


RIPON FORUM

MARCH, 1970

VOL. VI, No. 3

ONE DOLLAR

The Cost of Bureaucracy



How the State Dept. Watched Biafra Starve

With a Reply by the Undersecretary of State on p. 28

ALSO: LOTTMAN ON WINTHROP ROCKEFELLER and RIPON RATINGS

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THE STATE DEPT. AND BIAFRA

Another chapter in the sad story of Biafra and the Bureaucrats. **Christopher W. Beal** tells how the State Department helped starve Biafra, while disobeying President Nixon and alienating the Nigerian government. Immediately after Biafra's military collapse, the Department had a comprehensive and scientific medical report on the impending famine, but failed to disseminate it properly. President Nixon should be warned that an unwatched bureaucracy is more apt to produce delay and negligence than results. —8

RIPON RATINGS

Unwilling to leave the congressional rating business to the ADA or the ACA, Ripon has inaugurated its own system. **Richard A. Zimmer** has compiled a list of 29 Senate roll-call votes that illustrate what Ripon sees as the issues of the 1970s, transcending the liberal/conservative dichotomy and the fading polemics of the New Deal. Though selected votes and percentages don't tell the whole story, why not check up on your Senators? Complete chart attached. —13

PROFILE: WINTHROP ROCKEFELLER

The state that voted for Wallace for President and Fulbright for Senator, also reelected Rockefeller as Governor in 1968. This "other Rockefeller," the "former New York playboy," adopted Arkansas with a vengeance and became her first GOP Governor since Reconstruction — and did it running as a moderate against Faubus-surrogate Jim Johnson. Perhaps because he supported Nelson over Nixon, Winthrop Rockefeller has been ignored by his Party. Rather, as one of its most remarkable and dedicated Southern representatives, he should serve as a model of how the GOP can win in the South. —20

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The FORUM would like to announce the appointment of a new editor. He is Howard L. Reiter, who recently completed editing the book-length version of the Ripon Report on Youth, to be published this fall by Hawthorn Books. Howard, whose writing has appeared in the FORUM, The Nation, and The Lessons of Victory, is pursuing a doctorate in political science at Harvard.

Michael S. Lottman will continue to contribute to the FORUM as consulting editor.

Ripon's new research director is David M. White, former staff assistant to the Wednesday Group in the House of Representatives. David will operate Ripon's 1970 research consortium for candidates.

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In publishing this magazine the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for fresh ideas, well-researched proposals and for a spirit of criticism, innovation, and independent thinking within the Republican Party. Articles do not necessarily represent the opinion of the National Governing Board or the Editorial Board of the Ripon Society, unless they are explicitly so labeled.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES are \$10 a year, \$5 for students, service-men, and for Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteers. Overseas air mail, \$10 extra. Advertising rates on request.

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EDITORIAL

Biafra: The Cost of Bureaucracy

When President Nixon took office last year, the Ripon Society in a widely reprinted article expected a "sharp reappraisal" of American policy toward Biafra. ("Biafra and the Bureaucrats," Ripon FORUM, February 1969). Probably the President's most eloquent campaign statement of 1968 had been made on behalf of Biafran relief, and his remarks in private indicated sympathy for Biafran self-determination.

Barely a month after his inauguration, the President put his money where his mouth had been. He appointed a Special Coordinator for Nigerian Relief, and relief flights broke the Nigerian blockade in increasing numbers with American diplomatic and financial support. Though the relief flights delivered only half as much food as was needed, they took the edge off Biafra's famine.

Then in June the State Department reversed the President's policy. The Nigerians scored a lucky hit on a Red Cross plane, and the Red Cross stopped its half of the clandestine airlift. All of a sudden, the State Department stopped talking about expanding the airlift in defiance of the Nigerian blockade and started talking about the need for an "agreement" between Biafra and Nigeria on conditions for a formal, daylight airlift.

The shift in U.S. policy was dramatized on July 2, when Secretary Rogers publicly deplored Nigeria's use of starvation as a weapon of war at a news conference in the middle of the day and then issued a revised policy statement that night which asserted that relief shipments could increase only if blockader and victim came to an agreement. Not surprisingly, they didn't come to an agreement, and in January of this year Biafra was finally starved into submission.

As soon as General Ojukwu fled and the Biafran defeat was obvious, the President reasserted himself. He publicly offered more food, eight huge C-130 cargo planes to carry it, and \$10 million to pay for a massive relief operation under the Nigerian Government. At the same time, the President

publicly ordered the State Department to transmit to the Nigerian Government all information it had gathered on Biafran starvation in the course of the war.

For six weeks, the Department had had a thorough medical survey establishing that Biafra was suffering from the worst famine, from the highest rate of edema in the population, ever recorded in history. Conducted by Dr. Karl A. Western, of the U.S. Public Health Service, this survey was based on almost three thousand medical examinations, a larger sample than those normally used by the Harris and Gallup Polls. Dr. Western reported that over two million Biafrans were suffering seriously from the Nigerian blockade, with lower weights than was normal for their heights and ages. One million had also sunk into edema, the last stage of starvation when the body is consuming its own cells for lack of food.

The State Department started to implement the President's instructions by sending copies of the Western Report to Lagos, but for over a week it did not follow through and insist that the U.S. Embassy there transmit it. On January 14, Dr. Western made the first calculation of post-war food needs anyone had made on the basis of his medical survey; the State Department refused to cable that estimate for presentation in Lagos. To the concerned American public, the State Department repeated Nigeria's overoptimistic claims at face value and put out gross exaggerations of the amounts of food actually being distributed in conquered Biafra.

The State Department now protests that it did not want to annoy General Gowon and damage relations with Nigeria. But its insubordinate delay and negligence produced a much worse effect. When the American Embassy in Lagos finally presented the true picture, Gowon had adopted a hard-line position against foreign assistance. From his viewpoint, it was arbitrary, practically a betrayal, for the State Department to accept his ignorant claims for two

weeks and then to come in suddenly and to tell him that a massive effort was needed immediately, on the basis of a study that U.S. officials had had for several months. For lack of the courage to annoy Gowon with the truth early in the crisis, the State Department enraged him two weeks later. Now, of course, American relations with Nigeria are bad and thousands of Biafrans are dying unnecessary deaths.

Experienced hands have told us that this sort of thing goes on all the time — that the State Department, like other bureaucracies, sabotages new Presidential policies as a matter of reflex. After all, why should a President, whose only qualification is that he has been elected by the people, be allowed to countermand the considered opinions of determined and confident career officials?

Well, the frustration of President Nixon's wishes and even of his explicit instructions may not seem unusual for experts on bureaucracy. But to everyone else, this frustration should be horrifying. The cost of bureaucracy in American policy toward Biafra is documented in the pages that follow. That cost is simply summarized: a million preventable deaths in 1969, several hundred thousand already in 1970, and more still dying.

Those who would tolerate insubordinate delays from the State Department are giving it the benefit of a double standard. In this same crisis the President ordered the Air Force to deliver equipment to Nigeria. The Nigerians refused to accept planes bearing American military insignia. American generals initially refused to fly under these conditions but were overruled by Secretary Laird. Had they succeeded in delaying execution of the President's orders, as the State Department did, public outcry would have been terrific — and rightly so.

The Air Force generals were not trying to starve Biafra. They were not frustrating the President's instructions just to cause trouble. They simply had other considerations in mind which they did not want to abandon even in the face of a clear Presidential intent. If Secretary Laird had allowed the generals to persist, even for an extra day, the Air Force would have been widely accused of "dereliction of duty" and "insubordination."

It is time to apply the same standards to the State Department for not reacting to the highest edema rate ever recorded, not executing a Presidential instruction, and doing what it should have done only under steady prodding and face-to-face briefings initiated by outsiders.

Moreover, the Biafran case raises a serious question of whether President Nixon's changes in foreign policy in other areas will be carried out or will be sabotaged on the operating level. The President deserves praise for his reversal of American escalation in Vietnam and for his Guam doctrine

of non-involvement in future such conflicts. But words, even Presidential words, may not be enough. In Southeast Asia, as in the Biafran case, the President is faced with a determined group of officials who have built their careers on past mistakes.

If the President wants control over his foreign policy bureaucracy, then he cannot ignore the State Department's thwarting of his Biafra policy. The more its insubordinate delay becomes public in the aftermath of Biafra's famine, the more it challenges the President's authority on foreign policy generally. If the Congress and the American public want our foreign policy to be ultimately responsible to the people, then they should insist that the bureaucrats be made truly responsible to the President.

The Ripon Society urges an immediate formal inquiry. We propose the following questions, not as the only ones, but as the initial ones which we believe must be answered after a full reading of "How the State Department Watched Biafra Starve:"

1. How long should it take the State Department to adopt publicly a political formula agreed upon in a National Security Council decision and announced in a Presidential statement? Isn't the eight and a half months between the President's statement of February 22, 1969, and Secretary Rogers' of November 12 a good bit too long?

2. Who really decided in June and July to back away from the Administration's initial policy of increasing humanitarian relief to Biafra, even if it involved violating the Nigerian blockade? What accounts for Secretary Rogers' reversal in a matter of hours on July 2? Did the President change his mind about aiding Biafra just when the situation had stabilized? Did the State Department make a deal with the British? Or was it just the lower levels of the bureaucracy refusing to believe in Nigeria's oft-repeated policy of starvation and falsely insisting that an agreement could be negotiated between perpetrator and victim?

3. Are not the oil companies well enough represented by their lobbyists in Washington? Is it really necessary for Ambassadors appointed to represent the United States in oil-rich countries — say, Trueheart in Nigeria — to go to corporate headquarters in company airplanes, to be entertained at company expense, and to be briefed on company problems and policies? Did Ambassador Trueheart's pilgrimage to the oil companies represent established procedure?

4. Why was the highest edema rate ever on record not labelled as urgent information to be acted on? Is this culpable negligence on the part of specific officials or simply another instance of scientists and policy-makers failing to communicate? If a technical consultant feels that the basic implications of his work are misunderstood, should he

have recourse to the President's Science Adviser?

5. Why did the State Department decide to reassure the press, Congress, and the American public on the relief situation, when information already available showed that at least a million Biafrans were in the last stage of starvation and when incoming cables reported evidence of a substantial reduction rather than an increase in the amount of food delivered?

6. Shouldn't the State Department be subjected to the same standards of obedience and promptness required of the Defense Department? If so, should charges for insubordination and dereliction of duty be weighed within the State Department, by a White House investigator or by a Congressional committee?

* * *

The American people are now accustomed to the notion that certain kinds of corruption are endemic to business. Where profit can be discerned as a motive, we are alert to detect abuses. We now assail businessmen for pollution that is the inadver-

tant result of their search for profit. But in bureaucracy, where only pride and promotion count, we Americans have been slow to draw similar lessons and to take corrective action. In the Biafran case, where the costs, however inadvertent, have been so high, the President cannot ignore the frustration of his policy.

At the Bay of Pigs, the bureaucracy ignored contrary political evidence and cut President Kennedy's decision down merely to deciding when to invade. In the midst of the Cuban missile crisis, it emerged that the State Department had ignored repeated Presidential instructions to withdraw obsolete and vulnerable missiles from Turkey and Italy.

In Vietnam, the bureaucracy trapped President Johnson, closing off one escape route after another, until, as someone then close to the President says, he had to go down the chute.

President Nixon has long specialized in foreign affairs, but it remains an open question whether he will control America's foreign-policy machinery, or whether it will control him.

Civil Rights Reversals?

February has always been a time for Republicans to reaffirm their commitment to the ideals of Abraham Lincoln, the ideals of human equality and national unity. In the February of 1970, a Republican national administration assumed the posture of seeking a kind of unity based on a sacrifice of the struggle for equality.

Foremost was the Administration's fight on behalf of the President's third Supreme Court nominee, G. Harrold Carswell, a man whose distant past is blemished and whose recent past is undistinguished. In passing over Southern judges of the stature of Frank M. Johnson, Jr., William E. Miller, and John Minor Wisdom, the President chose to reward country-club conservatism rather than judicial courage or intellectual breadth.

Some have said, in defense of Judge Carswell, that his 1948 speech is insufficient grounds for opposing his elevation to the high court; perhaps. The Ripon Society chooses to associate itself with the words of Prof. William Van Alstyne of the Duke University Law School, who said, "There is in candor nothing in the quality of the nominee's work to warrant any expectation whatever that he could serve with distinction on the Supreme Court of the United States." (Prof. Van Alstyne endorsed Judge Haynsworth last fall.)

Last month also saw the Administration moving to the right on school desegregation by seeming

to acquiesce in Southern (Democratic) Congressmen's obstructionist tactics, such as the Stennis and Whitten amendments. If the Administration's stand in relation to the Stennis amendment was intended to dramatize the national scope of the race problem, and if it were prepared to launch a vigorous nationwide attack on racism, this would be laudable. The South has, it is true, too long been the whipping-post for the nation's sins. But in light of the abrupt dismissal of HEW's civil rights director, Leon E. Panetta, it is more likely that the Administration is willing to sacrifice the rights of black Americans on the altar of political expediency.

As if to add insult to injury, Vice-President Agnew attacked collegiate open-admissions programs, accusing them of fostering racial quotas. Apparently he does not realize that open-admissions does not set quotas, but is really the absence of any quota — an antidote to quotas of the past. If the Vice-President cannot discern the difference between open-admissions and quotas, perhaps he should not comment on the issue at all.

Over a century ago, Abraham Lincoln said, "We cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves." The same is true of the Ninety-first Congress and the Nixon Administration; and if the trend against human rights continues, history will pass stern judgment indeed.

Political Notes

THE NATION: on the horizon

Rumors are growing that the Justice Department will prosecute Humphrey fund-raisers for violations of the various federal corrupt practices acts. These prosecutions, the feeling is, will hamper the Humphrey for Senate campaign . . . White House sources believe that Lyndon Johnson is seriously considering a campaign for Speaker of the House. That office is created by the Constitution and, many lawyers believe, can be filled even by someone not elected to Congress . . . Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan are not recruiting law clerks for next year. Many take this as a sign that they will retire. . . .

Most of the rumors now circulating that New York Mayor John V. Lindsay is about to join the Democratic party cited as a major source Peter Tufo, the Lindsay aide who handled his unsuccessful campaign for vice president at the San Diego meeting of the National League of Cities. Tufo has since resigned from Lindsay's staff. This should be a sign that Lindsay is by no means as enthusiastic as has been reported about leaving the GOP. Also, Lindsay has told former Congressional colleagues that they shouldn't believe everything they read in the papers. . . . The Budget Bureau civil servants describe the last budget season as one of the roughest in history in terms of relations with the agencies and with the White House staff. A few more bumpy months will be in store for the Bureau. Internal reforms and changes in personnel are on the way.

INDIANA: the first leg

"But in the winter of our discontent, a new leader has come forward who testifies that words come easily, that deeds are paid for dearly. . . . He has promised to lead America out of a dark night of the spirit. . . . Those critics who have stated with finality that Richard Nixon does not care about cities, and has adopted priorities which slight or demean cities — these critics may well continue . . . for a while because winter continues in many cities. . . . But I know that times have changed. . . ."

With these words, Indianapolis Mayor Richard G. Lugar greeted President Nixon, six cabinet members, and a whole bevy of White House staff members and

attempted to set the tone for what the White House billed as an unprecedented effort to bring the Urban Affairs Council and the Nixon administration to the people.

What actually took place was a two-hour meeting of the Urban Affairs Council with nine mayors representing cities with populations falling roughly between 100,000 and one million — signaling a recognition on the part of the Nixon administration that the problems of the largest cities in the nation differ qualitatively and quantitatively from those which fall into the above category.

Speculation has been that the Nixon administration had come to the conclusion that basing a national policy on either the problems of the largest or the middle cities would produce jealousy and dysfunctional results in the cities of the other group; that what was needed was an "intensive care" approach for the largest cities coupled with a national urban policy geared to the needs of the middle cities.

At any rate, Nixon's "meet the people" policy was probably an overstatement, but the visit of the "Flying White House" to Indianapolis on the first leg of a two-day tour represented a departure from the conventional.

As Mayor Jack Maltester of San Leandro, California, President of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, put it in a briefing of the press, "This represents the first time the Urban Affairs Council has met outside of Washington. The comments of the participating Mayors were more open than they would have been if we had been summoned to Washington to participate in the same sort of conference."

Lugar echoed Maltester, noting that it was perhaps a more comfortable meeting for the President and the nine Mayors than it was for the participating Cabinet members; the latter came under considerable fire for the unresponsiveness of regional offices of the departments.

In an earlier briefing held about an hour after the conference started, Dr. Daniel P. Moynihan outlined a ten-point urban policy which he had originally published in the Fall 1969 issue of *The Public Interest*.

Although Press Secretary Ron Ziegler stopped short of saying that Nixon has endorsed the proposal, it was apparent from the fact that the program was released that Nixon concurs in large part with the proposal. If so, this would represent the first such effort for a national urban policy.

Among the points enunciated by Moynihan:

★ Poverty and social isolation in central cities are the most serious problems of the American city today.

★ At least part of the relative ineffectiveness of efforts of urban government derives from the fragmented and obsolescent structure of urban government itself.

(This may in part explain why Nixon chose Indianapolis as the site for his conference; under Lugar's guidance, Indianapolis recently shifted to a unified govern-

ment system, making it the largest city in the nation to do so. Moreover, the city gave Nixon his greatest plurality of any major metropolitan area in the 1968 election, and his respect for Lugar is well-known).

★ A primary object of federal urban policy must be to restore fiscal vitality to urban governments. (Moynihan stressed the need for revenue sharing, a proposal first made by the Ripon Society in 1965, as an alternative to many of the hundreds of categorical grant programs).

★ The federal government must assert a specific interest in the movement of persons displaced by technology or driven by poverty to the cities, and in the movement from cities to suburbia.

★ The federal government must provide more and better information concerning urban affairs, and should sponsor extensive and sustained research into urban problems.

It remains, of course, to be seen how the Nixon administration will move to implement the proposals enunciated by Moynihan, but the fact that the Administration has recognized the need for such a policy is a hopeful sign.

During the press briefing, Lugar observed that much of the discussion (which he characterized as "very frank and extended") revolved around lack of coordination among cabinet-level departments on the regional office level. Lugar repeated a plea made by Nixon's Model Cities Advisory Task Force, of which he is a member, for a relaxation of regulations and control on the federal level and a concomitant increase in the power of local citizens and officials to decide in tandem what direction the local programs should take.

The rest of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of federal law enforcement programs, with Attorney General John Mitchell reportedly taking the lead. Several Indianapolis citizens, including the chief of police, had been asked to make a presentation on citizen involvement in law enforcement, but time limitations prevented them from doing so.

The Nixon entourage included Secretaries Stans, Romney, Volpe, Hickel, and Hardin; Attorney General Mitchell; OEO director Rumsfeld; Presidential Counselor Moynihan; Presidential Assistant John Ehrlichman; Science Advisor Lee DuBridge; Assistant AG Charles Rogovin; Assistant HUD Secretary Floyd Hyde; and Urban Affairs Council Secretary John Price. Secretaries Finch and Shultz were forced to cancel the trip at the last minute due to press of Washington duties.

In addition to Lugar and Maltester, mayoral participants included Frank Curran of San Diego, President of the National League of Cities; Donald Enoch of Wichita, Kansas; Lawrence Kramer of Paterson, N.J.; George Seibels of Birmingham, Alabama; Christian Sonneveldt of Grand Rapids, Michigan; (Miss) Antonina Ucello of Hartford, Connecticut; and Walter Washing-

ton of the District of Columbia. (A tenth mayor, Peter Domenici of Albuquerque, did not attend; he was in the hospital with acute appendicitis.)

A glance at the biographical sketches prepared for the press by Lugar's staff is instructive; most of the mayors are "self-made men," though several were elected as nonpartisans, the bulk of the group is Republican. In short, they were mayors with whom Nixon might overall feel more comfortable than their more flamboyant and dynamic bigger-city counterparts.

ILLINOIS: the second leg

President Nixon's early February stop-over in Chicago to attend what has been called a "major anti-pollution conference" also was scheduled as a boost for Senator Ralph T. Smith's (R-Ill.) March 17 primary battle against North Shore challenger William H. Rentschler. Nixon, whose office had previously indicated that he would remain impartial in the Illinois GOP primary was quoted by the *Chicago Sun-Times* as telling Senator Smith, "of course we want you to win." (Feb. 6) The President then pointed out that he could not and would not officially endorse Smith for fear of being trapped into similar commitments in other states and other races. However, according to some observers the fact that the Nixon party included the four Republican Governors of the states bordering Lake Michigan, high administration aides and Charles Percy, Senior Senator of Illinois, plainly signaled that the White House wants Smith nominated. Smith has also been "endorsed" by the GOP State Central Committee (the 24 committeemen are individually supporting Smith although there has been no formal announcement) and a pamphlet featuring a seal showing a drawing of an elephant and the words "official Republican endorsement" has been circulated on behalf of the Senator.

Smith, whose practical and technical qualifications for service on Capitol Hill are impressive (Speaker of the Illinois House 1967 and 1969), remains somewhat suspect ideologically in liberal and progressive circles. The Senator's well-known public switch from "nay" to "yea" on the Haynsworth confirmation vote and his pronounced conservatism on "law and order" have not won him many independents or marginal Democrats. There also seems to be some truth in Rentschler's charge that Smith has deliberately built up his image as an anti-pollution warrior in order to jump on the national environmental publicity bandwagon rather than out of genuine interest in the problem. Undoubtedly, Smith is sincere; he recently introduced legislation in the Senate

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How the State Dept. Watched Biafra Starve

A mass famine, which could have been averted, is now cutting down the weakened people of Biafra.

As these lines are written, the best estimate is that some five hundred thousand Biafrans have died of starvation since the end of the war. Probably a million more are suffering from edema, the last stage of starvation when the body starts to swell up with excess water and begins to consume its own cells instead of food. Biafran refugees have given up on getting fed by the Nigerian Red Cross. Biafrans instead have set off from their camps in different directions in a vain search for food. As these refugees exhaust their last internal reserves, they are dropping dead by the thousands.

Foreign journalists who were allowed to tour Biafra a few days after the surrender generally regarded the ability of many Biafrans to walk along the main roads as reassuring sign that there would be no mass famine. A typical report was filed by Bridget Bloom, of the London *Financial Times*, on January 21: "There is no evidence of mass starvation in the former Biafran enclave, but many of the people here are very hungry." In fact, a starving person can seem to act and talk normally until the end by breaking down the less essential cells of his body to support his vital organs. Then, when he runs out of expendable cells, the starving person can simply drop dead in mid-stride. Untrained observers often make the mistake of underestimating the magnitude of an impending famine. Initial reports from Ireland after the failure of the potato crop in 1845 claimed that people were getting on well without much food. Early reports from the Western Netherlands in 1945 were also deceptively reassuring. Untrained visitors to Biafra have also made the same mistake, whether Red Cross, UNICEF, Nigerian Army, or British Army observers. The only evaluations which can be taken seriously are those based on medical examinations of the hungry population.

HIGHEST IN HISTORY

Already in the latter half of October, the Biafran population was suffering from the highest rate of famine edema ever recorded in history. Almost one third (31.4%) of the population had edema, a proportion three times higher than in the worst sieges of World War II, those of Leningrad and of the Western Netherlands.

This shocking information was obtained in a thorough survey by Dr. Karl A. Western, who examined almost three thousand Biafrans in thirty-six sep-

arate villages and refugee camps. Dr. Western is employed at the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, part of the U.S. Public Health Service, and his findings have been endorsed by a colleague who frequently consults with the Nigerian Health Ministry and by his superior, the Director of the Communicable Disease Center.

DR. WESTERN'S MEMO

Right after Biafran resistance collapsed, on Wednesday, January 14, Dr. Western sent to the White House and relevant agencies of the State Department a one-page memo on the current relief problem. In the memo and in private conversation, the doctor emphasized that social disruption would prevent efficient use of local food still growing in the fields and would also prevent relief workers from ensuring that those most in need would get fed first. Dr. Western stressed that a massive operation would have to be started, distributing enough food for everyone in order to make sure that the weakest would benefit. He maintained that the population with famine edema would have increased substantially over one million and that unless 10,500 tons of food arrived each week for several months, those suffering from edema would start dying wholesale in two weeks.

The startling suddenness of Biafra's collapse only reinforced Western's assessment. Whereas Biafran units in the past had often been forced back by superior Nigerian firepower, they had always regrouped and dug in again a few miles away. But in early January, the whole Biafran southern front simply disintegrated. There was practically no fall-back resistance. It should have been obvious that the Biafrans were exhausted. For confirmation of this fact, the Nigerians had only to listen to captured Biafran officers, many of whom were old schoolmates. The Biafrans reported that their front-line troops had been getting only a few "meals" a week, at most a few spoons of cassava a day. And if the Biafran army had run that low on food for weeks in a row, it followed that the civilian population could not have been much better off. But in their dispatches to Lagos, Nigerian officers insisted that their victory was due to their own improved efforts rather than accept the evidence before them that the Biafrans had finally succumbed to the harshest food blockade in modern times.

All that was necessary to contain the starvation problem was for the victorious Nigerians to sponsor a

revival and an expansion of the relief system which had operated in Biafra during the war. Some 250 tons of food had been brought into Uli airstrip each night by the church flights and then had been distributed by a fleet of one hundred trucks to 3194 feeding centers throughout the enclave. This system had passed the incoming food quickly from airplane to mouth in less than 48 hours. The revival of this system could have been accomplished quickly. The airplanes could have flown in as before, with Nigerian Air Force officers riding on board and with Nigerian Red Cross officials supervising the distribution of the food on the ground.

The very opposite occurred. According to a myriad of reports from foreign newsmen and other independent observers (including U.S.), Federal troops commandeered the trucks and all other Biafran transport, including ambulances, for carrying off their loot. Uli was not reopened. As Biafra's lifeline to the outside world, it had become a symbol of Biafran resistance and had taken on almost mystical importance to the Nigerians. "We must forget about Uli," Gen. Gowon declared in Lagos, when asked why he wasn't using the field for relief.

Even as these lines are written, five weeks after the last flight, the Nigerians have delivered less food than the wartime airlift would have. So, contrary to the "quick kill" advocates, who claimed that a defeat of the Biafran army would be followed by an increase in relief shipments which could save the general population, the end of the war has brought a savage reduction of food distribution.

The tragedy is that Gowon probably did not have the remotest notion of the starvation problem. Like most Nigerians, Gowon regarded the starvation as the invention of Biafran propaganda. From what his officers had told him, he surely viewed Nigeria's military victory as the long-delayed result of superior firepower and of a recent improvement in Nigerian tactics. Obviously, Gowon would not be able to anticipate a famine on his own, and neither his own officers nor his British and Soviet backers were going to tell him. Nor, as it turned out, were the Americans.

NIXON TRIES TO SAVE BIAFRANS

President Nixon initially tried to avert a mass famine in Biafra. On January 11, within hours of General Ojukwu's departure and Biafra's military collapse, the President offered tons of additional food to the Nigerian Government, eight huge C-130 cargo planes to carry the food, and \$10 million to pay for a massive relief operation into conquered Biafra. At the same time, the President ordered the State Department to transmit to the Nigerian Government all information it had collected on Biafran starvation during American-supported relief operations.

Unfortunately, the President then turned respon-

sibility for Biafran relief over to the State Department. And therein lies a tale, the final chapter of the long, sad story of Biafra and the Bureaucrats — a chapter still to be closed.

The President and his staff had long been interested in obtaining accurate information on the extent of starvation in Biafra. Eleven months before, when announcing the appointment of C. Clyde Ferguson to the newly created post of Special Coordinator for Nigerian Relief, the President had cited "widely conflicting information on future food requirements within the Biafran-controlled area" and had called for "a comprehensive, internationally conducted survey of food needs in that area."

Some eight months later, Ferguson, since raised to Ambassadorial rank, sent Dr. Western into Biafra to make just such a survey. But Dr. Western's work, submitted first in preliminary form on November 17 and then in final form on November 26, was not effectively disseminated.

BRIEFINGS LACK URGENCY

By November 26, Ferguson had in hand the scientific survey the President wanted. Dr. Western reported that almost one third of the Biafran population had edema, the highest proportion ever recorded anywhere and that two thirds had "lost a dangerous amount of weight." Ferguson did not suppress this report — but he didn't disseminate it properly, either. Instead of immediately and urgently communicating the report to other officials in the Executive Branch, not the least the President, Ferguson gave his most extensive briefings to relief officials and congressmen on December 15, 17 and 22. But even those briefings did not present the edema rate as unprecedented and asserted estimates of food needs lower or equal to previous estimates.

Of greatest importance to Ferguson's task of promoting relief into Biafra were other offices in the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) working under the President. Yet on November 26 Ferguson presented his sole briefing to the Nigeria Desk and a member of the NSC staff, and this briefing covered only Dr. Western's preliminary conclusions of November 17. A short memo, similar to that distributed among the relief organizations, was sent to the Under Secretary of State on December 9 and was forwarded in a routine manner to Henry Kissinger, the President's National Security Adviser, a day later.

But this memo, transmitted in a routine fashion, to very busy men, made no effort to interpret the high edema rate; and it failed to propose for their approval any actions in response to the high edema rate, even the obvious ones of raising the estimate of food required and of increasing the clandestine airlift. From subsequent events, it is doubtful that even the staffs,

let alone the high officials, saw or read the memo. Even if they had read it, they would not have got from it the full implications of Dr. Western's study. A month later, when Biafran resistance collapsed, Dr. Western's medical survey and its ominous implications were not the basis of American relief strategy.

After the Nigerian victory, the State Department could have informed General Gowon of the magnitude of Biafran starvation simply by obeying President Nixon's clear instructions to transmit all information on conditions in Biafra. The best opportunity to present the Western Report to Gowon was probably on January 13, 14 or 15, when Assistant Secretary Newsom was in Lagos.

INSUBORDINATE DELAY

On January 13, Newsom transmitted personally to Gowon expressions of President Nixon's concern and the President's offers of food, planes, and money. But Newsom did not transmit the most important information within the State Department — the high edema rate in Dr. Western's report — in his meeting with Gowon and in his meetings with other Nigerian officials. Newsom did not push the cautious Gowon into immediate acceptance of American airplanes, for fear of a hostile response. But that same fear should not have stopped the State Department from informing Gowon of the magnitude of the problem.

A prompt, quiet, high-level presentation would have effectively warned the Nigerians of the impending famine, because, unlike the exaggerated guesses of the relief organizations, the Western Report's statistics were based on qualified medical examinations of almost three thousand people.

This sort of initiative was clearly what the President wanted when he promised General Gowon in a letter delivered by Newsom on January 13 that all information would be transmitted. The State Department began to execute the President's instructions by sending six copies of the Western Report to the U.S. Embassy in Lagos on January 14, and those copies arrived two days later. But the Department did not formally instruct the Embassy, urge it, or remind it to present a copy to the Nigerians in any way until January 20 — ten days after the last regular relief flight.

Similarly, Ambassador Ferguson gave a copy of the Western Report to the Nigerian Ambassador in Geneva on January 14. But Ferguson knew from personal experience that this Nigerian official is a hard-liner against relief and made no effort to ensure that he transmit the Western Report to his superior in Lagos — or to ensure that anyone else did, either.

By January 15, the State Department also had in hand the first estimate anyone had made of post-war food needs, Dr. Western's one-page memo of January 14. But the State Department did not even cable this

memo, its arguments, or its estimates to the U.S. Embassy in Lagos. What it did cable were pleas to obtain Nigerian acceptance of American supplies, but without calling attention to the best evidence of the need.

A great opportunity was lost, not only because Assistant Secretary Newsom left Lagos on January 15, but also because Nigerian opinion started to shift. In the first few days of the Biafran collapse, Gowon patterned his behavior on that of Lincoln and Grant and displayed considerable magnanimity. Lincoln and Grant had not faced the danger of mass starvation of their defeated former enemies in 1865, and Gowon had no disinterested evidence to warn of a famine. Before Gowon or other Nigerian officials understood the need, the foreign relief agencies which fled Biafra during the collapse out of fear of Nigerian massacres began demanding to be readmitted. At the same time, it emerged in the London *Times* that the British Army had prepared a major relief operation which included the dispatch of two battalions of infantry. Not surprisingly, the Nigerians decided to reject such colonialist offers, and a general ban was put on the entry of foreign military aircraft into Nigerian airspace.

Fortunately, at this point an outside development intruded on the State Department's lethargy. On January 19, Dr. Western arrived in Washington with two respected colleagues for a conference at the National Institute of Health. The doctors had prepared a briefing, with visual materials, and made themselves available to the relevant officials. So, on the afternoon of January 19, Western briefed Ambassador Ferguson, Assistant Secretary Newsom, and the Director of the Nigeria Desk, William H. Brubeck.

STATE RESPONDS AT LAST

In his briefing, Dr. Western presented a second estimate of food needs in conquered Biafra. Like his first estimate, it called for the distribution of about 10,000 tons of food a week, or 40,000 tons a month, for several months.

Though the President's instruction had had only a partial impact, and Dr. Western's first estimate of post-war needs had not even been cabled to Lagos, the face-to-face briefing session began to move the State Department. Within a day, the Department cabled the second estimate to Lagos and recommended that the Embassy lay it physically before the Nigerian Ministry of Health. This was not a strong instruction, but it was progress.

An AID doctor in Lagos apparently mentioned Dr. Western's second high estimate to a Nigerian official on the night of the 21st. But the doctor could not have tried very hard to persuade him of that estimate's validity. Two days later, the doctor refused to argue in favor of that estimate when asked to do so. A week later, it became apparent that the doctor, not

a nutritionist, had never really understood Dr. Western's finding of a high edema rate; and only repeated meetings with nutritionists convinced him subsequently of the need for 40,000 tons of food per month.

But even after the briefing from Dr. Western, the Department held back. On the 21st, in his prepared testimony to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee, Ferguson said that "Our first task, certainly, and that of the Nigerians, is to determine accurately the extent of the relief problem. . . ." Apparently without blushing at the contradiction, Ferguson then summarized Dr. Western's work, which had made unnecessary the kind of inquiry which Ferguson had just described as "our first task."

On the 20th, between receiving Dr. Western's briefing and testifying before Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee, Ferguson and Newsom had reviewed the situation with President Nixon, Secretary Rogers, and Henry Kissinger. One can only guess what they told the President. For over a year, he had been concerned about starvation in Biafra. He had asked for scientific information on that starvation, and for eight weeks the documentation had been available to establish that Biafra was suffering from the highest edema rate ever recorded. But the President had not been told. Judging from the testimony Ferguson and Newsom gave Senator Kennedy's subcommittee the next day, after they briefed the President, it seems unlikely that they gave him a clear picture of the problem even on January 20.

On the evening of the 21st, the State Department was finally shaken. One of Ferguson's staff, Colonel A. Eugene Dewey, had been allowed into Biafra with a survey team at the same time as foreign journalists were admitted. While the Department did not respond when the journalists reported indiscipline in the Nigerian army and hopeless confusion in the Nigerian Red Cross, it did jump when Col. Dewey cabled a detailed confirmation of these developments.

Finally, Ambassador Ferguson conveyed the Western Report in a manner intelligible to everyone. On the morning of the 23rd, he said on nationwide TV that the famine in Biafra was three times greater than those during the blockades of Leningrad and the Western Netherlands in World War II.

Stronger cables were sent to the Embassy in Lagos. On the 23rd, a copy of the Western Report was presented to the Medical Adviser to the Nigerian Government.

DR. FOEGE'S VISIT

But the Embassy did not really believe in Biafra's starvation until a previously scheduled visit by a knowledgeable doctor intruded on its peace and quiet. On January 25, Dr. William Foegen, one of Dr. Western's colleagues at the State Department briefings of

the previous week, arrived in Lagos to work on the Smallpox Eradication Program.

In a few hours, Dr. Foegen convinced Ambassador Trueheart that more should be done to communicate the problem to the Nigerians. So on the 26th, finally convinced that the President had had the right idea two weeks before, the U.S. Embassy presented the Western Report and a high estimate of postwar food needs to a Nigerian cabinet minister.

While the delayed presentation was better than none, its political and human cost was high. Gowon, with the agreement of the British and American Embassies in Lagos, had already concluded that mass starvation would not occur. Suddenly, the Americans stopped agreeing and came in with a medical report they had never acted on and insisted that Gowon and the whole Nigerian Government turn around on the spot and start an emergency airlift. For lack of the courage to annoy Gowon with the truth early in the crisis, the State Department enraged him two weeks later.

It should already be clear from the foregoing sequence of events that the State Department did not set out to starve Biafra. But its refusal to respond to Dr. Western's first estimate of postwar food needs and its negligence in not gaining swift execution of the President's order threw away the best chance of averting that starvation.

The depths of the State Department's negligence can best be expressed in terms of a comparison with the Defense Department's execution of the President's instructions. Defense did not need special reminders to put the eight C-130 cargo planes on 24-hour alert. When the Nigerians refused entry to military aircraft, the U.S. Air Force responded by refusing to remove the military insignia from its planes. Like the U.S. Embassy in Lagos, the Air Force had no direct knowledge of Biafra's starvation. Nor was it trying to starve Biafra. It simply had other considerations in mind which led it to resist the President's clear intent. But Secretary Laird instantly overrode the Air Force and ordered the military insignia to be painted over.

WHERE IS THE OUTCRY?

If the delivery of hospital equipment had been delayed by the refusal of the Air Force to meet Nigerian conditions of entry, the outcry in the United States would have been enormous, and rightly so. But where is the criticism of the State Department for bouncing along from day to day, not reacting to the highest edema rate ever recorded, not executing a Presidential instruction, and doing what it should have done only under steady prodding and face-to-face briefings?

After having engaged in obstructionist behavior, the State Department has tried to cover it up. The only admission of any kind which has emerged five weeks

after the President's original instruction was made by Assistant Secretary Newsom.

In a carefully worded statement to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Refugees on January 21, Newsom declared:

"Some projections of the incidence of malnutrition among the population suggest a major problem. We have asked our people in Lagos to lay the results of such surveys before Nigerian authorities while at the same time indicating our readiness to be of help."

An alert reader of Newsom's statement could tell that the Western Report had not yet been presented, for compliance would have been reported if it was available.

Yet, aside from Assistant Secretary Newsom's implicit admission, the State Department has been assiduous in claiming that the President's instructions were followed and all relief information was given the Nigerian Government. Such claims were made in a "Status Report" of January 28, a "background" briefing on January 22 and the regular midday briefing on January 20.

The mechanism responsible for making State Department policy on the relief emergency was a special working group on Nigeria, chaired by the Under Secretary, Elliot L. Richardson. Responsibility for coordinating information and drafting speeches and cables was given to William Brubeck, the head of the Nigeria Desk.

"PRETTY GOOD SHAPE"

From their first statements after the war's end, Richardson and Brubeck ignored the Western Report and implied that the post-collapse relief problem could be met by the Nigerians alone with a little logistical backup. In the first State Department press conference on the subject, reporters were told by Brubeck: "I think the relief situation is in pretty good shape." The Department was "not complacent," he said, but he rebutted concerned journalists by remarking that "A third of those people (one million) are not going to die in the next forty-eight hours."

On January 15, Richardson spoke confidently in a prepared speech of "ample stocks of food to meet the needs of the people in the Biafran area for thirty days or more within relatively quick reach of the area." The implication was overwhelming that any government could manage the distribution problem. This despite the fact that Richardson already had in hand the information from which Ambassador Ferguson later announced that saving Biafra would entail "about three times as large a feeding problem as ever faced by any government anywhere." Richardson refused to meet with Dr. Western to discuss his findings. And for two weeks he refused to discuss the problem face to face with qualified doctors or relief officials who had just escaped from the fallen enclave and who were now

on hand in Washington, ready and eager to volunteer eyewitness testimony on the magnitude of the problem to anyone who would listen.

Just as the State Department tried to reassure itself and the American public about the magnitude of the problem, it also sought false reassurance in grossly misleading descriptions of Nigeria's initially negligible solution. On the 14th, the Department's press spokesman asserted that there was a "large relief program under way." A week later, the spokesman described distribution as "inadequate so far." "But," he claimed, "a good deal has moved, according to our people." By this date — the 21st — only 140 tons of food had been confirmed as actually delivered in the former enclave, barely half of a nightly delivery before Biafra's defeat. Two days later, trying to exaggerate Nigeria's use of two C-97 cargo planes indirectly supplied by the United States, the press spokesman claimed that they "have begun operating in the internal relief airlift." In fact, these aircraft were only testing the runways at Engugu and Port Harcourt by flying in empty, and the initial finding was that the runways could not support C-97's coming in fully loaded. So the operational situation then was that there would be no internal airlift at all — because the Nigerians refused to use Uli, the best airstrip for hundreds of miles and the center of communications in the conquered enclave.

NIXON'S SYMPATHIES

The State Department's negligence and insubordinate delay since Biafra's military defeat should astonish and outrage most Americans. But for the State Department, its recent behavior is merely a continuation of past efforts to frustrate President Nixon's sympathy for the Biafrans. In the first six months of his Administration, the Department implemented Nixon's relief policy but rejected his new formula on a political settlement. In the last half of 1969, the Department managed to reverse the President's relief policy and, having abandoned the notion of opposing the Nigerians even on the use of starvation as a weapon of war, American diplomats began a belated and futile effort to promote negotiations.

Before his election, there were indications that Nixon privately shared the French view that the Biafrans had demonstrated their right to self-determination. In a strong campaign speech, Nixon had criticized the Nigerians for trying "to pursue total and unconditional victory." At the same time, he accepted as valid "the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities and genocide."

"But genocide is what is taking place right now — and starvation is the grim reaper," he added. "This is not the time to stand on ceremony or to 'go through channels' or to observe the diplomatic niceties."

The tragedy of Biafra — and of Nixon's cam-

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Toward a New Congressional Rating System

The Ripon Society does not put much stock in rating Congressional voting records. Neither virtue nor wisdom nor courage can be adequately scored on a percentage basis. For this reason, we have previously refrained from issuing annual ratings on the model of Americans for Democratic Action, Americans for Constitutional Action, the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education, etc.

However, the very fact that the Congressional rating business has been left to such groups has helped to engender a pervasive misapprehension that the only basic cleavage in Congress is the one that preoccupies most of the raters, namely, the split between conservatives and liberals. The only fundamental dispute among the raters is which side of the cleavage is the wrong one.

The trouble with this view is that the liberal-conservative dichotomy still is defined in terms of the fading problems of the New Deal: Higher appropriations versus budget cuts, internationalism versus isolationism, the welfare state versus *laissez faire*. We believe that such battle lines are becoming increasingly irrelevant now that both parties are irreversibly committed to an affirmative social and economic role for government at home and abroad and now the major beneficiaries of the welfare state include well-to-do skilled unionists, corporate farmers and Medicare doctors.

BEYOND THE NEW DEAL Discussion in the FORUM in coming months will seek to elucidate cleavages more relevant to the realities of the Seventies. We have sought, as a first pass at the problem, to find Senate roll call votes that reflect new cleavages. We have taken for our norm values that are central to the traditions (and the rhetoric) of the Republican Party:

Devolution of power from the Executive to Congress, to local institutions (both private and public) and to individual citizens;

Relying on, and expanding the benefits of, the free market system in national and international dealings, and, conversely, refusing to subsidize inefficient enterprise;

A national economic policy aimed at correcting basic imbalances rather than treating symptoms through direct controls;

A foreign policy which shuns national proselytizing and provocation in favor of private and multi-lateral initiatives; and

Substantive legal and economic equality of the races.

If the ranking of these Senators bears some resem-

blance to the more conventional liberal/conservative rankings it is because the Senate did not have the opportunity to vote on several post-New Deal issues such as draft reform, Nixon's Family Security proposals, federal tax sharing with the states or fundamental questions involving civil liberties. Moreover, many votes were influenced by ideological battle lines of previous decades, especially when they dealt with Democratic-patented programs such as OEO.

CONVERGING WITH NIXON Although a number of conventional liberal Democrats score high on the Ripon scale, it should be noted that several Republicans score higher than any Democrat and that many Democrats score lower than any Republican. A Senator could be assured of a minimum score of 34% if he merely supported the announced position of the President on the ten votes on which the President's announced view coincided with ours. (Our positions diverged from Nixon's four times).

These ratings should not be judged as our selection of the "best" and "worst" Senators, if for no other reason than that the crucial business of Congress usually takes place off the floor. Furthermore, our giving equal weight to announced positions and votes actually cast enhances the score of, for instance, those labor-backed Senators who found it convenient merely to announce their support for the Philadelphia Plan, rather than to see to it in person that it passed.

Even every *viva voce* pro-Ripon vote cannot be valued equally. Surely the votes of Republican Senators who defied threats of political opposition and economic reprisal to oppose the Haynsworth nomination are more laudable than the identically-weighted vote of Senator Dodd, who cravenly waited outside the Senate chamber until the issue was decided before casting his vote.

KEY

- V Record vote for Ripon position
 - X Record vote against Ripon position
 - O Absent, general pair, present, or did not announce or answer Congressional Quarterly poll
 - (V) Paired for, announced for or CQ poll for Ripon position
 - (X) Paired against, announced against or CQ poll against Ripon position
 - * Ripon position the same as announced position of the President
 - # Ripon position in opposition to announced position of President
-

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KEY TO ROLL CALL VOTE NUMBERS

Devolution of Power

50. National Commitments Resolution affirming the role of Congress with respect to making military and economic commitments to other nations. (Vote yea)

70. Schweiker amendment providing for periodic audit reports to Congress on major defense contracts by the General Accounting Office. (Vote yea)

79. Fulbright amendment to cut funds for Pentagon research by \$45,000,000 and to bar military funding of non-military research projects. (Vote yea)

121. Murphy amendment, providing that state governors could effectively veto local OEO legal assistance programs. (Vote nay)

128. Ellender amendment to cut funds for Congressional staffing by \$1.4 million to delete authority for Senators to hire additional clerks. (Vote nay)

249. Javits amendment to delete provision in education aid bill cutting off funds to colleges which do not take steps satisfactory to the Secretary of HEW to suppress campus disorders. (Vote yea)

267. Dominick motion to delete provisions of OEO bill earmarking funds for local initiative programs and making members of the armed forces eligible for legal services. (Vote nay)

Anti-Subsidy

54. Goodell motion to suspend rules in order to set \$10,000 limit on agricultural subsidies payable to any individual. (Vote yea)

97. Williams (R-Del.) amendment cutting maritime industry subsidies from \$145 million to \$15.9 million. (Vote yea)

210. Dole-McIntyre amendment sheltering the intangible drilling expenses of "small" oil producers even from the token minimum income tax provisions of the tax reform bill. (Vote nay)

239. Javits amendment permitting repairs of naval vessels to be made in any port within 350 miles of their home port when there is no competitive bidding and when repairs are not made in the home port. (Vote yea)

251. Proxmire amendment to cut funds for prototype Supersonic Transport. (Vote yea)

Free Market/Free Trade

58. Confirmation of the nomination of Carl J. Gilbert as U.S. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. (Vote yea)

133. Vote to loosen provisions of Export Control Act to permit greater trade with Communist nations. (Vote yea)

152. Bennett amendment to strike the provision of S2577 authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to institute a "voluntary" credit restraint program. (Vote yea)

200. Cotton amendment authorizing the President to impose tariffs and other import restrictions

which he deems necessary. (Vote nay)

Foreign Policy/Foreign Aid

65. Smith (R-Me.) amendment prohibiting funds to be used for the Safeguard ABM system. (Vote yea)

146. Young (D-Ohio) amendment cutting funds for the Pentagon's civil defense activities by \$8.3 million. (Vote yea)

271. Mansfield motion to table the House version of the Foreign Aid bill, which would provide unrequested funds for jet fighters for Nationalist China. (Vote yea)

34. Vote on HR33, providing for an additional \$480,000,000 in funding for the United States participation in the International Development Association. (Vote yea)

225. Javits amendment to provide \$20,000,000 funding for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an organization designed to guarantee private American investments in foreign business and housing. (Vote yea)

Fiscal Responsibility

61. Williams Amendment to extend surtax beyond December 30, 1969 at a 5% rate through June 30, 1970. (Vote yea)

63. Final passage of bill to extend surtax at 10% through December 30, 1969. (Vote yea)

159. Byrd (D-Va.) amendment to allow the surtax to lapse at the end of 1969. Some liberals said they voted against the surtax extension in votes 61 and 63 because they wished to maximize their bargaining power in fighting for tax reforms. A similar vote on this roll call, taken after the bargaining was finished, could not be defended on those grounds. (Vote nay)

222. Williams motion to recommit tax bill to delete revenue-losing "Christmas Tree" provisions. (Vote yea)

Civil Rights/Civil Liberties

138. Mathias amendment increasing funds for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from \$11.5 million to \$15.9 million. (Vote yea)

154. Confirmation of Judge Clement Haynsworth as Justice of the Supreme Court. Although most of the debate on Haynsworth was cast in terms of judicial ethics, we agree with those Senators on both sides of the issue who said that the fundamental issue involved was Haynsworth's conservative views on the rights of blacks and unions. (Vote nay)

247. Scott amendment adding the words "unless otherwise required by the Constitution" to an amendment authored by Rep. Jamie Whitten prohibiting certain desegregation initiatives by the federal government. Who voted against this amendment? The strict constructionists, of course. (Vote yea)

274. Mansfield motion that the Senate recede on its position opposing the Philadelphia Plan. (Vote yea)

RICHARD A. ZIMMER

Biafra — *from page 12*

campaign speech — is that Biafra would not have lost its war of independence and that an extra million Biafrans would not have died if President Nixon had really gone beyond bureaucratic “channels” in the State Department and overridden “diplomatic niceties” in U.S.-British relations.

POLICY REVIEW

During the campaign, Nixon could not have been under any illusions about the inability of Biafra to survive without external assistance. In September 1969, Biafra had been under blockade for a year and a half and had run out of both ammunition and protein-bearing food. An estimated ten thousand Biafran children were dying each day, and the Nigerians had just captured three of Biafra’s four remaining significant towns.

Even before the Nigerians’ September offensive, the British Member of Parliament foremost in arguing for a “quick kill” derided General de Gaulle for having “backed the wrong horse at the wrong time when the war is virtually over.” But de Gaulle had only begun to help Biafra, and French arms and ammunition arrived in increasing quantities in late September. Biafran resistance revived just as Nigerian supply lines became overextended. The Biafrans not only stopped Nigeria’s “final offensive,” they counterattacked.

As soon as he took office, the President ordered a policy review under the auspices of the National Security Council. Nixon then announced his basic decision on Biafra policy on February 22, after barely a month in office, before leaving for his European trip, and before he examined many other foreign policy issues. The President drew a crucial distinction between relief and politics. And for relief matters he created the new post of Special Coordinator and appointed to it C. Clyde Ferguson, a Professor of Law at Rutgers University and a much respected member of the black establishment.

A NEW POLICY

Nixon also announced a new policy on the politics of the war:

“. . . the U.S. earnestly hopes for an early negotiated end to the conflict and a settlement that will assure the protection and peaceful development of all the people involved.”

This might have seemed innocuous to the casual observer, but it repudiated two clear preferences of the State Department bureaucrats charged with relations with Nigeria. Rather than “an early negotiated end to the conflict,” most bureaucrats advocated a “quick kill” of Biafran forces. Their idea of “a settlement” was based solely on a renunciation of Biafran independence and the restoration of “One Nigeria.”

Joseph Palmer, II, the Assistant Secretary of State

for Africa whom President Nixon inherited, had already made clear to a Congressional hearing on the previous July 23 that the only solution favored by the State Dept. was one which maintained “the unity of Nigeria, which we have supported from the beginning.”

Palmer was not an ordinary bureaucrat, and he was not to be swayed by a Presidential appointee and a few Presidential statements. Joseph Palmer was — and is — a determined, personable career diplomat who has the rare gift of being able to put over a clear-cut view without arousing opposition. He had been our first Ambassador to Nigeria, and while there he had campaigned successfully for an unprecedented six-year foreign aid commitment and had persuaded many American businessmen to invest in Africa’s largest market even though it had formerly been a British colony. Palmer became the leader of the new generation of American diplomats sent to Africa after 1960. After G. Mennen (“Soapy”) Williams went back to Michigan, Palmer was promoted to be the first career diplomat in charge of the Africa Bureau.

PALMER’S WORLD VIEW

When Nigeria was rent by a succession of two coups and three pogroms against the Ibos in 1966, Palmer’s whole view of Nigeria as a mighty bastion of democracy was threatened. His reaction was defensive, and his arguments against Biafra’s secession followed his preconceptions, not the sequence of actual events in Nigeria. However just Biafran grievances (30,000 had been massacred with the help of federal troops), Palmer and his State Department allies regarded Biafra’s independence bid at best as a nuisance, at worst as an aberration. A free Biafra would mean a weakened Nigeria, and this flew in the face of everything Palmer had been promoting.

A measure of the State Department’s resistance to President Nixon’s open-minded political formula is that it was not used in a Department policy statement for nine months. On November 12, 1969, Secretary Rogers, the President’s close friend, repudiated the “quick kill” as a tactic and “One Nigeria” as the sole acceptable outcome of the war. But by then the State Department had long since reversed the President’s relief policy, and there was little chance that Nixon’s formula for peace without preconditions would become a basis for negotiations.

A strong new Assistant Secretary for Africa might have promoted Nixon’s desire to save the Biafran people and to obtain “a negotiated end to the war” which did not preclude some form of Biafran sovereignty. But Palmer’s departure was not ordered until May, and he did not actually leave his office in the State Department until July. Nor is it a discredit to Palmer’s successor, David D. Newsom, that the latter did not have the former’s personality and determination. Newsom

did, unfortunately, share Palmer's tendency to romanticize the government of the country where he had recently been U.S. Ambassador. Despite his several years as Ambassador to Libya, Newsom was no better prepared than anyone else for the coup which deposed the ailing, 79-year-old King Idris and then shut down Wheelus Air Force Base last year.

OIL LOBBY TRIES HARDER

A strong new U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria could have assisted in developing a compromise. The Embassy in Lagos had — and still has — a reputation for being headstrong, and special delegations have twice been dispatched from Washington in recent years to reprimand the Embassy for refusals to follow instructions. But before going out to Lagos, Ambassador-designate Trueheart was wined and dined by the U.S. oil companies with interests in Nigeria, including round-trip transport to a corporate headquarters in one company's executive jet. In one semi-public appearance shortly before his departure, Trueheart's remarks made it plain that he had been more thoroughly briefed on the financial stakes of the oil companies than on the life-saving activities of the relief agencies. When he got to Lagos, Trueheart was surrounded by "One Nigeria" careerists and by "quick kill" oilmen, and he never rose above his surroundings.

With the career appointees below him not likely to abandon the One Nigeria orthodoxy, the new Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. Richardson, became the Nixon appointee crucial to implementing the President's policy on saving lives and promoting a compromise. A pillar behind the scenes of the liberal, intellectual wing of the Republican Party, Richardson had been close to Nixon in the late 1950's, when he was Acting Secretary of H.E.W. and Nixon was Vice President. Both were young, activist lawyers in a Cabinet dominated by older, less flexible businessmen. When given his new job by Nixon, Richardson must have perceived the President's sympathies for the Biafrans, but apparently he did not share them. For his staffwork, Richardson assigned not only Nigeria-Biafra but the rest of Africa and Latin America — over 50 countries in all — to a single official.

SURPRISING REAFFIRMATION

On July 15, Senator Edward Kennedy made one of his last uses of his awesome pre-Chappaquiddick power. He tried to force the issue by holding hearings on Nigeria-Biafran relief and calling Richardson to testify. According to the distinction President Nixon had made from the first between relief and politics, Ferguson, since raised to Ambassadorial rank, could have been sent alone. But when Richardson accepted Kennedy's invitation to speak on politics, many people, including Kennedy and probably the President, expected a new position out of the State Department. Instead, Richardson argued publicly against Biafran in-

dependence and inserted a sympathetic reference to "the high promise of a unified Nigeria." As a practical matter, Richardson reaffirmed Palmer's orthodoxy without summarizing it in a phrase which could later be quoted against him.

Even without sending arms or trying to mediate politically, American policy proved decisive in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict. A great increase of American-financed relief shipments was crucial to Biafra's comeback in the spring of 1969. Then the U.S. allowed relief shipments to be reduced to half in June, when the Red Cross suspended its contribution to the airlift. The ostensible reason for the Red Cross withdrawal was the shooting down of one of its planes on June 5 and the Nigerian threat to enforce a total blockade. But the loss of that plane was a fluke, since it had foolishly tried to fly into Biafra too early, before sunset. The ad-hoc operation of Joint Church Aid continued its delivery of food to Biafra, but it could not possibly meet the need alone. Even in the peak months of April and May, the 300 tons of food which reached Biafra each night were barely half of the estimated need, and when the churches were left operating their half alone, only a quarter of the need was being met.

SWITCH IN POLICY

Instead of trying to expand or supplement the church flights four-fold, the State Department embarked on a vain search for an "agreement" between Nigeria and Biafra. For six months, the U.S. had supported systematic and increasing violations of the Nigerian blockade. But after June, the State Department joined with the British Government in providing diplomatic cover for Nigeria's announced policy of starvation. In August, Biafra met Nigeria's initial conditions, but Nigeria prevented a return of the Red Cross in September by posing — with British and American support — additional conditions. Finally, toward the end of 1969, the State Department began to explore possibilities for expanding the airlift. But by then, it was too late.

The State Department's behavior can in part be explained by incompetence, in part by defensiveness, and in part by the One Nigeria orthodoxy. But a desire to preserve cordial relations with the British also had an influence. Indeed, it would be unfair to conclude this analysis without putting the basic external responsibility for the disaster where it belongs, on the British Foreign Office and on Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

As the former colonial power, the British originated the myth of Nigerian unity, and it was put on the defensive when Nigeria was divided by two coups and three pogroms in 1966. Britain opposed Biafra's secession in the following year because it was the final rebuttal to Britain's justification of colonialism as having at least prepared Nigeria for democracy. The ulti-

mate rationale of Britain's regular arms shipments to Nigeria was stated most succinctly toward the end of the war by Maurice Foley, a career diplomat responsible for British policy: "those who say Britain's arms are dripping with blood misunderstand Britain's residual colonial responsibilities."

The British public, for whom the blockade and bombings of World War II are still an active memory, opposed British arms shipments to Nigeria as soon as they were publicized. Public opinion polls showed two thirds of the public opposed, and the Labor Party's annual conferences of 1968 and 1969 passed resolutions against sending arms to Nigeria.

The British establishment was frightened into supporting Nigeria by the Foreign Office's claim that an independent Biafra would endanger Shell-BP's best oil concessions. This was patently untrue, for the Biafrans fully appreciated that all the major oil companies would refuse to market oil expropriated from one of their number.

Another false argument for British conservatives was the threat that the Russians might take over in Nigeria if Britain withdrew its military support. But the Russians had had no position at all in Nigeria when the war began. Their entry in Nigeria was based on the supply of weapons, and the easiest way to block further Soviet penetration was to end the war. The Soviet threat in Nigeria is a real one, but the British Government, which was locked into military support by Nigeria before the Soviets came on the scene, used it only to defend itself from the Conservatives, not to advance Britain's real interests.

WHITEWASH DIPLOMACY

Throughout the war, British diplomacy covered up for Nigerian attempts to reduce the Biafran population. When Nigerian massacres of Biafran civilians began to get too much world attention in the fall of 1968, the British sponsored a "Military Observer Team" to follow Nigerian military units. The first chairman of this team was a retired British major general, H. T. Alexander, whose peacetime occupation was being managing director of an oil transport firm which did 75% of its business with Shell and which was taken over entirely by Shell in the spring of 1969. In addition to putting out misleading reports on the massacres, Alexander defended Nigeria's use of starvation as a weapon in the war.

In June and July 1969, public hostility rose again against Nigeria, this time against the explicit statements of top Nigerian leaders announcing the conscious use of starvation as a weapon in the war. Again British diplomacy came to the rescue. The British Foreign Minister took his Nigerian counterpart to Geneva to meet with the Red Cross and to offer to permit daylight relief flights if the Red Cross met certain conditions. The Red Cross refused the offer, but ad-

mitted that if Biafra accepted the conditions it would operate such an airlift. British propaganda immediately put out a misleading and self-interested interpretation: relief flights would begin as soon as Biafra agreed to receive them, and the disruption of relief operations should be blamed on Biafra for not agreeing to Nigeria's terms rather than on Nigeria's blockade. When the British public finally caught on to this trick, in November 1969, Foreign Minister Stewart put out a convenient lie to disarm his opposition in Parliament: "a guarantee was provided by the United States" that Nigeria would not use relief flights as cover for air attacks. The lie was eventually exposed (though not by the U.S. State Department), but Stewart had already accomplished his purpose of baffling Parliament and the British public.

C'EST LA GUERRE

The most recent British move was the cleverest of all. Right after Biafra's defeat, British public opinion again began demanding a large relief operation. Prime Minister Wilson sent Lord Hunt to go to conquered Biafra and report on its condition. Lord Hunt climbed Mt. Everest just before Queen Elizabeth's coronation, and he occupies a place of special pride and trust in the British public mind. But Wilson knew that Hunt was not an impartial observer. A year and a half before, on August 27, 1968, Lord Hunt had frankly endorsed Nigeria's blockade against Biafra, stating explicitly that Nigeria would never permit regular relief operations, and concluding that "Brutal and inhuman though it is, the very essence of siege tactics is to reduce the defenders to physical conditions which they can no longer endure." Then, after Biafra's collapse, Lord Hunt returned from a tour of the ruins and asserted that the number of starving Biafrans had been "wildly exaggerated and gullibly accepted."

An estimated two million Biafrans died of starvation before the war's end. A large proportion died in 1969, during a hopelessly inadequate but well-publicized airlift. Another half million Biafrans probably died in three weeks, when the blockade tightened instead of loosening, immediately after the war.

Nigeria admitted foreign journalists and suffered a few days of bad publicity in the week after Biafra's surrender. But then the Nigerian Government banned foreign journalists, imposing a blockade on information even more stringent than that on food.

Having got their sensational stories of rape, looting, and confusion, the world's press has stopped all mention of Biafra's famine. And from the bureaucrats in Washington, the silence is deafening.

—CHRISTOPHER W. BEAL

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Winrock Goes to Little Rock

The Republican Party was barely breathing in Arkansas when Winthrop Rockefeller came to the state in 1953. In the 1940's, the GOP frequently failed to nominate candidates for such major offices as Governor and U.S. Senator, and it rarely bothered to oppose any of the state's Democratic congressmen. The party, if it could be called that, served as a refuge for "courthouse" Republicans hoping for patronage from a Republican national administration, incompetents, and soreheaded Democratic defectors. Four years after Rockefeller's arrival, Orval Faubus plunged Arkansas (and Southern) politics into a decade of race-baiting and irrelevance with his stand at Little Rock. Partly because of this, and partly because new forces were being felt in Arkansas, the dormant Arkansas GOP began to stir.

In 1956, Winthrop Rockefeller — a gentleman farmer with Northern connections — was named chairman of the state's Industrial Development Commission; in the next ten years, Rockefeller was responsible for providing new job opportunities for some 90,000 Arkansas residents. Much of the state's current relative prosperity is due to his efforts during those years.

Even before his entry into partisan politics, Rockefeller became something of an institution in his adopted state. Looking for a suitable spot to breed cattle, he purchased a cozy little plot of a few thousand acres near Morrilton in the Arkansas River valley and built a farm, "Winrock," that became one of the state's top tourist attractions. Rockefeller had come to Arkansas straight from New York society, reeling from the effects (and the publicity) of his \$6.5 million divorce from "Bobo" Rockefeller; but in Arkansas, he remarried, and he and his new wife, Jeannette Adrin, worked to encourage programs for educational and cultural advances. He led a drive that raised \$700,000 for an arts center in Little Rock, and his wife initiated a sort of cultural exchange program for the schools, whereby the students submitted drawings and paintings and the best were exhibited all over the state. (When the late Dorothy Kilgallen wrote rather cattily in her newspaper column that she hoped the "natives" would enjoy the art exhibit, Mrs. Rockefeller won the hearts of many Arkansans with her retort: "Who's Dorothy Kilgallen?" As *The Charlotte Observer* later recalled, "Arkansans loved it. For once, they came out on the better end of a joke.")

MONEY TALKS

Rockefeller plunged into state Republican affairs in 1960, and two years later supported the GOP's 22 legislative candidates (the most in recent memory) while personally financing the campaigns of the Republican gubernatorial and senatorial nominees. This direct financial involvement was only the beginning of Rockefeller's unprecedented financial backing of Republican candidates and causes. It is largely Rockefeller money that pays for the operation of the state party's elaborate "brain center" in Little Rock, where campaign plans are formulated; and Rockefeller money also plays a prominent part in implementing these plans. In April, 1969, the Governor revealed to the press that he and his wife had contributed \$6,000, the legal limit, to the GOP's two congressional candidates in Arkansas, \$3,000 to certain legislative candidates,



and lesser sums to nominees for the constitutional offices and various local posts. Nor has Rockefeller's largesse been confined to partisan activities; in March, 1969, he admitted, "not with apology but with pride," that he was supplementing the salaries of 13 state employees to the tune of more than \$1,000 a year for each, and had paid smaller amounts to about 20 others. Recipients included key personnel in the state Administrative Department, Rockefeller explained, because the salaries offered by the state "could not attract the men we had to have to fill these extremely important new posts. . . . The work of these experts has already brought in millions of new dollars in federally funded programs for Arkansas." Rockefeller's personal financial involvement in state government, he said, was "another expression of my belief in Arkansas, and of my conviction that the best government will be found only in the hands of the best people." In addition to all this, Rockefeller also used his own funds to pay for just those fringe benefits of office that attract many politicians in the first place: personal secretaries, a press secretary, security guards (rather than the usual state troopers), and staff for the Governor's mansion.

FAUBUS THE RACE KING

In 1964, Rockefeller made his first try for the Governor's office, but ran into a still-potent Orval Faubus, making his sixth and last successful campaign. Faubus used the traditional parochial appeal against the political newcomer, reminding the voters of Rockefeller's high-priced divorce and alleged drinking habits, calling him a "former New York playboy" whose family made its fortune by "squeezing the common people like you and me." Faubus had inaugurated the modern era of Southern racist politics with his 1957 stand in Little Rock; in 1964 he added some new refinements to the art form, including one catchline that would ring across the land four years later out of the mouth of George C. Wallace: "The first time they (demonstrators) lie down in the streets to block traffic of a legitimate business, they're going to get run over, and if no one else will do it, I'll get in a truck and do it myself." Most Southern Republicans in the 1960's, faced with such opposition, attempted to out-shout their Democratic counterparts, only to find that it couldn't be done and that given the choice, voters — including black voters — would prefer a Democratic racist to a Republican one. Faubus' hard-line stance gave Rockefeller wide latitude on the race question, and the GOP nominee cautiously stayed close to the center line, endorsing "equal rights" but deploring the necessity for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was a sensible position to take under the circumstances, though perhaps a little more cautious than absolutely necessary, and the results of the election proved it. Though Rockefeller lost, no one — especially under the tattered banner of the Arkansas

GOP — could have done any better than his 43 percent of the vote against the undisputed king of race politics. At that, Rockefeller carried the counties in which Arkansas' four largest cities — Little Rock, North Little Rock, Pine Bluff, and Fort Smith — are located, and put together an unusual coalition of eight counties in traditionally Republican northwest Arkansas and two with substantial black voting populations. It was estimated that Rockefeller, despite his lukewarm position on civil rights, polled 80 percent of the black vote in Arkansas; and it seemed likely that, all other variables remaining constant, he could have carried the state against anyone but Faubus.

SUCCESS IN 1966

Arkansas Democrats played right into Rockefeller's hands in 1966, nominating arch-segregationist Jim Johnson, a racist demagogue without any of Faubus' redeeming qualities. If Arkansas Negroes were disappointed at Rockefeller's failure to speak out strongly on civil rights in 1964 — and some were — they had no place else to turn in 1966, regardless of the flaccidity of the Republican's position; for blacks and for many thinking white people, Jim Johnson as Governor was simply unthinkable. So Rockefeller campaigned as a reformer, correctly noting that state government under Faubus had grown steadily more corrupt, and as a responsible alternative to the fanatical Jim Johnson. Again, Rockefeller captured the traditional Republican vote, but his election could hardly be viewed as a party victory: the new Governor was confronted with a legislature that included 132 Democrats and only three Republicans. Rockefeller put together a 54.4 percent majority by running as strongly as before in the black communities and in the cities, and by winning the support of industrialists who thought his policies on reform, race, and economic development would mean a good business climate for Arkansas.

A number of Southern Republican candidates, against similar (if less extreme) opponents, might have done as well by taking Rockefeller's path; but few, even recently, have had the foresight or the courage. In Rockefeller's own case, he had the added benefit of growing public distaste for the excesses of the entrenched Faubus administration, which generated the kind of good government sentiment, always just beneath the surface in Arkansas, that had elected Sid McMath to the Governor's office in the aftermath of World War II.

Arkansans might never have voted against Faubus himself, but their affection for the old demagogue was apparently non-transferable. Johnson, as expected, ran strongly in the rural areas, but he fell far short of the landslide margins there that had kept Faubus in office for so many years. The lesson of Rockefeller's victory seems almost too obvious to require elaboration, particularly in view of the caliber of

the opposition; but it is a lesson that Southern Republicans have often ignored, and one that seems to be lost on the advocates of today's "Southern strategy": Rockefeller became Arkansas' first Republican Governor in nearly 100 years, not by trying to outdo an extremist opponent, but by building a coalition of interest groups that had long gone unrepresented — Republicans, blacks, city dwellers, reformers, and white moderates.

ONCE AND FUTURE GOVERNOR

Once in office, Winthrop Rockefeller became the kind of Governor that many candidates promise to be, but few ever are. Of course, his great wealth gave him extraordinary freedom; he had no particular interest in the office or its emoluments, and no one could rationally question his motives on the ground of self-promotion. And yet his advocacy of programs to meet the needs of Arkansas and its people required a certain amount of personal fortitude. Rockefeller had run, from a public relations point of view, a less than brilliant campaign, whose success depended more upon the correctness of his positions than upon the magnetism of his personality. He was — and is — a poor public speaker, whose emotions could overpower his syntax and his very power of speech. His first mumbled address to the state legislators dissolved in a tide of emotion. In 1968, after the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. was slain in Memphis, Rockefeller led a crowd in front of the Arkansas state Capitol in singing the civil rights anthem, "We Shall Overcome"; and a year later, addressing a crowd of 3,000 at the Capitol in a memorial service for Dr. King, the Governor was so moved by the occasion that he could not finish his remarks. Rockefeller has never had the gift of a Bobby Kennedy, of turning profound emotion into eloquence; rather, the Governor is the kind of man who just stands there and blubbers. But no one seeing him or hearing him can question his sincerity. Rockefeller has not hesitated to take stands that render him particularly vulnerable to personal attack; the irony of the richest man in Arkansas asking others to pay more taxes has not been lost on his critics. In view of the continuing speculation in Arkansas as to the Governor's drinking habits, his wisest course might have been to remain silent when the issue of liquor by the drink was debated in early 1969. But Rockefeller threw his entire weight behind the measure, twisting arms in the legislature and testifying for the bill at a jam-packed committee hearing. As the Governor saw it, there were two important considerations involved — the millions of dollars in new revenue that mixed drinks would mean to Arkansas, and the state's untenable position in attempting to administer an outdated and hypocritical set of prohibition laws. The mixed-drink measure cleared the state Senate by one vote more than was necessary, 19 to 16, although Rockefeller never succeeded in winning

over the Senate's only Republican, Church of Christ leader James Caldwell of Rogers.

Rockefeller's first two-year term was one of substantial accomplishment, despite the occasional intractability of the overwhelmingly Democratic legislature. The Governor's successes included a crackdown on illegal gambling in Hot Springs; passage of Arkansas' first effective minimum wage law; enactment of some, though not all, of his prison reform proposals; creation of the Department of Administration to organize the chaotic state government; appointment of the first Negroes to local draft boards; an increase in teachers' salaries; and a continued influx of new industry to the state. His greatest disappointment — one that would continue to nag him, though finally to rebound in his favor — was his inability to get the legislature to appropriate money for the programs Arkansas needed. Guided by purely partisan motives, the legislators refused to enact either a 3¢-per-pack cigarette tax, liquor by the drink, or any other method of producing extra revenue. But despite these difficulties, Rockefeller was able to tell the people of Arkansas as he launched his re-election campaign in August, 1968: "I told you I would stop the brutality and corruption in the prisons and I did. I told you I'd run the gamblers and racketeers out and I did. I told you I would stop the fly-by-night insurance operations and I did." And so in 1968, Winthrop Rockefeller asked the fiercely Democratic voters of Arkansas to return him to office solely on the basis of the excellence of his record — and with the assurance that if elected, he would try once again to wring higher taxes out of the legislature.

TESTING THE COALITION

The 1968 campaign, more than that of 1966, was a test of the stability of Rockefeller's coalition of Republicans, blacks, city dwellers, and white moderates. For the Governor's 1968 opponent, Marion Crank, was no Jim Johnson; in fact, he had defeated Johnson's wife, Virginia, in the Democratic primary, while the 1966 gubernatorial nominee was running a losing race against U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright. Crank, a nine-term veteran of the Arkansas House, had ties to the old Faubus machine, but was nonetheless a moderate, at least by Arkansas standards. Race was not an overt issue in the 1968 campaign, though in an election in which George Wallace was running for President, it could not have been far from many voters' minds. But in a year when Hubert Humphrey, not Jim Johnson, was at the top of the Democratic ballot, Rockefeller might have wondered how many of Arkansas' 130,000 Negro voters (13 percent of the total registration) would stay loyal. The Arkansas gubernatorial election squarely posed the question of whether a moderate Republican, clearly identified with liberal causes and black support, could hold black voters against a moderate Democrat while also retaining sufficient strength in the white community.

As it happened, Arkansas voters split their ballots with abandon in 1968, sending Fulbright back to the Senate and giving Wallace the state's seven electoral votes; but Rockefeller's coalition held firm. With 52.1 percent of the vote, he led Crank by more than 25,000 — half his 1966 margin, but enough. Of the 12 counties with black population (though not necessarily voting) majorities, Rockefeller carried 11; in the three counties where black voters evidently predominated — since they were carried by Humphrey — Rockefeller's percentages were 55.8 (Chicot), 52.4 (Lee), and 55.5 (Phillips). But he also ran well in the eight largely-black counties that were carried by Wallace, winning seven of them with margins of 53.2 percent (Columbia), 54.1 percent (Craighead), 53.3 percent (Crittenden), 53.4 percent (Mississippi), 55.2 percent (Ouachita), 52.8 percent (St. Francis), and 55.4 percent (Union). Additionally, the Governor carried most of the Ozark and northern counties where GOP strength customarily resides, including the territory that has been dominated since 1966 by conservative Republican Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt (though Hammerschmidt's pluralities against a liberal Democrat generally exceeded Rockefeller's showing). In Clay County at the state's northeastern tip, the only black county carried by Nixon, Rockefeller won 51.1 percent of the vote; and his share ran as high as 67 percent in Benton County, 61 percent in Boone, and 61 percent in Carroll. Arkansans were not yet ready to give their hearts to the GOP; aside from Lieutenant Governor Maurice "Footsie" Britt, who squeaked in by 1,300 votes over a Wallaceite Democrat, all the other Republican candidates in statewide races went down to defeat in 1968, Nixon ran third in the presidential balloting, and only five GOP nominees were elected to the 135-member legislature. But Rockefeller's second victory showed that a moderate Republican with progressive views on civil rights and other issues could not only survive but prosper, even in the face of an 83 percent white majority.

JOUST WITH THE SENATE

The 1969 Arkansas legislative session began where the previous one had left off — with Rockefeller trying to cram his program down the throats of an unwilling legislature. One acrimonious chain of events began with the Governor's attempt to appoint a Negro to the state Board of Education for the first time in history. First, Rockefeller submitted to the state Senate the name of John W. Walker, a 31-year-old Little Rock attorney who had filed several desegregation suits against Arkansas school districts. Without ceremony or delay, the Senate rejected the young black lawyer, 28 to 2, after the Arkansas Education Association gave Walker's opponents something to hang their hat on — a charge that if appointed, he would face a conflict of interest. Less than a week later, Rockefeller tried

again, with Dr. William H. Townsend of Little Rock, the first of his race to practice optometry in Arkansas and former president of the Council on Community Affairs, a black political action group. The Senate took less than 24 hours to turn him down, by an undisclosed vote taken in closed session, and this time did not even bother to think of a reason. This second rejection of a black appointee, like some of the legislature's other extremes, seemed to arouse resentment among whites as well as blacks. The liberal *Arkansas Gazette* observed:

It is possible that the Senate did not quite realize the full ramification of its blunder in the Townsend appointment. If the Senate cares nothing for the merits of the issue, it might be willing to consider the political impact upon the Arkansas Democratic Party in its efforts to recapture Negro support. At least the Senate might consider the grave implications when the Negro population is affronted as it has been affronted in the Townsend case.

Indeed, the *Gazette* noted,

there are prominent Democrats who seem to be making a calculated effort to drive Negroes out of the Democratic Party. A few days ago a survey on state employment showed that the state auditor (a Democrat) still did not have a single Negro in his employ. Now the state Senate has rejected in rapid order the appointment of two prominent Negroes nominated by Governor Rockefeller, one after the other, to the State Board of Education. . . . The state Senate has given Arkansas Negroes still more reason to turn away from the state Democratic Party as an agency to which they may look in fulfilling their hopes and legitimate aspirations.

Shortly thereafter, Rockefeller nominated a third Negro — the Rev. Emery Washington of Forrest City — for the nine-year term on the Board of Education, and this time the appointment went through without a ripple.

Nor was Rockefeller's new forthrightness on race — he could have made such appointments before, but didn't — confined to the borders of Arkansas. In late June, 1969, as the Nixon Administration was undergoing one of its periodic vacillations on school integration, the Governor told the President in a telegram that the contemplated slowdown in HEW enforcement "breaks faith with the black community and compromises to a disturbing degree the position of those who have courageously gone ahead with objectivity and a sense of justice — if not always with enthusiasm — in the implementation of federal desegregation guidelines." Rockefeller thus became the first major Southern Republican — or Democrat, for

that matter — to oppose a slackening in federal school desegregation efforts.

Later that year, came a moment of real drama at the Southern Governors Conference in Williamsburg, Va. Governor Albert P. Brewer of Alabama, maneuvering for a probable 1970 re-election battle against George Wallace, had come to the conference with a much-ballyhooed resolution against the busing of school children to achieve integration. Republican Governors Arch A. Moore of West Virginia, Russell Peterson of Delaware, and Dewey F. Bartlett of Oklahoma, along with Democrat Marvin Mandel of Maryland, had been leading the opposition to Brewer's resolution, but Bartlett was elsewhere when the actual vote was taken. Resolutions needed three-fourths approval for passage, but even so, Moore, Peterson, and Mandel by themselves could not block the measure from going through by 9 to 3. With the matter squarely up to him, Rockefeller abstained, causing the resolution to fall short by one vote, 8 to 3. Purists might have wished for something more cathartic than an abstention, but then that is Rockefeller's way. As a result of his action, the conference instead passed a resolution affirming the governors' belief in quality education for all children without discrimination and urging that busing be used "with restraint and good judgment." (Brewer, Lester Maddox of Georgia, and John Bell Williams of Mississippi — all Democrats — voted "nay.") And to cap it all, Rockefeller was elected chairman of the Governors Conference.

MONEY AND MORALS

Meanwhile, Rockefeller's epic struggle with the legislature continued unabated; and the Governor's determined pursuit of his goals for the state raised the question of governmental revenue to a moral issue. Early in 1969, Rockefeller unveiled his plan to raise the \$195,000,000 in new revenue he said was needed for the next biennium. The program included a revision in the state's personal income tax rates (putting more of the burden on those in the higher bracket), a flat 7 percent corporate income tax, a 1 percent increase in the sales tax coupled with a rebate for low-income families, and several special and excise taxes. Despite the increase in the sales tax, the Governor's plan promised in general to relieve the poor of some of their tax burden and transfer it to well-off individuals and corporations. The additional revenue would be used largely for improvements and capital investments in the fields of education, mental health, and penal institutions. But halfway into the 1969 legislative session, only two revenue bills had cleared the stubborn state Senate — an inconsequential insurance tax, and a local-option sales tax that threatened the underlying structure of the Rockefeller plan. On February 13, Rockefeller warned the Democrats in the legislature that unless they enacted an adequate tax

package, he would run for a third term to see his own proposals through. A day later, the Governor told a group of dairy farmers that "you elected me to provide . . . leadership . . . and get something done for our state. And that's exactly what I'm doing." Some Arkansas Democrats, he noted, were getting "nervous because they feel that a do-nothing General Assembly can do more to build the Republican Party than anything else. And I think there's some merit to their thinking." *The Arkansas Gazette* agreed:

. . . the obstreperous, often puerile, Arkansas General Assembly has been credited with helping elect Rockefeller to a second term and the General Assembly may be capable of doing it again.

SEARCH OF CONSCIENCE

But while noting the political ramifications of the legislature's conduct, the Governor made it clear to the dairy farmers that "I repeat, I did not solely run to build a political party." And in a dramatic address to the General Assembly February 19, Rockefeller stated the question facing the legislature not only in political terms, but in terms of the basic needs of the people of Arkansas. It was a rare example of a politician trying to lead by the force of his moral authority:

Responsibility is the key word today. Your responsibilities are special, because your actions will decide, for better or worse, what kind of state we're going to be. I urge that every member of the General Assembly search his conscience for the answer — can I represent my people responsibly and honorably? . . . If conscience is no problem, we here today would pay nothing. . . . We who will not be going back to school could say we served well by voting for a local project, and by trading votes with others doing the same.

But you know who would pay.

The young people of Arkansas would pay. They would never stop paying, because the penalty of substandard education is borne for life. . . .

We read of unrest, rioting, and revolt . . . and I cannot help but ask myself if much of this does not stem from fainthearted or selfish leadership . . . leadership unwilling to assume the responsibility of meeting the challenge of our changing time.

But the Governor's eloquence was largely lost on the legislators, who proceeded to vote just \$20,000,000 in new taxes (of the \$90,000,000 Rockefeller had asked for the first year of the biennium) before recessing in early April. The major component of the Rockefeller program, the sales tax increase, was laughed out of the Senate, 30 to 3, almost the same margin by which the personal income tax change had

been rejected a day earlier. Senator Jim Caldwell, the only Republican in the upper chamber, fought valiantly for the sales tax, only to be drowned out by humorists like Senator Guy H. "Mutt" Jones of Conway, who offered an amendment that would have made the tax apply only if Rockefeller were re-elected in 1970. Nor was the partisanship confined to the halls of the legislature. During the session, State Democratic Chairman Charles D. Matthews told a party meeting in western Arkansas that the Governor's tax program was merely another manifestation of the GOP's "tending to stomp the working man." It was a charge that could hardly be substantiated by the evidence, as Matthews — a leader of the liberal movement within the state Democratic Party — must have known. Nonetheless, he blasted Rockefeller as "a hypocritical Governor with the vulgar capacity to gain public office merely because he happened to be born — not talented — but rich." It was a depth not previously plumbed, even by the likes of Orval Faubus and Jim Johnson.

PRO-TAX RALLY!

There were encouraging signs, however, that the people were not misled. On March 6, 1969, the steps of the state Capitol were the scene of a most unusual occurrence — a pro-tax rally. Some 400 citizens told the Governor through a spokesman that "we have gathered here today . . . as this visible evidence that the people of Arkansas do not want an inadequate program, that we do not want the program of education to falter in this state and that there is public support for your action in finding the necessary and adequate income from additional taxes and other sources to meet our urgent need." Rockefeller said the demonstration substantiated the results of a poll taken in early 1969, which showed that 79 percent of the respondents were amenable to a tax increase. And there were even reports that a half dozen Democratic legislators were contemplating a switch to the GOP — not with the usual Southern motive of escaping an influx of blacks or of protesting national Democratic policy, but one of disgust with their party's record in the General Assembly. Though not much came of these rumblings immediately, the possibility existed that there would be some switches before the 1970 legislative election.

The jostling between Rockefeller and the legislature also took place over less lofty considerations. The General Assembly finally overrode Rockefeller's veto to change the definition of the "majority" party in Arkansas — where the majority party gets to name a preponderance of election workers. The majority party used to be the party that won the Governor's office; after votes of 78 to 4 in the House and 25 to 4 in the Senate, it became the party electing the most state constitutional officers. One day in March, the Governor had the experience, probably unique in Arkansas his-

tory, of seeing three of his vetoes overridden by the Senate on the same day — two inconsequential measures and a potentially dangerous one calling for run-offs in state, congressional, and district races if no candidate earned a majority in the general election.

NELSON AGAINST NIXON

Yet for all his willingness to do battle for state and party, Rockefeller seems to have received short shrift from certain segments of the GOP, particularly that segment headquartered in the White House. Shortly before President Nixon took office, Congressman Hammerschmidt, the northwest Arkansas conservative, was knighted as the state's chief dispenser of federal patronage. This gave him a loud voice in the appointment of U.S. attorneys, judges, and marshals, and the state directors of various federal farm agencies; and in view of Hammerschmidt's assurance that he would consult with Democratic Senator John L. McClellan before making any judicial recommendations, it was reasonable to assume that his selections would be far different from what Rockefeller's would have been. "I will, of course, consult with the Governor, the state Republican Executive Committee and local Republican leaders before making my recommendations," Hammerschmidt allowed. "But the final responsibility will be mine." Evidently, this was Rockefeller's punishment for pursuing a favorite-son course before the 1968 GOP convention, and for supporting his brother Nelson against Nixon. And Winthrop Rockefeller's voice has been notably missing from high GOP councils, even as the party and the Administration give winning the South a high priority. It is shameful that the GOP's most remarkable and dedicated Southern representative should be a virtual stranger to a President from his own party.

DEMOCRATS ON THE RISE

In fact, if anyone has learned anything from Rockefeller's sustained success at the polls, it appears to be the Arkansas Democratic Party. The defeat of Marion Crank and of Bill Wells, the candidate for Lieutenant Governor, in 1968 sounded the death knell for the Faubus wing of the party; and Crank himself, in an effort to win back the reformers, blacks, and young people, designated Charles Matthews, the liberal lawyer from Little Rock, as state chairman. "It is no secret," Matthews said not long after the election, "that the long years of the Faubus Administration caused a considerable segment of our society, especially our younger men and women, to feel they had no place in the Democratic Party. . . . The one thing that is going to distinguish the new Democratic Party is that rather than keeping people out, we are going to be inviting people in. . . . If this concept of a new Democratic Party is diligently pursued, we will not lose again."

And in the months that followed, Matthews embarked on a course which — despite some unfortunate excesses of partisanship — promised to put new life into the Arkansas Democratic Party. The party also had developed some impressive young leaders — Hayes C. McClerkin, the Speaker of the House; Sterling R. Cockrill Jr., the House Majority Leader; Attorney General Joe Purcell; and most of all, 36-year-old Ted Boswell of Bryant, who rose from obscurity in 1968 and nearly forced Crank into a runoff — and who appeared to combine some of Winthrop Rockefeller's best instincts with an eloquence all his own. "The year 1970," *The Arkansas Gazette* editorialized, could become a turning point for the Arkansas Democratic Party, depending upon whether the party has finally learned its lessons. What the Democrats must offer is both reform-minded and progressive leadership of the kind which the Arkansas Republican Party has been virtually monopolizing.

And 1970 might also determine whether or not the Arkansas Republican Party has the heart and the will to continue providing such leadership, even if Governor Rockefeller should decide to retire to his beloved Winrock.

—MICHAEL S. LOTTMAN

Political Notes — from page 7

which would institutionalize an apparatus for combating pollution on an immediate basis. But, Smith, along with Percy and Illinois Governor Richard Ogilvie, is also attempting to wrest away the spotlight from Illinois Attorney General William J. Scott, who as Smith's and Ogilvie's most important factional opponent within the state party has dominated the anti-pollution campaign in Illinois.

Rentschler maintains that in reality the show of force and effort to pump up Smith's visibility through his "victory by association" exposure with the President and other notables is a reflection of the Senator's weakness and instability as a political force in his own right. He has denied the authenticity of the Sun-Times quote attributed to Nixon and argues that it would be "grossly unfair" for a President (or state central committee) to take sides in a Republican primary. Rentschler also stated that the "official" brochure endorsing Smith is "scandalous and insulting . . . violating a state law requiring that sponsors of campaign literature identify themselves in the literature." No such identification is made in the Smith pamphlet. Concluding that this "trumped up" support of Smith is indicative of "the dictatorial mentality which is guiding our party in Illinois," Rentschler suggests "that our party is the property of a handful of . . . rulers rather than an institution belonging to all Republicans." (Sun-Times, Jan. 29, 1970).

Rentschler's next move will be to embrace the program of Attorney General Scott and take advantage

of the Ogilvie-Scott feud. He is going to try to arrange a conference between Nixon and Scott on the pollution question and will attempt to bring Scott into his campaign. Olgivie complained that Rentschler is actually running against him rather than Smith and indeed a surprise victory or even a strong showing for Rentschler would upset the Governor's plans to completely control statewide GOP politics. The influential and informed political editor of the Chicago Tribune, George Tagge, maintains that Rentschler will amass a vote total that will flabbergast pollsters and politicians alike.

Miffed over being excluded from the Nixon-Smith conference, Rentschler remains bitter because he failed to receive a major appointment from the White House even though he served as Nixon's 1968 chief strategist in Illinois. Rentschler might pick up momentum if he can capitalize on the Scott-Ogilvie split and stamp Smith as an Olgivie puppet while presenting himself as an independent moderate. However, he has yet to sharply define himself in relation to anything other than personality and pollution (where the thrust of his contention appears to be that Smith is an uninformed opportunist). Smith is pressing the advantages of incumbency and the solid support of the Republican machine in Illinois (over 90 percent of the state's GOP party leaders and congressmen are backing the Senator) and is rated the favorite to clash with Democrat Adlai E. Stevenson III in November.

Letters — from page 27

EUTROPHY

Dear Sir:

I was impressed by the fine drawings accompanying my article on pollution and overpopulation in the January issue of the FORUM. I was less happy that the editor decided that I must have misspelled the word "putrefy" and thus inserted it where I had written the word "eutrophy." I hope that readers will have been aware that I was referring to the process of eutrophication of the Great Lakes and that "putrefy" was not at all what was meant.

Prof. Anthony D'Amato
Chicago, Ill.

F FOR BLOUNT

Dear Sir:

I received in the mail under date of January 15th the November issue of Ripon FORUM. It was properly addressed to me at my offices at 2063 Suburban Station Building, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

I am merely dropping you this note as in the poll that you had you wanted the rating of various members of the Cabinet and obviously since the delivery of this Ripon magazine for November coming in January is typical of what's happening in the post offices in the Philadelphia area you can see how I rate Mr. Blount.

It would seem to me that Mr. Nixon could well send Mr. Blount back to Alabama where he could probably be a great construction man as he certainly is no help to us in the Philadelphia area either in getting mail or dispensing routine patronage.

Herbert W. Salus, Jr.
Philadelphia, Pa.

Ed. Note: The November issue was mailed Nov. 17. Late, but not that late.

14a ELIOT STREET

Ripon President **Josiah Lee Anspitz** will have a feature article in the April *Playboy*. Entitled "Toward a Moderate Majority," it examines the new cleavages in American politics.

National Governing Board member **Bruce K. Chapman** will be Ripon's representative at the Left/Right Libertarian Conference held the last weekend of February in Santa Ana, California. The conference aims to bring together libertarians of all stripes, from YAF'ers to SDS (Oglesby wing) types.

HEW Secretary **Finch** has appointed Ripon member **Sidney L. Gardner**, 28, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Development. After getting a master's from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School in 1965, Sid spent two years as an assistant to New York Mayor John V. Lindsay. He joined HEW in March 1969 and in May was named Director of HEW's Center for Community Planning. In his new post, Sid will determine if there is a need for a "rural Model Counties" program and continue to develop HEW's inputs into the Model Cities program.

The Cambridge chapter met February 4 with **Bill Abbott** (unsuccessful 1968 Congressional candidate for Massachusetts' 7th District seat held by Torbert Macdonald). Bill talked about his campaign against violence on TV, but refused to confirm rumors that he will take on Macdonald again this fall.

The Cambridge chapter's annual dinner will feature **Josiah Spaulding**, the GOP's only announced opponent to Senator Edward Kennedy, as guest speaker. The banquet is scheduled for March 25 at the Harvard Faculty Club.

There are a limited number of Ripon ties now available at the special price of \$5.00. Send orders to this office. Gift cards on request.

LETTERS

TURN AROUND

Dear Sir:

As a resident of Virginia and a close observer of and participant in Republican politics in the Old Dominion, I read with interest your very fine article on Linwood Holton which appeared in your December 1969 issue.

I wish to point out one important fact, however, which was omitted from the article. The Democrats held 11 of the 13 House of Delegates seats in the fast growing urbanized Northern Virginia area around Washington prior to the election. After the election, the ratio was reversed in favor of the Republicans 10 to 3. While statewide the Republicans gain in the House of Delegates was less dramatic, I believe the turnaround in this key area of the State may have a significant impact on the new Governor and Virginia politics in general.

Robert N. Meiser
Washington, D.C.

ON BASE

Dear Sir:

I don't know how I missed it but I just now read your article in the Ripon FORUM on the Holton campaign.

I'm happy to see that the campaign finally received some in-depth coverage by the FORUM. During the campaign itself I was hoping someone would cover it. Since our balancing act was so precarious, too much mention of Holton in "liberal" Republican circles (including the offered Ripon endorsement) could have been dysfunctional.

Your analysis of the campaign was, I feel, right on base. I would beg to differ with your observations on the Convention ("hardly calculated to give its moderate gubernatorial candidate a rousing send-off", "a tepid pro-Holton" speech by Wampler, an acceptance speech "received with a singular lack of enthusiasm"). In the overall picture these are probably minor points but I do feel they are overly pessimistic.

Rick Carson
Washington, D.C.

LEONARD DEFENDED

Dear Sir:

I read with some interest your article, "John Mitchell as Attorney General: A Political Approach to Justice." I will not go into the political argument as to whether or not Mr. Mitchell is as you portray him. Rather, I write to express my disappointment over the author's lack of research on certain aspects of the article.

If Ripon intended to portray an analysis of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, you might as well have reprinted Gary Greenberg's trite attack on the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Jerris Leonard. What your correspondent appears to have done was pick up parts of Greenberg's article in the *Washington Monthly* without making any effort to determine the accuracy or validity of statements made by Mr. Greenberg.

The Ripon Society article quotes Mr. Greenberg in his attack on Jerry Leonard as one "with no background in civil rights and, indeed, very little as a lawyer."

A check of the record in Wisconsin would show the error in both charges. Jerry Leonard had an outstanding record in civil rights — as one of the leading sponsors of Wisconsin's open housing law, during his tenure in the Legislature — as well as a fine record as a trial lawyer with one of Milwaukee's largest law firms.

I am distressed by the lack of original research or analysis by the author of the article and disappointed at the Ripon Society's decision to apparently rely on others to do their work for them.

This assessment of the Attorney General's staff leads me to question the basic approach of the article. It is one example of many which I find in reading the piece carefully.

William A. Steiger
Member of Congress

PRIDE


Dear Sir:

The enclosed front page story by Jules Witcover [the *L. A. Times*, January 21, 1970, on the Ripon "juvenile delinquents"] should interest you. Mr. Mitchell has probably done more to make your work known than any one individual. Probably your subscription list will increase and I am sure you will have calls for the issue with the Mitchell story.

Can't say how proud I am of the work Ripon is doing and know that you will not be dissuaded from seeking truths and discussing controversial issues.

Maybe Ripon will have been a small nudge at causing Mr. Mitchell to leave politics — which he very apparently does not understand.

Mrs. Richard M. Link
Pasadena, Calif.



"Damned Radical!!"

A Reply From Elliot L. Richardson

The following statement was cabled to the Ripon Society on February 27 by the Undersecretary of State in response to the editorial on p. 3 and the article on p. 8.

Polemics tend to invite either a reply in kind or studied silence. The charges made on the prior pages of this issue are too serious, however, and the FORUM is too important a journal, to permit succumbing to either impulse. Although space does not permit a point-by-point rebuttal of the charges in these articles, several general points need to be made.

The overall impression conveyed by Mr. Beal and the Ripon editorial of the formulation and execution of United States policy with respect to the Nigerian conflict is totally misleading. Both the article and editorial are replete with overtones of sabotage and convey an impression of a vast conspiracy intent on undercutting the President's policy of humanitarian relief. These excesses of verbal overkill and of moral outrage do not assist intelligent and responsible analysis.

Apart from its specific and numerous distortions of fact, Mr. Beal's article and the accompanying editorial are based on a series of fundamental misconceptions concerning United States policy toward the Nigerian conflict and the foreign policy processes, which are worthy of correction.

1. The President's statement of February 22 indicated that the United States would "draw a sharp distinction between carrying out our moral obligation to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others." The President ordered a new emphasis on effective relief as a first priority. He appointed C. Clyde Ferguson as special coordinator to the relief effort. Ambassador Ferguson expended immense efforts to resolve the intractable obstacles to increased relief flows, shuttling back and forth among Washington, Geneva, Lagos, London, Paris, Addis Ababa and the Biafran enclave. His mandate included, from the outset, the seeking of an agreement between the combatants which would permit increased relief flows to Eastern Nigeria. His first set of proposals for such an agreement was personally presented by him to both sides in March.

When the International Red Cross decided to terminate its night relief flights, after one of its planes had been shot down by the federal air force, we turned with increasing urgency to the negotiation of a daylight relief airlift. On September 13 General Gowon personally approved a daylight relief program. Citing an array of technicalities, the Biafran authorities rejected the Lagos agreement even after the United States had endorsed Federal assurances with respect to the inviolability of the daylight operations. Instead, several days later, they suddenly accepted the so-called Cross River proposal — at a time when the low water level in the river drastically reduced the capacity of this route. The severity of the malnutrition problems now faced in Eastern Nigeria is in large part attributable to the Biafran leadership's determination to persist in increasingly unrealistic military and political objectives, despite the ever-increasing suffering of its civilian population.

2. On the political side, the President reaffirmed in February the prior administration's policy of neutrality and arms embargo and endorsed an early negotiated end to the conflict. I personally emphasized our support for such a resolution of the conflict before the Kennedy Subcommittee on July 15. We established a special office directed to the encouragement and sup-

port of such a political settlement. The Department of State has never followed a so-called "quick-kill" approach, and any charge to the contrary is not only false but outrageous. Since the conflict started, the United States Government has contributed some \$65,000,000 in support of the relief efforts.

3. Mr. Beal's article and the editorial evidence curious misconceptions of the foreign policy process. For example, the response expected to a decision of the National Security Council is execution, not departmental press releases. Implementation of the February 14 National Security Council decision started immediately. Second, despite inherent institutional dialogues, there has been the closest coordination and cooperation between the White House and this Department at every stage of this problem. For example, in this as in other cases, all important policy messages to the field were reviewed by the White House staff.

4. The critical argument made by Mr. Beal in support of his charge of "insubordinate delay" relates to the presentation of Dr. Western's report to the Nigerian authorities. The argument is based on a series of unsupportable premises:

A. That the Nigerian Government was completely unaware that they had a major relief problem;

B. That a forceful presentation of the Western Report during the first week after the war's end would, in a situation of disruption and conflicting reports, have had a critical beneficial impact on the flow of relief supplies to Eastern Nigeria; and

C. That the subsequent presentation of the report enraged the Nigerian Government because we had lulled it into accepting its own inadequate estimates.

In fact, the critical problem in the early weeks after the fighting stopped was not convincing the Nigerian Government that the need was very great — they were aware of this, as General Gowon publicly acknowledged — but the logistical problem of actually getting the food to the people most in need. It was to this need that the President's offer of funds, planes and equipment was directed, and it was to this need that the Nigerian Government turned its efforts, although it insisted on adherence to its previously announced policy that all relief be provided through Nigerian organizations. During the weeks following the Biafran collapse, the actual movement of food and medicine certainly fell far short of even the Nigerian Government's own estimate of the need. But this was attributable to the suddenness of the Biafran collapse, the disruption in Eastern Nigeria, the sudden need to extend Nigerian organization, and, above all, the Nigerian lack of transport.

I do not mean to minimize the desperate condition of the Eastern Nigerian population during the conflict and immediately after the cessation of hostilities. The suffering has been very great. By common consent of qualified observers, conditions now have substantially improved. Relief shipments into the war zone have been twice the highest rate ever achieved by the airlift. Major problems, however, remain for the Nigerian Government, which is seeking further substantial increases in the flow of relief.

The editorial raises in a general sense a real issue in any democratic society: the responsiveness of professional "bureaucracy" to decisions made and direction given by those directly responsible to the people. But the conduct of United States policy toward the Nigerian conflict is not an example of this general problem.