawed, father of an attractive brood, he looked like everyone’s picture of the all-American Governor. He had the civic and political credentials: elder of his church and Sunday school teacher, graduate of Washington and Lee and Harvard Law School, Captain in the Naval Reserve, loyal Republican, and state campaign manager for gubernatorial candidate H. Clyde Pearson in 1961. Furthermore, Holton was an outspoken racial moderate; during the darkest days of Virginia’s massive resistance, he paid for a newspaper advertisement urging the people to “Keep Your Schools Open.”

LOSING THE BLACK VOTE In his 1965 race against Godwin, Holton linked the excesses of massive resistance to the state’s pressing need for improvements in public education. Furthermore, he urged the appointment of a Negro to the State Board of Education, and he advocated repeal of the poll tax — then still a requirement for voting in state and local elections. It was a campaign that should have appealed to Virginia’s Negro voters; but in the November election, nearly 75 percent of the blacks shunned Holton to vote for a man who had opposed their

interests for all of his political life. Godwin polled about 48 percent of the total vote, to 38 percent for Holton and more than 13 percent for a strong Conservative Party candidate, William J. Story.

Certainly, some of this black contrariness was due to memory of the Goldwater campaign of 1964. But Holton’s failure in 1965 could also be laid to the GOP’s assumption that if the candidate merely said the right things, Negro voters would come a-running. While shrewd Democrats like Sydney Kellam of Virginia Beach sought out Negro leaders (and union chiefs), the Republicans were unable or unwilling to make personal contacts with key figures in the black community. Even in 1965, it was no longer enough for Republicans to “let the word go out”; since Goldwater, this sort of *noblesse oblige* approach has failed time and again to win Negro votes.

By 1969, there were a quarter of a million black voters on the rolls, and the 1969 gubernatorial election would be the first for which payment of a poll tax was not required. But the Republicans still seemed to be waiting for black voters to come to them. “The GOP hopes to win, again, without making an aggressive try for the Negro vote,” an experienced black Republican said in the spring. “If Holton runs the same way he did in ’65, and doesn’t get at least 40 percent of the black vote, he’ll lose. He can’t do it by hanging back.

REPUBLICAN DEFECTIONS There were indications, too, that Holton’s only problem in 1965 had not been with the black voters; four years later, many Virginia Republicans were still grumbling

THE AUTHORS

This profile was revised and expanded by Michael Lottman from an election analysis by Tom R. Morris. Mr. Morris is a Ph.D. candidate in American Government at the University of Virginia.

that he had been "too liberal." How many of these GOP regulars defected in 1965, either to Godwin or to Story, cannot be accurately determined; but the number may have been considerable. In 1969, Holton still had to contend with a discernible lack of enthusiasm for his candidacy among certain segments of his own party. Though Holton's nomination was unopposed at the party's convention in early March, 1969, it was not necessarily unanimous. Professor Ralph Eisenberg of the University of Virginia, who attended the convention, said afterwards, "One was convinced the delegates in the convention didn't like him, because he was too moderate."

It was not surprising, therefore, that in early 1969, Holton thought long and hard about accepting a federal judgeship before announcing again as a candidate for Governor. As one of the earliest and hardest-working of Richard Nixon's Southern supporters, he had earned the \$40,000-a-year lifetime appointment; and his qualms about the Governor's race, if he admitted to any, appeared to be justified.

At the time Holton was nominated, the Democratic primary was still four months away; Holton did not know whether he would be running against a liberal (State Senator Henry E. Howell, Jr.), or Byrd-oriented conservative (Lieutenant Governor Fred G. Pollard), or a moderate (William C. Battle, Ambassador to Australia during the Kennedy Administration). If Holton faced Howell in November, he would veer to the right, which would please his Republican critics; if Pollard were the Democratic nominee, Holton would have to go left, which would please labor, the blacks, and Democratic liberals. If, however, the Democrats nominated Battle, whose views on most issues were identical to Holton's, the Republican candidate would have to perform a straddling act of heroic proportions to have a chance in the general election. And as it turned out, that is exactly what Linwood Holton did.

A GAGGLE OF BABBITS The 1969 Republican State Convention was hardly calculated to give its moderate gubernatorial candidate a rousing send-off. For one thing, among the 891 delegates and several hundred alternates and extras who filled the hall at the Hotel Roanoke, there were at most half a dozen Negroes. The overwhelming majority of the delegates looked — and acted — like every Democrat's stereotype of a Republican — well-fed, well-heeled, tax-conscious suburbanites.

Holton's nomination on March 1 could be charitably described as an anticlimax. First, after Holton's advisers had settled on State Senator H. D. "Buz" Dawbarn of Waynesboro for the second spot on the ticket, Northern Virginians in the convention put up

a virtual unknown, Tom Wright of Fairfax County, and came within 170 votes (504½ to 335¾) of nominating him. Then, after a tepid pro-Holton nominating speech by Congressman William C. Wampler — "he was born in Big Stone Gap, Va., and is a graduate of Harvard Law School, and one just about offsets the other" — and a noisy demonstration involving no one of voting age, the deed was done. Holton's acceptance speech was received with a singular lack of enthusiasm.

And when Holton's running mates were unfurled, it was hard to believe the gubernatorial candidate had saddled himself with them of his own free will. Dawbarn, considered a moderate in Republican circles, was notably moderate in his attitude toward the entire venture; and his platform style — a slow, sleepy-eyed drawl — promised many early bedtimes along the campaign trail. But Holton was going to have even harder time living with his other running mate — Richard D. Obenshain of Richmond, the nominee for Attorney General. Obenshain, an unabashed Goldwaterite, had learned little since he tried to out-seg Congressman David E. Satterfield in the 1964 Third District House race and lost by 654 votes out of 120,000 cast. At the press conference after the convention in March, 1969, Obenshain brushed aside a suggestion that the next Attorney General concern himself with consumer protection. As everyone now knows, consumer protection became a major issue in the campaign.

ON A FULL STOMACH But Obenshain saved his deadliest volley for the month of April, when hunger became an issue in Virginia and Senator William B. Spong, Jr. toured the state to see the malnutrition for himself (he subsequently noted that 46 of the 440 U.S. localities without federal food programs are in Virginia). Warning that Spong's solution to the problem would "consist largely of more and bigger federal handouts," Obenshain indicated that he clearly preferred the "Lincolnesque self-reliance" displayed by some of the hunger victims Spong had visited. "Food stamps and similar programs are valuable in alleviating hunger," the nominee conceded. "But they are no match for the ancient virtue of determined self-reliance as the ultimate conqueror of poverty and hunger."

The Holton campaign stayed in low gear as the Democrats' July primary approached. But luck was with the GOP nominee this time, as the primary provided the first of three unexpected breaks that made his candidacy viable and ultimately successful. Though it would never have taken place during the reign of Harry Byrd, Sr., the three-way Democratic contest was not necessarily, in itself, a liability to the party; it kept

the Democrats in the headlines for several months while the GOP was waiting to see the results. But Henry Howell, the Norfolk liberal, succeeded in polarizing the Democratic electorate to a degree that few had anticipated.

Howell, almost alone among liberal politicians, understood that George C. Wallace's appeals to "the little man" encompassed more than just racism; and so he carried the battle to the Establishment and the big-money interests ("Keep the big boys honest!"), espousing the cause of consumer protection and fighting high insurance rates and the state's sales tax on food. As a result, Howell built a coalition that included blacks and labor on one hand and rural Wallaceites on the other. The Virginia press had always been hostile to Howell, refusing to take him seriously, and few observers gave him much of a chance in the primary; but he forced a run-off with Battle, as Pollard ran surprisingly far behind.

DISGRUNTLED DEMOCRATS And then, in a bitter run-off, the insurgent came within some 20,000 votes (out of 430,000 cast) of defeating Battle, who by default became the standard-bearer for the Establishment. Thus, the Democratic primary left Holton with 200,000 disgruntled Democrats to shoot for — if he could figure out how to do it without alienating the Republicans who nominated him.

The GOP candidate's only overt gestures in the direction of the Howell voters were his emphasis on consumer issues and his proposal to refund the food tax at the rate of \$9 per year for every citizen of Virginia. Otherwise, he and Battle continued to occupy the same eddies of mainstream politics. But five weeks before the election, Holton's other two breaks materialized — endorsements by the Virginia AFL-CIO and by the Crusade for Voters, the state's largest Negro political organization. The endorsements were lukewarm at best, and they were made for reasons that had little to do with Holton himself, but there they were. The labor leaders were at least partly motivated by the belief that Battle's defeat would pave the way for their hero, Henry Howell, in 1973. "The general consensus," said AFL-CIO President Julian Carper, "was that the best way to make sure the Byrd machine is eliminated completely is to elect a Republican Governor." With the blacks, it was also a matter of tactics: "A vote for Battle would be a vote for the Byrd machine."

On top of these endorsements, Holton was able to win and hold the support of some 500 businessmen, mostly from Richmond, who, after years of being presidential Republicans and state Democrats, formally switched to the GOP and Holton.

THE BYRD MACHINE It hardly seemed possible early in 1969 that the GOP could plan on winning the gubernatorial election by running against the spectre of the Byrd machine. It no longer made a great deal of sense to wage a holy crusade against the Byrd organization's history of penury and neglect. Mills Godwin, it seemed, had been listening to Holton in 1965, even if too few others had, and there was general agreement among those of all political persuasions that he had been a competent Governor. Holton himself, in announcing his candidacy, said he was glad Godwin was barred from seeking a second term, because the old massive resister could probably win re-election. Many of the big battles that had to be fought were fought — and won — during Godwin's term: liquor by the drink, sales taxes and a bond issue for schools, and long-overdue constitutional reform.

In addition, Godwin took pains to identify himself with the cause of quality education, and he pointedly went about erasing the last vestiges of massive resistance. In February, 1969, he made two appointments to the State Board of Education that, according to the *The Richmond News Leader*, "indicated how far Virginia has come in 10 years from its program of 'massive resistance' to school integration." The appointees were Hilary H. Jones, Jr., the first Negro in this century, and possibly the first ever, to be named to the board of education (though by no means the first Negro Godwin had appointed to a state agency); and Thomas C. Boushall, a white banker who had been purged from the state school board in 1958 because of a suspected lack of enthusiasm for massive resistance.

Battle, at least until the Democratic run-off, avoided any identification with what was left of the Byrd machine; in the second primary, however, he was forced to seek support from that element of the party. Nonetheless, William Battle, a John F. Kennedy Democrat, was hardly a candidate that Harry Byrd, Sr. would approve of; and it remains a mystery how he became so strongly linked in some people's minds with the Byrd organization. As *The Washington Post* observed after the November election, "the defeat of Mr. Battle did not announce the death of the Byrd Organization; that occurred some time ago, although Mr. Battle undoubtedly lost votes because of the myth of its continued existence."

STATE AND LOCAL ISSUES In winning by a margin of 70,000 votes (out of 900,000 cast), Holton rarely strayed from his rather general theme, "It's time for a change." Except for his tax refund proposal, the Republican candidate confined himself to hammering away at the failure of Democratic one-party rule to respond to the needs of all Virginians. National issues, including the Vietnam

war, were of little consequence in a state preoccupied with deciding whether the time for a change had arrived.

On the other hand, Holton made little secret of his close ties with President Nixon. He spoke in glowing terms of the President's "new federalism" concept, and emphasized the advantages to Virginia in having a Republican Governor to deal with the Republican Administration in Washington. Nixon's visit to the state shortly before the election enabled the Republicans to regain the momentum they had felt after the second Democratic primary and again after the labor and Negro endorsements. Before the President came to Virginia, there was concern that the well-organized and extremely well-financed Holton campaign had peaked too early. The Democrats had released an Oliver Quayle poll showing Battle leading Holton, 46 percent to 37 percent, as of the first week in October. But Nixon's visit, replays of same, and commercials taped by the President were given maximum TV exposure during the closing days of the campaign, and probably contributed to the record turnout—60 percent over the previous high for a gubernatorial election.

Holton, a Roanoke attorney, built his victory total on traditional enclaves of Republican support in the Shenandoah Valley and the western highlands. The key to the Holton victory, however, was to be found in his share of the suburban and urban vote. The most rapid increases in population in Virginia in recent years have occurred in the state's urban corridor, which extends from the suburbs of Northern Virginia south to Richmond and southeast to the Tidewater cities. The vote in this corridor has been decisive in every statewide contest since 1964; and in 1969, Holton took a 54 percent slice of it. Counting the Roanoke and Lynchburg metropolitan areas, which are not contiguous to the urban corridor, Holton polled 55 percent of the vote from an area that cast almost 60 percent of the total vote in 1969.

The heaviest contribution to Holton's winning margin came from the suburbs around the state's major urban centers. The following table shows each party's share of the vote in the central cities (Richmond, Roanoke, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Lynchburg, Newport News, Hampton, and Alexandria) and in the surrounding metropolitan areas in the 1969 Governor's race:

	Cities (percent)	Suburbs (percent)
Democratic	46.2	40.1
Republican	51.5	57.6
Other	2.3	2.3

The Holton vote, however, also represented an impressive gain over past Republican performances within the central cities. One has only to look at the statistics in the races for Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General to see how important these gains were to Holton's success. Republicans Dawbarn and Obenshain also carried the suburbs, but plagued by their conservative images, they lost the city vote by 50,000 and 35,000 votes respectively.

Party Shares of 1969 City and Suburban Vote

	Lieutenant Governor		Attorney General	
	Cities	Suburbs	Cities	Suburbs
Democratic	61.0	47.5	58.0	45.1
Republican	35.7	48.9	40.0	53.1
Other	3.3	3.6	2.0	1.8

The lesson for the future is that Republican candidates must be able to compete for a majority of the suburban vote and a substantial percentage of the vote in the cities themselves. To lose the inner city vote by a large margin is to concede defeat. Only a broad-based campaign, such as Holton found himself running, seems likely to succeed in a state that is growing progressively more urban and more national in outlook.

A TEMPORARY TRIUMPH? Whether or not Linwood Holton's victory was also a victory for the Virginia Republican Party remains to be seen. It should be noted that the biggest winner in the November election was not Holton, but Democratic State Senator J. Sargeant Reynolds, who defeated "Buz" Dawbarn by more than 90,000 votes in the race for Lieutenant Governor. And the Democratic nominee for Attorney General, Andrew P. Miller, led Richard Obenshain by more than 40,000. Reynolds, the 33-year-old Reynolds Aluminum heir, and Miller, son of long-time Democratic insurgent Francis Pickens Miller, may be the emerging leaders of the Virginia Democratic Party; and Howell's 1969 campaign will have an impact beyond this particular election. Both Reynolds and Miller are considered liberals, though not to the same degree as Howell, and both had the endorsements of the same labor and Negro groups that backed Holton. If the Democratic Party is reformed in the image of these men, the pro-Republican developments of 1969 may not be repeated.

Holton, as Virginia's first Republican Governor since Reconstruction, will have to remember that the endorsements that put him over the top were anti-Byrd, rather than pro-Holton. His election was a victory, but it was not a mandate, either for him or for the Republican Party. If Holton and his party truly seek such a mandate, they now have four years in which to write their own.

Problem: U. S. Farm Policy **Solution: Steps to a Free Market**

During the next year the Nixon Administration faces a perennial problem of American politics: the farm program. Most of the major farm legislation passed in 1964-5 and renewed in 1968 expires at the end of the 1970 crop year. The "farm problem" is no longer the burning social and political issue it once was, but like death, taxes and the poor it is extremely durable. Agricultural policy has changed relatively little since the New Deal when close to a third of the nation's people still lived on farms. Although only about 6% still do, the Department of Agriculture budgets remain in the range of \$6 to \$8 billion a year, with about half of that amount going for price and income supports for farmers.

This huge investment in resources has not solved the problems of American agriculture. Price instability still plagues the farmer, along with a perpetual cost-price squeeze. Consumers are increasingly restive about the high cost of food, often blamed (not always correctly) on government farm programs. Urban congressmen resent the continued high expenditures of precious resources on a declining number of farmers at a time when the needs of the cities are so pressing, a resentment exacerbated by disclosure of large government payments to gigantic commercial farms, often located in the same areas where poverty and hunger are ignored. All these groups sense, with considerable justification, that changes are imperative.

FOR FOOD AND FIBER In economic terms the farm problem is essentially a matter of excess capacity. More productive resources remain in the agricultural sector than can be justified by national requirements for food and fiber. Though farm employment plummeted 43 percent between 1950 and 1967, technological innovations, combined with capital expansion, have more than offset these reductions in labor resources. Productivity per man hour in the farm sector has more than tripled since 1946,

THE AUTHOR


James L. Guth is a 1966 graduate of the University of Wisconsin and is presently a graduate student in Government at Harvard University.

an advance unmatched in any other part of the American economy. The result of all this is very simple: we can grow food much faster than we can eat it.

It appears also that we can produce food faster than our foreign trade partners can eat it, even if we subsidize their purchases. With the great productivity increases in the post-war period, American agriculture became extremely dependent on foreign markets for disposal of its products. The following table indicates the proportion of farm production in various crops usually exported: the year cited is 1965-66.

Exports as % of total sales (includes exports under P.L. 480, Food For Peace)	
Wheat	64
Hides and skins	62
Rice	55
Grain Sorghums	48
Soybeans	43
Tallow	38
Corn	33
Tobacco	28
Barley	24
Cotton	26 (very low year; usually 35%)

As is clear from the table, the prices of many farm crops are heavily dependent on the state of foreign markets, though U.S. government purchases and subsidies open up markets that would otherwise be uneconomical. As late as 1967 economists and policymakers were fairly optimistic about the prospects for strong foreign markets for American farm products; exports were booming and American surpluses were dwindling.



ing. But recently the situation has reversed, with farm exports declining by more than \$1 billion in the last year alone. The reasons for the decline are several. Most of the developed Western nations have excess agricultural capacity and unused surpluses. Agricultural advances in previously food-deficit nations have cut the need for imports from the West. New varieties of high-yield disease-resistant wheats have produced record crops in Mexico, India and other countries. Similar advances have occurred in other crops, turning many former food-deficit nations into exporters of their own surpluses. Thus, the outlook for expansion of foreign markets for American products does not appear bright.

NEW DEAL LEGACY

The problem of excess capacity will not be solved by market expansion, either at home or abroad. Some other solution is required. Unfortunately, government programs inherited from the New Deal era have actually retarded solution of the very problems at which they were aimed. These programs have not been without benefits: they have often improved farm income (though not for low-income farmers), stabilized prices and outputs to varying degrees, and assured consumers of plentiful supplies of low-cost food. But for the most part government programs have been aimed at ameliorating the consequences of the surplus resources in the farm sector, rather than promoting a more economically efficient and socially productive reallocation of resources.

Price supports for basic farm commodities have often been set far above market-level prices, encouraging the continued influx of capital into the farm sector, and the continued cultivation of marginal farm land. Production control programs and sporadic efforts aimed at land retirement have failed to offset the attractions of artificially high prices of farm products. Recent programs have shifted the emphasis from maintaining high market prices to providing direct support payments to farmers cooperating with government production control programs. Such programs allow commodity prices to fall to more natural levels in the market. Increased income goes directly to the farmer, attacking the farm income problem at its root.

But these programs tend to perpetuate existing inefficiencies in the farm sector. They provide for acreage allotments and quotas that are based on past history of production of a particular commodity, thus tending to freeze production in inefficient patterns. To maintain their allotment for a particular crop, farmers may often continue to raise it, even when another crop might provide a larger market return. This prevents concentration of production on those farms and in those regions with the greatest comparative advantage. A final disturbing aspect of recent programs is the ex-

tent to which farmers are forced to depend on government payments for their income. This varies from crop to crop: some farmers depend heavily on farm program payment for income, while others, like livestock and poultry farmers, receive none at all. The major crops included in direct payment programs are wheat, cotton, and feed grains. Government payments provide the following percentages of cash receipts in these products for 1967:

Feed Grains	21.0
Wheat	26.0
Cotton Lint	49.6

The benefits of these programs have not been evenly distributed. Larger farms are the chief beneficiaries of government payments.

Value of sales	Cash Receipts %	Government Payments %	Number of Farms %
\$40,000 and over	43.3	22.9	5.2
\$20,000 to \$39,999	21.7	21.8	9.6
\$10,000 to \$19,999	18.2	22.9	15.4
\$5,000 to \$9,999	9.1	14.9	14.8
\$2,500 to \$4,999	3.7	7.4	12.1
Less than \$2,500:			
Other	.8	2.1	6.5
Part-time	1.9	5.6	24.9
Part-retirement and abnormal	1.3	2.4	11.5
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Thus, the top 15 percent of agriculture receives about 45 percent of the direct government payments and probably an even larger share of price-support indirect benefits. While government payments loom as substantial parts of farm income for many larger farmers, those farmers with the greatest income problem have received very little.

NOT ALTOGETHER BLEAK

The economic trends in agriculture are not altogether bleak; in some respects they are most encouraging. The number of farms with gross incomes over the \$10,000 minimum required for profitable operation is increasing steadily. The trend toward larger and more efficient farm units facilitates greater efficiency, lower production costs, and more adequate returns and provides a basis for an economically sound agricultural sector. Such farms constitute less than one-third of our three million farms, but produce over 80 percent of our national farm output.

Of the remaining two-thirds of the farmers presently on the land, most are not needed there and cannot make a profitable living from farming. Although present farm programs are usually justified as means of halting emigration from the countryside by enabling small farmers to make a decent living, no such effect


has been apparent. As noted above, most small farmers receive little or no benefit from existing commodity programs. Voluntary diversion programs give the largest benefits to those who have the greatest capacity to produce and the most land to divert. Similarly, price supports aid only those who market substantial amounts of farm products. Economists agree that these programs have had relatively little effect in keeping poor farmers on the land; when urban job opportunities are present, migration off the farm is rather steady, whatever the farm program in effect.

TRANSFER OF RESOURCES What is required at the present time is a farm program which will cushion the transfer of resources presently in farming to other economic sectors. This is by no means an easy task, but there is a growing consensus that a sound long-range aim of government farm policy should be to return to a greater reliance on the market mechanism as a means of distributing economic resources and returns. This is not a new suggestion: the Eisenhower Administration fought for eight years to effect such a readjustment, with only moderate success.

Market-oriented proposals have appeared regu-

larly in the past few years. In 1962 the Committee for Economic Development suggested a program which would phase out price support and production control programs in five years. The American Farm Bureau Federation has persistently supported a gradual phase-out of most farm programs over a five-year period. In January of this year, Hendrik Houthakker, member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, suggested a three-year transitional program. Such suggestions appeal to a number of groups. Urban congressmen are attracted by the hope of budget savings and the possibility of reduced food prices. Some farmers are attracted by the promise of greater managerial freedom and less general interference in their farm operations. Farmers could then shift productive resources and energies more readily to those crops promising the best return.

However sound the general goal of shifting to a greater emphasis on the free market in agriculture, monumental economic and social problems are involved in its implementation. Too frequently in the past, farm policies have been formulated without adequate consideration of their social and human implications. New Deal farm programs drove thousands of



CROPLAND IDLED BY 1980 UNDER A FREE MARKET

families from the land, without providing for any kind of readjustment to a new and often urban life. The Eisenhower Administration fought to decrease agriculture's dependence on government, but failed to provide an equally forward-looking strategy to deal with the social effects of a market-oriented policy.

OUT OF PRODUCTION The social impact of any such policy is substantial. A study by the Iowa State Center for Agricultural and Economic Development indicated that under a free market policy, substantial amounts of cropland would be idled by 1980, assuming normal increases in domestic consumption and 1965-level exports. The map on page 11 indicates roughly the extent of acreage decrease. Over 75 percent of the cropland in Mississippi and the Dakotas would be idled due to the movement of crop production to areas with greater comparative advantages.

These three states — with over 30 percent of their work force in agriculture — would need compensatory programs. Alabama and South Carolina would also require substantial assistance. But the benefits to efficient farm areas and to the national economy as a whole would make government programs cushioning the transition a sound national investment.

Policy is never independent of politics and policy innovations require political strategies. A sketch of present political alignments will indicate both the possibilities and limitations inherent in any attempt to reorient our farm program.

PHANTOM FARM BLOC A persistent misconception about power realities in farm politics is perpetuated by the continued use of the term "farm bloc" by the urban press. Although farm organizations and farm congressmen are sometimes united in support of certain non-controversial USDA programs, unity on major issues is the exception rather than the rule.

One major line of cleavage has been partisan; both Agriculture Committees and their parent Houses have tended to divide along party lines, although there has been some farm unity in the Senate. The present Agriculture Committees, like those of the past, are dominated by Southern Democrats. Fourteen of the 18 Democratic members of the House Committee are from the South or border states; six of seven on the Senate Democratic group are Southerners. Most of these men favor strongly the maintenance of existing income support and production control legislation for a number of reasons. Government programs provide substantial proportions of farm income in cotton-producing states, as noted above. Although a disproportionate amount of such income goes to large commercial operations, a very large number of Southern farmers receive government payments in cotton areas. Elimination of production

controls would result in the movement of cotton production from the Deep South into the more productive areas of the Southwest, crippling the economic base of the rural Deep South. Economic reconstruction of depleted areas would require a degree of government involvement in social changes which has been anathema to this predominantly conservative group.

BOUND BY TRADITION The number of Northern and Western Democrats on the committees has varied with the electoral success of the Democratic Party. After the 1964 election a number of newly elected Northern Democrats joined the committee, but most were defeated two years later. Although Northern and Western Democrats are usually less reluctant to involve government in broad areas of rural social concerns, most members favor production control and income support programs for their regional commodities along the same lines backed by their Southern brethren. Although the interests of the Northern and Southern Democrats are not entirely compatible, they are bound together by party tradition. Midwestern and Plains Democrats have often come from marginal agricultural areas and, like the Southern members, fear the social and economic effects of a market-oriented policy on their regions. On the present committees, however, only Senator McGovern on the Democratic side comes from these regions

In contrast to the Democratic position, most Republicans have come to favor a transition to a policy of less government involvement in agriculture, a policy pressed by Eisenhower and Secretary Benson during the 1950's. This preference reflects both traditional Republican free-market values and the economic interests of their districts. Eastern Republicans come from food deficit areas which receive very few government payments under the present programs for cotton, wheat, and feed grains. Moreover, government programs aimed at raising prices on wheat and feed grain increases production costs for Eastern dairy, cattle, and poultry producers. Urban Republicans adhere to the free market standard as a matter of course.

BENEFIT THE CORN BELT Midwestern Republicans represent areas with substantial competitive advantage in the production of a number of staple crops. Readjustment of existing production patterns might well benefit the Corn Belt states. For a number of years, then, only a declining number of wheat state and upper Midwest Republicans were likely to adhere to the traditional "farm bloc" programs. But the balance among farm state Republicans has shifted somewhat in the last few years, especially on the rapidly changing Agriculture Committees. With the recovery of the GOP in the upper Midwest and Plains and the growth of the party in the South, the number of committee members sympathetic to existing programs has increased.

The partisan polarization has been paralleled by a division among farm organizations. The major ally of Republican farm policy in recent years has been the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF). The AFBF has often been more royalist than the king, pushing for a faster dismantling of existing programs than envisioned by most Republicans. This organization boasts substantial membership in every region, but is strongest in the Midwest and South. Its social and political philosophy is extremely conservative, a factor which has hindered the organization's recent attempts to recruit farm policy allies among urban Democrats. The Bureau's free-market emphasis also made it *persona non grata* to both the Agriculture Committees and the USDA during the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations.

Although the Bureau's social and political views are generally conservative, it is the only farm group which recognizes the economic fact that large numbers of farmers must eventually move out of agriculture into other occupations. Traditionally, the AFBF has pushed for a fairly rapid transition to the free market as a means of accomplishing the needed readjustments, but has suggested few means by which transitional problems could be dealt with. In the last year, however, the Bureau has suggested a number of government programs aimed at easing the movement of poor farmers into other occupations, a significant and praiseworthy change in perspective for the organization.

OPPOSING THE AFBF Presently opposing the AFBF is a loose coalition of organizations, none of them matching the Bureau in scope or numerical strength. The National Farmers Union, a liberal organization tied closely to the Democratic Party and centered in the Great Plains and Upper Midwest, favors the continuance of existing production controls and income and price supports. The NFU was extremely influential in the Freeman USDA, supplying a number of top-level administrators and many farm policy ideas. A second major organization, the National Grange, with membership concentrated in the Northeast and Northwest, is a traditionally conservative group whose farm policy ideas have gradually moved toward those of the NFU. A third organization with considerable strength is the decade-old National Farmers Organization, which operates primarily in the Midwest and North Central states. Although the NFO focuses its efforts principally on its promotion of "collective bargaining" for farmers, during the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations it cooperated with the NFU and Grange, together with a number of other farm groups in support of Democratic farm programs. Common fear of the AFBF and a growing recognition of declining rural political power has solidified this incongruous alliance. In recent months this coalition of 18 farm organizations has formally constituted a

Farm Coalition Committee aimed at combating AFBF suggestions for massive land retirement and shifting marginal farmers off the land. Most of these groups argue that the aim of government policy should be to keep farmers prosperous and on the farm, refusing to admit that a great many marginal farmers can no longer make a go of it.

Although farm policy is still dominated by the USDA, the Agriculture Committees and farm groups, urban congressmen have become a pivotal force in the passage of farm bills, with legislative success usually going to the side which successfully mobilizes this bloc. During the late 1950's Secretary Benson capitalized on the growing discontent of urban Democrats with the high cost of government programs to defeat Democratic farm bills. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson kept most urban Democrats in line through skillful use of concessions, pressures and log-rolling, despite the repeated threat of urban revolts. But the Nixon Administration might well be able to utilize urban discontent with existing programs to achieve some readjustment of farm policy.

THE NIXON APPROACH Campaigning in 1968, Nixon stressed the need for a fundamental shift in farm policy, emphasizing greater reliance on market allocation and on efforts to expand farm exports. He also suggested the need for legislation to improve farmer bargaining power and the necessity for economic revitalization of rural America by encouragement of industrial decentralization. Although some of the suggestions were new, Nixon's rhetoric was basically consistent with the GOP farm program of the 50's, with its emphasis on decreasing agricultural dependence on the federal government and on calling a halt to the encroaching web of federal controls. Most of Nixon's farm policy advisers were veterans of the Benson USDA or closely identified with the ideas of the Farm Bureau, prompting a number of observers to predict rather drastic changes.

Actual initiatives have been rather cautious. Cognizant of the potential for stalemates similar to those of the 1950's inherent in the present situation, and reflecting something of a "Southern strategy" as well, Nixon sought an ambiguous middle ground in policy and personnel. Secretary Hardin's appointment was greeted with cautious optimism by farm groups and rural congressmen; his lack of identification with either side in past struggles was undoubtedly a prime factor in his selection. Hardin's own selections for USDA administrative posts indicated his hopes of working cordially with the Southern-dominated committees; J. Phil Campbell, a Georgia Democrat recently turned Republican, was named Undersecretary of Agriculture. Campbell and Hardin's other major assistants, with one or two important exceptions, are in general supporters of existing programs, although not irretrievably iden-

tified with them. Hardin soon made explicit what his appointments hinted: farm policy would change, but not precipitately.

SECRETARY HARDIN TESTIFIES On September 24, 1969, Hardin offered the outlines of the Nixon farm program in testimony before the House Agriculture Committee. He emphasized that price supports and production controls could do nothing to help a large number of low-income farmers who simply do not have the land and resources to make a decent living by farming. A number of the Southern Democrats on the committee were startled by Hardin's estimate that over 400,000 small farmers would qualify for welfare payments under President Nixon's new family assistance plan. For commercial farmers Hardin suggested two production control programs intended to increase the farmer's flexibility in choosing his crops. Hardin refused to be pinned down on his relative preference and suggested merely that the committee should choose between the alternatives before it. He also was reluctant to express his opinion of Rep. Poage's bill, which would merely extend the existing program with minor modifications. This bill has been staunchly supported by the Farm Coalition Committee and by a majority of members on the House Committee.

Hardin noted that all annual commodity programs, his own included, did relatively little to solve the basic problem of resource adjustment. He cited the need for programs which would shift unneeded cropland into uses for which there are growing requirements: timber, grazing, recreation and wildlife propagation. But he emphasized the need for caution: too rapid a rate of long-term retirement would depopulate many rural areas. In some respects, such shifts might also disrupt existing programs; shifting marginal farm lands into grazing would have tremendous consequences for meat prices, for example. During the early years of such a shift, retail prices for meat would skyrocket as farmers and ranchers held animals off the market to build up breeding stocks. Later the price might dive to unprofitable levels as large numbers of additional livestock hit the market. Thus Hardin felt the need for considerable caution.

RETIRING THE ACREAGE He suggested expanded use of the cropland adjustment program which has aimed at the conversion of cropland to less intensive uses. Another program would assist local governments in purchasing farm lands for various municipal purposes, such as recreation, airports, and public facilities. A third pilot project would be an "easement" plan, by which the government would purchase cropping rights but the farmer would retain title to the land. Some groups have suggested a large-scale utilization of a similar plan to retire large

acreages, but the Secretary argued that the approach should be tried on a small scale first, retiring 3 to 4 million acres a year, in contrast to the 10 million a year suggested by the Farm Bureau.

The Nixon policy is thus aimed at some movement in the direction of a freer market, but this shift has been slowed both by the massiveness of the problem and the intransigence of the Agriculture Committees. Hardin's mild approach reflects these basic considerations. However, the Administration has a powerful weapon in the urban majorities in the Congress. Farm district representatives cannot hope to pass any program without Presidential support. Many committee members themselves recognize that changes distasteful to them may have to be made to get urban support. Secretary Hardin has taken cognizance of this fact. It remains to be seen whether the Administration will utilize its political resources to ensure the enactment of policies which will go to the root of the farm problem.

Its caution to date has been based on a look at the composition of the Agriculture Committees of Congress. But an analysis of Congress as a whole — not to mention the nation's interests — dictates a bolder approach. Any unsatisfactory legislation submitted by the Agriculture Committees can be amended and overruled by a Congressional majority composed of suburban and urban congressmen allied with farming and ranching congressmen from the Midwest, Northeast, West and (if tobacco is left unscathed) the Border States. A steady budgetary drain of \$6-8 billion a year is at stake.

CUT THE GROCERY BILL This sum should be invested in programs which will phase out the farm problem, not perpetuate it. The Ripon Society calls, therefore, for an urban-rural coalition to invest in programs to develop the rural economy, to lower consumer prices and move toward a free market in farm programs by 1976.

The Nixon Administration should pursue the creation of an economically sound agriculture based on a market-oriented price system. At the same time, "farm programs" should assist the transition of marginal farmers to other occupations. To do this, we suggest a broad four point program for a coherent approach to the problems of agriculture. These proposals are not original: most have been suggested by a variety of individuals and organizations in the past. Nor are they comprehensive; many aspects of our nation's complex agricultural policy must necessarily remain untouched in these suggestions. But this program does suggest the direction in which a Republican Farm Policy should move.

I. Price Supports and Allotments

The Administration should aim at the gradual

reduction of government price support and acreage diversion payments and the eventual elimination of production allotments and quotas existing presently in the major feed-grain, wheat, and cotton programs. These goals should be accomplished over a five-year period in regular steps. Farmers presently in these programs are dependent on payments for a considerable part of their income, but a gradual phaseout will allow efficient operators to offset these losses by conversion to other crops and/or continued improvement in productive efficiency.

An immediate step which should be taken is the enactment of a limitation on the payments to any one individual. Although the limitation might have to be more flexible than the flat \$20,000 suggested by the House in the last two years, the present distribution of payments is highly inequitable.



Although production allotments and historical bases would be abolished by the end of the five-year period, a useful transitional device might be to provide for the interstate transfer of allotments during the interim period. Although this presents some problems, with careful safeguards such a program could assist in the orderly shift of production, both within and between regions.

Price support loans would be maintained, but as an insurance measure only, set at 80-85 percent of the average market price in the three years preceding.

II. *Land Retirement and Conversion*

Reduction of government payments and allotments will not eliminate the farm problem. Steps must be taken to facilitate the transfer of land and other resources out of agriculture. The Administration should emphasize the long-term retirement of farm land, especially in marginal areas. Secretary Hardin's suggested pilot projects may well serve as useful points of departure, but more substantial acreage will have to be retired. The emphasis should be on removing whole farms from production, thus preventing the shift of resources to more intensive cultivation of remaining farm acreage which plagues the present partial diversion programs. The Cropland Adjustment provisions of the 1965 Food and Agriculture Act should be extended with amendments to require whole farm retirement for at least a ten year period. This could be done on the basis of bids by individual farmers or on the basis of schedules determined by the Secretary. The Secretary should be given considerable discretion in determining annual levels of acreage retirement in the light of production levels and prices then obtaining. At first, to protect the economies of small towns which serve farming areas, it may be necessary to limit the amount of land retired in any one county or region, but this restriction should not be excessively rigid.

CONVERT AND CONSERVE Land conversion should also play a major part in the new farm policy. This means reorienting our present conservation programs. The Agricultural Conservation Program and the Soil Conservation Service in the USDA and other programs in the Department of the Interior often emphasize conservation practices such as proper fertilization, draining, irrigation and others which increase productive capacity at the same time other programs attempt to reduce production. Instead, these agencies should stress conversion of marginal land to non-crop uses. A valuable prototype here is the Great Plains Conservation Program, established in 1956, which has facilitated the shift from cropland to grass in marginal wheat regions of the Plains. This program should be expanded and similar ones instituted in other parts of the country to convert cropland to timber,

grass, or other uses. The major problem with this type of program has been the continued incentive provided by existing commodity programs for farmers to continue raising crops in order to participate in program benefits. The phasing out of the commodity programs will make the conversion programs more attractive.

III. Encouragement of Efficient Operations

A number of agricultural programs presently providing assistance to the farmer should be re-evaluated. A good example is the Farmers Home Administration (FHA) program of farm ownership loans. This has been a useful program in the past, but appears to be increasingly inadequate in an era of capital-intensive agriculture. Limitations on individual loans often mean that the government merely assists the small farmer in prolonging his agony on an inadequate, inefficient farm unit. A number of other loan programs often have much the same result. Such programs should be directed at the creation of strong commercial farm units.

Similarly, agricultural research and Extension work should be re-oriented from its narrow concern with improving production methods toward a greater concern with the economic problems of the new agriculture: farm size and capital structure, alternative production patterns, problems which are increasingly vital to the commercial farmer. The agencies dealing with research must shift their attention to the most pressing problems facing the modern farmer.

IV. Development of Human Resources

The USDA must broaden the scope of its concern to the problems of easing the transition of many farm people to new occupations and often new homes. Although the Department has become more involved in rural affairs generally, it has done little to solve such transitional problems. The Department should institute the following programs:

1. Retraining grants for low-income farmers who desire to move to new occupations.
2. Adjustment assistance for farmers moving to new homes. This assistance could take the form of loans or outright grants, administered by existing agencies such as the Farmers Home Administration.
3. Improved vocational education in rural areas. Such programs at present often emphasize agricultural training, useless to the great majority of farm youth.
4. An accelerated "rural development program" to absorb part of the farmers leaving agriculture. Careful use of tax incentives can attract industry to some rural areas, increasing opportunities for employment.

The Agricultural Extension Service should be used as a major tool in the development of human resources and the alleviation of poverty in the rural economy. The Nixon Administration has already taken significant steps in this direction.

THE BEST FOR ALL

These suggestions have traced in broad outline the direction in which American agricultural policy should move. This type of policy will have long-term benefits to all involved. The consumer will be provided with food and fiber produced economically in the most efficient way. The taxpayer will be divested of the responsibility of supporting costly agricultural programs which merely perpetuate the conditions they feed upon. Ending of existing commodity programs will allow commercial farmers to operate unencumbered by the existing web of bureaucratic controls and regulations, enabling them to allocate their productive resources most efficiently in the light of market indicators and their own talents. The termination of price supports and allotments will end the continuing spiral of land prices, caused by the capitalization of allotment values into land values. This will enable young farmers and those hoping to expand operations to a more efficient level to do so. The land retirement programs will provide city-dwellers with new recreational facilities; they will enable older farmers to retire early and provide younger farmers with a useful economic cushion during the transition to a new occupation or location. In the end, the programs will provide a better life for thousands of low income farm families. As one congressman remarked recently, "We can all think of a better farm program than the present one. The question is whether we will have the sense to enact it."

For the Republican Party, with its traditional appreciation of the free market and its developing sense of social responsibility to those unable to compete in it, this new farm policy should be a natural.

—JAMES L. GUTH

The legislative proposal most closely resembling the recommendations of the Ripon Society is the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1969, formulated by the American Farm Bureau Federation and introduced in Congress in a number of bills by the following sponsors:

SENATE

Everett M. Dirksen (R., Ill.)
Wallace F. Bennett (R., Utah)
J. Caleb Boggs (R., Del.)
Edward W. Brooke (R., Mass.)
Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.)
Norris Cotton (R., N.H.)
Peter H. Dominick (R., Colo.)
Paul J. Fannin (R., Ariz.)
Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.)

Robert P. Griffin (R., Mich.)
 Clifford P. Hansen (R., Wyo.)
 Len B. Jordan (R., Idaho)
 Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R., Md.)
 Jack Miller (R., Iowa)
 George Murphy (R., Calif.)
 Charles H. Percy (R., Ill.)
 Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.)
 William B. Saxbe (R., Ohio)
 Hugh Scott (R., Pa.)
 John J. Williams (R., Del.)

HOUSE

William G. Bray (R., Ind.)
 William S. Broomfield (R., Mich.)
 Frank M. Clark (D., Pa.)
 John H. Dent (D., Pa.)
 Edwin D. Eshleman (R., Pa.)
 Paul Findley (R., Ill.)
 Joseph M. Gaydos (D., Pa.)
 George A. Goodling (R., Pa.)
 James Harvey (R., Mich.)
 Carleton J. King (R., N.Y.)
 Robert H. Michel (R., Ill.)
 Alexander Pirnie (R., N.Y.)
 Howard W. Robison (R., N.Y.)
 Fred B. Rooney (D., Pa.)
 William V. Roth (R., Del.)
 Richard L. Roudebush (R., Ind.)
 Fernand St. Germain (D., R.I.)
 Robert T. Stafford (R., Vt.)
 Robert Taft, Jr. (R., Ohio)
 Charles M. Teague (R., Calif.)
 Guy Vander Jagt (R., Mich.)
 J. Irving Whalley (R., Pa.)
 Gus Yatron (D., Pa.)

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CONUNDRUM OF THE MONTH

What election year (besides 1968) does this scenario describe?

Eight years previously, the voters had chosen a bright young Harvard-educated Northeasterner for the White House, a man of naval background noted as a war hero. This liberal had many intellectual supporters.

Four years later, the voters chose a member of his Administration over an intense Western idealogue whose main support came in the South and Far West. The President shared many of the same views of his predecessor but lacked the charisma and respect of the man.

During the new Administration, the liberals in the President's party grew increasingly disenchanted with him. Finally, a Midwestern Senator announced that he would oppose the President in the primaries.

This Senator was soon joined by a man who bore the name of the young liberal President who had been in office previously. This New Yorker was clearly regarded as having far more political muscle than the Midwestern Senator. The Midwesterner's followers were bitter.

In the course of the campaign, the New Yorker was shot at a campaign rally.

In the convention that followed, the Administration standard-bearer was chosen amid cries of bossism and packed delegations.

In the three way election, the Midwestern Administration standard-bearer was defeated by the out-party candidate, who won with less than 45 percent of the popular vote and was least popular in the Northeast. (His Administration was to be noted for a hard-line Attorney General called Mitchell who was accused of persecuting radicals.)

Dissidents in the party of the unpopular outgoing Administration vowed to take over the party and liberalize it.

Abandoning New Deal Statism Is Reprivatization Nixon's Answer?

Peter Drucker's tenth chapter on "The Sickness of Government" is neither the best nor the most original in his latest book,* but it is likely to be the most influential. It has already become scripture around the White House. Last spring President Nixon gave several members of the White House staff carefully underlined copies of the essay as it appeared in its pre-publication form in the Winter 1969 issue of *The Public Interest* magazine. And both the conservative and liberal bards of the Republican Administration, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, have sung Drucker's praises.

The tenth chapter is notable for its sketch of the concept of "reprivatization," is misleading term if it is taken to imply exclusive reliance on the private sector. Drucker uses reprivatization simply to mean the contracting out and devolution of governmental activities to non-governmental bodies, and he doesn't care whether these outside institutions are business, universities, foundations, cooperatives, or semi-public corporations. The important thing is that they be autonomous — that their internal operations be no worry to government policy makers. For the whole purpose of reprivatization is to free government for policy-making by sloughing off the "doing" of things to independent managements.

INSTEAD OF GOVERNING

Right now, Drucker says, governments spends too much of its energy in administration; its leaders are so preoccupied with personnel, production, and accounting procedures that they become ill-suited to providing vision and political direction. The problem of government is not, then, simply a matter of getting bright young men into public service or of realigning the nation's priorities or of regrouping departments along more rational lines. It is that government, instead of governing, is trying to do things for which it is not suited.

**The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society* by Peter Drucker. Harper and Row, 394 pages, \$7.95.

Drucker believes that the unfitness of government for effective delivery of goods and services is inherent in the nature of the political process. Political leaders are doomed to live in a crisis atmosphere that forces them to direct all their attention to 10 per cent of government programs, while the other 90 per cent are allowed to drift out of control. They are under constant pressure to come up with "new" programs and dramatic legislation, while the once-bold initiatives of yesteryear become, as Drucker says, "tired, overextended, flabby, and impotent." Should they attempt to abolish an outdated bureau, or even to reform it, they will soon find that it has in the course of its lifetime developed a constituency that will rush to its defense. Businesses, when they cease to perform, lose money and disappear; government agencies, when they fail to deliver results, blame it on insufficient funding.

FEAR OF SCANDAL

Moreover, public scrutiny gives government agencies an obsessive fear of scandal and makes them less risk-oriented than private businesses. If government puts more stress on procedures than results, it is in part because any violation of procedures will bring public charges of arbitrariness, corruption, and favoritism. Hence, government agencies are inevitably more rule-oriented, more "bureaucratic" than corresponding private organizations which do not have to be as responsive to Congress and the press.

Such then, according to Drucker's tenth chapter, is the sickness of government, and his prescription is simple: "Government has to do less to achieve more." Instead of trying to do things itself, government should concentrate on getting others to do them. It should "try to figure out how to structure a given objective so as to make it attractive to one of the autonomous institutions." The role of the political leader should be like that of the orchestra conductor who "need not even know how to play an instrument." His job is to know the capacity of each instrument and to evoke optimal performance from each.

Drucker's view comes at a time when most advanced countries are badly in need of new concepts to

replace outworn doctrines of the welfare state. His contribution is especially timely for Richard M. Nixon, who has come to office at the head of a squabbling minority party in a period when the budget is tight and when swing segments of the voting public doubt the efficacy of government spending, both in defense and in social programs.

Peter Drucker, who certainly did not write with a Republican administration in mind, happens to fill the President's needs for three reasons: his concept is good for the Republican Party, it is good for the country, and it is workable in the bureaucracy. But it is also insufficient in itself and will need to be supplemented and superseded.

In the first place, reprivatization is good party politics because it is one concept that can give the warring factions of the Republican Party a common sense of purpose. Its anti-bureaucratic observations will appeal to old-line conservatives, its concern for managerial efficiency will appeal to pragmatic moderates, and its strong image of government as an "orchestra conductor" will have the support of Republican progressives. Drucker's ideas draw political strength from a deeply rooted Republican suspicion of big government. Just as the diverse elements of the Democratic coalition have been able to agree mainly on a notion of government which presupposes an expanding base of federal patronage, so Republicans, slighted by federal largesse for more than a generation, have rallied to the rhetoric of self-help, federalism, voluntarism, and reliance on the private sector. Drucker's view of government falls within this family of decentralizing ideas. And it costs little money besides. As a concept about means not ends, it does not require massive new spending, nor does it demand a repudiation of high-minded goals for social programs. Instead of turning back the hands of the clock, it puts Republicans in the politically more advantageous position of providing the mechanisms that can make the thing tick.

A SCANT GUARANTEE

Now the popularity of an idea within the GOP is scant guarantee that it will win acceptance in the nation at large, where fewer than 30 per cent of the voters are willing to describe themselves as Republicans. But it is a second virtue of Drucker's concept that it is politically viable for Mr. Nixon in a full national sense because it can generate programs that are measurable improvements over those we now have. One already before Congress is the proposed reform of the post office into a semi-private corporation under independent management.

Other diverse applications of the concept are possible:

1 — government funding of a university voluntary-action program in American cities;

2 — consolidation of government credit programs into a semi-private Domestic Development Bank;

3 — transferring certain Peace Corps and foreign aid programs to multi-national and privately administered institutions;

4 — contracting out to private industry the building of new towns, the designing of new educational and hospital systems, the provision of neighborhood information and day-care centers in poor communities;

5 — virtual abandonment of federal bank supervision activities in favor of reliance on government licensing of private auditing firms;

6 — allowing parents to opt out of public schools and transfer their tax dollars to licensed private schools and to industry-run vocational programs;

7 — allowing people to opt out of the social security system for privately administered, government-approved insurance schemes;

8 — separating defense procurement from defense policy, as the British and Canadians do, merging it with civilian procurement now performed by the General Services Administration and spinning the combined organization off under independent management.

MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

Such measures, properly designed, can noticeably improve present arrangements; they can reduce administrative costs, increase freedom of choice, and provide better distribution of government services at the point of delivery. Devices which work, which are progressive, and which are improvements over existing programs ought to be good politics because they are good for the country. But many of them will be politically impossible unless government is first able to drill into the heads of its citizens a new conception of its role in society that goes counter to the interventionist prejudices accumulated over the past generation.

For the past four decades American government has responded to problems by setting up massive bureaucracies to wage war on them. The depression gave rise to public works and welfare bureaucracies, the Axis powers to a great military bureaucracy, the veterans' problem to a veterans' bureaucracy, international communism to dirty-trick and cable-writing bureaucracies, and poverty to new social-service bureaucracies. These responses have taught many Americans to expect that, whenever they read about a "problem" at home or abroad, government will hire people or pass laws to "solve" it directly; that, whenever they hear about a "gap" or "shortage," government will spend money to fill it. This approach is now inadequate, not only because of the sickness of government, but because of fundamental changes in our society.

Some of Drucker's other chapters suggest what these social changes are. He speaks of the emergence of "knowledge workers" as a new social class in American society — a class at once proletarian and aristocratic. The knowledge worker has a liberal education and an "aristocratic" sense of public obligation. Yet he increasingly finds himself on an assembly-line producing specialized paperwork — in a law firm, a university, a consulting firm, a publishing house, a research lab, or a financial or advertising institution.

CLASSY ASSEMBLY LINE

What happens when such a man, reared to participate in public affairs and convinced of his elite status, becomes a "proletarian" in a large organization? He may do one of three things: rebel, attach importance to his work, or find satisfaction in his hobbies. For American society to remain vigorous, politically responsive, and productive, a preponderant number of knowledge workers will have to remain work-oriented and, of those who prefer their hobbies to their employment, a substantial number will have to choose politics and social service as their avocations.

This cannot happen if meaningful labor is concentrated in the federal government. For Washington simply does not have enough niches to go around. The New Deal braintrusters were doubtless a talented lot, but in the coming generation men of equal ability will be found on the school boards of most medium-sized American cities and in quite a few corporations and universities. It will be wasteful to deny such men the chance to assume a consequential public role. And dangerous besides.

America is not, after all, a land of gaping savages content to remain passive while the President and his minions from Harvard or Texas or the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency pronounce on world events. A primitive country with a scarcity of educated talent does well to hoard this precious resource in the capital city and to centralize control in the hands of a small governing class. But a society which rears a mass aristocracy — a whole class of citizens with the leisure, the education, the desire to participate in public affairs — will be compelled to adopt a decentralizing and libertarian strategy of government or to suffer from apathy and unrest.

A BROADER SCOPE

Thus, Drucker's tenth chapter should be seen as more than a businessman's view of government. Reprivatization is a technique for distributing more evenly the chance to do work in the public interest. As such, it is a response to the growth in America of a new class that demands a public role. Reprivatization en-

ables the knowledge worker to do work that he believes to be in the public interest while he is employed by a non-governmental institution. It goes hand in hand with a reinvigoration of local government, which enables him to assume important public responsibilities outside his workplace. Drucker's notion is good for the country, then, not only because it can generate programs that are apt to be managerially more efficient, but also because it follows a decentralizing strategy of government that is now better suited to American society than the statist liberalism of the New Deal.

Yet the bureaucratic state which the New Deal built will be with us for some time, and it is the third virtue of Drucker's idea that it provides workable guidelines for redirecting this bureaucracy. Reprivatization is, after all, not entirely new. American government already makes use of non-governmental institutions on a massive scale, and its experience with them suggests what should be done — and what should not be done — to make Drucker's concept work.

What should not be done is exemplified in a recent \$80 million federal contract to a leading institution for a five-year program. "I have read through the grant application — all 1,100 pages of it," Drucker told me in an interview. "It specifies in minute detail all the conceivable legal provisions: the exact numbers of people who will be employed, the number of minority-group employees, the kinds of facilities to be used, the kinds of accounting and administrative procedures. But not one page of the 1,100 says: 'These are our objectives, these are the results that the American people can expect from their \$80 million in five years.' Certainly there are general aims, but nothing that can be cited five years from now to learn whether the grant — and the program behind it — was a success or a failure."

WE'VE BEEN TOOK

Nor is this an isolated case. There are innumerable instances in which the federal government has been conned by its contractors — and innumerable others in which it has no way of knowing whether it has been conned or not.

If government agencies are not under budgetary and Congressional pressure to orient themselves toward results, we should not expect them to get results from their contractors. Bureaucrats who are preoccupied with rules are likely to impose this preoccupation on the private sector. Contracting out under these conditions will not reduce the sickness of government but merely spread the contagion, as it has already done among defense contractors who have fed too long at the federal trough. Drucker does not recognize this explicitly in his book, but he shows himself to be amply aware of it in conversation. He has a rich reper-

toire of examples to show how government can actually reduce the ability of non-governmental bodies to accomplish socially desirable goals.

A SLOW SPIN OFF

Drucker himself, then, does not see reprivatization as something to be quickly imposed. Whether it involves contracting out government activities or spinning them off totally (as in the case of the proposed post-office reform or the recent reprivatization of Fanny Mae), it demands much more disciplined managerial and evaluative judgments within government and probably new institutions to make this discipline stick. It demands much closer study by government of the incentives of outside bodies; it demands much franker relations between government and its contractors and grant swingers than our present procedures require; and, most important, reprivatization demands a change in the kinds of things most Americans expect from the federal government — an emphasis on government as a systems manager for society rather than a solver of problems by direct bureaucratic means.

Given all these preconditions for success, reprivatization cannot in itself be Mr. Nixon's answer. But it can be part of his answer. I have remarked earlier that Drucker's is but one of a family of decentralizing ideas that includes federalism, voluntarism, self-help, local initiative, and increased reliance on market mechanisms. Taken together, these ideas provide the basis for a new definition of the role of government, which will accept an "activist" responsibility to further the public interest but will reject many interventionist prejudices of the New Deal. A decentralizing and libertarian strategy of government — if adapted to the present needs of the country, to the rhetoric of the Republican Party, and to the realities of managing a cumbersome bureaucracy — provides perhaps Mr. Nixon's only chance to be creative in domestic policy, at a time when he will become increasingly identified with the overseas commitments and economic malaise left him by his predecessor.

A COHERENT PROGRAM

Mr. Nixon's major proposals for domestic reform — revenue-sharing with the states, movement toward a negative income tax in welfare, commitment to a volunteer army, emphasis on administrative decentralization of federal programs, and the plan for a reprivatization of the post office — do in fact tend toward a less statist, less interventionist federal government. But since he has entered office, the President has not found the symbolic means to present such reforms as part of a coherent program.

To give him his due, new symbols to dramatize a decentralizing strategy are hard to invent, for the public and the press share a statist view of executive leadership. They want to see their President swooping down and visibly changing things. For them it is not enough that federal programs may deliver results. The results must appear to be directly caused by the conscious exercise of moral leadership. For them there must be a crisis to which the President can respond, a problem on which he can wage war, or a gap which the President can fill with money and rhetoric.

The bureaucracy, with its bias against taking risks, has no reason to discourage these popular attitudes. So long as the success of programs is measured by the money spent or by the moral intensity of the President's commitment, the blame for failure will always lie with Congress, for appropriating insufficient funds, or with the President, for exercising insufficient leadership. There is thus a nice fit between the bureaucratic desire to shift blame and the popular need to find heroes.

Such attitudes need to be changed. If Mr. Nixon does not try to change them, he will go down in domestic affairs as a much more clever, much less handsome and unsavory replica of Warren G. Harding. If, on the other hand, he is able to dramatize new concepts of government, he can expect a better verdict, perhaps a comparison to the progressive Toryism of Benjamin Disraeli.

THEY HATED F.D.R.

What a pity that the major opposition to new concepts is likely to come from the very liberal intelligentsia whose ultimate interests are best served by a decentralizing and libertarian strategy of government. Already one sees that reforms like tax-sharing with the states, a volunteer army, the replacement of social security, and a voucher plan for education must overcome enormous initial hostility from the intellectual leadership of the "new class" — the academicians and journalists who cling to a statist ideology that has served to justify their own privileged access to the national stage. This kind of dogmatic opposition to reforms in one's own interests is not, of course, an unprecedented irony. The New Deal, though it saved America for capitalism, was unable to win acceptance in much of the business community.

THE AUTHOR

Josiah Lee Auspitz is president of the Ripon Society. His article is abridged and adapted from a piece appearing in the November, 1969 issue of The Washington Monthly. It is reprinted by special arrangement.

Election Analysis

PITTSBURGH: Caught in a Machine / anti-machine squeeze

John Tabor showed Pittsburgh what a modern political campaign looks like. Then Pittsburgh showed John Tabor what a two-to-one Democratic landslide looks like.

March fifth of this year saw Republican John Tabor on the steps of Pittsburgh's City Hall promising the city its first real fight for Mayor after thirty-four years of the Democrats in unchallenged control. For moderate Republican County Chairman Elsie Hillman it was a long-awaited day. She had hoped for years to get away from the usual sacrificial lamb candidate and find a man of Tabor's caliber to make the run.

Tabor's promise was not just in the spoken words of that day; it was in his prodigious achievements in three state cabinet posts and once as a successful statewide candidate (Secretary of Internal Af-

fairs in 1966). It was in his intellect and energy (Yale Phi Beta Kappa with a Harvard Law School degree). It was in the hundreds of people of all backgrounds who had been impressed by his ability to be a straight shooter while still handling the role of public servant or candidate. (Congressman John Lindsay was another such person. He campaigned for Tabor during the latter's run for City Council in 1961).

A POLITICAL "HAK" There was promise of success from another quarter


as well. The Democratic machine of the late David Lawrence showed every sign of decay. The unpopular tenure of Mayor Joseph Barr was ending and the Democratic Policy Committee had picked, behind closed doors, Judge Harry A. Kramer to carry on the orderly succession. But handsome young City Councilman Peter F. Flaherty ("PETE!" said the billboards) disagreed with this method and he was "taking his case to people" in the May 20 primary.

The Democratic party elders were confident of winning and the Republicans were just as confident that such a victory would yield a bumper crop of alienated Democratic voters and volunteers. By the time primary day came Flaherty's apparently genuine independence was catching on while Kramer shouted about safe streets. When the day came for the machine to steamroll, the cigars and the spotted ties and the white socks gave evidence at every polling place that the 6000 city payrollers had been given the day off. But the college students — many of whom had "come clean for Gene" last year — and the young housewives were there too. When it was all over 25 of the city's 32 wards had gone for Flaherty. He had risked everything by bolting the supposedly powerful organization; now he was riding high.

Tabor's candidacy was ratified that day by Republicans over token opposition. Five especially able City Council candidates were also picked; this was the "Tabor Team."

MY OWN BUTTONS What happened in the next 22 weeks could fill a book.

"PETE!" continued to fight hard against the very thing he had shown to be a paper tiger (now the message was "REPETE!"). He added the "Republican Big Money Machine" to what he and the people had to contend with as they fought together to restore democracy to Pittsburgh's neighborhoods. Peace feelers from the regular Democrats were publicly rebuffed; Flaherty even discarded buttons made for him by the organization.



Meanwhile Tabor made ready to fulfill his promise of a vigorous and issue-centered campaign. As with most other challenges in his life, he welcomed the Flaherty candidacy. Al Abrahams, one of the growing groups of Republican professionals, had been retained as campaign manager just before the primary. He put together a young and energetic staff which was to turn in one of the most proficient performances in the city's history.

Tabor's ad agency began immediately on both a "recognition" campaign ("Tabor. The Doer.") and a "selling" campaign to follow it for the last 6 weeks before the election.

Many insiders felt that Tabor could take the city, even with Flaherty and not with the "Ins" as his opponent. For one thing, the many resources of Tabor as a politician could and would be brought to bear. As the *Post-Gazette* was to say later, editorially, "An endorsement by the Carpenters District Council 'was largely based on the availability, fairness and integrity compiled by Mr. Tabor during his service as Pennsylvania's Secretary of Labor and Industry.'" Tabor could also point to his ethnic background; he was a Czech, whose father and Thomas Masaryk worked together in Pittsburgh to form the Czechoslovakian Republic.

In addition, there was ample financial backing available. This was clearly something new in Pittsburgh Republican politics.

GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM

There was further ground for optimism in the several interpretations to which the Flaherty victory was subject. Possibly the voters intended to clean house completely: to vote first for the out-Democrat, and finish the job in November by choosing the out-party. In this vein it was even hinted by Tabor that the whole caper could be a Barr set-up. "For a change that's no small change, vote for Tabor. The Doer." Another theory that buoyed the Tabor forces was the feeling that Flaherty was a rather shallow man and that a hard-hitting campaign could rattle him by October. A pretty wife and an Ultra-Brite smile might not suffice if he could be shown not to have done his homework. In fact, to the despair of many of his liberal supporters, Flaherty's answer to every question was "to include the people in government." It's not so much that this is the wrong approach — indeed, the opposite is true — but it was the only approach Flaherty would make.

The Tabor strategy, given all of the above, was: (1) to tie Flaherty back to the regulars at City Hall; (2) to give a vision of real change and genuinely new direction; (3) to capitalize on Flaherty's refusal to talk issues and also on his lack of past achievement; (4) to tap the ethnic vote, which is supposedly key in Pittsburgh; (5) to break into the labor vote, through the use of Tabor's connections and reputation as past State Secretary of Labor and Industry and through intense

personal campaigning in blue-collar areas; (6) to cut into the nearly solid Democratic black vote through de-registration of "phantom" voters in some wards, and through a handling of the law and order issue that emphasized equality of treatment and protection, and a crackdown on narcotics.

The results on November 4th (118,600 to 62,500) indicate that none of these strategy goals was reached. The figures by ward tend to confirm this nil-results observation. In view of the sophisticated campaign techniques used — in scheduling, direct mail, issue research, voting analysis, extensive data processing and advertising — and in view of the quality of the candidate, and in view of the excellent cooperation from the GOP organization, especially Mrs. Hillman, how was it possible to lose so miserably?

DOWN TO DEFEAT

An easy answer is that Pittsburgh is a Democratic city (about 3½ to 1 by registration) and that when two attractive candidates both took the right side of the Big Issue — change — then the Democrat was inevitably going to win. This seems pretty close to the truth, but it is important to add several other comments.

Flaherty ran a very fine campaign. It was a campaign that started early, found the important issue, and clung to that issue. It was free of major blunders. Flaherty retained his credibility as an "out" in the face of every conceivable argument made by Tabor against it. Some persons, including Flaherty himself, go so far as to say that the election was over on May 20.

But the real cause of Flaherty's achievement was the support he got from the regulars, in spite of his independence and even in spite of his actually insulting them on occasion. Both he and they seemed to know by instinct how to play the campaign on two levels. Public coolness was very convincing, but when it really came time to decide, the organization was quite clear on what to do. Tabor was saying, "Let's turn this town around," and his manner and his record showed he really meant it. Flaherty said he was for change, too, but he was unquestionably a safer man for City Hall than any Republican could ever be. As a result the regulars manned the polls in impressive force on November 4.

With the machine quietly behind him, Flaherty held onto the ethnic, labor and black vote. He won much of the undecided vote which the polls showed existed right into the last week of the campaign. At the same time, his disavowal of the Democratic regulars kept dissident Democrats out of the Tabor camp. Tabor found himself caught in a squeeze.

The question for the future is whether Flaherty can hold together these disparate elements. His administration is unlikely to please both the "outs" and the Democratic regulars. By the time the next election rolls around the people of Pittsburgh may be ready for a John Tabor.

—JAMES SEIF

CLEVELAND: Running against a moderate black Democrat

In 1967, the Republican organization in Cleveland ran a young, liberal lawyer for the office of Mayor, fully expecting his opponent to be the honest but lackluster incumbent, Ralph Locher. But in the September Democratic primary, much to Seth C. Taft's surprise, Locher lost the nomination to Carl B. Stokes. The Republican plan to criticize and belittle the meager accomplishments of the Locher administration, and to substitute Taft's well thought out and explicit ideas, had to be drastically altered. Suddenly, the GOP's prime problem was how to maintain a liberal image while campaigning against an articulate, moderate Negro. Seth Taft, refusing to employ the racism that might have won him the election, lost to Stokes by 1600 votes out of more than a quarter million.

Two years later, the Republican organization turned to its most prominent elected official — in fact the only Republican to be elected to county-wide office, while also carrying the city of Cleveland, in more than 30 years, Ralph J. Perk, a former five-term City Councilman, who had been an excellent administrator in his post as County Auditor. He had reduced his department's budget, and introduced the use of computers; he also eliminated the patronage that had flourished under his Democratic predecessor, and put the office on a business basis.

PERK'S CLEAN GOVERNMENT In his 1966 race for Auditor, Perk, who is of Czechoslovakian descent, ran well among the white ethnic groups that make up nearly 40 percent of the Cleveland vote. But he also polled about 40 percent of the black vote, largely because of the nearly unanimous support he received from business, labor, and the newspapers (including the Republican-oriented *Call and Post*, the largest Negro paper), and because of the widespread charges of corruption against the Democratic incumbent. Perk's "clean government" campaign cut across all normal voting patterns.

Perk in 1969 faced an incumbent Negro Mayor with certain obvious credits and liabilities. In 1967, a year after the Hough riots, there had been concern that failure to elect a Negro Mayor would bring renewed disturbances in Cleveland. Also, Cleveland had a chance to achieve a "first" by electing a black man, a symbolic event much anticipated by many Americans. By 1969, the glow had worn off. In the aftermath of the assassination of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. in April, 1968, many cities experienced riots, directed against both white property and the agencies of social control. Thanks in good part to Mayor Stokes, Cleveland avoided any violent confrontation.

In August, however, Fred "Ahmed" Evans and a group of black militants were involved in a gun battle with police that resulted in the death of three policemen and seven other people. (Evans has since been sentenced to death.) Stokes was heatedly criticized for his handling of the incident, and for letting the situation develop.

The fact that Stokes and Evans were linked in any way goes back to another 1968 event — Stokes' introduction of Cleveland: Now, a fund-raising campaign which, with the help of many of the city's top business leaders, solicited contributions to be used along with state and federal grants for the rebuilding of Hough and the development of Cleveland. Ahmed Evans had received a grant from Cleveland: Now. This revelation not only caused an almost total cut-off of contributions, but it also brought into question the allocations of the collected funds. Was Stokes trying to "buy" the militants? What other radical groups had received funding?

ILLEGAL GAINS? The range of accusations soon widened. There were rumors that Stokes had siphoned off money from Cleveland: Now and from certain land deals, and that he had greatly profited from his term in office. How else, some asked, could he afford to buy his mother a house in fashionable Shaker Heights, move to the very boundary of Shaker himself, and send his children to private schools? Rumor had it that Philip N. Dearborn, Stokes' Finance Director, had been suspended from his last two positions after the State Auditor investigated his books. Literature appeared claiming that Stokes had once been arrested by a state liquor inspector for brutally assaulting a client who was overdue on Stokes' kickback money.

It was in this atmosphere that the 1969 campaign began. In March, in an attempt to avoid a racially charged election and to give Stokes two more years to carry out his program, some of the same business leaders who first planned and coordinated Cleveland: Now staged a \$100-a-plate testimonial dinner for the Mayor. The event, presided over by Robert W. Morse, president of Case Western Reserve University, raised more than \$250,000 for Stokes' campaign.

Rather than be intimidated by this showing, Robert E. Hughes and Saul G. Stillman, Cuyahoga County Republican Co-Chairmen, put on their own dinner — a 98¢-a-plate affair, to show they were "for the people." They outdrew the Stokes dinner 2½ to 1 (losing money in the process), and put the pressure on Ralph Perk to announce for Mayor.

A SURE LOSER Then the question of strategy arose. Stokes was being challenged in the October primary by a white Democrat — Robert J. Kelly, a former city Service Director and a strong law and order candidate. Since it appeared from the start that Kelly had little chance, Perk directed his campaign at Stokes; and rather than echoing Kelly, Perk contrasted what he called the Mayor's unfulfilled promises with the smooth, unexciting efficiency of the County Auditor's office.

At no time did Perk permit racism in his campaign; he went so far as to promise a public reprimand to any of his supporters found appealing to racial prejudices. It was sufficient, he felt, to contrast the economy of the Auditor's office with the "payroll padding, high salaries and inefficient methods" of the Mayor. Perk accused the administration of increasing spending by 50 percent, and of running up a deficit that would reach \$6 million by 1970, despite enactment of a 1 percent city income tax. In a city fearful over rising taxes — and with little enough to show for them in way of increased services or reduced crime (the crime rate actually had risen more than 20 percent under the Stokes regime) — this was sound, albeit uninspired campaigning.

In October, Stokes defeated Kelly by a 3-to-2 margin in the Democratic primary, and the GOP strategy crystallized. Some viewed the vote as a show of faith in the Mayor, since the balloting was heavy in the Negro wards of the East Side, and very light and slightly more pro-Stokes than before on the mostly-white West Side. But the total vote in the primary was far below that of two years earlier, and many interpreted this as meaning the voters had stayed at home and would come out for Perk in November. Working on this assumption, Perk took aim after the primary at the non-blacklash middle-class white who voted for Stokes in 1967 but now could be convinced that the Mayor's record didn't justify further trust.

NO NEED TO ASK Since Robert Kelly came out for Perk, and the police were in near revolt against Stokes and his Safety Director, there was little question as to where any law and order vote would go, whether Perk openly sought it or not. The ethnic vote on the East Side would be heavier for Perk than it had been for Taft; meanwhile, Negro registration on the East Side had dropped 10,000 between 1967 and 1969, while the white vote on the West Side had actually increased. So Perk's task was to attack Stokes' performance in office, and to make sure his message was heard on the West Side.

The Mayor also realized that the West Side held the key. The final two weeks of his campaign saw a daily crusade across the Cuyahoga River and down into the flats and beyond. One week before the election, the City Council passed Stokes' air pollution

code, one of the strongest in the country. It was aimed squarely at the giant steel mills on the West Side, and at the votes in the surrounding communities. Late in the campaign, the Stokes administration also made its long-delayed appointments to the police force — another move that was not lost on the white voters of the West Side. Immediately after the appointments, however, Police Chief Patrick L. Gerity objected to 60 of the 280 new officers as unqualified or substandard. This resurrected the spectre of a major Stokes embarrassment — the grand jury indictments of two of his appointees to the Civil Service Board, which tests and selects police officers.

STOKING THE FIRES Perk began to criticize the other rifts among members of the Stokes camp, which occurred within a few months of Stokes' election in 1967; the feud between Stokes and City Council President James V. Stanton; and the resignation of Charles V. Carr, another Negro, as Majority Leader of the council. These splits showed that the Mayor was unable to unite the city, Perk argued.

But the emphasis of the Perk campaign continued to be on economic issues. Perk hit hard at the seeming slowness of the Mayor in formulating plans to make use of the \$100 million bond issue passed in 1968 for water pollution control; the probability that Stokes would soon ask the Council to raise the city income tax to 1½ percent; the question of the \$100,000 that the administration had yet to place in a trust fund to activate police and fireman's benefits; and the five-year contract for transportation head Robert T. Pollock at \$42,500 per year, \$2500 more than the Governor's salary.

On election day, the polls showed Stokes with a 1½ percent lead. Only a large turnout, especially on the West Side, could win for Perk. Early lines at the polling places indicated a large vote; but slightly before noon it began to rain, and the weather remained uncooperative for the rest of the day. Whether it was this or the relatively dull campaign that kept down the vote is uncertain, but the results are clear. Where 258,000 people had voted in 1967, only 239,000 went to the polls in 1969. The decline was more than 12,000 in predominantly black areas, and more than 3,000 on the West Side. The Stokes vote on the West Side was 150 votes higher than in 1967, while Perk's vote was some 3,500 below Seth Taft's showing. Perk lost by 3,500 votes.

VERY HIGHLY POLARIZED The election demonstrates, if demonstrations were needed, that Cleveland is still highly polarized. Stokes did receive about 21 percent of the white West Side vote; but this included areas with increased concentrations of Puerto Ricans, and represented only a token rise over his 20 percent showing in 1967. Despite the

fact that 400 off-duty police and firemen went into black polling places, fully armed, to weed out illegal voters (ostensibly because they were interested in a proposition to lower the voting age), Perk received no votes at all in several precincts and no more than 4 percent in any Negro area.

Perhaps Perk could have brought out more white voters with a racial appeal; but such an appeal might also have engendered a larger black turnout. So the question remains: how to defeat a Negro candidate without resorting to racism? It is a question that will continue to haunt the GOP in future elections, not only in Cleveland but in all metropolitan areas with large black populations. Taft was unable to solve the problem in 1967 by running as a liberal, and Perk couldn't do it by campaigning on ethnic and economic issues and on the Stokes record.

FIND YOUR OWN Two steps suggest themselves, however, to Republicans who feel uneasy in a race against a black Democrat. First, it is not enough to call yourself a liberal, or to refrain from racial appeals; future candidates must go into Negro wards and meet their black opponents (and black voters) face to face. Both Taft and Perk did this to some extent, but Stokes was far more aggressive in carrying the battle into white meeting places and living rooms. A second step, more obvious but also more difficult, is for the Republicans in urban centers to find their own black candidates.

—HENRY PELL JUNOD

Political notes - from page 4

- William Woods, elected Magistrate, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
- Howard Woods, elected Constable, New Haven, Connecticut.
- Elijah Wheeler, elected Commissioner in East Cleveland, Ohio.
- Glen Williams, elected City Comptroller, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

OHIO: from our mailbag

Imagine, for a moment, that you are a revolutionary: You are clever, cool-headed . . . You leave the violence to others . . . Your method is to utilize propaganda — cleverly working within the framework of a "respectable," "non-political" student organization — to fan discontent and sedition. You are a leader in the National Student Association (NSA). The above is no exaggeration, My Fellow American. A small clique of revolutionaries — a mere 6% of the NSA delegates — continue, year after year, to ram through some of the most radical resolutions ever approved by

- an American student organization. For example, on:
- **BLACK POWER**: NSA has called for the liberation of all black people in America "by any means necessary."
 - **VIETNAM**: NSA has condemned "The U.S. aggression against the people of Vietnam."
 - **HUAC**: NSA has strongly urged that it be abolished.
 - **RED CHINA**: NSA has asked the U.S. to propose the admission of Red China to the UN.

The above is an excerpt from a letter sent out by Representative Donald E. "Buz" Lukens (R.-Ohio). Lukens is cooperating with STOP-NSA, an ad hoc committee of national Young Americans for Freedom. STOP-NSA is lobbying with student leaders, urging them to cut all ties with NSA. Enclosed with the letter is a "Citizen Ballot" urging Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to instigate an investigation of NSA "leftist" activities. If you would like to contribute to this worthy effort, write STOP-NSA, 4723 Richmond Avenue, Houston, Texas 77027. (You will be joining 36 Representatives besides Lukens and four Senators: Murphy, Holland, Goldwater and Thurmond.)

GEORGIA: three - ring circus

If the last few months of 1969 are any indication, Georgia's 1970 gubernatorial election ought to be a genuine three-ring circus. Former Governor Carl Sanders and former State Senator Jimmy Carter, both Democrats, have been running hard since mid-year; and on the Republican side, State Senator Oliver Bateman of Macon and Comptroller General James Bentley are taking extensive soundings.

Others have been busy as well. Governor Lester Maddox was rebuffed by a state court in December when he sought to have the ban against a second term declared unconstitutional, but he plans to appeal. Former Republican Congressman Howard "Bo" Callaway — who actually out-pollled Maddox in 1966, but lost in the state legislature after neither won a majority — has denied any interest in another governor's race, but many believe that he could be talked into it.

Even Congressman Fletcher Thompson, a once-moderate Republican, who has recently begun waging a one-man crusade against school integration, has been mentioned as a gubernatorial possibility. Sooner or later, Thompson probably faces a challenge in his Atlanta-area district from State Representative Julian Bond. However, Thompson may have won a temporary reprieve in December, when a federal court ruled that the state's House districts, which now permit Atlanta to be represented by two Republican congressmen, do not have to be redrawn before the 1970 elections.

Meanwhile, many of the state's black leaders, fearful of another choice between the frying pan and the fire, have already held the first state-wide convention of their Georgia Voters League and nominated Albany civil rights attorney C. B. King for Governor.

14a ELIOT STREET

John R. Price, Jr., one of Ripon's founders and former Chairman of the National Governing Board, has been named by President Nixon to succeed Daniel Patrick Moynihan as Executive Secretary of the Urban Affairs Council. John has also been named Executive Secretary of the new Rural Affairs Council, on which the President will put increasing emphasis in the coming months. He served for the past 11 months as legal counsel to the Urban Affairs Council.

John, a former Rhodes Scholar and a graduate of Grinnell College, Iowa, and the Harvard Law School, worked on the Rockefeller and Nixon campaigns in 1968. He was a vice president of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Development Corporation and president of the New York chapter of the Ripon Society.

- Price's successor as Ripon's Chairman of the Board and president of the New York chapter has also entered the Administration. **Peter J. Wallison** has taken leave from his Ripon posts to become a senior staff analyst on the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization. The National Executive Committee of the Ripon Society has named **J. Eugene Marans** to succeed Wallison. Marans, former chairman of the finance committee, is a New York attorney. He has specialized in civil rights research for Ripon and has reported regularly in the FORUM on Republican Governors' Conferences, of which he has attended more than any Republican Governor save Nelson Rockefeller.

- Elevated to a new post at the same time as John Price, **Stephen Hess**, a sometime contributor to the FORUM, was appointed chairman of the White House Conference on Children and Youth. Hess addressed Ripon meetings last year when he was a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics.

- President Nixon invited several members of the Ripon Society and Senator Howard Baker, Jr. to discuss with him "Bring Us Together," the Ripon Report to the President on Youth, which appeared in the September issue of the Ripon FORUM.

- **Bruce K. Chapman**, senior author of the youth report and for the past year Ripon's National Director, will resume his role as a free-lance ombudsman in the Pacific Northwest. He will remain as a member of the National Governing Board, and will be active in coordinating Ripon groups on the West Coast.

- Ripon FORUM contributor **William D. Phelan** wrote an article on the Southern strategy in last month's Nation. Entitled "Nixon's 'Southern' Strategy — The Authoritarian Prescription," the piece accuses Phillips of promoting social conflict, unwittingly aiding the destruction of civil liberties and the formation of an authoritarian, militaristic political coalition.

- Ripon member **Dean Lapham** was finance chairman for Ray Pleasant's successful city council race in Bloomington, Minnesota (see political notes).

- Writer **Jack Newfield** spoke to the New York chapter on November 20. In response to a question about how liberal Republicans can best influence national policy, Newfield said that they should begin by quitting

the Administration. On November 25, the chapter sponsored a debate on abortion law reform. **Assemblyman John T. Gallagher** (R.-Queens) argued the negative and **Dr. Robert Hull** of the Columbia University School of Medicine (Physicians and Surgeons) the positive. The debate was moderated by New York chapter member **Dr. Lester Grant**.

- **Christopher W. Beal's** review of "One Man Alone" will appear in a coming issue of Saturday Review (probably late December). The book, by longtime conservative and National Review associate **Ralph de Toledano**, is a study of **Richard Milhous Nixon**. Chris and his wife Jan also recently devised "The Lindsay Game — Three Roads to the Presidency" which appeared along with an article by **Joseph Kraft** in New York Magazine. An expanded version of this whimsical/serious look into the political crystal ball will appear in the FORUM.

- FORUM readers will be pleased to note the success of **Jean Mayer**, the President's Special Consultant on Nutrition. He ran the White House Conference on Food and Nutrition, which avoided the confrontation politics that have been common in discussions of hunger and yet committed the Administration to an eradication of hunger in America. Mayer's first comprehensive expression of nutrition policies for the new Administration appeared in the November 1968, issue of the Ripon FORUM. The extraordinary favorable national publicity for Mayer's conference has made him a rumored possibility to run against Senator **Edward M. Kennedy** (D.-Mass.) in 1970.

- Several Ripon members from the San Francisco area attended the Governor's Conference on the Changing Environment on November 17 and 18 in Los Angeles. They report that the conference, sponsored by California Gov. **Ronald Reagan**, was noteworthy in several respects. Two officers from the Nixon Administration, Messrs. **Hickel** and **Ehrlichman**, the Governor, and numerous Republican officeholders led the chorus of voices calling for correction of past environmental damage and constant monitoring of all future government and private decision-making for known and foreseeable environmental impact.

The one thousand five hundred persons attending the convention, including conservationists, businessmen, scientists, politicians, teachers, government administrators, and students, were divided into groups to study four categories: air, water, land and the urban society.

The conference members discussed hopes of building on the Reagan Administration's conservation record in protecting the Redwoods National Park, creating the Bi-State Council to plan for Lake Tahoe, and of blocking the Dos Rios Dam project.

The conference strongly supported the completion of Point Reyes National Park, and supported legislation to save San Francisco Bay.

CORRECTION

The box endorsing Rep. Paul McCloskey on page 11 of the November FORUM was unintentionally left unlabeled. Omitted was a headline reading "PAID POLITICAL ANNOUNCEMENT."

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