

RIPON FORUM


JUNE, 1971

VOL. VII, No. 6

ONE DOLLAR

The SALT Talks and the Strategic Balance

by Stan Sienkiewicz



PLUS:

The Emerging Rockefeller Majority

by Glenn S. Gerstell

The Service - Station State

by George Gilder

Inside HEW with Leon Panetta

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THE SALT TALKS & THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

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INTERLOCKING EDITORSHIPS

Despite official proclamations after the 1970 elections that the Republican party would have a new position of openness to all wings of the party and all ideological strains, the Republican National Committee publication Monday began to take on a more rigid ideological line. The first sign was a failure to list welfare reform as an important Nixon priority. And since then there has been careful attention to Senator James Buckley, attacks on Common Cause, and steady warfare on the Washington Post and the New York Times.

The reason appears to be the new editor, John D. Lofton, Jr., who divides his editorial skills among the National Committee, the National Review and the Young Americans for Freedom. Lofton is listed as one of three associate editors of New Guard, the publication of YAF. Lofton contributes initialed book reviews to William F. Buckley, Jr.'s National Review.

The staff on Monday consists of Lofton and an editorial assistant, Pam Pitzer. Lofton's superior at the RNC is Lyn Nofziger, former "Communications Director" for Ronald Reagan. No one represents moderate or liberal opinion within the GOP, yet Monday is increasingly quoted in the press as an official expression of Republican opinion.

THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in thirteen cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of subchapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor \$25 or more; Sustainer \$100 or more; Founder \$1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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Editors: Evelyn F. Ellis, George Gilder.

Technical Editor: John Woodman.

Contributors: Christopher W. Beal, Duncan K. Foley, Douglas Matthews, William D. Phelan, Jr., David Omar White.

Circulation Dept.: Judith D. Behn.

Correspondents

Mrs. Barbara Mooney, Conn.
 Mike Halliwell, California
 James F. McCollum, Jr., Florida
 Michael McCrery, Idaho
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 J. Kenneth Doka, Indiana
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EDITORIAL

LESS MEANS MORE

It now appears that the success or failure of Richard Nixon's presidency, as well as the identity of his Democratic opponent in 1972 — may be deeply affected by an issue which every leading politician talks about but none understands. That issue goes under various names: liberals call it national priorities; conservatives call it national security; doomsday adventists like the Alsop brothers call it Armageddon. But it all comes down to the question of how much money we will spend on the defense budget — more specifically, how Congress should respond to the Pentagon's demand for various new strategic weapons systems like ABM, the B-1 bomber and the F-14 fighter at a time when the Soviet Union is apparently expanding its strategic panoply. And though the participants in the debate all have important arguments to make, none of them has put the issues into valid perspective. As a result both the debating points and the policy choices have been dangerously falsified, and both the President and his critics are rushing to impale themselves on the horns of a spurious dilemma. Both are taking positions that would weaken our security.

The divisions are fairly clear. Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, the Administration and their allies in the press cite the new Soviet programs as evidence that the new Pentagon programs are urgently needed. Defense Department Research Director John Foster, a suavely persuasive 49 year old who has held high Pentagon positions under three Presidents, now discloses an impending Soviet lead in research and development and urges that we go ahead immediately with the whole gamut of new Pentagon proposals.

The liberals, on the other hand, disparage the alleged Soviet gains, point to "our disordered national priorities," and call for substantial cuts in defense spending. They also call for renewed efforts at the SALT negotiations, which they regard as something of a last chance to limit an arms race allegedly "spiraling" toward doomsday. By their emphasis on the uncontrollable momentum of arms technology unless limited by negotiated agreements, they seem to accept the Pentagon claim that it has no choice but to respond to new Soviet deployment. But closer scrutiny would suggest further divisions in Democratic ranks. There are liberals like Hubert Humphrey who disguise an es-

sential acceptance of Pentagon arms race theory with loud demands for disarmament treaties; and there are those who urge disarmament treaties with any arguments at hand but in fact would promote various limited schemes of unilateral disarmament if it were politically feasible. The liberals are nearly unanimous, however, in decrying the disarray of our national priorities. The notion that the Administration is placing excessive emphasis on national defense has become Democratic party line.

The politics of the defense issue are complicated by the President's own deep stake in spending reductions. Without some retrenchment in defense, there will not be enough money to lend real impact to his welfare and revenue sharing programs; and unless the Administration can commit substantial funds in these two areas, its domestic record will be difficult to promote in 1972 amid the desperate din of protests from city and state officials. Nixon is not so strong that he can be re-elected without relieving at least some of the nation's domestic distresses. The present trend on the defense budget, however, together with already mandated federal spending increases would use up most of the funds available for new domestic programs, even if the war is ended soon.

In these terms — the terms of the present debate — President Nixon's dilemma would seem to be nearly insoluble. The President will have nothing of the contention that he places defense too high on our list of national priorities. He rightly believes that defense, and more specifically, strategic deterrence, must be our very highest imperative. The President knows he can win any debate on the question of "taking risks for peace" if his opponent advocates the risk of a weaker defense posture. Military strength is indispensable to preserving the peace in a world of nation-states not notably governed by pacifists.

Nixon's commitment to an unflagging military effort is surely deepened by the huge new Soviet commitments. Although the exact figures are controversial, such ordinarily objective analysts as London's Institute for Strategic Studies corroborates Foster's estimate that for the last several years, the Russians have been spending substantially more on strategic weapons — particularly on research and development — than the United States. The Soviet Union is gaining a substantial numerical lead in land based ICBM's and because their missiles car-

ry much larger payloads than ours, Soviet offensive potential will be awesome indeed when they master MIRV technology. The new Soviet missiles may accommodate far more independently targeted warheads than our smaller Minuteman and submarine launched systems. Although the doomsday adventists are preposterous in predicting a Soviet first strike capability, they are probably right in their contention that the Soviets may become more aggressive — more prone to miscalculate U.S. responses — if they acquire a substantial lead in accurately deliverable megatonnage. Soviet confidence, moreover, may become particularly overbearing if John Foster, who should know, is correct in ascribing to them a lead in technological research and development which means that “in the next five years breakthroughs in military technology will tend to occur in the Soviet Union rather than in the United States.” This change, which will introduce an unsettling unknown into the calculations of U.S. defense planners, is more dangerous than the measurable increases in Soviet missile strength.

In a sense, the new Soviet deployments merely give the USSR the kind of offensive capability which the U.S. has long possessed. Against such a heavily deployed modern offense, both sides are pitiful helpless giants, incapable of effective defense, capable only of Samsonesque retaliation. The Soviet deployments, in fact, are less plausible as a first strike posture, capable of preempting retaliation, than the American strategic stance, since the Russians depend more on immobile land-based missiles vulnerable to increasingly accurate American weapons. Yet the Pentagon is not entirely illogical in finding first strike portents in those SS-9's. War games will show that the current strategic balance gives the attacker an overwhelming advantage in destructive effect — and a greater possibility of minimizing damage — though it will be more difficult for the “winner” to appreciate his gains amid the radioactive rubble of his nation than beside a table at the Rand Corporation.

Nonetheless even these relative gains — after years of abject inferiority to the U.S. — may increase Soviet belligerence in a crisis.

One concludes, then, that Nixon is essentially right in placing deterrence first among national priorities and in showing deep concern over the changing strategic situation. One also may conclude that his most vocal opponents — McGovern, Fulbright and Symington — have been too ready to dismiss Administration alarms about the Soviet threat. It is ironic that this Administration, the first to face a relatively menacing Soviet buildup, is also the first to be widely disbelieved in its strategic alarms.

None the less it will be disastrous for his Administration and the country if the President concludes from these assumptions about the Soviet threat and the paramount priority of defense that current Pentagon demands — even in the somewhat diminished form they are being presented to the Congress — are sacrosanct and that military spending cannot be reduced. For in fact the new Soviet threat dictates a complete reappraisal of current defense priorities. The mistakes of the past are well illustrated by the fact that after a decade when the U.S. spent over twice as much on defense as the Soviet Union, John Foster can disclose that we are falling behind in the area that matters most: technological development.

Our blunders have fallen into a regular pattern. We have consistently overreacted to current or impending threats, often illusory, while failing to prepare for future exigencies. We have spent far too much on procuring current technology, even if obsolescent, and have failed to plan intelligently for future developments. Our present defense budget proposes more of the same — more money and manpower to be squandered on the refining and embellishing of obsolescent weapons in the service of futile strategies — while we spend too little on basic research and development, and while we fail to submit all our defense programs to overall strategic criteria.

The result again is a series of weapons systems that are technically sophisticated but conceptually and strategically retarded. In the past decade the U.S. has wasted at least \$100 billion on misconceived weapons systems. The ABM is characteristic — a dazzling combination of technologies assigned to defend obsolescent land based missiles at a cost far beyond the value of the ICBM's it protects or of the ICBM's attacking them. Similarly retarded are the projected F-14 fighters, designed to defend carriers which are themselves obsolescent, and the B-1 bomber, a technical marvel of little utility and vast expense. The defense budget is full of such futile extravagances which we may have been able to afford in the past but cannot any longer.

It is precisely because the Soviet Union is expanding its offensive spending and deployment and may be taking a lead in research and development that we must summarily jettison such systems. It is because Senator Jackson and Defense Secretary Laird may be generally right about the Soviet threat that they are hopelessly wrong about the ABM, the F-14 fighter, the B-1 bomber, the attack carriers and the other Pentagon programs which are being cogently criticized by Members of Congress for Peace Through Law. These systems

were never desirable; but to support them today, when our deterrent may be compromised by new Soviet programs, opens the Administration legitimately to the charge that it is weakening America. Our military programs pose a far greater threat to our own security than to our adversaries.

These programs are far worse than a prodigal misuse of money and resources, however. Not only do they fail to contribute in any significant way to our security, but also and most importantly at a time of major Soviet gains in R&D, these programs divert and dissipate our most valuable scientific manpower. We can no longer afford to have billions of dollars worth of technical personnel working on complicated weapons systems that will never contribute to our defense. The failure of liberals to understand this point is exemplified by their alternative to last year's ABM proposal: stop deployment but spend 700 million dollars in R&D for a system that they know is strategically misconceived. Only Senator Margaret Chase Smith perceived this lunacy for what it was. But the Admin-

istration is no less fatuous in its acceptance of Pentagon contentions that real Soviet gains in offense and R&D justify further spending on current U.S. weapons already outdated.

The fact is that Nixon's supposed dilemma is spurious. He can drastically cut defense spending while at the same time increasing our national strength and security. He can halt the expensive over-reaction to anticipated Soviet deployments and initiate far cheaper programs to assure our technological leadership. He can find money to expand his most far-reaching domestic programs, while at the same time greatly excelling the strategic performance of his predecessor and giving employment to our jobless scientists and technicians. In political terms he can take the initiative from the Democrats who are beginning to display an obscurantist fear of science and technology. Contrary to Democratic alarms, leadership in R & D can give us the confidence to resist Pentagon demands and can be an alternative, not a stimulus, to expensive deployments.

Political Notes

MASSACHUSETTS: EMK's game plan

The most recent evidence that Massachusetts' Senior Senator Edward M. Kennedy is keeping his options open for the 1972 Presidential race has been his involvement in reshaping his home state's Presidential Preference Primary laws.

The present law was adopted in 1966. It requires all delegates elected to be bound for one roll call at the Convention to the candidate who wins the Presidential Preference poll which is on the same ballot. This law created considerable embarrassment to party leaders in 1968 when Eugene McCarthy and Nelson Rockefeller won their respective preference contests. Pro-Humphrey and pro-Nixon party bosses were forced to go through the excruciating experience of voting against their private choice in front of all the home-folks on national TV.

The law was amended in 1969 to add an Oregon-type disclaimer provision so that all prospective candidates would be listed on the ballot unless they signed a statement asserting that they did not intend to run for President.

The prospect of upsetting the applecart in 1972 was apparently too much for Kennedy. Several bills further democratizing the law were before Massachusetts' Joint Legislative Committee on Election Laws this session. Under the careful eye and precise draftsmanship of the Committee's staffer, long-time Kennedy associate Carl Johnson, and at the reported urging of Kennedy aides, the Committee reported out a bill which

would repeal the preference primary, not meet several of the guidelines of the McGovern Commission, and permit what Kennedy wants and what would have been impossible before — an unpledged delegation.

House Republican Floor Leader Frank Hatch (R-Beverly) called the bill an "almost unbelievable step backward" and has publicly urged Kennedy to disavow his support. Hatch is trying to garner votes for his proposals which include provisions which would bar unpledged delegates, and would require delegates to vote for their stated preference until the candidate releases them.

Passage of the Kennedy-backed bill is key to the Senator's game plan. Without it the Massachusetts delegation will likely include a host of renegades with binding commitments to other Presidential hopefuls.

Of course, the Hatch law could affect President Nixon as well. A serious primary challenge from the left would have a fair shot at succeeding. The prospect of casting votes for a McCloskey, Goodell, or Lindsay at the Republican Convention must be giving Senator Brooke and Governor Sargent some food for thought.

THE NATION: ipse dixit department

"It may be that Agnew's day will be over; that like Manolete, he will have killed the bull which, however, also will have succeeded in killing him. In that event Agnew would not be able to deliver the help in marginal states that Reagan could deliver." So saith William F. Buckley, Jr., May 7, 1971. It seems only yesterday that columnist Buckley was touting Agnew as a man of presidential stature. But of course, that was last fall, when the Vice President was still blood-stained from killing the bull for brother Jim.

In point of fact, Agnew could still help Nixon in marginal states like Tennessee, North Carolina and Florida. But he need not be a candidate to campaign effectively. Agnew has already gone on the public record with a pledge to campaign for President Nixon, even if he is not on the ticket himself.

The marginal states where Agnew hurts — Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin and Iowa — are not more likely to swing behind Nixon-Reagan. The swing voters who deserted the GOP in these states in 1970 are moderate, middle-class folk, who don't cotton to ideological overkill.

ALABAMA: preliminary bouts; Varner confirmed

Republican National Committeeman James D. Martin of Gadsden has joined Postmaster General Winton M. Blount in the lineup of probable GOP Senate candidates for 1972. Martin supporters still recall how he came within 6,000 votes of unseating former U.S. Senator Lister Hill in 1962; they forget, however, that the election was held a month after the James Meredith episode at Ole Miss, which did little for the popularity of Southern Democratic moderates like Lister Hill.

Although Blount has not declared himself, a committee of state GOP leaders launched a Blount for Senate campaign last March. The Postmaster General, who left a multimillion-dollar construction business behind in Montgomery when he went to Washington, can be expected to appeal to middle- and upper-class whites and to the business interests in the general election — or in a primary, if the GOP decides to have one. These are the same voters who, even with the help of some 250,000 blacks, were unable to give Albert P. Brewer the Democratic gubernatorial nomination last year over George C. Wallace. (In fact, since Blount and other GOP figures were known to be backing Brewer, one of Wallace's most effective campaign gambits was a sneering reference to Blount's "\$750,000 house with the 26 bathrooms.")

Martin, though more of a low-brow than Blount, has been a leader of the conservative wing of the state GOP and would have the same basic appeal. It is hard to imagine any circumstances under which either Martin or Blount would get black support in the general election. Thus, though the race for the GOP Senate nomination may be interesting, the election itself could be another Republican disaster.

It appears likely that incumbent John Sparkman will again seek the Democratic nomination. Sparkman has mostly kept his mouth shut on civil rights, and has voted for just enough progressive measures to be vaguely thought of as a man of the people. These attributes, using the term advisedly, should guarantee him the votes of Alabama's numerous blacks and poor whites against either Republican.

It is not inconceivable that Sparkman could be challenged by Brewer, who finished out the late Lurleen Wallace's term as governor and is now practicing law in Montgomery. Brewer did not get the votes of low-income whites in 1970, and he won the black vote by default, rather than for anything he had ever done

or said. In a Democratic primary against Sparkman, the black vote would go to the highest bidder, but Brewer could be expected to pull a heavy sympathy vote from whites who knew he had done a decent job as governor but nevertheless voted against him in 1970.

* * *

Robert E. Varner of Montgomery, whose nomination was opposed by civil rights groups, liberals, Republican moderates and even Wallaceites, has been confirmed and sworn in as a U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Alabama.

Protests from the unusual coalition arrayed against Varner and President Nixon's first choice for the post, Walter Byars of Montgomery, had kept the job open since the spring of 1970. Even after Varner was nominated last year, the Senate Judiciary Committee dragged its heels on confirmation, so that the nomination lapsed and had to be renewed in the current session of Congress.

Members of the Senate Committee, particularly Birch Bayh of Indiana, did not appear overly impressed by Varner's qualifications, and might have been persuaded to kill the nomination. But not one representative of the groups that protested Varner's nomination ever appeared to testify against him, leaving the committee little choice. Such is the current state of the civil rights-liberal movement in Alabama.

There is always room for hope, however, that the robes of judicial office will have a broadening effect on Varner's outlook and understanding. It has happened before to other men.

NEW YORK: Buckley goes a wooing

New York's freshman Senator James L. Buckley is out to win over the Republican Party, and most indications are that he's succeeding. Although he ran last year as a Conservative against a Republican incumbent (Goodell), and remains a "hyphenated" Senator in Washington (Conservative-Republican), his emphasis since his dramatic win has clearly been on the Republican side of the hyphen.

As one of the most sought-after speakers in the country, Buckley has charted a modest, but strategic national schedule; including a visit to Philadelphia last month where the crew-cut Senator, in the midst of kind and generous words for both Pennsylvania Senators, cited the many virtues and abilities of Hugh Scott (who hosted a cocktail fund-raising party for Charles Goodell last fall) and applauded Scott's performance as leader of "our party" in the Senate. Scott responded by placing Buckley's speech in the Congressional Record with some praise of his own: "... there is no question where the Senator from New York stands in his support of the Republican principles. His recent speeches have set this tone. His articulation in support of President Nixon's program to return government to the people comes across loud and clear... These penetrating and progressive ideas provide the guidelines to the thinking and motivation of this attractive addition to the Senate, the junior Senator from New York..."

In addition, the upstate New York GOP organization is being quietly and effectively wooed. Buckley's

office already has better relations with many county chairmen than Goodell ever took the time to develop in his two Senate years. His executive assistant, Thomas E. Cole, is familiar with the State's Republican terrain, having served with an upstate Congressman for several years; and has made it a point to encourage a sense of cooperation not only with leaders back home, but also with the New York GOP House delegation and their staffs.

Recent manifestations of this policy are an invitation to House Republican staffers for a drink and conversation with Buckley; and a meeting arranged by the Senator with House members to discuss his "revenue-shifting" alternative to "revenue-sharing." For House members, who often are jealous of the attention given to Senators anyway, this is a refreshing change from the ambivalent attitude both Javits and Goodell have had for their House colleagues.

THE CONGRESS: last of the small-time savers

When big-spending New Deal Democratic Representative Wayne Hays of Ohio proposed increasing investigative funds for the House Internal Security Committee (formerly HUAC) by \$120,000, nearly five out of six Republican Representatives, including such would-be fiscal conservatives as H. R. Gross (Iowa), Joel Broyhill (Virginia), and Samuel Devine (Ohio) snapped into line. The Ripon Society salutes the brave twenty-five who voted or were paired against this waste of tax dollars in an age when President Nixon is doing all he can to hold the line on spending:

| | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| Biester (PA) | Heckler (MASS) |
| Conte (MASS) | Mailliard (CAL) |
| Coughlin (PA) | McCloskey (CAL) |
| Dellenback (ORE) | McDade (PA) |
| DuPont (DEL) | McKinney (CONN) |
| Dwyer (NJ) | Morse (MASS) |
| Edwards (ALA) | Mosher (OHIO) |
| Forsythe (NJ) | Railsback (ILL) |
| Frelinghuysen (NJ) | Reid (NY) |
| Frenzel (MINN) | Riegle (MICH) |
| Gude (MD) | Schwengel (IOWA) |
| Halpern (NY) | Stafford (VT) |
| | Whalen (OHIO) |

THE NATION: entering from stage right . . .

President Nixon has problems. It is not merely that the public opinion polls show him losing support, it is that Republicans are dissatisfied with his administration. GOP conservatives feel that they have the Vice President and the rhetoric but not the Administration's policies. Progressive Republicans, on the other hand, believe that the stated policies, such as the Family Assistance Plan and the Philadelphia Plan, are meaningless unless they are made top political priorities — unless they are supported by the necessary rhetoric and what Pat Moynihan called "second and third order advocacy." Finally, the Republican regulars — the non-

ideological state legislators, county chairmen, precinct workers — are unhappy because of the administration's handling of patronage, and because they believe the tone of the Administration cost them elections last November.

The conservative journals, like *National Review* and *Human Events*, are making it very clear that the Nixon administration has not lived up to their expectations or desires. Senator Barry Goldwater, writing in *Human Events*, argues that "concessions to long-held liberal doctrine have won Mr. Nixon nothing but criticism" from liberals, while M. Stanton Evans, chairman of the American Conservative Union, complains in its monthly publication, *Battle Line*, that conservatives haven't learned to exert their influence, particularly on Nixon, as effectively as the liberals have. Conservatives are consistently warning that if Nixon takes them for granted he will lose their support and the election in 1972.

The conservative position is summarized in the May issue of *New Guard*, the monthly magazine of the Young Americans for Freedom, by Jeffrey Bell, Executive Director of the American Conservative Union:

... the most urgent problem facing Nixon strategists is not how to expand their narrow-victory base of 1968 — but how to regain the enthusiasm of the base itself, and, ultimately, the full measure of its electoral support. Once the activist enthusiasm with the 1968 Nixon areas and constituencies has been mobilized, expansion of the base will be relatively easy.

Bell acknowledges that conservatives may have no alternative to Nixon in 1972, but cautions that no candidate has won the presidency without enthusiastic support from his power base.

However, there is one conservative candidate who is not merely waiting in the wings for a call to audition before the GOP convention. He appears to be preparing for a dramatic entrance onto the stage in what may be the last major performance of his career. Indeed, the *New Guard*, which has made an open break with President Nixon, is already hinting that it will support Ronald Reagan.

The California Governor is making sure that the President can't ignore him as he plans for 1972. Implicit in both Reagan's veto of federal OEO funds for the California Rural Legal Assistance Program and his request for variances in HEW regulations for federally-assisted welfare programs is the threat to be an active contender at the 1972 GOP convention. On these issues Reagan's negotiating position is firm, boxing Nixon into a corner. Politically, Nixon would like to be able to appease all of Reagan's demands for federal cooperation in implementing a conservative philosophy in California government.

But there are limits to how much the President can comply with Reagan's requests. This is particularly true when they rest on as flimsy a foundation as the charges of illegal activities by the CRLA staff, or when Reagan demands the elimination of key principles — such as the work incentive elements of federal welfare programs — to which Congress has committed the executive branch. Reagan admits that his welfare proposals require exemption from provisions of the Social Security Act, but claims this can be done under a "waiver provision" that was designed for small-scale experiments.

It appears that Reagan will push the Nixon ad-

ministration with special conservative requests until Washington finally can only respond "No." Then, the California Governor will throw up his hands and reluctantly announce to the country,

We simply don't have a government in Washington which is sympathetic to our conservative views. It is my duty as governor of the largest state in the union, as governor of a state which has indicated it wants a conservative government, to carry our philosophy to the nation as a presidential candidate.

California does not have a presidential preference primary; party members select an at-large delegation which may be pledged to a particular candidate or may be uncommitted. Reagan has announced publicly he will head a broadly-based delegation pledged to Richard Nixon. However, the election law has recently been modified to permit a write-in candidate to request, as late as eight days before the June 6th primary, that his write-in vote be counted. If the write-in candidate wins, he then has ten days to name his own delegation.

This means that although California law requires a delegation to file nomination papers by March 24th, Reagan has until the end of May to decide if he wants to enter the California primary in his own right. If he wins as a write-in candidate he can then name a delegation which supports him.

In 1968, Strom Thurmond and John Tower were the men who held the Southern delegations for Nixon; Reagan was able to win a majority of only the North Carolina delegation. In 1972, these two Senators are up for reelection and the National Review Bulletin claims that both plan to run campaigns "independent" of Nixon. With Nixon's key lieutenants deserting, Reagan could win significant support from Southern delegations by promising to operate a true-blue conservative federal government.

The National Review Bulletin claims that Nixon will not face a conservative opponent unless Congressman Paul McCloskey or someone else is first successful with a challenge from the left. However, it does confess:

The possibility of a Reagan candidacy exists, even if the President is a candidate. Reagan has the potential luxury of being a troublesome favorite son from California, a role he makes no public noise about wanting to play but which he does not talk down so much in private.

If possible, Reagan will undoubtedly claim that a progressive Republican challenge has so weakened Nixon that he (Reagan) is the only conservative who can win for the GOP. However, this is only a minor subplot. After all, in 1968 Reagan looked long and hard for an excuse to get in the race, and when no legitimate one materialized, he simply announced his candidacy anyway.

The continuing political blackmail on the questions of conservative government is the important drama to watch.

KENTUCKY: if at first

Republicans in Kentucky have hired Civic Services, the same firm that "managed" the Burton Senate campaign (and loss) in Utah last year.

The Louisville Courier-Journal and the Lexington

Herald have both publicized widely the unfavorable comments of Utah state GOP officials, leaving Governor Nunn and GOP gubernatorial hopeful Tom Emberton somewhat embarrassed.

Emberton has no Republican opposition, but there is a Democratic gubernatorial primary on May 25. The FORUM will report the results next month.

WASHINGTON: Hickel and the "gun-shy" network

When former Interior Secretary Walter J. Hickel accepted Ripon's First Annual Man of the Year award he planned to have his speech carried live on NBC's 234 local radio affiliates across the country. A commercial sponsor offered to pay.

But after seeing Hickel's prepared text, the NBC management, on the advice of one of its attorneys, refused to carry the speech, claiming that certain portions might be considered controversial and stations that broadcast the speech might be required, under rulings of the Federal Communications Commission, to allow air time to those who wanted to give an opposing point of view.

However, Hickel's remarks, entitled "Wanted: A New Breed of Leader," contained no specific criticism of present or past government leaders according to Daryl Lembke in the Los Angeles Times. Mr. Hickel criticized the business sector for spawning men of action who are sometimes "short of ideals" and the academic community for producing men of ideals who don't know how to "make things happen." He called for a "new breed" of politician to combine the best of both worlds.

Hickel, in a Seattle press conference, said that NBC cited as "controversial" the following paragraph in his text:

There might be too many people in government. I won't argue with that. It may be misdirected. I won't argue with that. But I'll argue until I die that there is not enough government in the areas which are choking the living of life in modern America — areas such as transportation, the environment and the urban crisis.

Hickel continued that he couldn't "blame" the National Broadcasting Company. "I can understand the networks being gun-shy in view of some events of the past months," he said.

VERMONT: uniform adult rights

Republicans in the Vermont General Assembly have fulfilled their 1970 platform commitment to lower the age of majority. Under the new law, signed by Governor Deane C. Davis in April, every person in Vermont will become a full-fledged adult at age 18. He will be able to enter into binding contracts, sue and be sued, make wills, vote in all elections, marry without parental consent, consume alcoholic beverages — and pay the poll tax.

Vermont thus becomes the first state in the na-

tion to lower the age of majority to 18 in all respects, although other states have legislated some of the privileges of adulthood at 18, notably voting. This is another famous first for Vermont, which long ago became the first state to outlaw slavery and to abolish property requirements for suffrage.

The first bill to lower the age of majority was introduced by Republican John McClaughry (R-Kirby), who had been responsible for the GOP platform plank calling for a lowered age. His bill had a unique option in it: upon reaching age 18, a person could elect to assume all the privileges and responsibilities of adulthood, but was not required to do so.

The House government operations committee spent almost three months developing a complete legislative package. When it emerged, the committee bill left out the optional feature and made 18 the mandatory majority age. It also reduced residency requirements from one year to 90 days for Congressional, state and county elections, and 30 days for Presidential elections. A rather complicated requirement was added to discourage massive electoral impact of college students in small towns, by attempting to define a "permanent" resident.

* * *

And in a speech to the U.S. Senate 78-year-old Vermont Republican George D. Aiken proposed that the Constitution be altered to allow 18-year-olds to become members of Congress. (The Constitution now stipulates that one must be at least 25 to serve in the House and at least 30 to serve in the Senate.)

SOUTH CAROLINA: rural strategy

Democrat Mendel Davis, 28, godson of the late Representative L. Mendel Rivers, won a special election to fill Rivers' seat on April 27. He took every county except populous Charleston and Beaufort. This was in line with his pre-election strategy, modeled after the one used so successfully by Rivers in the past. Charleston was ignored, and the candidate stumped the rural counties — stopping to talk with the people and woo the powerful courthouse gangs at the county seats. At every stop, Davis' association with Rivers was stressed. The result was that rural voters gave Davis a 5000-vote advantage over Republican Dr. James Edwards.

Edwards made infrequent tours of the smaller counties and tried to run a "front porch" campaign from Charleston. He stressed that he was the more conservative candidate and that he was better able to keep Charleston's vast military complex intact because of a Republican in the White House. The people weren't impressed. Campaign appearances by Governor Ronald Reagan, and Senators James Buckley and Barry Goldwater didn't turn the trick either.

From the size of the vote, it seems that blacks turned out in moderate numbers and voted Democratic rather than for Mrs. Victoria DeLee, the black candidate of the United Citizens Party. Mrs. DeLee waged a vigorous campaign but emerged with only slightly over 10 percent of the vote. This election shows that the black voter is not about to abandon the Demo-

crats for a splinter party or a Republican Party which is hostile to his well-being.

The election also pointed out the power still remaining in the rural county seats in the hands of the old-line politicians. The GOP is fatally weak in these areas and the state party leadership is making no attempt to better the situation. The victories in Charleston and Beaufort Counties were victories by default and not by battle: these counties were never essential to the Davis strategy.

THE SOUTH: the forward-lookers of LQC

About 400 persons from all 11 states of the Confederacy, several border states, and the District of Columbia converged upon Atlanta for a remarkable two day symposium of the L. Q. C. Lamar Society held April 30 - May 1. The Lamar Society is a bipartisan biracial group of forward-looking Southerners. The symposium, entitled, "The Urban South: Northern Mistakes in a Southern Setting," drew not only the academics — often the lonely torchbearers for Southern progressivism — but also a remarkable collection of Southern state and city officeholders.

Terry Sanford, President of Duke University and former governor of North Carolina, looking to many like the other half of a Muskie Presidential ticket, delivered a stirring keynote speech asking the Southern governors to create a Southern Regional Growth Board through interstate compacts. Later Sanford chaired a governors' panel including four moderate Southern Democrats, Reubin Askew of Florida, Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Jimmy Carter of Georgia and John West of South Carolina. This panel symbolized most dramatically the arrival of the New South; aside from their draws, these governors talked like their counterparts from other regions about urban sprawl, human rights, restricted tax sources, archaic state constitutions, and other everyday administrative problems. Bumpers, Askew, and Carter all came across as potential nominees for national office in the 1970's or early 1980's.

At dinner Friday evening Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine delivered a speech calling for the creation of a sense of community in our cities, South and North. The Muskie speech was generally well received, although it did not rouse the audience to any great show of emotion. Senator Muskie and his wife spent the night at the residence of Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter.

Saturday morning, former Mayor Dick Lee of New Haven delivered to a panel of Southern mayors a talk urging strong executive leadership in building a humane city. Mayor Lee stated that he had accomplished much in New Haven but admitted that his methods would now be "high-handed," argued that "effective community involvement" was today the key to the creation of a livable city. Mayors Russell Davis of Jackson, Mississippi, Cooper White of Greenville (the only Republican among these) South Carolina and Moon Landrieu of New Orleans, like the governors the day be-

fore, talked of problems similar to those the Mayors of Seattle, New York or Buffalo might discuss. Mayor Davis concluded by inviting next year's Lamar Symposium to Jackson, Mississippi, the home of the Society's name-sake, L. Q. C. Lamar, a former U.S. Senator and Supreme Court Justice who spoke out for national reconciliation after the Civil War.

Throughout the Lamar Society Symposium one could not avoid feeling that the shape of successful politics in the South will be moderate with a taste of populism. While the group of attendees like that of any cross-section of Southerners was predominantly Democratic, it did include a sprinkling of moderate Republicans of consequence from Alabama, Virginia, Texas, and South Carolina as well as top aides to Republican Governors Linwood Holton of Virginia and Winfield Dunn of Tennessee.

Racist politics will persist for a while on a state-wide basis in Mississippi, Alabama and in parts of other states but such politics are rapidly becoming nonproductive in even the Deep South. Republicans who have tried to ride in the Dixiecrat robes are finding themselves in a double bind — they have already written off the growing black vote while the country club atmosphere of many of the state Republican parties repels poor whites. In past years some of these poor whites voted Republican in response to the racial conservatism of some Republican candidates. Now that school desegregation is already a fact in much of the South, Republican promises to slow this process no longer override the party's reputation among poor whites as a country club organization. If the Republican Party is to compete in the South its candidates and officials must develop programmatic appeals to blacks and to poor whites. Otherwise the field will be dominated easily by the Bumpers, Askews, Carters and other Democrats who have sensed the advent of a new era in Southern politics.

TEXAS: unfair share

During the 1970 campaign, Senator John Tower of Texas, chairman of the Senate Republican Campaign Committee, was accused by moderates of dispensing funds inequitably, unduly favoring conservative candidates over moderates. The Senator denied the charges.

This past April 16, Senator Tower spoke at a fundraising dinner in Houston, and according to the New York Times: "To the delight of the Texans, Senator Tower recounted how as chairman of the Senate Republican Campaign Committee last year he had withheld funds from Charles E. Goodell, the New York Republican Senatorial candidate who had incurred opposition from the Nixon Administration."

Senator Tower's staff denies that he said this, or that he shortchanged Charles Goodell. Surely the new chairman of the committee, Peter Dominick of Colorado, is in a position to halt the suspicions and recriminations surrounding the conduct of the committee by discharging his responsibilities with scrupulous fairness in the 1972 campaign, when a good mix of conservatives and moderates will face reelection.

MISSOURI: Danforth ban still stands

After much bitter debate, a proposed amendment to the state constitution which could have set the stage for a 1972 Hearnese-Danforth gubernatorial race is as good as dead. The amendment would have eliminated the two-term limit, allowing Hearnese to run again, while at the same time setting aside the ten-year residency requirement that would keep the popular Republican Attorney General out of the race. Danforth's backers are circulating an initiative petition to set aside the residency requirement, but even with the necessary 100,000 signatures it is doubtful that the governor would call the required special referendum in 1971 (so that it would apply to 1972) since the elimination of the third term ban is not included. The third alternative, a court test of the residency requirement, has been set aside as too lengthy a process.

In the state House the bill itself was first defeated, then passed; in the Senate it is stuck in committee and probably will never emerge. Most House Republicans voted against the bill, which seemed to show that Danforth people had not exerted much pressure upon Republican members. The vote also reflected distaste of three-term governors (particularly Hearnese), displeasure with the "liberal" Danforth, or support for another GOP gubernatorial hopeful, "Buz" King, who has since stepped down from his post as minority leader to prepare for the race. King, who has aspired to the governorship for years and who supported Danforth when he ran for Attorney General and U.S. Senator, abstained.

If Danforth is barred from running, it is a good possibility that State Auditor Kit Bond, who is close to Danforth, will join the race.

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Missouri became the first and only state so far to reject the 18-year-old-vote constitutional amendment. Speeches about student radicals and Berkeley-type takeovers preceded the negative vote in the state Senate.

* * *

In a city-wide election in St. Louis, Republican Joseph Badaracco was reelected president of the Board of Aldermen. Badaracco topped a strong, organized Democratic opponent. Even though his margin of victory was only 2000 votes, it was a very impressive victory, and Badaracco is being mentioned as a mayoralty candidate for 1973. The Democratic majority on the Board of Aldermen, incidentally, immediately retaliated by stripping their president of all his powers.

MICHIGAN: a ripon-black coalition

Detroit's Ripon Society and black Republicans have taken the initial steps in the construction of an informal partnership that will speak out for full commitment by the Republican party to the needs of the poor, black and disadvantaged.

Through the involvement of several officers of the

Wolverine State Republican Organization in the Detroit chapter of Ripon, and the election of a young black Milliken appointee as vice president of the chapter, these philosophical naturals seem to have discovered each other. (The WSRO's objectives are to increase the participation of black people in the Republican party).

At the invitation of WSRO, the Detroit chapter participated in a conference on "The New Black Approach to Republican Politics" on April 24. The Ripon Society presented a panel analysis of the now-defunct "Action Now" program, begun in Detroit four years ago, and subsequently carried onto the national scene by former Michigan Republican Committeewoman and RNC vice chairman Elly Peterson. The program was begun to serve both as a means of social impact in the city (it ran action centers in ghetto areas) and as a way of eventually involving more blacks and city-dwellers in the Republican party. It was dropped by the RNC when it did not return votes quickly enough. As indicated in a forthcoming research paper by the Detroit chapter it was felt that the approach was and is potentially valuable but demands a degree of principled commitment from the party so that it can be allowed to develop more "non-politically."

The panel and audience dialogue broadened into a general discussion of Republican party attitudes towards blacks. Although Michigan's progressive Republican governor, William Milliken, has appointed more blacks to key state positions and commissions than any governor in Michigan's history, there were feelings that increased involvement of blacks is directly dependent upon rewards for hard work and loyalty. Blacks turn away from the Republican party when Independents or Democrats receive subsequent political appointments.

Throughout the day-long conference and dinner at which Robert J. Brown, Special Assistant to President Nixon, and Senator Robert Griffin spoke, conversation turned to the need for sustained support by the party of experimental programs aimed at bringing minorities into the Republican fold, for the ending of tokenism in party positions and the need for leadership training and experience for those traditionally under-represented in GOP party politics.

A coalition of Ripon and blacks might help steer Republican priorities into sensitivity for the plight of ethnic minorities and the socially and educationally disadvantaged.

PENNSYLVANIA: Heinz's best variety

A young (32) moderate-liberal Republican has secured the nomination for the 18th Congressional District of Pennsylvania for a special election in November of this year. He is H.J. Heinz III ("57 varieties"), patrician in style but a fairly hard-headed politician. The seat was vacated by the death of 20-year veteran Bob Corbett (R.) The district, pending redistricting, comprises northern and eastern suburbs of Pittsburgh. It was a "safe" seat for Corbett, but fortunately the 700 or so committee people who did the selecting on May 13 grasped that the 6000-vote Democratic registration edge in the district required a vigorous candidate with bipartisan appeal. (The Democratic opponent is also well-known and well-to-do. His name: John Connelly, a local businessman.) Heinz is definitely the kind of

Republican that progressive former Allegheny county chairman Elsie Hillman has for many years encouraged to seek public office.

The Pittsburgh Ripon chapter provided manpower for the fierce but short fight to win the nomination. The local chapter also tried to put Congressman Pete McCloskey and Heinz together when the former was in Pittsburgh on May 10. But Heinz, properly cautious, spent that day in suburbia digging up votes.

CALIFORNIA: politics of poverty

A Federal team assigned to probe the operation of Governor Reagan's state Office of Economic Opportunity has charged that the agency used its \$800,000 annual Federal grant to monitor and harrass local anti-poverty groups in California.

The team urged that Federal money be withheld after June 30th and that the state agency be abolished unless certain basic changes are made.

The emphasis of the state agency appeared to be on investigation and review rather than assistance as mandated by Federal guidelines.

State OEO Director Lewis Uhler responded with charges of "gross malfeasance" and "breach of commitment" on the part of the Federal OEO office. He claimed that his office had been assured that the report would not be released until May 20th (after the legislative hearing on renewed funding of the agency).

In a hearing before an Assembly committee the state OEO was refused funding in the 1971-72 budget. Criticism came from the Federal report, the California Legislative Analyst, A. Alan Post, CRLA and Republican Assemblyman William Bagley. Bagley said that the state OEO was serving the poor like "an arsonist in charge of the fire department."

* * *

The hearings on California Rural Legal Assistance have run afoul of the OEO feud. State OEO Director Uhler has refused to appear before the three-judge commission to defend his charges in vetoing the legal services project. The judges had understood that they were to sit and hear testimony by CRLA and the state OEO; Governor Reagan and Uhler claim that the panel was supposed to do its own investigating.

Reagan has said that he felt that he was misled by Federal OEO Director Carlucci. But Washington spokesmen explained that no one told the governor that the panel would make its own field investigation. The hearings continue with the CRLA on one side and what its spokesmen call "the phantom accusers" on the other.

As a result, one of the judges appointed by Carlucci has resigned. Oregon state Supreme Court Justice Thomas A. Tongue said in a letter of resignation that the state OEO was not willing to "accept responsibility" to support its charges against CRLA.

* * *

From the California Secretary of State: To date the newly enfranchised 18-to-21-year-old voters are registering Democratic over Republican at a ratio of 3 to 1. A sampling of 14 counties showed registration of 19.4 percent Republican, 58.9 Democratic, .4 American Independent, and 4.7 Peace and Freedom.



Washington Viewpoint

The Service-Station State

As a Republican who has spent much of his time over the last year at Harvard defending the world capitalist system from academic detractors, I greeted the news of John Connally's appointment as Treasury Secretary with all the enthusiasm I would have given the appointment of John Kenneth Galbraith. It was even possible, I believed, that for all his socialist protestations, Galbraith has more respect for the free enterprise system than does this Texas spokesman for the National Security State. Under his leadership, in fact, Texas became a kind of national security service station for enterprises leery of the marketplace; and Connally embodied, in his suave salesmanship, populist touch, and inventory of oils and greases, all the qualities of the Man Who Wears the Star. It is the style of Democratic leadership that made me a Republican and prevented the top Texas oil, cattle and aerospace magnates from joining the party.

In retrospect, however, I suppose I must have had more respect for Connally than did Richard Nixon, who I imagine thought he could *use* the Texas Democrat. Of course, as a rather conventional Republican, I cannot speak for the President. (Speaking for the President is a privilege also often denied Hugh Scott, though often granted to Texas, South Carolina, and Louisiana Democrats). But I will say that the new Treasury Secretary has vindicated my own high expectations for him. He has been promoting the national security well enough to relieve our fears that the President's anti-inflationary program would bankrupt the domestic oil industry. (That industry has in fact been all but exempted from such restrictions). In the event of a war with Canada — a possibility that had escaped the concern of many of us until Russell Long, defending oil quotas in a speech, alerted us to the danger of a coup by expatriate draft dodgers in Ottawa — in any case, we can be assured that a war with Canada will not leave us dependent on wetback oil from Venezuela. Otherwise Connally has been conspicuous in behalf of Boeing, Lockheed, and other businesses seeking national security from the ravages of the free enterprise system.

Such criticism of Connally, of course, bespeaks certain rather lively prejudices on these matters. In a more reflective mood, I am conscious of the man's considerable value as an administrator, analytical mind, public spokesman and private persuader to an Administration in which these qualities are not in surplus. Because Connally represents almost perfectly the most powerful wing of the Democratic Congressional establishment, I grant also that he

will be useful in securing support for Administration programs. And having taken the chance to express my own prejudices on Connally, I think it is fair to let him express some of his on a issue of enormous importance: the role of the U.S. in the world economy.


Connally believes that "The United States did very well in the past when we were a lean and hungry nation. . . [But] now we are rich and the rest of the world is lean and hungry and out to get what we've got. . . So we've got to protect ourselves."

Such views are increasingly heard in this country, particularly among Southern Democrats and within organized labor. Suggestive of a new mercantilism, which assumes that the United States loses when other countries gain in world trade — and that the U.S. can benefit from protectionism — they are views that economists from Milton Friedman to Paul Samuelson have fully confuted.

They are views, I think it is safe to say, that would not be expressed by any of the leading economic advisers of this Administration. They are views that would be rejected by former Secretary Kennedy and by virtually every other man seriously considered by the President for the Treasury post. They are rejected by the President's foreign trade negotiator, Carl Gilbert, and by the chairman of his new council on Foreign Economic policy, Pete Petersen. They reflect a spirit alien to the generally good record of this Administration in foreign economic affairs: its untying and multilateralization of aid, its relaxing of foreign investment controls, its general commitment to free trade. Moreover Connally's attitude — and his willingness to express it publicly in crude terms, along with cavalier comments on the recent monetary crisis — suggests an insensitivity to international economic problems unbecoming in our chief financial spokesman at a time of world financial unrest. Decisions made abroad will affect us all, whether he likes it or not.

I therefore believe — beyond my partisan prejudices against Texan Democrats — that taking into consideration his great personal skills, Connally poses a more serious threat to the record of this Administration and to its ideological and political consistency than any other appointment. We should be alert to the danger that in naming him to the Treasury, Nixon exposed the inner councils of his Administration to the same forces and special interests which under Johnson brought economic sclerosis to the country and defeat to the Democrats.

GEORGE GILDER



How We Created the Allenberry Assembly

On September 19 and 20, 1970 the Ripon Chapters of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh co-sponsored the Allenberry Assembly near Carlisle in central Pennsylvania. Approximately one hundred moderate and liberal Republican men and women came to the Allenberry (a resort motel), to talk about three important statewide issues and to meet other people.

The Allenberry Assembly idea is heartily recommended by its sponsors as a good way to begin to shift Ripon activities in your state to the more directly political. The following thoughts are offered only as a starting place for the planning of such a gathering. It would be impossible to give a complete plan since no two states are alike. Such matters as the state's size and population, its political climate, and the particular inclinations of the sponsors will be the real determinants of the nature of the conference.

COOPT OFFICIALDOM

I. *Support of the "Regular" Republicans.*

Get the support of the GOP in the state, or at least neutralize any opposition. The Pennsylvania group was lucky to have a keynote speech from a sympathetic state chairman, Cliff Jones. Once he accepted the invitation, the use of his name was helpful with persons (such as state legislators and county chairmen), who might otherwise have been wary about coming or even supplying names of other potential participants.

If no support is forthcoming, be sure, nevertheless, to keep party officials informed. A conference that incurs their public hostility is hardly useful to Ripon. It may be that after it goes past the planning state, hostility will turn to interest.

II. *Location.*

Find a place that is central and a little isolated, if possible.

The hotel or motel should be experienced in handling small conventions. This will save you dozens of hours of worrying about the mechanics of rooms and meals. It may also enable you to run your finances through their office.

Go there several weeks prior to the conference

THE AUTHOR

This "how to do it" column will be an irregular feature in the FORUM. This inaugural effort was compiled by James Seif with the editorial assistance of Leah Thayer and Barbara Groninger.

to get a feel for the place and the staff. Make as many arrangements then as possible, including contingency plans for overflow and unexpected guests. Learn what you can and cannot do with the facilities available.

If you succeed in getting a place with nice grounds and a leisurely atmosphere, be sure to leave enough holes in your schedule for people to walk around and enjoy it while they get acquainted. The latter activity, of course, is one reason why you are all there in the first place.

III. *Recruiting.*

Achieve as broad a geographical spread as you can. Just getting participants from two big urban centers makes the conference little more than two regional conferences meeting at the same time and place. Set a goal for each Congressional or state senatorial district. Stick to the goal by giving your recruiters maps and quotas and as much information about the area as possible. Obviously the best procedure is to find interested persons living in the area and to deal with them. The steering committee should be coordinated well enough so that names suggested to one person by his contacts can be acted upon by the individual who is covering the area in question.

Use lists of subscribers to the Ripon FORUM, lists of Republican officials, Christmas card lists, and every other list you can get your hands on. Begin work *at least six* — preferably seven to nine — weeks before the date of the conference. This will help to determine the number of persons who will attend, and you will find that your early conversations and correspondence will help to refine your ideas about the conference.

PLAN AHEAD

A descriptive brochure is helpful, but avoid a slick one. A few mimeographed pages might suffice, and they will be easier to revise as your ideas change.

The main recruiting tool will be the telephone. Don't use it sparingly, even if you feel it's expensive. A personal phone call is very effective, and for those persons you would particularly like to have in attendance, it is essential. The real purpose of written material is to supplement the telephone; it is to give something concrete to persons who are already interested and to provide a registration coupon.

IV. *Finances.*

Don't try to make money; just avoid losing it.

Some speakers may consider themselves as guests of the conference, but see first if they are willing to

come on the same basis (and for the same length of time) as the other conferees. Many will, if the prospects are good for a stimulating gathering where they can meet interesting people.

Other expenses include your phone bills, postage, printing, paper, and possibly pre-conference travel expenses. To prevent the sponsoring committee or your Ripon Chapter from going into debt, here are some suggestions:

a) Add three to five dollars to the price you charge for the conference. This in effect makes the participants themselves the "sponsors."

b) Find some persons interested in subsidizing your project. They can contribute directly, serving as "patrons" or they can sign up as participants and then stay at home.

c) As a *last* resort, arrange to hike the cash bar prices. Everyone else taxes alcohol — you can too!

It is suggested that the price per person be kept under thirty dollars. If the price is greater, then underprivileged persons — like students and wives — may have to stay at home.

V. *Format.*

Use several different formats on your program. The panel discussion is best when you have several good speakers on the same subject. On the other hand if you're dealing with a technical issue have your experts address the whole group and then break up into small discussion groups. Or have several experts circulating among groups. However you choose to discuss the issues, "audience participation" must be encouraged.

Meals are a good forum for better-known speakers, but consider leaving at least one meal free for the participants to talk with each other.

A cocktail party — or two — should be included in the program.

GAB FEST

VI. *Content.*

Besides the problem of "who is coming," the most crucial problem of the conference is "what to talk about." Develop issues that are good for your state. Use practicing politicians as well as scholars to give you ideas (and read the FORUM). Use experts — it doesn't matter whether or not they are well-known — to guide your discussions. Occasionally, you will find that your plans must be tailored to fit the available talent, but careful advance planning should yield valuable results.

You should probably have one session on political technique. The subject is interesting to many potential participants, and it fits one of the goals of the conference. A political advertising man, a pollster, direct-mail expert, a press secretary, somebody who knows what Census '70 means for your state — each

would add something. Some past or present candidates might fit here. What about a discussion of campaign costs?

You may or may not wish to have the conference make statements on the issues discussed:

If you have succeeded in getting together a group which is representative of something (unlikely on the first try) and

If there is consensus, and

If it is politically wise for the sponsoring committee, whether or not it be Ripon, and

If the mechanical difficulties of recording and reporting can be overcome, and

If somebody in power might actually be listening, then go ahead and make statements.

FRONT PAGE NEWS?

VII. *Press.*

The particular situation in your state will determine the news-worthiness of your conference. In any event, there should be releases from your sponsoring committee which will announce the conference, its most important participants, and the like. The larger newspapers, TV and radio should be enough. Special releases can be sent to the home areas of individuals who have some special role at the conference, and who might like the publicity.

VIII. *Follow-up.*

Theoretically, regional or county conferences should precede the statewide effort, since names and experience are a necessary ingredient for the statewide affair. In fact, however, it will probably be a statewide conference that will catch people's interest and in turn spark subsequent regional gatherings. It takes three or four dedicated people to put together a statewide conference; it takes exactly three times that many for three regionals. After a successful statewide affair, however, it will take less effort to make the regionals materialize.

A directory of participants will be a valuable result of your efforts. Compile it either by mailing biographical questionnaires before the conference or by including them in your registration kit and mailing the directory later. (The latter method is suggested, since there will probably be unexpected guests, and since the form can then include a request for suggestions and comments on the conference.)

In your recruiting material include a coupon space for those who are interested but can't come because of other commitments. These names should be part of the directory so that they can be included in future activities.

After the directory is mailed, and the bills are paid, and the thank you letters are written, your sponsoring committee should consider producing an "instruction sheet" like this one. The experience you gain in your state can then be made useful to others.

The Emerging Rockefeller Majority

Not long after the 1970 elections New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller obliquely let it be known that a decade of frustration hadn't quelled his desire to be President. While ritually endorsing Nixon's reelection, Rockefeller said that if Nixon chose not to run "that's a whole new ball game." It probably will be a new ball game, as well, if Nixon, though still running for reelection, is rendered vulnerable by the war, the economy or by weak showings in preliminary primaries. That signal was enough to recall to Rockefeller watchers those flashes from the past: the Summit of Fifth Avenue, Rocky starting down the yahoos at the Cow Palace, the flashy, fitful campaign of '68. But the odds are that Rockefeller's fourth try for the White House, if there is one, will be quite different from his earlier ones — partly because of the lessons he learned in losing, but largely because of the momentum gained from his latest — and most impressive gubernatorial victory.

GAINS WITHOUT LOSSES

Rockefeller's reelection was accomplished by a dramatic change in the makeup of his supporters. Not only did the Governor capture the votes of the more conservative (and Democratic) sections of the electorate, but he did it while holding onto the bulk of his liberal supporters, which, in New York politics, is no mean feat.

Throughout the 1966 campaign the Governor appeared more liberal than his Democratic opponent, Frank O'Connor, but in 1970 the Governor was clearly and deliberately the more conservative. In his third term, bowing to conservative pressures, the Governor ordered cutbacks in welfare and Medicaid payments. His refusal to condemn Nixon's handling of the war was interpreted by many as implicit support. His lack of strong identification with blacks and other minorities (as compared to, say, Lindsay's) and his running disagreements with Mayor Lindsay did not endear him to those liberals who supported him four years earlier.

Yet the liberals' fangs were pulled. During his years in office Rockefeller gave more state aid to the cities (as measured by any criterion) than any previous administration, and in particular his personal plan

for state revenue-sharing with localities promised to help the urban situation considerably. Budget cuts of 1969 were restored in 1970. And, of course, if not for Rockefeller's insistence, the Republican State Committee would never have nominated Senator Charles Goodell for his first full term.

The dramatic shift in Rockefeller's constituency is most clearly seen in New York City, whose 68 state Assembly districts were ranked according to priority by Rockefeller's New York City Campaign Chief, Fioravante Perrotta (who is mentioned by many as a possible mayoral candidate in 1973). Priority One districts were the conservative Democratic areas that accounted for 45 percent of the City vote and were mainly "blue-collar" Roman Catholic and Irish, Italian or German; Priority Two districts were the more moderate to liberal districts that had 43 percent of the total City vote and were predominantly Jewish; and finally Priority Three districts were very liberal and very Democratic (with 11 percent of the vote) and were black and Puerto Rican.

INDIAN GIVER REPUBLICANS

The whole election really hinged on the "swing Democrats" of Priority One. In general, they were second- or third-generation immigrants who had generally voted Democratic, but dissatisfied with the "permissiveness" of the Democratic administrations, voted Republican for the first time in 1968. They quickly went back to their old party to vote for Mario Procaccino over John Lindsay the following year. In 1966, only 38 percent of these voters went for Rockefeller, but the Perrotta strategy raised that figure to an astounding 56 percent in 1970. This was accomplished while the Priority Two districts slipped only 4 points from their 1966 total, from 44 percent to 40 percent; surprisingly, the Priority Three areas dropped only from 30 percent to 28 percent — much greater black losses had been expected.

On the Assembly District level, when one ranks the districts in order of 1970 Rockefeller percentage and compares that with the 1966 percentage, the shift in constituency is dramatically presented. For example, the "silk stocking district" (East Side liberal Republican A.D.'s 66, 64, and 62) which was John Lindsay's home district, were #1, 2, and 3, respectively, in rank of '66 Rockefeller vote; in 1970, however, these districts dropped in rank to #14, 15, and 16. On the other hand, the most conservative districts in the City, which were ranked #1, 2, and 3 this

THE AUTHOR

Glenn S. Gerstell, a student at N.Y.U., was Special Assistant to Governor Rockefeller's New York City campaign director, Fioravante G. Perrotta.

year, were ranked 7, 9, and 10 four years ago. As might be expected, Rockefeller's 1970 rank for each A.D. was about the same as for Nixon in '68, with one difference: Rockefeller consistently received an additional 13 percent above Nixon, and in the Puerto Rican districts the Governor increased his vote by 18-23 percent over the President's. Furthermore, the Governor appealed more to Democrats than did the President. Over 51 percent of the Priority One Democrats deserted their party to vote for Rockefeller, and on a City-wide basis, the Governor was supported by more than 40 percent of the Democrats, in addition to 76 percent of the Republicans.

PRIORITY ONE: ITALIANS

However, such an analysis (on a relatively large scale) does not really indicate the full shift in constituency. An analysis of the vote by ethnicity does. The typical Priority One voters were the Italians. Although enrollment in Italian areas averages 68 percent Democratic and 26 percent Republican, Nixon (in '68) received about 61 percent of their votes; it was perhaps the first time many of them had broken away from the old Democratic line. In 1966, disenchanted with Rockefeller's liberal politics and marital situation, only 40 percent of the Italians voted for the Governor. The campaign's conscious appeal to these voters in 1970 resulted in an average 73 percent Rockefeller vote. For example, in Astoria, Queens (33A.D./1 E.D.) where one searches the voting lists in vain for a non-Italian name and where the enrollment is 79 percent Democratic, the Governor more than doubled his vote from 34 percent (in '66) to 75 percent (in '70), while Nixon pulled only 54 percent. In Bay Ridge, Brooklyn (49A.D./11E.D.) where American flags are in every window and "America: Love It or Leave It" decals are on the cars, Rockefeller received 76 percent against his 42 percent four years ago and compared with Nixon's 66 percent.

In contrast to the Italians, whose support for the Governor nearly doubled, the number of Jewish supporters dropped. The Jewish vote is not quite as homogeneous as the Italian vote, but roughly speaking, Rockefeller was backed by 29 percent of the City's Jews compared with 36 percent in '66, and as opposed to Nixon's dismal 20 percent. In older Jewish communities the tendency to vote for Arthur Goldberg ("one of our own") was overwhelming: Rockefeller received only 11 percent of the vote (less than half his '66 total), which was still better (not much) than the President's 6 percent in Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn (45A.D./89E.D.) However, in areas of younger, higher-income families, Rockefeller took up to 40 percent (compared to 56 percent in '66) at Neponsit, Queens (19A.D./79E.D.).

Whereas in 1966 Rockefeller received 35 per-

cent of the Black vote, he picked up only 21 percent in 1970, due in some part to Goldberg's black running mate. Nixon obtained only 8 percent two years ago.

The Puerto Rican areas were the object of a very intensive effort by the Governor's organization, and his vote improved from 20 percent (in '66) to 36 percent last year. In 1968, the President also captured the support of a fifth of the City's Puerto Ricans.

The last major group is an easily identifiable conglomeration of unidentifiable groups. It consists of middle income Italian, Irish, German, Polish, and Scotch voters, who are either blue- or white-collar workers and largely Roman Catholic. These "mixed white" voting districts form the bulk of the City's population; and in spite of their diversity, they vote surprisingly consistently. These are the voters who, when their incomes rose slightly, moved out of ethnic lower and lower-middle class neighborhoods to the all-white middle class areas of Queens and Brooklyn. Though typically Democratic, in the more conservative sections the Republican enrollment equals the Democratic figure. These voters formed the core of the Priority One Districts and their support was the dividing factor in the City vote. In 1966 40 percent of these voters supported the Governor — but in 1970, 75 percent voted for his reelection! In an old Polish area in Greenpoint, Brooklyn (35A.D./1,2,4E.D.'s), despite the better than 3:1 Democratic enrollment, Rockefeller received 73 percent of the vote (compared to 30 percent in '66). In the most conservative area of the City, Glendale, Queens (30A.D./3E.D.) Rockefeller obliterated all opposition with over 81 percent of the ballots; in fact, this district is one of a handful in the City where the vote for Conservative Paul Adams actually exceeded that for Goldberg.

AND UPSTATE

The upstate campaign, under the capable direction of Joseph Boyd, now the Governor's Appointments Officer, added icing on the cake by supplying a plurality of almost three-quarters of a million votes. Although it was expected that the Governor would win big in largely Republican upstate areas, the question was how big. What is most interesting is Rockefeller's improved vote-getting ability over Nixon's even in these fairly conservative areas. For example, in the suburban counties of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester, Nixon obtained 53 percent of the vote to Humphrey's 41 percent, while Rockefeller took 58 percent to Goldberg's 33 percent — and the Governor would probably have received more if Adams had not siphoned off 9 percent of the total vote.

In the heavily Democratic Albany county, where Nixon got 39 percent against Humphrey's 57 percent,

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Gambling with the Strategic Balance

Given the significance of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and the portents of their failure, it is important to understand their strategic context. Even a brief examination of the issue leaves one with disappointment at the low level of candor (or, heaven help us, high level of ignorance) with which the Administration has chosen to treat this matter in its public statements, not to mention the unfortunate alarmism with which a number of widely read commentators have dealt with the strategic balance and related questions. The expressions of growing official concern about Soviet military deployments — together with predictions of an impending Soviet predominance in strategic weaponry — may be ingenuous, but they seem calculated to mobilize popular support for increasing defense expenditures as Congressional debate proceeds on the military procurement bill.

NOT MERELY FALSE

Were the Administration's alarms merely false, the matter would be less serious than it is. Their arguments, however, are not merely false, they are dangerous, because they undermine the kind of American confidence necessary for the President to move, as he promises, from an era of confrontation, to extensive exploration in East-West negotiations. It is dangerous because it contributes to an arms-race mentality and a receptiveness to ever-increasing strategic expenditures, both on the part of our leaders and of the people who elect them. And then, of course, there is the further danger that one may be locked in by one's utterances, or worse still, come to believe them.

The SALT negotiations are especially important at this juncture because of the nature of the strategic balance today. Should the talks fail, we would no longer have the luxury of a return to the relatively stable balance of the 1960's. Research and development in strategic weaponry is near a number of significant breakthroughs which could interject elements of substantial instability into the strategic balance.

If this is the case, it is essential to assess ac-

curately the room for negotiation and compromise which the present strategic balance allows, in order that no opportunity for agreement on arms limitation be precluded because of a false notion of its risks.

At this juncture, increased Soviet efforts create little or no foreseeable danger of a meaningful shift in the strategic balance in their favor. In fact, the American superiority is presently quite substantial and allows great flexibility (certainly far greater than appears to have been exercised in the negotiations so far) in search of an arms limitation agreement.

The rather tough posture adopted by the United States in these negotiations can be plausibly explained. It is, in all likelihood, a case of seeking the best deal possible, superimposed upon the great mistrust with which the present generation of American policy-makers, both Democrat and Republican, have learned (more or less legitimately) to view the Soviet Union. It also includes, no doubt, a healthy dose of highly technical strategic analysis, all-too-often conducted *in vacuo*, which by missing the "political" element in the negotiations, tends to decrease the flexibility of the negotiators.

A HEDGED BET

Against Pentagon tendencies toward almost a paranoid caution must always be counterposed the question: What are the risks in compromise or concession, and what are the probable costs of failure to attempt or even to entertain it? No concession or compromise need commit the United States to an irrevocable position if the Soviets do not live up to their part of the bargain. But a willingness to compromise could well ascertain just how far the Soviets will move, or better still, open the way for agreement.



THE AUTHOR

Stan Sienkiewicz is a student at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Pittsburgh, after completing his Masters at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He contributed to Ripon's 1970 Campaign Research Consortium and to the Military Spending Report prepared for the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law last year.

An overly rigid fear of "giving something away" can well prove self-defeating if it produces failure where there is any chance of success.

With an economy far smaller than ours, the Soviet Union has strong economic incentives to negotiate seriously. Many key indicators, such as, for example, the marginal productivity of investment, show a consistent decline in recent years, and the rate of growth of civilian industrial production declined for the third year in a row in 1970. The defense budget has, on the other hand, grown steadily over the past two decades.

Given the cost and complexity of modern strategic weaponry, there is no hope of leveling off defense expenditures in favor of other kinds of investment in the face of a continuing arms competition. Yet to maintain economic growth, a growing defense budget is a prime competitor for those investment resources necessary to maintain economic growth.

This fundamental problem of growth in the Soviet economy, though certainly not "caused" exclusively by high levels of defense spending, could clearly be attacked with greater hope of success were more resources available for alternate investment. And just as contemporary conditions in the Soviet Union give them a strong incentive to seek agreement, so the present state of the strategic balance gives the U.S. substantial room to negotiate flexibly.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS COMPARED

There are three primary strategic delivery systems in the arsenals of the two superpowers, along with several secondary ones. Each system has weaknesses and strengths, and together, it is generally argued, they form more formidable deterrent forces than any single system alone. Although the Soviet Union presently has a larger number of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed than does the United States, this relationship is more than reversed in terms of separately deliverable warheads, or total numbers of delivery vehicles. The American lead, in fact, is quite likely to grow substantially in the next half-decade or so, given the current deployment schedules.

The United States has deployed 1054 land-based ICBMs to the Soviet Union's approximately 1300. Five hundred of the American missiles, however, are already beginning to be reequipped with three multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), which will increase the warhead total to 2054. There is as yet no evidence that the Soviet Union has an optional MIRV, although we can doubtless expect one in the next few years. This would mean a potential increase of 700 or more in their warhead strength, depending upon whether a three-headed or greater MIRV capability is achieved. It is

safe to assume that only the 300 or so SS-9s can be MIRVed with any counterforce capability.*

Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) number 656 aboard 41 nuclear-powered submarines, although this number also is due to increase greatly since 31 of the submarines are in the process of being equipped with the 10-headed MIRV system, Poseidon, bringing the American total to 5120. The Soviet Union presently deploys about 280 SLBMs although about 75 of these are aboard diesel-driven submarines which are not capable of reaching the United States from their "on-station" operating radius. Furthermore, the range of the Soviet SLBMs is thought to be substantially less than that of the American missiles.

BIG BOMBERS

The United States presently deploys some 505 long-range bombers to the USSR's 140. The average payload in the former instance is 3 or 4 nuclear weapons (including standoff missiles of considerable range) while the Soviet payload is normally judged to be about three weapons per plane. The totals therefore, are on the order of 2250 separate weapons for the United States to about 420 for the Soviet Union.

In terms of the three principal strategic delivery systems, the United States currently deploys about 4000 warheads to the Soviet Union's approximately 2000. Furthermore, the U.S. deployment is in the process of being increased to more than 9000 over the next few years, by means of the already operational MIRV systems. It is almost certain, as a result, that the strategic balance will continue to shift significantly in favor of the United States despite anything the Soviet Union does over the next half-decade.

These are, however, not the only factors involved in the strategic balance. The medium and shorter range aircraft stationed in Europe and the Pacific and the 900 or so deployable from aircraft carriers can all, to varying degrees, have strategic potential, since, when properly deployed, they can reach many areas of the Soviet Union with a nuclear payload. These systems can deliver anywhere from several hundred to well over 1000 nuclear warheads depending upon their specific equipment and deployment. The Soviet Union has no comparable capability against the United States, although it has a massive ballistic missile and aircraft capability against Western Europe. Additionally, there are still shorter range missiles deployed in Western Europe which cover Eastern Europe, and in some instances could reach border regions of the USSR.

In sum, the United States can presently target more than 6000 separate warheads against the Soviet Union, while the comparable Soviet capability against the United States is on the order of a third or less.**

With the MIRV deployments presently under way, the American total will increase by more than 5000 over the next several years. In such calculations, furthermore, Soviet planners must, no doubt, take into consideration British and perhaps even French capabilities, which, although small, are by no means insignificant.

From a Soviet perspective, such an imbalance, and its certain growth, can only be viewed with great concern. It provides a far stronger *prima facie* case for an attempt to achieve a first-strike capability than Mr. Laird's argument about Soviet motives. It could easily justify extreme efforts to catch up, as well as provide ammunition for the more militant groups in the Soviet leadership. The efforts to catch up are evident in the testing of multiple warheads, various ABM systems, very great effort in deployment of the SS-9 missiles.

Beyond the absolute gap which the Soviet Union faces, it must also be pointed out that there is a substantial gap in the quality and effectiveness of deployment between the Soviet and American strategic forces. A much higher percentage of the Soviet deterrent is in fixed, land-based systems, hence the Soviet Union is far more susceptible to having a high percentage of its strategic weapons destroyed in a first strike than is the United States.

IN CASE OF ATTACK

Taking these more or less concrete comparisons, it is necessary to place them in a more realistic context. Highly complex nuclear delivery systems operate at no better than a 70 or 80 percent reliability. That is, there exists about a one in five chance that a given ICBM will malfunction between launch and its arrival on target. Targeting of missiles, furthermore, is also an uncertain process,*** hence there is a probability that even a successful launch and flight will not impact near enough to a hardened target to destroy it. More than 400 warheads are currently invulnerable as they are always on station aboard submarines. This number, of course, will grow to over 4000 in the next few years. Bombers on airborne alert are also not susceptible to surprise attack.

Such uncertainties make a successfully orchestrated pre-emptive or first-strike attack an effective impossibility. A still more important consideration, however, is the inability of any strategic planner to rule out the possibility that the presumptive victim will fire all his weapons upon warning of a nuclear attack. Contemporary detection technology allows at minimum 20 minutes warning, and regardless of stated policy (for the U.S. it is to ride out a first-strike), it is a consideration that must rule out rational calculation of a pre-emptive strike.

These are the strategic conditions for the near

foreseeable future. The resultant strategic balance is still a secure one, and weighted heavily in favor of the United States. There is, as a result, substantial room for American flexibility, negotiation, and if need be, compromise, in search of an arms limitation agreement. Such an agreement under present circumstances might well institutionalize aspects of this American superiority. However if by setting this as a basic American goal in SALT, failure results where there are chances of success, the costs will have been far too great.

Should the SALT talks fail, far more dangerous conditions are likely to replace the present more or less secure strategic balance. They will arise as a result of new inventions and technological breakthroughs produced by large and well-funded research and development establishments spurred on by a continuing arms competition. Breakthroughs and new inventions are dangerous because they can rapidly shift the strategic balance (or appear to, which may be just as dangerous). A means of orbiting an ABM system, so that it could destroy missiles shortly after launch over the territory of the launching country, would, in principle, effectively prevent a state from retaliating for a nuclear attack against it. Such a system is by no means implausible, and certainly no stranger to the research sectors of the military in either country. An effective land-based ABM system would have a similar effect.

One saving grace in modern weapons technology, which does work to stabilize the strategic balance somewhat, is its great and growing complexity and cost, both militating against rapid (surprise) deployments which destabilize the strategic balance, and against unquestioning procurement of large numbers of weapons and systems.

POSSIBLE CONCESSIONS

If the above is not an unreasonable description of the strategic balance, and its greatest potential dangers, what conclusions for American policies does it suggest? The SALT talks are of crucial importance. They can safely be approached with more flexibility by the United States. Nothing is lost in strategic terms by the kinds of concessions and compromises which would clarify just how far and in what directions the Soviet Union is willing to move. The strength of the American strategic advantage, in any case, suggests a substantial ability on the part of the United States to make real concessions without altering the balance of forces significantly. One such area might be explored in terms of the Soviet desire to include American tactical nuclear capabilities against the Soviet Union. The non-strategic considerations of these deployments in terms of U.S.-West European relations need not be sacrificed out of hand, in so doing. The Soviet proposal for a halt on ABM deployment could

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Inside HEW with Leon Panetta

Bring Us Together: The Nixon Team and the Civil Rights Retreat, by Leon E. Panetta and Peter Gall, J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and New York, 1971, 380 pages.

"A President can ask for reconciliation in the racial conflict that divides Americans. But reconciliation comes only from the hearts of people.

"And tonight, therefore, as we make this commitment, let us look into our hearts and let us look down into the faces of our children.

"Is there anything in the world that should stand in their way?

"None of the old hatreds mean anything when we look down into the faces of our children.

"In their faces is our hope, our love, and our courage.

"Tonight, I see the face of a child.

"He lives in a great city. He is black. Or he is white. He is Mexican, Italian, Polish. None of that matters. What matters, he's an American child.

"That child in that great city is more important than any politician's promise. He is America. He is a poet. He is a scientist, he is a great teacher, he is a proud craftsman. He is everything we ever hoped to be and everything we dare to dream to be.

"He sleeps the sleep of childhood and he dreams the dreams of a child.

"And yet when he awakens, he awakens to a living nightmare of poverty, neglect and despair.

"He fails in school.

"He ends up on welfare.

"For him the American system is one that feeds his stomach and starves his soul. It breaks his heart. And in the end it may take his life on some distant battlefield.

"To millions of children in this rich land, this is their prospect of the future."

Thus spoke Richard M. Nixon on the night of August 8, 1968, as he accepted the Republican presidential nomination. The candidate's sensitive, even moving, remarks on race and poverty stood out in a speech that had its fair share of law-and-order flummery and locker-room exhortations ("let's win this one for Ike!"). Mr. Nixon's description of the plight of poor children seemed to reveal a previously untapped comprehension of the desperate urgency of their situation; and this new understanding, coupled with the candidate's stature as a lawyer and his relatively progressive record on civil rights, led the more hopeful among us to believe that a Nixon administration might offer some hope for the black and the poor. But the "I see a child" speech, like so many other Nixonian statements on the nation's most pressing domestic problems, turned out to be a colossal untruth.

An early casualty of the war was Leon Panetta, who served as Director of the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare from March, 1969, until his forced resignation in February, 1970. Now Panetta, with Peter Gall, who was

his special assistant at HEW, has chronicled the disintegration of the Federal government's civil rights enforcement effort, in a book sardonically titled *Bring Us Together* after another of President Nixon's untruths. Though the book will not win any awards for elegance of style, its dogged presentation of Panetta's equally dogged attempts to enforce the law emphatically puts the lie to the President's early promises. The cumulative effect of the book's description of one civil rights setback after another is to fill the reader with disgust at the President's men who so callously and stupidly traded the constitutional rights of black people for political gain — gain which, much more often than not, failed to materialize.

The major episodes of *Bring Us Together*, of course, are already well known, at least in broad outline, but Panetta and Gall provide some fascinating inside observations. Examples:

- Former HEW Secretary Robert Finch on the telephone, seeking the blessing of Senator Strom Thurmond for HEW's decision to grant only a partial reprieve to five recalcitrant Southern school districts, rather than abandoning termination proceedings entirely: "Yes, sir, I realize this is a touchy subject, but we think this is the best approach . . . Yes, sir, I know that . . . Yes, sir, I'm sending the best people we have here [to negotiate with the districts] . . . No, sir, these are people out of Washington . . . Yes, we will . . . Thank you."

- Former HEW General Counsel Robert C. Mardian, the California conservative who now heads the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, expounding on civil rights enforcement: "What about the politics? — you can't just kick the South in the ass."

- Former GOP National Chairman Rogers Morton, addressing a group of Southern Republican State Chairmen: "Well, fellas, it's my honor to be here today. This is a big job and it takes all of you to help me out. As you know, I'm a Kentucky boy — a mountain boy — who believes that it's time a national party made room for the South. We've been kicked in the ass long enough." (Certain themes tend to recur in Administration rhetoric.)

- The Chester County, Tennessee, bail-out in March, 1969. HEW was about to terminate Federal assistance to the Chester County district, which had stubbornly refused to do anything to meet the requirement, set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968 in *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia*, that schools adopt desegregation plans, normally other than "freedom of choice," that "promise realistically to work now." But a special congressional election was coming in the neighboring Eighth District of Tennessee, and Senator Howard Baker, among others, intervened. After a tense negotiating session regarding, among other problems, the concentration of most of the district's black students in the all-black Vincent School, Secretary Finch announced to Panetta: "Leon, I think we've got an agreement. Mr. Plunk [the superintendent] agrees to send thirty-five

white elementary students to the Vincent School beginning next September for regular classes in music and chorus. So I think we can wrap it up." (The Republican Congressional candidate finished third, behind a Democrat and a Wallaceite.)

- Former Nixon aide Bryce Harlow, who was a White House assistant to Dwight D. Eisenhower when the original school desegregation decision, *Brown v. Board of Education*, was handed down, asking Panetta at a luncheon called to discuss civil rights: "Can you please summarize what the background is on this problem? . . . You know, I'm from Oklahoma, But I frankly wasn't aware of the issue till I got here."

- White House aide John Ehrlichman, at the same luncheon: "I've heard about the *Green* case . . . what does it say?"

- Jerris Leonard, former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, at a meeting in March, 1969, that eventually led to the much-denounced Mitchell-Finch statement of July 3, 1969, which had the effect of extending the deadline for final school desegregation to at least September, 1970: "The South . . . the South, I'm so goddamned tired of hearing about the South. When is somebody going to start worrying about the North? That's where the votes are to begin with. Instead, we're fighting over the law in order to give something to a bunch of racists."

Most of the people who perform in Panetta's and Gall's memoir are not evil men. Finch, for instance, comes across as well-meaning but hapless, torn between an understanding of the law and a belief that good government means never having to say you're sorry. Mardian and Leonard are at least human. But the authors are less sympathetic towards the President's men, particularly Ehrlichman and Harlow, who emerge as cold-hearted, cynical manipulators only too willing to disregard constitutional principles. And at least by inference, President Nixon comes off the worst of all. Nowhere in *Bring Us Together*, which covers the period from the beginning of the Nixon administration to February, 1970, does the President put himself on record as firmly supporting the vindication of black people's civil rights. Nowhere does he use the moral authority of his office to hasten the racial reconciliation he spoke of so convincingly in August of 1968.

And if anything, the President's performance on the issues of race and poverty has declined since the day he informed Leon Panetta by means of a headline in the *Washington Daily News* that Panetta was expected to resign. Probably the most shameful civil rights incident during Panetta's tenure was the Administration's decision to delay implementation of desegregation plans for 33 Mississippi school districts, in total disregard of the *Green* decision and the recommendations and beliefs of the Federal officials who had worked on the cases. This brazen sellout led to the landmark Supreme Court ruling of October, 1969, in *Alexander v. Holmes County*, that "the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools." That language seemed clear enough, but the Administration immediately took steps to erode its meaning. Shortly after Panetta resigned, in March, 1970, the President issued his infamous 8,000-word treatise on school desegregation, extolling the neighborhood school, saying that busing of students should not be required, and extending the concept of *de*

facto (unintentional) desegregation to Southern situations that seemed clearly to be the result of official action. This unprecedented and uncalled-for intrusion into the ongoing civil rights enforcement process threw HEW compliance efforts and even some courts into confusion for more than a year, until the Supreme Court once again, in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education*, unanimously discredited the President's position. In April, 1971, the Court ruled that the convenience of the neighborhood school must yield to the commands of the Constitution, that busing was indeed a legal and legitimate technique for desegregation, and that school districts with a history of official discrimination could not now claim to be victims of circumstantial housing patterns. It now remains to be seen whether the Nixon administration will accede to the relentless logic and accumulated weight of the *Brown*, *Green*, *Alexander*, and *Swann* decisions, or initiate yet another round of false issues and false hopes.

And what is one to make of the President's actions in other, related areas? What of his denunciation of "forced integration" of the suburbs? His "welfare reform" that seems likely to mean reduced benefits and loss of food stamps for many of the nation's poor? His apparent willingness to let Governor Ronald Reagan violate Federal regulations in the course of gutting California's Medicaid and Welfare programs? His vetoes of bills for continued Hill-Burton hospital construction, for Federal manpower training and employment programs, for the education of family doctors?

What it all has meant is that the Nixon administration, rather than bringing us together, has prolonged the agony of black-white confrontation in the South, widened the distance between the rich and the poor in this country, and turned the nation's suburbs into fortresses of selfishness and fear. It is for these reasons, quite apart from the Vietnam tragedy, that America cannot afford another four years of Richard Nixon.

— AEI

Reapportionment *from page 24*

process. Districts generated by this process would be relatively homogeneous, since people with similar characteristics tend to cluster in neighborhoods. They would maximize effective representation, since district boundaries would follow basic political subdivisions. The districting process becomes politically neutral: no incumbent or political party is given a built-in advantage over prospective challengers.

This nonpartisan procedure can be expected to reduce the fragmentation of minority communities; prevent the concentration of Republicans in a few lopsided districts; protect political mavericks from being districted out of office; prevent vested interests from perpetuating existing power relationships by gerrymandering district boundaries; make it impossible for powerful legislators to carve the new congressional seats to suit their own aspirations; and increase the number of marginal two-party districts, making legislators much more accountable to their districts.

MICHAEL HALLIWELL

Rockefeller Majority *from page 16*

the Governor picked up 58 percent — which obviously means he benefited from much Democratic support. On the whole, the Governor bested Nixon in most counties, except for the conservative farming areas bordering Lake Ontario. There, Rockefeller received a little less than the President's percentage, because the Adams candidacy proved appealing enough to steal some would-be Rockefeller votes. For example, in Wayne and Orleans counties Adams averaged 13 percent to Rockefeller's 50 percent — other than that, the Adams candidacy proved irrelevant.

As noted, the fact that Rockefeller kept his losses to a minimum among the more liberal voters while building a new constituency among the more conservative voters accounted for his great success. The gubernatorial results might have meaning for a possible, if unlikely, '72 presidential race. His shift last year was a conscious decision based on his view of the state electorate's mood, which turned out to be correct.

However, the rightward thrust of his 1970 campaign has ineluctably been carried into his current administration as his newly acquired constituencies have made their demands felt. Rockefeller's avid quest for the votes of ethnic Democrats, his comparative neglect for liberal Republican areas and his nonaggression pact with Conservative Senate candidate James Buckley combined to help elect a GOP legislative majority clearly dominated by the right. The legislature quickly showed its new bent by slashing \$760,000,000 from the governor's already austere budget, primarily in the areas of urban aid and welfare.

A DIRECTED DRIFT

Rockefeller's liberal associates argue that the governor was an unwilling victim of the legislature's parsimony. But the governor's critics point out that he made no real effort to forge an alliance of Democrats and moderate Republicans to save his budget and that budgetary considerations alone can't explain Rockefeller's recent vocal support for a welfare residency requirement of questionable constitutionality and a Reaganesque proposal to bus indigents back to where they came from if they cannot find decent New York housing.

Whether or not the rightward drift in Albany has been deliberately planned by the governor, it has surely strengthened Rockefeller's image among conservative Republicans throughout the nation (including President Nixon, who has warmly commended him for "biting the bullet" on the welfare issue).

When Thomas Dewey was New York's governor, he succeeded in building a strong national moderate Republican movement capable of capturing the GOP. But Nelson Rockefeller may have decided that

he will have to accommodate himself to the Republican Party as he finds it if he wants to be its presidential nominee. If this proves to be the case, then those Republicans who seek to change the thrust of their party will have to be prepared to do so without the assistance of the man who once led them. In spite of this, should President Nixon retire, the governor could be in a position to translate into nationwide terms the emerging Rockefeller majority.

GLENN S. GERSTELL

Salt *from page 19*

well be treated a good deal more favorably in order to see if it might lead to other agreements, as well as for its own intrinsic usefulness.

Modern surveillance technology is an important stabilizing tendency in the strategic balance today. It furthermore, suggests itself as a primary source of possible negotiation at SALT. Modern satellite surveillance technology, if extensive and available to all could serve to remove a great deal of instability and suspicion from strategic-political relations.

Beyond the SALT talks, various unilateral actions ought to be examined, including pauses in the deployment of both MIRV systems, as well as SAFE-GUARD. These would not produce serious strategic disadvantages.

The central necessity, beyond the immediate goal of arms limitation itself, is to somehow work to ease the pressure upon both sides to maintain such a high priority to testing and deployment of strategic weaponry. This is primarily a matter of the less tangible kind of confidence, which can only emerge from a piecemeal process of accommodation. It is probably not well served by arguing for significant unilateral cutbacks, or attempts to restrain research and development, although certainly much research and development and even deployment is so redundant in technically strategic terms, that it ought to be opposed vigorously. Both the United States and the Soviet Union can find many important alternative uses for the resources and social energy presently allocated to defense, with salutary effects upon both societies, and the international systems in general.

*"Counter-force capability" implies an ability to be used effectively against hardened-sites, that is, strategic missiles, in underground silos, for example. This capability is a function of the size of the warhead and the accuracy of its delivery system. For a given accuracy, a specific minimum size warhead is required in order to destroy a hardened target. The SS-9 is the only Soviet missile system large enough to deliver several warheads of a size requisite to "kill" a Minuteman, for instance, at the estimated accuracy of their guidance systems. Smaller warheads are, of course, useful against population centers, but are therefore not normally considered as first-strike or counter-force weapons.

**Comparisons can also be drawn in terms of launch vehicles, or megatonnage, with comparable results.

***Circular error probable (CEP) is the normal measure of a delivery system's accuracy. It is the circle about the target, of such a radius that 50% of the warheads can be expected to fall within it. If therefore, the CEP is equal to the 'killing radius' of a given target, one has, statistically, only a 50-50 chance of destroying it with a given missile.

STAN SIENKIEWICZ

14a ELIOT STREET CHINA PAPER

Five years ago Ripon published a position paper entitled "China Today — Containment and Contact." This paper was read into the Congressional Record by Congressman Paul Findley shortly after its publication. It was the first Republican position paper to lay out the lines of policy which the President has now adopted.

Ripon rereleased the paper last month and has these words of praise for Mr. Nixon's policy:

Mr. Nixon prepared the way for his current policy of greater contact during the 1968 campaign in a radio speech entitled "To Keep the Peace," CBS radio network, Saturday, October 19, 1968. He said:

"... taking the long view we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation."

Patiently and quietly during his administration, the President has pursued this goal with such acts as an exchange of visits with the independent-minded premier of Communist Rumania, a visit to Yugoslavia, reopening of the Warsaw talks, and repeated announcements of American willingness to normalize relations with China. He has also adjusted official rhetoric, speaking of the People's Republic of China and referring to the capital by its official name, Peking.

In general, the thrust of the policy toward the communist world has been to seize opportunities for the advancement of American interests as national differences develop among Communists. The Ripon Society approves of this policy and commends the President for his patience and courage in pursuing it. The President deserves personal praise for exercising leadership and initiative in responding quickly to opportunities to normalize relations with China.

• The newly admitted Detroit-Ann Arbor chapter has elected the following as its 1971 officers: President, **Ralph Heikkinen**; Vice President, **Dennis Gibson**; Secretary, **Mary Low**; Treasurer, **Sharon Selander**; Executive Board members, **Karen Brewster**, **Jean Arlen** and **Eric Oppenheim**.

• Ripon was represented at The White House Conference on Youth in Estes Park, Colorado by **Lee Auspitz**, its lame-duck president. Auspitz introduced the only resolution explicitly praising the Nixon Administration to pass among the Conference's 1500 youth and adult delegates. The resolution, which endorsed the Presidents China policy, received support from Vietnam hawks (who appreciated the support for the President) and Vietnam doves (who appreciated the support for the cut-and-run strategy towards Chiang Kai-Shek's plans to recapture the Mainland).

LETTERS

IOWA REPLY

Dear Madam:

... On the report on Iowa in the May FORUM. Your reporter is correct in his visions of a deepening schism among Republicans here, but some points in the report bear explanation. First, because Robert Ray is in trouble, Republicans are in trouble. Robert Fulton came within an eyelash of the governor's chair in 1970, and any split in Republican ranks threatens to send the next Democratic challenger into the office. Second, Bill Scherle's district is not nearly as rock-ribbed as it appeared to be after the 1970 election. Former influential state senator Maurice Van Nostrand, a staunch Ray supporter from Scherle's district, has publicly suggested that Scherle be replaced on the next ticket. Scherle's recent wild swings at Ray over local issues and the attempt to move the USDA's Veterinary Experiment Laboratory from ISU to Maryland (which

Ray squelched by talking to Hardin) have weakened the Congressman's credibility. And Richard Nixon's incredibly inept staff really lowered the boom on Scherle by rejecting him for an appointment which he had never sought. That didn't do much for the constituency, either! Finally, your reporter's comments regarding the recent Muskie lead on Nixon in Iowa, that "if a Republican is behind in Iowa, he's behind everywhere". This sort of attitude which takes Iowa's Republicanism for granted is just the kind of thing which severely damages the GOP's effectiveness here. We now have one Democratic senator, who sounds like a presidential candidate, and two Democratic congressmen. And one of those congressmen sounds more like a stiff challenge to Jack Miller's seat every day. And, as I think Republican Fred Schwengel would attest, the tide is shifting in other sections of the state as well.

Most of this evidence leads me to the conclusion that before Iowa Republicans worry about Nixon's future in Iowa, they should look to their own futures!

JAMES T. STENSVAAG
Ames, Iowa.

ANTI ABATE & DREISLER

Dear Madam:

The article in the April issue of the Ripon FORUM on the encouraging prospect of Steve Dreisler winning the Chairmanship of the College Republican National Committee is unfortunate. Mr. Dreisler, contrary to what the article indicated, is a prime example of the old far-right leadership of the organization. The present Chairman, Joseph Abate, who is running against Dreisler for re-election is no better.

The FORUM indicated that Dreisler was forging an effective liberal, moderate and conservative alliance in his bid for the Chairmanship. As a liberal College Republican State Chairman, I am unaware of this alliance. As I understand it, the moderates and liberals, as well as many of the conservatives are determined to vote for neither Abate or Dreisler. A possible candidate for the non-aligned is Mid-Atlantic College Republican Area Chairman Chris Maier, a moderate Republican from Upsala College in New Jersey. He is a person un-tainted with the "old politics methods" of both Dreisler and Abate.

JOHN FIELD REICHARDT
Chairman,
Maine College Republicans


PRO ABATE

Dear Madam:

I have some questions based on the April issue which I received today. The section titled **Political Notes** had two articles — YR-LTS, and the CRNC and YRNF hassles — which are of special interest to me since I'm a member of both national committees and will be voting at the joint convention in June. I deplore the appearance of Senator Buckley at LTS at a time when any Republican Congressman, especially a Republican Congressman of Representative McCloskey's stature and import, could not be fitted into the program I feel that there is room for improvement within both the CRNC and the YRNF, but also within the Party and within our Society. Joe Abate has served for six months as Chairman of the CRNC, and within that time has established a vigorous program to recruit new members by providing campus-oriented news stories, on a weekly basis, to campus clubs, campus newspapers, and campus radio stations. The 18-year-old voter is the object of a special drive by a new CRNC committee, which is receiving a lot of CRNC attention and, more important, a lot of CRNC funds. I feel Joe Abate has established an open College Republican organization, especially after the examples of the President, Senator Dole, and the Republican Congressional Committee in the New York Senatorial race

ELWIN SPRAY
Honolulu, Hawaii

CALIFORNIA CORNER



Gerrymander: Who gets hurt?

Because the GOP lost both the State Senate and Assembly in the 1970 elections, reapportionment of California's legislative districts will be conducted by a Democratic Legislature. California's 43-man congressional delegation is the largest in the nation, so the state's redistricting has important national implications. If the most recent congressional districting is any guide, California Republicans will lose much more in the new legislative districts.

In 1967 Governor Reagan was unable to prevent Democrats from drawing congressional lines; the Democrats won most of the seats, even though the total aggregate vote for GOP congressional candidates substantially exceeded the combined Democratic total.

THE EVILS OF GERRYMANDER

The precedents set by Democratic gerrymanders indicate that minority groups can expect to find their communities fragmented to provide general election margins of victory for a maximum number of Anglo Democrats, while the chances of minority group candidates in the primary are minimized. This is especially likely to happen to the Mexican-American community, which constitutes 10 percent of the state's population but which has been frozen out of the State Senate entirely and has only token representation in Congress and in the Assembly. Small towns and other

THE AUTHOR

Mike Halliwell teaches political sociology at California State College — Long Beach and currently heads the Ripon chapter in Los Angeles. Halliwell was a nominee for the California State Senate in 1970 and serves on the GOP State Central Committee. He organized the Free Delegation which opposed Reagan's presidential candidacy in the 1968 California primary. (The Free Delegation led Reagan 47% to 42% when ruled off the ballot by the California Supreme Court because of petition deficiencies.) He will be writing "California Corner" as a regular feature in the FORUM.

communities of interest can expect to be split between districts, thus minimizing their political power.

GOP losses in the redistricting process may well fall most heavily on Republican moderates, since they tend to come from the more marginal districts and can be more easily hurt by boundary manipulation. By concentrating Republican voters in a few lopsided districts, Democrats can insure the election of one ultra-conservative instead of several moderate Republicans. Representatives from safe GOP districts often tend to be less concerned with the needs of the poor and ethnic minorities because they find few such voters in their districts.

Whatever concessions the GOP is able to gain in the new districting will probably be in the form of protection for their incumbents.

By its very nature, the reapportionment process tends to reflect existing power relationships. All groups not favored by the status quo tend to find themselves at a disadvantage in the struggle over district lines, while lobbyists able to make large campaign contributions have maximum political leverage. The major reason that bills favoring consumer protection, conservation and political reform so often fail is that the districting process favors special interests. Political mavericks who try to arouse public sentiment against such devices as the seniority system and secret committee voting can be districted out of office by colleagues who prefer a minimum of public accountability.

DEPOLITICIZED DISTRICTING

The evils of gerrymandering are obvious. There is no more brazen conflict of interest in government than in having legislators determine the boundaries of their own districts. It is the last vestige of the spoils system in California. What is needed is a means of redistricting that is independent of political pressures.

The basic requirements for fair legislative districts are quite simple: substantial population equality, conformity with political subdivisions, and geographic compactness. Enacting a few basic legal requirements for districts could insure reapportionment meeting these criteria and providing district boundaries fair to all potential candidates. These criteria can be completely deterministic, eliminating legislative discretion and its chronic abuse from the reapportionment

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