

RIPON FORUM

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ONE DOLLAR

George Romney

& HUD

A
Ripon
Policy
Analysis



Also: Ripon Endorsements
& Senator Mathias on
"The Optional Congress"

RIPON RATINGS

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PHILLIPS BACKS SENATE '72 SURVEY

Which page of HUMAN EVENTS do you believe — if any?

The September 18 issue on page 20 offered a column by Ralph de Toledano deriding the Ripon 1972 Senatorial predictions (see September FORUM). Failing to note that it was party control of seats, not particular incumbents, that we rated "safe," "vulnerable," or "swing," de Toledano particularly scouts our decision to classify "vulnerable" (open to capture by the opposing party with significant breaks) seats held by elderly Senators, likely to retire, such as Len Jordan and Margaret Chase Smith.

On page 16 of the same issue, however, Kevin Phillips offers his own '72 election analysis, which backs our judgment in each instance. De Toledano also derides our "vulnerable" classification for the 67 year old Senator Carl Curtis (we have our doubts too), but Phillips confirms that he "could have a rough race in farm troubled Nebraska" where Senator Hruska eked by in 1970 with a margin far smaller than the likely 1972 youth vote.

In fact, Phillips' judgment accords so closely with ours in virtually every race, including controversial Michigan and Rhode Island, that we along with some of our readers are inclined to question several of our conclusions (see Letters).

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The Optional Congress

The President's New Economic Policies represent a bold and necessary response to a serious crisis and they have my support. At the same time, the emergency powers he was able to invoke dramatize anew the scope of constitutional authority which Congress has over the years relinquished to the office of the President.

This process has a long history, that unfortunately continues to transpire in the headlines of today. But perhaps the crucial moment in establishing these emergency powers came in the midst of the Depression almost 40 years ago.

On May 9, 1933, in a moment of genuine crisis, President Franklin D. Roosevelt convened the Congress and demanded, in effect, that it re-vamp the Constitution before midnight. The purpose of his proposed reforms was, in effect, to make Congress, and consequently the Constitution, optional at the discretion of the President, as the national interest required.

The demand came as part of the Emergency Banking Act, an omnibus bill reorganizing the Nation's then collapsing banking system and retroactively legitimizing the President's Bank Holiday proclamation of 3 days before.

It was referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency with instructions that it be reported in an hour. The bill was never printed and it was not available for Senators to read prior to action on the floor of the Senate. The then Senator from Louisiana, Mr. Huey Long, complained that he did not know what was in it until it was read by the clerk. Most Senators indicated that they had grave reservations about what they understood to be the bill's provisions and Senator Long protested the extraordinary powers it granted to the President. But in the extremity of the crisis at hand, Congress felt it had to act immediately as the President demanded. The bill was passed by both Houses before midnight and the American constitutional Republic has been in its Damoclean shadow ever since.

The key provision, not much remarked by the Congress at the time, came in an amendment to section 5b of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917. As enacted in 1917, section 5b shifted from Congress to the President the power to regulate trade and financial transactions between Americans and foreigners in wartime. The 1933 amendment to 5b authorized the President — by the

simple expedient of declaring a national emergency — to assume in peacetime the extensive wartime emergency powers associated with the Office of President as Commander-in-Chief.

In this little noticed enactment, Congress established a principle with reverberations going far beyond the legislation at hand. For the courts have interpreted the amendment as creating a virtually unlimited Executive prerogative that now applies to some 200 laws granting special powers to the President during national emergencies. But neither Congress nor the courts have set criteria for invocation of these multifarious powers.

In accord with President Roosevelt's approach, the President alone decides when a national emergency exists and when it ends, when he should share power with Congress as the Constitution prescribes, and when Congress can be made optional by proclamation.

GUEST EDITORIAL

This assignment of emergency powers has worked very smoothly over the years. Since that dire extremity of 1933, there have been six Presidents — four Democrats and two Republicans. But they have been as one on the question of when the country is in a state of national emergency and when the Congress, on a wide range of issues, is optional. Their answer, quite simply put — in a word — is always. In the last 37 years, the country has passed through many vicissitudes of war and peace, but Presidential powers have been continuously "at war." The result, described by Jeffrey G. Miller and John R. Garson in an excellent article in the February 1970 issue of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review, is that "some 60 percent of the nation's population have lived their entire lives under a continuous unbroken chain of national emergencies."

A lower court did judicially acknowledge — in 1962 — that the depression had ended. But no authority has yet recognized the end of the Korean emergency, proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950, and still in effect today. Since the President declared with reference to Korea that "world conquest by Communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggression," the State Department has interpreted the emergency to mean

the duration of the cold war, whatever definition they may apply.

This interpretation, however, has not limited the emergency powers to military matters affecting the protracted conflict with the Communists. Before the recent Nixon monetary actions, the Korean authority, in fact, was most recently invoked in 1968 in relation to our economic competition with our European allies.

President Johnson felt he would have difficulty securing from Congress the broad powers he needed to deal with the deficit which had been emerging for several years in the nation's balance of payments. Yet the Constitution clearly reserves to the legislative branch all powers for regulating foreign commerce. So the President invoked the emergency powers granted in 1950 in relation to the Korean war and signed Executive Order 11387: Governing Certain Transfers Abroad. The Department of Commerce immediately issued the foreign direct investment regulations — FDIR. The Executive order and the FDIR restrict the amounts of capital that American investors may transfer to or accumulate in foreign affiliates, and compel repatriation of short-term liquid balances such as foreign bank deposits.

Executive Encroachment

Without citation of the Korean war powers, these measures clearly represent an unconstitutional encroachment on legislative authority. The courts have upheld them, however, and they remain the law of the land. It is currently the law of the land, therefore, that the state of national emergency proclaimed by President Truman in 1950 in relation to the Korean conflict can be invoked in relation to a balance-of-payments deficit 18 years later. Similarly, regulations against gold hoarding, activated by the depression emergency, are continued under the 1950 proclamation.

Other measures thus invoked under 5b include, respectively, the foreign, Egyptian, and Cuban Assets Control Regulations. The Cuban trade embargo was also based in part on the 1950 emergency, as was the recent suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act, requiring the government to pay prevailing wages on construction contracts.

Among the nearly 200 other emergency laws are several that seem immediately pertinent today as we consider the future of the draft and the Executive's latitude to act alone in Southeast Asia. The President's emergency powers seem to permit him both to detain enlisted troops beyond the terms of their contracts and to detail military men to the governments of other countries. Also pertinent are his powers to sell stocks of strategic materials,

revoke leases on real and personal property, suspend rules and regulations applicable to broadcasting stations, exercise control over consumer credit, and, as we know, assume sweeping authority in the world monetary realm.

Continuous Emergency

These powers infringe on so many crucial constitutional rights and principles that collectively they may be seen as placing our system of democratic government in jeopardy. Certainly the deprivation of rights and property is authorized without due process. But perhaps most important, these measures threaten the constitutional balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches. Because a state of official emergency has obtained continuously since 1933 — and has been upheld by the courts to validate actions unrelated to the original crisis — the national emergency powers have accumulated and become institutionalized in the executive. The Presidency, already enhanced by modern trends, has been further aggrandized by the paradox of the continuous emergency.

Unless we accept the principle of an optional Constitution and an optional Congress, we must reject the concept of national emergencies declared by the President at his discretion in peacetime without termination dates. Since this concept has been upheld in essence by the courts, it is up to the Congress to recover by legislation the constitutional role that it has allowed the executive to usurp. We must reassert the principle that emergency powers are available only for brief periods when Congress is unable to act and for purposes directly related to the emergency at hand.

Rooted in

This is easier said than done. We discover that the continuous and cumulative and institutionalized emergency is also almost irrevocable. So many executive agencies and procedures are rooted in emergency powers that it is extremely difficult to rescind them without major administrative disruptions. With this in mind, the distinguished majority leader, Mr. Mansfield, joined with me during the last session in Senate Joint Resolution 166, a resolution which, among other things, proposed the creation of a special committee to explore with the executive the consequences of terminating the Korean emergency. In the aftermath of the Cambodia incursion, however, our proposals were not acted upon. And so I have reintroduced the proposal as a Senate concurrent resolution. It calls for the establishment of a commission to study and make recommendations terminating the state of national emergency.

It is to be expected that the commission's

recommendations would at least have the effect of restoring to Congress its full constitutional authority to regulate commerce, and would clearly define a national emergency. Together with S-731, an act to regulate undeclared war, which was introduced in February by the distinguished Senator from New York, Mr. Javits, this would serve to assure that emergency powers would only be applied for the duration of genuine emergencies. The Constitution did not envision a state of national emergency to be the normal state of affairs.

Under the best of circumstances, the Congress will not find it easy to maintain its historical constitutional role in the modern age. Modern communications, national interdependence, and international involvement converge to enhance the Presidency; real emergencies continually arise requiring the kind of decisive response the Executive is best equipped to give. But if the Congress allows these National Executive advantages to be expanded by special emergency powers responding to unspecified emergencies without termination or limit, the balance of powers between the branches of our Government may be irreparably broken.

I believe that we do face today a national emergency — even a paradoxically continuous one. It emerged during the depression and has been with us for several decades. It is a crisis that throws our whole system of constitutional government into jeopardy. This emergency — if I may use the term so loosely — is the atrophy of Congress. It is not an emergency which calls for the decisive exercise of executive powers. It calls for the decisive recovery of legislative powers. Only Congress can redeem itself; but in serving itself, it can also save the Constitution.

1971 RIPON ENDORSEMENTS

Each year the Ripon Society endorses Republican candidates whose ability, positions and policies reflect their concern with, and their commitment to do something about, today's critical issues. While we have not studied every 1971 political contest, our endorsements do reflect a survey of the major elections in a year of very few big races. Some candidates felt compelled — for various reasons — to decline Ripon's public support. Therefore, the following list does not include all candidates deemed worthy of endorsement.

Paul Capra — Mayor of New Haven

Kentucky:

Tom Emberton — Governor

Pennsylvania:

John Heinz — U.S. Congress, 18th District

Thacher Longstreth — Mayor of Philadelphia

Political Notes

FLORIDA: self-destructive potential

All is not well for the strong conservatives who run the Florida GOP. The 1970 Democratic sweep, which has been dissected and explained over and over and blamed on Nixon, Agnew, Senator Ed Gurney, 1970 Senatorial candidate William Cramer, J. Harrold Carswell and former Governor Claude Kirk, depending on who is explaining, has been followed by a period of general peace. But distant rumblings are heard, as in the Florida Keys before a storm comes whipping in from the Caribbean.

With no state-wide contests scheduled for 1972, major state electoral interest now focuses on Gurney's seat, up in 1974. The quiet, articulate emigre from Maine has beefed up his staff with new press and legislative artillery as he prepares for a strong Democratic opponent and a possible revenge challenge by Cramer, who was embittered by Gurney's backing of Carswell in the 1970 Senatorial primary. The state's first GOP congressman and a pioneer in the backlash politics that won Gurney his seat, Cramer feels he has earned another shot at the U.S. Senate.

In defeating former Governor LeRoy Collins in 1968, Gurney ran well ahead of the President and of George Wallace in all areas and garnered more votes than any candidate in Florida political history. Since his election, he has been a responsive though rigidly conservative representative; his introduction of S. 385, the Neighborhood School Act, long before the present busing controversy, has solidified his support in the state. Moreover, his near-weekly trips to Florida and a killing speaking schedule, combined with top-notch PR work by his press staff, have resulted in Gurney remaining constantly in the public eye.

Despite this, a primary may not be averted, unless Nixon finds some federal post acceptable to the self-important Cramer — or selects Gurney as his vice presidential running mate. The argument goes that Gurney is an able, and highly conservative Senator from an important (and Southern) state, and has Maine origins and New England background that suggest a hands-across-the-country appeal. In selecting Gurney, the line proceeds, the President could pacify the Right without provoking the center as much as Ronald Reagan would, for though Gurney is as conservative as Reagan, he is less controversial. And although choice of Gurney, the author of the Neighborhood School Act and an opponent of much of the President's program, including Family Assistance, would outrage GOP progressives, his presence might be expected to undercut George Wallace's candidacy.

Congressman Bill Young of the St. Petersburg area (who succeeded Cramer), Lou Frey of the Winter Park-Orlando area (who succeeded Gurney) and J. Herbert Burke, who represents the sprawling, wealthy Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood corridor of burgeoning Broward County, all generally conservative, seem assured reelection, barring all but a now-improbable Democratic sweep in Florida in 1972.

After the 1970 performance, however, one cannot

underestimate the self-destructive potential of the rightists who run Florida's GOP. By 1974 even Gurney may be in trouble if he fails to respond to his variegated and changing constituency reflected in the large 1970 victories by moderate Democrats, Senator Lawton Chiles and Governor Reubin Askew. Gurney's decision to join with Jacob Javits in calling for wage-price intervention before the President acted, and his vote to override the President's veto of the Emergency Employment Act suggest that he may — very slowly — be learning.

THE CONGRESS: iron cross candidates

On September 14, the House of Representatives, by an overwhelming vote, repealed Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950. That measure had empowered the Attorney General, in time of national emergency, to arrest anyone who "probably will" commit acts of espionage or sabotage. Civil libertarians held that the law was unnecessary and might have held the seeds of another mass incarceration such as that of Japanese-Americans in World War II. Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division, testified back in March that "the Department of Justice is unequivocally in favor of (repeal)."

The Ripon Society nominates for the Iron Cross those 27 (mostly Southern) Democrats who opposed repeal, as well as the following Republican representatives: Ashbrook (Ohio), Baker (Tenn.), Blackburn (Ga.), Crane (Ill.), Devine (Ohio), Gross (Iowa), Hall (Mo.), Hunt (N.J.), Jonas (N.C.), Landgrebe (Ind.), Mizell (N.C.), Price (Tex.), Robinson (Va.), Ruth (N.C.), Scherle (Iowa), Schmitz (Cal.), Scott (Va.), Spence (S.C.), Steiger (Ariz.), Williams (Pa.), Wyman (N.H.) and Zion (Ind.).

INDIANA: attack on unigov

Democratic mayoral candidate John Neff, whose campaign had been sagging, has been attempting to inject the question of school integration into the race for Mayor of Indianapolis. Despite the fact that Indiana law separates civil and school government, Neff has been trying to link the school problem to the recently-instituted unified government (Unigov) system advocated by GOP Mayor Richard Lugar.

The dispute arose in the wake of a ruling handed down by Federal District Court Judge S. Hugh Dillin that the Indianapolis Board of School Commissioners has been operating a segregated system. In his opinion, Judge Dillin raised the question of whether his court had the power to order consolidation of the Indianapolis Public Schools with Indianapolis suburban districts. Neff filed a petition with Dillin requesting a "referendum on Unigov."

Dillin denied Neff's request and suggested that this court "does not do business by plebiscite, has

no power to order referenda . . ." and was busy enough dealing with the decision without ". . . taking on the additional burden of dealing with sham issues put forth in the interest of political opportunism."

Meanwhile, Neff has had Matt Reese, a professional get-out-the-vote expert working for him at a reported fee of \$61,000. Reese worked for John and Robert Kennedy in their presidential campaigns, and is credited with generating the turnout which helped Vance Hartke squeeze past Richard Roudebush in Indiana last year. Reese has allegedly advised Neff to forget the inner city in favor of pursuing a "suburban strategy" which, if true, seems to be borne out by Neff's recent comments.

NEW YORK: rising above the tedium

September 14th was Primary Day, and the State's voters stayed away from the polls in thousands. The combination of no statewide contest, a mere handful of local races, obscure judgeships and party posts, plus poor weather, led to a massively uninteresting election. Only three races rose above this tedium — all were in New York City and concerned Democrats.

The Democrats' penchant for internal and internecine struggle has been quite strong on the national level, but in the City (where they like to be best in everything), local Democrats have honed it down to a murderously fine degree. State Assemblyman Frank Rossetti successfully turned back a challenge to his dual position as Manhattan Democratic County Chairman, as he easily won reelection as a local district leader. Had he lost the district leadership, he would have been ineligible for election as Chairman of the nationally-important New York Democratic organization. Rossetti has an old-style clubhouse politician image; his opponent in the district race was supported by many reformers, including former Mayor Robert F. Wagner, and two ambitious young officeholders: Herman Badillo, the nation's first Puerto Rican Congressman, and a wealthy City Councilman, Carter Burden. Assuming the district leaders select Rossetti again as County Chairman (as expected), it would be a definite setback to reform Democrats in general. But specifically, the careers of Badillo and Burden are not expected to suffer greatly.

Everything was not roses for Rossetti, however. His candidate for the most patronage-powerful judgeship in the State, the Manhattan Surrogate, lost. Millard Midonick defeated Frederick Backer and is almost certain to defeat the Republican candidate in November, Morris Aarons, who is the interim Surrogate by appointment of Governor Rockefeller.

The third interesting race, in Queens, also consolidated the position of another Democratic County Chairman. Eugene F. Mastropieri won the Democratic nomination for Councilman at Large and is expected to win the General Election in November. Mastropieri is the handpicked candidate of Queens Councilman and County Chairman Matthew Troy. The election represented the first test of Troy's strength in this significant and heavily Democratic borough.

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VIRGINIA: Can Shafran Follow in Holton's Footsteps?

If George Shafran can be elected lieutenant governor of Virginia this fall, he will be ideally positioned to advance to the governorship when Governor Linwood Holton steps down in 1973. Holton is constitutionally barred from succeeding himself. Such a victory would solidify the broadly-based moderate character of Virginia Republicanism.

Shafran's nomination for the vacancy created by the death of Democratic Lieutenant Governor R. Sargent Reynolds was in itself a crucial intra-party test for the Holton Republicans.

On Saturday August 21, forces loyal to Holton defeated party conservatives, as Arlington Delegate Shafran won nomination on the second ballot of the state Republican Convention. Shafran's well-financed campaign came within 56 votes of victory on the first ballot and went over the top when the large Fairfax County delegation deserted its favorite son, Warren Barry, to split between Shafran and his chief rival, arch-conservative Delegate George Mason Green, also of Arlington County. In addition, the largely pro-Shafran delegation from Southwestern Virginia's "Fighting Ninth" District swung much more heavily to the frontrunner on the second ballot, as Shafran won many delegates initially favoring 32-year-old Warren County Supervisor John Marlow.

While Governor Holton remained officially neutral, Holton allies such as House of Delegates Minority Leader Caldwell Butler, Delegate Peter Giesen and Delegate John Dalton piloted the Shafran campaign. George Mason Green's hard core consisted of the party's right wing, strongest in the Richmond suburbs and, oddly enough, in Northern Virginia. Green had been a leader together with Congressman Joel Broyhill of the 1970 drive to secure the Republican nomination for Senator Harry Byrd, Jr. Green claimed that he could, as a "common sense conservative," win the same kind of victory that Byrd had fashioned in 1970 as an independent.

Patronage Pique

The Green forces attempted to capitalize on the dissatisfaction of many party workers with Governor Holton's progressive racial policies and with his willingness to pass over the party faithful in filling top jobs. Shafran, who rose from poverty in the coal mines of Pennsylvania to millionaire status as a Northern Virginia real estate man, became closely identified with Governor Holton during his term in the House of Delegates.

When this November's special election was call-

ed, Shafran, the principal promotor of Holton's government reorganization proposals, emerged as the candidate of the Holton moderates. He drew strong support from Holton strongholds such as the Western Virginia Sixth District and the Southwestern Virginia Ninth District. Shafran's well advanced pre-convention campaign also carried delegations from Norfolk and Portsmouth. Pointing to an anti-busing bill that he had introduced and promising to be accommodating toward the party organization on patronage matters, Shafran managed to defuse much of the conservative resentment at his close associations with Holton.

Shafran's victory was due in large part to a well-organized, richly-financed campaign that established his credibility as a likely winner against independent populist State Senator Henry Howell of Norfolk and Delegate George Kostel of Clifton Forge, the moderately conservative Democratic nominee. The Holton forces had to blunt the memories of the Ray Garland 1970 Senate campaign: the attractive, young state legislator from Roanoke, underfinanced and badly organized, was swamped in a three-way race against Senator Harry Byrd, Jr. and populist Democrat George Rawlings.

Three-way race

Henry Howell starts with a substantial lead in name recognition but this fiery "battler against the big boys" has a limited voter base, largely blacks, labor and independent liberals. The busing controversy cuts heavily in Howell's Tidewater stronghold. Whites in Norfolk are incensed over court-ordered busing, and Howell, as a liberal with strong backing from blacks, is likely to be hurt among many working class whites — who have supported him in the past.

George Kostel, a little-known Democratic legislator who won his party's nod in a deadlocked convention after former Governor Mills Godwin and other conservative Democrats swung behind him, will probably gain most from the busing issue. Kostel has already made it clear that he intends to run to the right of both Howell and Shafran. He should be able to count on support in Southside and Richmond, both Byrd organization redoubts.

To win, Shafran must sweep the strongly Republican areas of Western Virginia, carry Southwestern Virginia and Northern Virginia and run respectably in Tidewater and the Richmond area. To do this he must persuade the legions of anti-Howell voters that he, not Kostel, is the chief rival to Howell.

OHIO: Getting in Shape for Nixon in '72

The Ohio Republican party, battered by defeat in 1970 yet crucial to President Nixon's reelection chances, approaches 1972 with conflict on every level and without a Republican governor or a statewide race to bring unity.

State Chairman John Andrews is highly regarded by party pros across the country and strongly supported by most Ohio county chairmen. But his media efforts are undermined by the residue of the 1970 Senatorial primary between former Governor James A. Rhodes and Robert Taft, Jr. and by factionalism in the GOP state legislative majority.

Senator Taft's bid for party leadership — a surprise favorite son announcement and a commendable proposal for a new high level party directorate — suffered from his characteristic failure to consult beforehand with other Republican leaders, including Andrews, Senator William Saxbe and big city chairmen.

Favorite Sons

The favorite son initiative was apparently designed to provide a focus for Ohio Republicans, project Taft as a possible vice presidential nominee, and contain the ambitions of Rhodes. But the 62-year-old former governor was a masterful politician in office and retains great loyalty — more than Taft — within the party. He may well want to be favorite son himself next year, as well as governor in 1974.

Battling GOP factionalism in the state legislature is another potential gubernatorial candidate, House Speaker Charles Kurfess. One of the ablest younger Republicans, he has nonetheless failed to achieve a unified party strategy in dealing with the ambitious Democratic governor John J. Gilligan.

Gilligan proposed a budget substantially higher than the last Rhodes budget, and a personal and corporate income tax to pay for it. (Ohio is now the only industrial state without an income tax.)

When budget and revenue bills were separated, the Republican controlled legislature substantially cut the budget. But no agreement could be reached on taxes among the governor, the Republicans and the Democrats in the legislature.

Part of Kurfess' problem lay in 17 or 18 conservative Republicans who for many weeks refused to support any income tax. Along with 45 intransigent Democrats in the 99 member House, they blocked any legislation until mid-July. Finally, over two weeks into the fiscal year, a compromise was reached in the House, providing among other things for a one to four

percent personal income tax.

As of press time, however, the Senate still had not passed a revenue bill, and the state is operating on its fourth interim budget. The latest delay occurred when Gilligan, in an attempt to mollify organized labor's opposition to the income levy, tried to impose three new business taxes on the Republican controlled Senate just as it was finally working out an agreement.

Kurfess, who wanted to run for Governor in 1970 but failed to find financial backing, emerged from the House battle with reduced stature. He is blamed by some Republicans for public association of the tax with the GOP and by some for his general failure to overcome legislative divisiveness. But observers expect him to bounce back and give the party leadership in some capacity in 1974, when most of the old guard of the '60s will have faded from the scene and the party slate will need several new faces.

At the top of the ticket, however, may well be the familiar face of James Rhodes. If it develops that he is the strongest opponent for Gilligan, Ohio's pragmatic Republicans, after testing the others, are likely to turn to their former governor. Although Senator William Saxbe has understandably remained aloof from current party squabbles, he will be on the slate in 1974 and is expected to play a significant role in deciding these questions then.

Gilligan's Popularity

After only nine months in office, it is difficult to measure Gilligan's popularity. The tax proposals were, of course, unpalatable, but he is sharing the blame with the Republican legislature. His arrogance is still present — turning off Democrats as well as Republicans.

Nonetheless, he is working to strengthen the Democratic party, as well as his personal standing within it. He wants the delegation to the 1972 convention to be under his control, both for bargaining in the Presidential balloting, and for his own personal interest in being on the ticket as someone's running mate.

Gilligan hardly had an overwhelming mandate to govern — a 330,000 vote plurality against a scandal-ridden GOP ticket. How well he manages the state will have much to do with his viability as a vice presidential candidate, or his reelection in 1974.

Meanwhile under Andrews' administrative leadership the state GOP continues its struggle to get in shape for Nixon in '72.

The Achievement of George Romney

George W. Romney, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, came into the suspicious environs of the Nixon Cabinet with two big strikes against him. As a successful two-term governor of Michigan, and as an unsuccessful Presidential candidate, he was one of the very few Nixon appointees with a national reputation and possibly independent political future. He was also the only high-ranking Administration official with an electoral base that could be called liberal.

Romney has survived his handicaps. He has even survived what no other Nixon official has: a widely publicized "shape-up-or-ship-out" warning from John Mitchell.

Romney is now an established member of the Nixon team, and he is thriving, even though he stands out sharply — progressive among conservatives, a national personality among political neophytes. Romney's loyalty is no longer suspect. If re-elected, Nixon could doubtless ask Romney to re-enlist for another four-year hitch. And Romney, long cut off from his Michigan base, would happily agree.

URBAN SPOKESMAN

Now that Romney is politically entrenched, and now that rumors of his firing have ceased, the time is ripe for an assessment. How has Romney met the challenge of being the Republican Party's number one urban spokesman — within the Administration, with Congress, with the city and housing lobbies, and with the HUD bureaucracy itself? Where does the Republican Party stand politically after three years of Romney's stewardship over the federal-city relationship?

On the whole Romney has done impressively — but not according to the traditional yardsticks of Cabinet accomplishment and influence.

Nixon has substantially downgraded the functions of the Cabinet and has neglected the federal bureaucracy. Only at HEW and the Pentagon — where the

Administration has made the kind of legislative initiatives that require bureaucratic cooperation — have the Secretaries continued to play the political and managerial roles expected of the Cabinet.

Secretaries Elliot Richardson and Melvin Laird go regularly to the Hill to negotiate with the committee barons and the mavericks. Their comings and goings are chronicled repeatedly in the daily press and on the evening television news. On a less visible but still more regular basis, they bargain with the affected lobbies. They are judged by how well they succeed as brokers. Robert Finch, for example, was ineffective and he was moved upstairs. Richardson and Laird are first rate brokers.

ALIVE AND THRIVING

Romney's style as a strong-willed citizen-reformer has not lent itself to effective brokerage either on the Hill or with the lobbies. His frequent resort to angry impatience has not endeared him to his congressional or mayoral constituencies in Washington where — unlike Lansing — everyone considers himself a chief and not an Indian. Still he has thrived as Secretary of HUD, first because the Nixon administration, lacking major programmatic initiatives in housing and urban affairs, has not required Romney to assume the traditional brokerage role. More importantly he has established a remarkable record by using his strengths as a salesman and administrative



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reformer to redirect an unwieldy bureaucracy into new policy initiatives affecting the cities.

Romney has skillfully used his sales ability to meet the number one challenge facing any HUD Secretary. The nation's cities are dying, economically, socially and politically. They are rapidly becoming black, dramatically joining for the first time since the slavery controversy the factious issues of inequality and race.

The shock waves of urban collapse and urban blackness have only begun to be felt. Eventually they may well cause the kind of political trauma which the demise of the farms triggered in the late 19th century.

Out of that trauma came wave after wave of political and social unrest, reflected first in Populism, then in Progressivism. Eventually new political configurations emerged within the two major parties. The collapse of the cities if it comes will have similar repercussions — if not greater because of the racial connections.

Quietly in the last decade the trend in nation's fifty biggest cities has gone from white to black. The rate of change is staggering.

Already Gary, Cleveland and Newark have black mayors. The necessary threshold for black takeover has been reached in Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, Oakland, St. Louis and Trenton. By the mid-1970's, if the black urban population continues to increase as the white declines, the necessary threshold will have been reached in Chicago, Cincinnati, Columbus, Memphis, New Orleans, Philadelphia and a number of other cities. Out of all this the country could see a sweeping Negro political takeover rivaling the earlier rise to power by the Irish in the cities: In the last

ten years the black population of the 25 largest cities has shot up sharply. Only in Indianapolis and Jacksonville — where city-county consolidations brought in large blocks of suburban whites — did the percent of black population decrease.

Only Romney has faced the challenge of the polarization between the black inner cities and the white suburbs squarely. His Democratic predecessors at HUD and his colleagues in the Nixon Administration have all backed off from it.

Courageously Romney has fought to knit all his department's programs to the goal of moving center city ghetto blacks into the surrounding suburbs where the job growth is. Within the higher reaches of the Administration, Romney has practically worked alone in promoting his "open communities" policy. And — remarkably — he has succeeded, to the great dismay of conservatives like Kevin Phillips who for two years has been lamenting Romney's quiet progress.

CIVIL RIGHTS-HOUSING POSTURE

The Nixon position on this issue was announced in the President's June 11 statement on equal housing opportunity. At the time, press reports stressed the statement's negative aspects, particularly the President's pledge not to force economic integration upon any suburb by cutting off federal funds. However, with the passage of time a revised opinion of the Nixon civil rights-housing posture has emerged, and now the press is beginning to stress the pro-civil rights aspects of the President's stance. For example, on August 4 the *Wall Street Journal*, which originally had been critical of the housing message, devoted a whole editorial page to Nixon's "Steady Pressure on Civil Rights." The article's emphasis was on creation of low-cost housing in the suburbs.

The original Nixon statement had three major parts supporting low income housing in the suburbs. Several pages of the statement were devoted to the philosophical, social and economic justifications for open suburbs, articulated by no previous President; several pages were devoted to how vigorously the Administration intended to prosecute racial discrimination in housing, even when it included economic sub-

Rank	City	Percent Negro	
		1960	1970
1	New York City	14.0	21.2
2	Chicago	22.9	32.7
3	Detroit	28.9	43.7
4	Philadelphia	26.4	33.6
5	Washington	53.9	71.1
6	Los Angeles	13.5	17.9
7	Baltimore	34.7	46.4
8	Cleveland	28.6	38.3
9	New Orleans	37.2	45.0
10	Atlanta	38.3	51.3
11	St. Louis	28.6	40.9
12	Memphis	37.0	38.9
13	Dallas	19.0	24.9
14	Newark	34.1	54.2
15	Indianapolis	20.6	18.0
16	Birmingham	39.6	42.0
17	Cincinnati	21.6	27.6
18	Oakland	22.8	34.5
19	Jacksonville	41.1	22.3
20	Kansas City, Mo.	17.5	22.1
21	Milwaukee	8.4	14.7
22	Pittsburgh	16.7	20.2
23	Richmond	41.8	42.0
24	Boston	9.1	16.3
25	Columbus	16.4	18.5

Source: Census Bureau



terfuges such as exclusionary zoning; and several pages were devoted to how the Administration planned to help those suburban communities which voluntarily accepted low-cost housing.

On June 13 the Nixon action program was spelled out at a joint Mitchell-Romney press conference when Mitchell made the dramatic announcement that the Justice Department would file suit charging racial discrimination against the Missouri suburb of Black Jack for its zoning ordinance prohibiting multi-family housing. The Black Jack case had become the intra-Administration battleground around which the Romney and anti-Romney sides had grouped. The Nixon decision to prosecute — and he had been repeatedly pressed in televised press conferences about the case — symbolized Romney's victory.

At the same joint press conference, Romney announced that HUD would "condition" virtually all its programs in order to provide economic leverage for his "open communities" effort. With Mitchell standing next to him in support, Romney said the controversial administrative move was the Nixon way of implementing his promise to "help" suburban communities which wanted to economically integrate.

The Nixon-Mitchell acceptance of "conditioning," the very issue over which Mitchell had originally threatened Romney in late 1970, means giving HUD's extremely able Under Secretary Richard C. Van Dusen a relatively free hand in program management. As Romney now says proudly of his programs: "We won't cut off funds; but we won't grant funds in the first place unless communities cooperate." Romney and Van Dusen repeatedly point out that they have more than 10 claimants for every HUD dollar. The message is clear: there will always be some community that will cooperate, and it will get the money.

There are three major HUD programs which affect suburban development: grants for water and sewer facilities, and two housing construction subsidy programs — one for lower middle class homeownership and one for lower middle class rental assistance. All three are now subject to open community regulations.

THE POLITICS OF SEWERS

Water and sewers provide the key. Romney claims that approximately one out of every ten suburban communities is seeking or getting HUD dollars to construct new water and sewer facilities. Where suburbs are undergoing boom development, local politicians badly want federal subsidies for water and sewers in order to keep pace with residential development needs. The popular HUD program pays 50 percent of costs, and Congress, responding to the program's grass roots popularity, has boosted appropriations from \$130 million in fiscal 1970 to \$700 million in fiscal 1972.

Under HUD's new program criteria, a key requirement is the extent of suburban acceptance of low-income housing. Demand for funding is so intense that, under the rewritten regulations, most communities will not qualify unless they cooperate. Already Romney has been put under considerable pressure from suburban-oriented Republican Congressmen over the new regulations. The New Jersey Republican delegation, virtually all suburban in makeup, has been the most vocal in lamenting how the new criteria will effectively exclude their lily-white communities. Romney has stood by his guns, however.

INSTITUTIONALIZING OPENNESS

At the same time HUD, with the support of the Justice Department, is carrying out an aggressive campaign against cases of racial discrimination in the suburbs. And on the urban front, HUD's urban renewal and public housing policies tend to disperse rather than impact the center city ghettos.

To be sure, the Nixon White House has not gone along entirely with the original HUD program. The degree of conditioning or leverage has been softened from what HUD initially proposed in 1970.


Nevertheless Romney has gotten Nixon to do what the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations shied away from: institutionalize access of ghetto residents to the suburbs as an objective of the federal government. Once started down that road, it will be difficult for any Administration to retreat.

Selling this effort has consumed more than half of Romney's time. For that effort he should get the highest marks. In later years, political historians will credit Romney with starting the federal government on a new and courageous course in dealing with the nation's most serious problem — the urban ghetto.

Unfortunately, Romney's other two sales programs have to be rated more critically. Within the Nixon Administration Romney has emerged as the super salesman for faster production of housing and for revenue sharing, particularly for special revenue sharing.

Breakthrough

Romney's passion for faster and cheaper housing production reflects his uncritical faith in the pro-



duction ethic. His whole approach to housing is very much a carryover from his ballyhooed days at American Motors. Even Romney's discussion of housing is laced with analogies to automobile production.

As a production man Romney has been a smashing success. So much so that he has become the darling of the housing lobbies, and in particular the politically potent National Association of Home Builders.

Romney has successfully lobbied within the Administration to get priority attention for housing production needs. In 1970, a bad year for mortgage money and hence for housing construction, the Administration, at Romney's persistent urgings, committed a record \$13 billion to support the mortgage market.

More significant, Romney has really stepped up the production of federally-assisted housing. During the Kennedy and Johnson years, production of subsidized housing averaged 50,000 units, a mere fraction of each year's total housing starts. Under the Nixon-Romney regime, subsidized housing starts have skyrocketed to 400,000 units in fiscal 1970, 550,000 units in fiscal 1971, and a projected 700,000 units for fiscal 1972.

Thus Romney's often repeated boast that "this Administration has done more for housing than any other Administration" is incontestable.

CRACKING THE WHIP

Even at HUD, where the Federal Housing Administration had traditionally gone its lazy and conservative ways, Romney has cracked the managerial whip repeatedly in order to promote faster production. The department has been reorganized twice already, and each time FHA has lost more of its historic autonomy. None of Romney's predecessors at HUD were ever willing to hammer the entrenched and sprawling FHA bureaucracy into line with the department's broader policy objectives.

Romney has clearly relished knocking the bureaucratic heads together. Often he boasts that HUD is now a department, with each division functionally deployed and responsive to centralized authority. Before his arrival on the scene, as Romney often notes, "HUD was more of a conglomerate than a department." Romney's yardstick for managerial success at HUD is to facilitate production. That has been the street map by which he has redrawn the department's bureaucratic segments.

Thus the research and technology division has been upgraded and become the bureaucratic vehicle for Operation Breakthrough, Romney's prized demonstration program to stimulate industrialized production of housing. Under the program, ten strategically scattered sites will serve as automobile showrooms for factory-built housing produced by big manufacturing

corporations. So-called "Breakthrough housing" will be given the equivalent of HUD's "good housekeeping seal of approval," which Romney hopes communities will honor in lieu of their local building codes and zoning ordinances.

To date, however, Breakthrough has made people aware of new systems, but has not got much new housing built.

As a producer of new housing, Romney, in general, has done wonders. He has lured big business into the housing field, jacked up subsidized housing more than tenfold, and revamped the department, especially FHA. When he is finally gone from the scene, the Home Builders lobby will doubtless judge all his successors by how well they measure up to Romney.

Zero for the Urban Poor

The problem with all this is that it doesn't do much for the real housing crisis. The real crisis is in urban housing, and especially housing for the urban poor. Yet the HUD programs which subsidize new housing reach only the lower middle class, those in the six to ten thousand dollar range. And they cannot be used in the big cities where land costs are higher than the programs allow. Thus the subsidy programs on which Romney is lavishing so much money (\$1.4 billion now, \$7.5 billion by 1978) to some extent repeat the old mistakes made by FHA in the 1940's and 1950's: suburban sprawl, exclusion of cities and the poor, and control by the private building and real estate interests.

BROOKE'S SOCIAL STRATEGY

Moreover, the rising tide of environmentalism is forcing those who have uncritically called for more housing to question that objective. Rather than develop new suburbs, and build more highways, they want a new federal housing strategy that is essentially anti-



production and anti-growth, at least in the eyes of the housing lobby. Politicians like Senator Edward Brooke (R-Mass.), who are new to the housing field, approach housing as a *social* policy. Old timers like Romney and Senator John Tower (R-Tex.), ranking minority member on the Senate Banking Committee and a staunch ally of the housing lobby, tend to see housing as *economic*. They measure success by how much is produced, how well homebuilders are doing and how homebuilding is contributing to overall economic prosperity.

Although Romney is responsive to both approaches, Brooke more than the Secretary judges housing policies from an urban consumer vantage point. His concerns are with the urban poor, the growing problem of abandonment and other essentially social concerns in the ghetto. Rather than chiefly subsidizing new housing production, Brooke is pressing for a federal strategy that links housing allowances for the poor with subsidies for rehabilitating existing urban housing. The Brooke strategy at least attempts to meet the social aspect of the housing crisis in the city itself; Romney's approach does not.

REVENUE SHARING

Romney's other major preoccupation has been as a top administrative salesman for President Nixon's general and special revenue sharing programs.

The concept of general revenue sharing, one of Ripon's first policy proposals, is widely accepted now as a way for every community to attain needed no-strings funding to meet general operating expenses. Unfortunately the Nixon formula, based as it is on tax effort rather than need, favors affluent suburban counties over big cities. Thus, for example, Beverly Hills, California, because it raises a high number of tax dollars per capita from its wealthy constituency receives four times as much in return per capita as a struggling city like Cleveland.

Special revenue sharing, whereby most of the Democratic initiated programs in urban development, rural development, education, transportation, law enforcement and manpower training would be lumped into six "no strings" pots, helps overcome bureaucratic red tape in Washington built up over the years by Democratic-sponsored categorical grant-in-aid programs. Still, the Nixon program, by going full circle to drop all requirements for the communities affected proposes to give up the opportunity to build through cooperation criteria for local priorities and performance.

This need not have been the Administration policy. In fact a different legislative package was drafted in HUD and cleared through the Secretary's Office. This program of block grants, built squarely on Republican initiatives in the Congress over the last

decade, would have authorized HUD to negotiate a single urban development package (as opposed to disjointed grantsmanship for urban renewal, public housing, code enforcement, and other housing subsidies). Priorities would be drawn up locally and sent to Washington for approval. Such a program would not only cut red tape but provide incentives for planning and coordination between local agencies.

The block grant package, which might have supplemented general revenue sharing, passed every stage of approval until it reached the President at the Winter White House in San Clemente January 18. Some time in the next five days the program was scuttled in favor of special revenue sharing, which was hastily drawn up and announced January 23 as part of Nixon's "peaceful American Revolution."

TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN

The Administration's special revenue sharing package now before the Congress, rather than reforming the old programs, scraps them and in effect tells states and cities, "here is some money, now go away and don't bother us." Worst of all from an urban point of view, the special revenue sharing drive militates against the open communities policy which Romney has so laboriously established. Since money flows automatically to individual political jurisdictions in metropolitan areas, some for the cities and some for the suburbs, special revenue sharing subsidizes the fragmented and balkanized metropolitan political structure which Romney has frequently blamed for getting us into the urban crisis.

Nevertheless, Romney is zealously promoting the entire revenue sharing thrust, even though it could undo in the name of reform what should stand as his signal achievement — the Administration's official adoption of an open communities policy.

Such a position is not surprising, given Romney's role as a team player. Still, when he saw the need for a policy of moving ghetto residents to where the jobs are, he pursued his goal, even in the face of initial Administration hostility, until ultimately he gathered White House support.

Romney can now redirect his housing and revenue sharing efforts back in line with his major policy initiative on suburban access and make the same effort to bring the White House along. The President's decision to suspend the drive for revenue sharing during the 90-day wage and price freeze gives Romney time to maneuver. The extent to which he is able to use this time to forge his three major policies into a coherent program is likely to determine the ultimate success or failure of this Administration in overcoming the very real and very dangerous polarization between the poor black cities and the rich white suburbs. ■

Ripon Ratings: The 91st Congress

Last year the Ripon Society issued quantitative ratings of the voting records of U.S. Senators in the First Session of the 91st Congress (1969). Recognizing the many deficiencies inherent in any quantitative rating system, we nevertheless concluded that the Congressional rating field could not be left to the American Conservative Union, the Americans for Democratic Action, or the AFL-CIO COPE.

A Senator or Representative's value is not merely a function of how often he votes in accordance with the position of the rating organization. His work and votes in committee, his initiative in drafting and molding legislation, and his leadership role on key issues are all factors which do not enter into a numerical rating. Thus some persons for whom the Ripon Society holds considerable admiration often rank relatively low in our ratings, while others whose service evokes less respect may rate much higher.

Numerical ratings are particularly questionable in the House; there committees are especially powerful and frequently send legislation to the floor under a closed rule barring amendments. The failure of the House until this year to record teller votes of individual Representatives restricts further the range of issues on which Members of Congress can be evaluated. While we were able to choose 26 Ripon test votes for the Senate during its Second Session in 1970, it was a difficult matter to find 17 House votes for the entire two years of the 91st Congress. Even then, there were no direct recorded votes in the House on the Vietnam war. In view of the paucity of key votes in the House, it would be of little value to compare the Ripon rating of a Senator with that of Representatives from the same state. Due to the frequently lopsided nature of the test votes in the House, House ratings are likely to run somewhat higher than those in the Senate. This does not demonstrate that the House is more in tune with Ripon principles than the Senate. In fact, the contrary is likely the case.

CONSTELLATION OF ISSUES In choosing the test votes for both the Senate and the House, Ripon used the following criteria central to the traditions of the Republican Party:

- Privatization as opposed to bureaucratization.
- Devolution of power from the Executive to Congress, to local institutions (both public and private) and to individual citizens.
- Openness and candor among our institutions, both those of a governmental and a quasi-governmental nature.
- Relying on, and expanding the benefits of, the free market system in national and international deal-

ings, and, conversely, refusing to subsidize inefficient enterprise.

- Fiscal responsibility and a concomitant national economic policy that seeks to correct basic imbalances rather than treating symptoms through direct controls.
- A foreign policy which is internationalist without being interventionist.
- Creation of an environment that encourages the substantive legal and economic equality of races and ethnic groups.

In 1970 as in 1969 progressive Republicans dominate the top rungs of the Ripon Senate ratings. Seven of the eight highest Senators are Republicans: Goodell (96%), Case (92%), Hatfield (91%), Brooke and Packwood (both 88%), Mathias (87%), and Javits (83%). The only Democrat to rate in this group is Ribicoff (91%) who frequently broke with his Democratic colleagues to vote against subsidies and in favor of maintaining a free market.

The lowest scores in the Senate were again garnered by Southern Democrats, who consistently voted against free markets, for producer subsidies, against civil rights and usually also civil liberties. The increased frequency of civil rights and civil liberties votes in the 1970 tabulations tended to lower the scores of Southern Senators of both parties.

STRESS ON FARM SUBSIDIES Four votes concerning agricultural subsidies were included in the Senate ratings. Since the economic status of farmers has continued to decline while the Department of Agriculture bureaucracy has proliferated and the costs of subsidy programs have swollen, Ripon has argued for a much freer market in agriculture. The heavy stress given to anti-agricultural subsidy votes symbolizes our determination that a more rational system be chosen to protect the economic interests of the farmer, the consumer and the taxpayer.

The highest ranking of the 1970 Senators who are now considered Presidential possibilities is Harris with 82% while the lowest is Jackson with 54%. The others range as follows: Kennedy (78%), McGovern (75%), Muskie (71%), McCarthy (65%) and Bayh (62%).

Of those Representatives who served a full two-year term only four, all Republicans, score 100%. They are Coughlin of Pennsylvania, Gude of Maryland, McCloskey of California and Riegle of Michigan. Fourteen Congressmen, eleven Republicans and three Democrats, score in the nineties. Six Congressmen, five Democrats and one Republican, rated less than 10%. The lowest ranking Democrats are Flynt and

O'Neal of Georgia, both at 7%, Whitten of Mississippi and Long of Louisiana both at 6%, and the anchorman, McMillan of South Carolina with zero. Watson of South Carolina with 7% was the lowest ranking House Republican.

Six new Republican Senators served as Representatives in the 91st Congress. Two freshmen Senators, Weicker of Connecticut (92%) and the newly appointed Stafford of Vermont (94%) score very high in the House ratings. The other freshmen, Taft of Ohio (76%), Roth of Delaware (71%), Beall of Maryland (64%) and Brock of Tennessee (44%) all range from average to above average in the Ripon ratings when they are compared with the Republican colleagues from their respective regions.

Now that the House rules are changed to allow recording of teller votes, we expect to publish in early 1972 ratings on the First Session of the 92nd Congress for both the House and the Senate. It will be interesting to see what influence on voting the greater public accountability of Congressmen will produce.

KEY

- V Record vote for Ripon position
 X Record vote against Ripon position
 O Absent, general pair, present, or did not announce or answer Congressional Quarterly poll
 (V) Paired for, announced for or CQ poll for Ripon position
 (X) Paired against, announced against or CQ poll against Ripon position

Key to Roll Call Vote Numbers U.S. SENATE

66. Mathias amendment adding "except as required by the Constitution" to provision of Labor-HEW Appropriations bill barring use of funds to require certain desegregation steps as a prerequisite for receiving federal aid. (Vote yea)

67. Scott amendment deleting provision of Labor-HEW Appropriations bill banning use of federal funds to force a student to go to a school other than one chosen by his parents. (Vote yea)

69. Javits substitute amendment to the Labor-HEW Appropriations bill requiring court convictions in connection with campus disorders before students lose federal aid. (Vote yea)

96. Scott amendment in the nature of a substitute for HR4249, extending the 1965 Voting Rights Act for five years. (Vote yea)

112. Confirmation of nomination of G. Harrold Carswell as an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. (Vote nay)

155. Scott amendment to fiscal 1971 Office of Education appropriations bill deleting the section barring use of funds to prepare plans that would go beyond freedom of choice. (Vote yea)

160. Javits amendment providing \$150 million in school desegregation aid. (Vote yea)

180. Cooper-Church amendment barring funds for U.S. military operations in Cambodia after July 1, 1970. (Vote yea)

206. Smith (R-Ill.) amendment limiting to \$20,000 agricultural subsidy payments to any producer in a single year. (Vote yea)

211. Moss amendment barring use of funds in the Agricultural Appropriations bill for carrying out price support programs for tobacco. (Vote yea)

238. Hart-Cooper amendment deleting \$322.2 million from the Military Procurement Authorization Bill for deployment of the Safeguard ABM system at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, and Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. (Vote yea)

247. Proxmire amendment striking all funds for the Subversive Activities Control Board. (Vote yea)

248. Committee amendment reducing funds for the United States contribution to the International Labor Organization. (Vote nay)

251. Goldwater-Hatfield amendment increasing military salaries and recommending the creation of a volunteer army. (Vote yea) This is a civil liberties issue as much as one of military policy.

258. McGovern-Hatfield amendment limiting to 280,000 the maximum number of U.S. troops in Vietnam after April 30, 1971, and providing for complete withdrawal of troops by December 31, 1971, but authorizing the President to delay the withdrawal for a period of up to 60 days if he found the withdrawal would subject U.S. troops to clear and present danger. (Vote yea)

271. Montoya amendment providing that price support payments to feed grain farmers be \$1.35 per bushel for corn and 77 percent of the parity price, whichever was greater. (Vote nay)

275. Passage of the Agricultural Act of 1970. (Vote nay)

281. Mansfield motion to invoke cloture on the Bayh constitutional amendment that would abolish the electoral college and substitute direct, popular election of Presidents. (Vote yea)

288. Williams (R-Del.) amendment striking provisions granting tax deferment for U.S. flag vessels. (Vote yea)

326. Mathias amendment to Packwood amendment to Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970; eliminating seniority system by providing for election of Senate committee chairmen by majority vote of members of the majority party. (Vote yea)

337. Ervin amendment deleting "no-knock" authorization from Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. (Vote yea)

375. Proxmire amendment deleting \$289.9 million in development funds for the supersonic transport. (Vote yea)

382. Yarborough amendment to the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Authorization, providing \$40 million for a flood control project in the Sabine River Basin. (Vote nay) Pork barrel.

389. Scott motion to table Fulbright motion to recommit the bill authorizing U.S. subscriptions of \$3.7 billion to four international financial institutions. (Vote yea)

396. Long motion to table Williams (R-Del.) amendment adding to Committee amendment two new titles dealing with textile and footwear quotas and trade agreements. (Vote yea)

398. Long motion to table Ribicoff amendment to establish a federal minimum grant of \$1600 annually for a family of four with lesser grants for working poor families. (Vote nay) This is the closest to an up or down vote on Family Assistance in the Senate in 1970, although not all who opposed Long's motion favored Family Assistance.

Key to Roll Call Vote Numbers U.S. HOUSE

91st Congress First Session, 1969

74. Resolution authorizing 15 members of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee to travel abroad to investigate postal questions, civil service policies and census procedures. (Vote nay) This was such a flagrant junket that 132 members of Congress opposed the authorizing resolution. While the total of wasted public funds on such junkets is relatively modest, these trips do little to set a tone of fiscal restraint for the rest of the federal government.

75. Passage of the bill to amend the Constitution by abolishing the electoral college and electing the

- turn to page 20

Minn.	McCarthy	65	68	V	V	(V)	(V)	V	(V)	(V)	V	(V)	(X)	V	(X)	V	X	V	X	(X)	V	(X)	(X)	(V)	V	(X)	(V)	X	(V)	17/26	
	Mondale	80	79	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	O	V	V	V	X	V	X	X	V	X	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	20/25	
Miss.	Eastland	4	9	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	1/24		
	Stennis	8	15	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	O	X	O	X	X	V	X	X	2/24	
Mo.	Eagleton	63	69	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	V	V	O	X	V	X	X	V	O	V	O	V	X	V	X	X	V	15/24	
	Symington	61	68	V	(V)	O	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	O	O	V	V	X	X	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	X	X	X	V	14/23	
Mont.	Mansfield	65	64	(V)	V	V	(V)	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	V	X	X	(V)	V	X	X	V	X	(X)	X	V	X	V	V	V	V	17/26	
	Metcalfe	61	60	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	V	V	(X)	(V)	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	(X)	X	(X)	X	V	V	16/26	
Nebr.	Curtis	19	31	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	X	(V)	(X)	X	V	X	X	X	V	V	X	(V)	X	(V)	5/26	
	Hruska	23	28	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	V	X	V	6/26	
Nev.	Bible	15	16	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	V	V	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/26	
	Cannon	26	35	X	X	X	V	V	X	V	V	(V)	X	O	O	(X)	(X)	O	O	(X)	O	O	(X)	O	X	X	X	X	X	5/19	
N.H.	McIntyre	46	54	V	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	12/26	
	Cotton	15	25	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	V	X	V	X	X	O	O	X	X	O	O	(X)	O	X	X	X	V	O	X	X	3/20	
N.J.	Williams	74	76	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	O	O	V	V	(V)	(X)	V	X	X	V	V	X	O	X	(V)	17/23		
	Case	92	86	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	V	23/25	
N.M.	Anderson	42	56	V	V	X	V	O	V	V	V	O	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	V	X	X	O	X	X	V	O	O	8/19	
	Montoya	65	48	O	O	O	(V)	V	V	V	V	X	X	V	O	O	O	V	X	X	(V)	O	O	O	(V)	X	V	X	V	11/17	
N.Y.	Goodell	96	96	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	V	(X)	(V)	(V)	V	O	(V)	(V)	V	24/25		
	Javits	83	85	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	O	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	X	O	(V)	V	X	O	(V)	V	X	O	V	(V)	19/23
N.C.	Ervin	8	19	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	V	X	X	X	2/26	
	Jordan	12	15	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	O	(V)	V	X	X	X	X	X	3/25		
N.D.	Burdick	62	54	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	V	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	V	X	V	X	V	(V)	16/26	
	Young	15	29	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	(X)	X	V	X	X	X	X	4/26		
Ohio	Young	81	63	V	V	(V)	V	(V)	V	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	V	(X)	(X)	V	(X)	(X)	(V)	X	(V)	V	X	V	V	(V)	21/26		
	Saxbe	55	67	O	O	O	V	X	V	O	V	V	O	O	(X)	X	X	V	X	V	X	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	11/20	
Okla.	Harris	82	71	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	O	O	V	V	V	X	V	(X)	X	V	X	(V)	(V)	V	O	O	V	V	18/22		
	Bellmon	43	42	V	V	V	O	X	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	V	X	O	O	X	V	V	V	X	10/23			
Ore.	Hatfield	91	76	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	O	V	V	X	V	X	(V)	O	O	(V)	(V)	21/23				
	Packwood	88	72	(V)	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	23/26		
Pa.	Schweiker	77	86	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	X	V	V	(X)	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	X	V	20/26			
	Scott	58	76	V	V	V	V	X	V	V	X	X	(X)	(X)	V	X	V	X	V	(X)	V	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	15/26		
R.I.	Pastore	69	59	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	(V)	X	V	X	(X)	X	V	X	V	X	(V)	18/26			
	Pell	75	74	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	V	O	X	V	X	O	X	V	X	V	X	V	18/24			
S.C.	Hollings	8	17	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(V)	X	(X)	X	(X)	2/26		
	Thurmond	12	21	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	O	X	X	X	V	(V)	X	V	4/25			
S.D.	McGovern	75	64	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	O	V	V	O	V	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	V	X	(X)	V	V	18/24		
	Mundt	25	38	(X)	(X)	O	X	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(V)	(V)	O	(V)	6/24			
Tenn.	Gore	33	58	X	X	X	V	V	X	V	V	O	(X)	V	O	O	X	X	X	V	X	O	O	V	X	X	X	X	7/21		
	Baker	36	44	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	V	X	O	(X)	V	V	V	X	X	V	V	X	V	V	9/25		
Tex.	Yarborough	53	58	O	O	O	(V)	V	O	O	V	X	X	V	(X)	V	V	V	(X)	X	V	O	X	O	X	X	(X)	V	V	10/19	
	Tower	15	29	X	X	X	(X)	X	(X)	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	(V)	(X)	X	(X)	X	(X)	X	(X)	(X)	(V)	X	(V)	4/26		
Utah	Moss	64	60	(V)	(V)	(X)	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	X	V	(V)	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	X	V	X	O	16/25		
	Bennett	27	41	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	(X)	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	7/26		
Vt.	Alken	75	82	V	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	X	X	(V)	(V)	X	X	V	X	V	V	O	O	V	V	V	V	V	18/24		
	Prouty	58	50	V	O	O	V	V	V	V	X	V	X	X	X	X	V	X	(V)	(X)	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	(V)	X	V	14/24	
Va.	Byrd, Jr.	17	21	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	O	V	O	O	X	V	4/23				
	Spong	33	36	X	X	X	(X)	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	O	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	V	O	X	X	V	8/24		
Wash.	Jackson	54	55	(V)	(V)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	(X)	(X)	X	X	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	X	V	X	X	V	V	V	14/26		
	Magnuson	48	55	V	V	X	V	V	V	V	O	(V)	V	X	X	X	V	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	12/25		
W.Va.	Byrd	19	11	X	X	X	X	(X)	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	5/26			
	Randolph	42	45	X	V	X	V	X	V	V	V	X	V	X	V	X	(X)	(X)	V	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	11/26		
Wisc.	Nelson	72	76	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	V	X	V	X	(V)	19/26			
	Proxmire	69	66	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	V	X	X	V	X	X	V	V	V	V	X	V	18/26		
Wyo.	McGee	58	48	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	(X)	O	X	V	X	X	O	(X)	O	O	O	O	O	V	X	V	O	V	11/19		
	Hansen	27	24	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	X	X	(V)	X	X	V	V	(V)	X	V	7/26			

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	1969 Votes							1970 Votes										
	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y				
Alabama																		
3 Andrews	25	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/16				
7 Bevil	24	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/17				
5 Flowers	25	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/16				
8 Jones	19	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/16				
4 Nichols	18	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/17				
6 Buchanan	41	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7/17				
2 Dickenson	35	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9/17				
1 Edwards	41	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7/17				
Alaska																		
AL Pollock	54	V	(X)	O	X	X	(V)	O	V	X	O	(V)	(X)	V	O	V	(X)	7/13
Arizona																		
2 Udall	82	X	V	O	X	X	V	V	(V)	X	V	V	V	(V)	V	X	12/16	
1 Rhodes	75	V	V	O	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	8/16	
3 Stolger	50	V	V	O	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	8/16	
Arkansas																		
1 Alexander	40	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	O	V	X	V	V	V	6/15
2 Mills	31	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/13
4 Pryor	47	V	V	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7/15
3 Hammerschmidt	41	V	V	O	X	X	X	X	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7/17
California																		
5 Burton	39	X	X	V	X	X	V	X	V	X	V	X	V	V	V	X	V	10/17
7 Cohelan	81	X	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	O	V	X	13/16
9 Edwards	69	X	V	V	(X)	X	V	(V)	X	V	X	V	(V)	(V)	X	V	X	11/16
4 Harris	63	X	X	V	(V)	X	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	9/17
2 Johnson	58	X	X	V	(X)	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(V)	X	X	9/16
34 Leggett	56	X	X	V	(X)	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9/16
15 McFall	56	X	X	V	(X)	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9/16
8 Miller	62	(X)	X	(X)	(X)	O	(X)	(V)	X	(V)	X	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	9/16
3 Moss	82	X	(V)	X	(V)	(V)	X	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	14/17
10 Slak	41	(V)	O	(X)	X	(V)	O	O	O	(V)	O	O	O	O	(X)	O	X	7/16
38 Tunney	90	O	V	O	(X)	X	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	9/10
37 Van Deerlin	71	(X)	V	X	V	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	X	X	12/17
14 Waldie	71	X	V	X	V	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	(V)	(X)	V	X	X	12/17
1 Clausen	44	X	V	X	O	X	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7/16
10 Gutser	100	X	V	X	X	X	(V)	O	X	X	X	X	O	(V)	X	X	X	9/16
11 McCloskey	80	X	V	X	X	X	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	(V)	(V)	X	X	X	12/17
6 Wallhard	69	(X)	V	X	V	O	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	11/16
18 Mathias	39	(V)	(X)	(X)	V	O	V	X	V	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	10/17
33 Pettis	65	X	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	11/17
12 Talcott	65	X	(V)	(X)	X	X	V	(V)	X	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	11/17
13 Tague	78	X	(V)	X	(V)	(V)	X	(V)	X	(V)	X	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	11/15
35 Utt	33	(V)	(X)	X	X	(X)	(Died)											2/8
35 Schmitz	33																	2/8
36 Wilson	59	(X)	V	X	(X)	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	10/17
Los Angeles County																		
17 Anderson	59	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	10/17
29 Brown	76	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	(X)	X	X	V	(V)	(X)	(V)	(X)	(V)	13/17
22 Gorman	76	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	X	(V)	(X)	V	(V)	X	(X)	(V)	V	V	13/17
21 Hawkins	65	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	X	(V)	(V)	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(V)	X	(X)	11/17
19 Hoffeld	59	(X)	(X)	(V)	V	X	V	X	V	V	V	X	(V)	(V)	X	(V)	X	10/17
28 Ross	76	X	V	V	(V)	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	13/17
30 Roybal	90	X	(V)	X	(V)	V	V	X	(V)	O	V	V	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	12/15
31 Wilson	71	X	(V)	X	(V)	V	V	X	(V)	(V)	X	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	12/17
28 Bell	83	X	V	O	X	V	V	V	O	O	O	O	(V)	(V)	X	X	X	10/19
23 Clawson	33	X	O	(X)	X	X	X	V	(X)	O	O	(V)	(X)	(V)	X	X	X	4/12
32 Hoemer	33	X	X	V	(X)	V	V	V	V	X	(V)	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	9/17
24 Lipscomb	40	(X)	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	O	(Died)										2/8
24 Rouselet	17																	1/6
27 Renoeker	27	(Resigned to become Lieutenant Governor of California)																3/11
20 Smith	38	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	6/16
25 Wiggins	53	X	V	X	X	X	X	(V)	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	9/17
Colorado																		
4 Aspinall	41	X	V	(X)	X	(X)	(X)	X	(V)	V	X	(V)	(X)	(X)	(V)	(V)	(V)	7/17
3 Evans	88	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	15/17
1 Rogers	87	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	10/15
2 Brotzman	82	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	14/17
Connecticut																		
1 Daddario	79	X	V	(V)	V	V	V	(X)	(V)	O	O	O	V	(X)	(V)	(V)	(V)	11/14
3 Giannino	56	(X)	X	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9/16
3 Monagan	71	X	V	(X)	V	V	V	(Died)										11/16
2 St. Onge	67	X	V	(X)	V	V	V	(Died)										8/17
2 Steale	67	X	V	(X)	V	V	V	(Died)										2/3
6 Meskill	92	X	V	X	V	X	V	(V)	(X)	V	O	O	(X)	(X)	V	O	V	8/13
4 Weiker	92	X	V	X	V	X	V	(V)	(V)	V	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	12/13
Delaware																		
AL Both	71	V	V	X	V	V	V	X	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	12/17
Florida																		
3 Bennett	47	X	X	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8/17
4 Chappell	18	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/17
12 Fascell	75	X	V	(X)	(V)	(V)	O	X	X	(X)	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	X	12/16
2 Rostenkowski	13	X	X	X	(V)	O	X	X	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1/14
6 Gibbons	81	O	X	(X)	V	V	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2/17
7 Haley	24	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/17
11 Pepper	56	(X)	X	(V)	X	X	X	X	(V)	X	O	O	X	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	9/16
9 Rogers	29	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	5/17
1 Sikes	33	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/15
10 Burke	35	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9/17
8 Cramer	35	(X)	V	X	X	X	X	X	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	6/17
3 Frey	53	(V)	V	X	V	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9/17
Georgia																		
3 Brinkley	24	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/17
7 Davis	24	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/17
6 Flynt	7	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1/14
1 Hagan	12	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2/17
9 Landrum	31	O	V	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4/13
2 O'Neal	7	O	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	(X)	X	X	O	X	X	O	X	X	1/14
10 Stephens	31	(X)	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	(V)	X	X	X	X	5/16
8 Stuckey	13	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	12/16
4 Blackburn	29	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2/16
5 Thompson	24	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/17
Hawaii																		
AI Matsunaga	76	X	V	V	X	V	V	X	V	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	13/17
AI Mink	65	O	V	V	X	V	V	X	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	11/17
Idaho																		
2 Hanson	69	O	X	O	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	O	(X)	X	X	X	11/16
1 McCure	29	O	X	O	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	O	O	X	X	X	4/14
Illinois																		
21 Gray	40	O	V	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	6/15
24 Price	59	X	O	V	X	V	V	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	(V)	X	X	X	10/17

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	1969 Votes										1970 Votes										
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N			
3 Sullivan	64	O	(V)	(V)	O	V	V	O	O	X	X	X	X	V	V	V	V	9/14			
25 Springfield	33	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	9/17												
7 Hall	19	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/16			
Montana																					
1 Olsen	41	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	7/17			
2 Melcher	56	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	V	V	V	V	X	X	X	X	8/16			
(Resigned to become federal judge)																					
Nebraska																					
2 Cunningham	71	(V)	V	X	V	X	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	12/17			
1 Denney	30	O	V	X	(X)	X	O	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	8/16			
3 Martin	50	O	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	5/15			
Nevada																					
AL Baring	18	(V)	X	X	V	X	X	V	(X)	(X)	X	(X)	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	3/17			
New Hampshire																					
2 Cleveland	59	V	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	10/17			
1 Wyman	53	(V)	V	X	V	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	8/17			
New Jersey																					
14 Daniels	53	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	V	V	V	11/17			
9 Gallagher	82	X	O	V	O	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	V	V	V	12/15			
13 Helatoski	80	X	O	V	O	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	V	V	(X)	13/16			
3 Howard	81	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	14/17			
8 Jolson	94	O	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	13/17			
13 Minish	76	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	1/1			
15 Patten	71	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	12/17			
14 Rodino	81	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	7/12			
4 Roe	58	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	13/17			
4 Thompson	76	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	13/17			
6 Cahill	50	X	V	V	O	(V)	O	V	V	V	Resigned to become Governor of N. Jersey							3/6			
12 Dwyer	88	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	14/16			
5 Frelinghuysen	78	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	8/16			
7 Hunt	85	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	11/17			
2 Sandman	88	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	14/16			
7 Widnall	85	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	14/16			
6 Forsythe	100																	4/3			
New Mexico																					
2 Foreman	31	V	V	X	X	O	X	X	V	V	O	O	O	V	X	X	X	4/13			
1 Lujan	67	V	V	X	X	O	X	X	V	V	(X)	O	O	O	V	(X)	X	10/15			
New York																					
41 Dulski	76	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	V	V	X	13/17			
35 Hansen	67	O	V	V	O	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	V	V	X	V	V	X	10/15			
5 Lowenstein	80	X	O	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	X	X	(V)	X	X	(X)	12/16			
36 McCarty	71	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	V	V	(X)	13/17			
25 Ortinger	76	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	V	V	(X)	13/17			
1 Pike	76	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	V	V	X	13/17			
35 Stratton	59	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	V	V	(X)	10/17			
3 Wolff	80	(X)	(X)	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	12/18			
29 Burton	92	X	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	11/15			
37 Conable	76	X	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	13/17			
28 Fish	94	X	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	16/17			
2 Grover	41	X	V	X	V	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	X	7/17			
36 Hastings	82	(V)	X	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	12/16			
38 Horton	75	(X)	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	13/14			
30 King	86	X	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	8/14			
31 McEwen	60	X	V	X	X	V	V	V	X	X	O	O	O	X	(X)	(X)	X	7/16			
27 McKeaney	44	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	V	V	(V)	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	9/15			
32 Pirata	64	X	V	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	X	X	X	11/17			
28 Reid	94	X	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	11/17			
33 Robinson	94	X	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	11/17			
40 Smith	79	X	V	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	12/16			
4 Wylder	80	V	V	X	X	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	(X)	V	V	12/16			
New York City																					
9 Adabbo	85	(X)	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	11/17			
24 Blaggi	59	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	10/17			
23 Bingham	82	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	14/17			
11 Brasco	89	X	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	V	12/16			
15 Carey	87	O	O	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	10/15			
10 Celler	80	O	O	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	12/15			
12 Chisolem	37	O	O	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	3/12			
9 Delaney	25	O	O	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	3/12			
19 Farstein	86	O	O	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	12/14			
22 Gilbert	74	X	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	12/17			
17 Koch	93	X	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	16/17			
18 Murphy	65	(X)	X	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	10/16			
13 Podell	73	(X)	X	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	11/16			
18 Powell	68	X	O	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	O	O	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	6/8			
14 Rooney	53	X	X	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	O	O	O	O	8/15			
8 Rosenthal	71	X	X	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	X	X	X	12/16			
20 Ryan	71	X	X	(X)	(X)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	V	V	X	X	X	X	12/17			
21 Scheuer	88	(X)	X	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	14/16			
8 Halpern	88	(X)	X	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	14/16			
North Carolina																					
2 Fountain	18	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/17			
4 Galifianakis	41	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8/17			
3 Henderson	27	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3/14			
1 Jones	18	V	X	O	(X)	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	3/17			
7 Lention	18	V	X	O	(X)	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	8/16			
6 Preyer	50	O	V	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	5/17			
11 Taylor	25	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	6/17			
10 Broyles	36	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	5/17			
13 James	35	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	5/16			
5 Mizell	31	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	5/15			
8 Barth	33	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	5/15			
North Dakota																					
1 Andrews	71	X	V	X	X	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	O	O	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	12/17			
2 Kleppe	47	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7/15			
Ohio																					
9 Ashley	82	X	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	(V)	X	(V)	V	V	V	V	V	14/17			
20 Feighan	46	X	V	V	V	V	V	(X)	(X)	(V)	X	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	(X)	6/15			
18 Hays	36	X	V	(V)	(V)	O	X	(X)	(V)	(X)	(V)	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	6/16			
19 Khrwan	75	O	(V)	O	(X)	O	O	O	O	O	(Died)							3/4			
21 Stokes	76	X	O	(V)	(V)	O	O	O	(X)	(X)	(V)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	13/17			
22 Vanis	82	X	V	(V)	(V)	V	V	V	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	(V)	14/17			
17 Ashbrook	18	X	V	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	10/17			
14 Ayres	58	X	V	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	10/17			
8 Betts	47	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8/17			
16 Bow	59	V	V	X	X	X	X	X	(V)	(V)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	10/17			

House votes *from page 17*

President and Vice President by direct popular election (Vote yea)

92. O'Konski motion to recommit the Defense Procurement Authorization bill to the Committee with instructions to delete \$345.5 million for procurement and \$400.9 million for research in the bill for the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. (Vote yea)

101. Whitten motion to table Conte motion to instruct House conferees on the Department of Agriculture appropriations bill to insist on a \$20,000 annual ceiling on individual farm subsidy payments. (Vote nay)

150. Ford (R-Mich.) amendment substituting HR 12695, the Administration Voting Rights bill, for the Committee bill. (Vote nay)

177. Mahon motion to agree to Senate amendment reaffirming powers of Comptroller General delegated by Congress, thus in effect overturning the Philadelphia Plan for eliminating racial discrimination in federal construction projects. (Vote nay)

91st Congress Second Session, 1970

45. Passage of the Family Assistance bill replacing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program with a plan providing guaranteed federal payments to poor families including the working poor. (Vote yea)

63. Passage of the resolution disapproving President's reorganization plan creating a Domestic Council and expanding the Bureau of the Budget to create an Office of Management and Budget. (Vote nay)

83. Passage of the bill raising the temporary and permanent debt ceilings. (Vote yea) This legislation is necessitated by obligations that Congress has already made. Economy measures should be applied at the authorization and appropriation bill stage. Opposition to increasing the debt limit appears to be a false gesture of economy, which would wreak financial havoc if it ever became a majority position. Also this hardly

seems the most appropriate or effective place for antiwar congressmen to bring their numbers to bear to stop the war.

84. Passage of the Foreign Aid Appropriations bill for fiscal 1971. (Vote yea) While a handful of dovish congressmen voted against the bill apparently as an antiwar protest, the vote still appears to be a good indicator of pro- and anti-foreign aid sentiment.

98. Gross motion to recommit the Postal Reorganization bill with instructions that would gut the reorganization proposals and substitute instead merely a postal pay raise. (Vote nay)

117. Hays motion to table Riegle motion instructing House conferees to concur in Senate passed Cooper-Church amendment on Cambodia. (Vote nay) While congressional doves were mousetrapped on this vote, this is still the closest to a House vote in the 91st Congress on the conduct of the war.

167. Passage of the bill authorizing increased U.S. subscriptions to four international financial institutions. (Vote yea)

170. Schwengel amendment barring proxy votes in committee. (Vote Yea) This amendment, if enacted, would have reduced the power of committee and subcommittee chairmen and would have penalized congressmen for non-attendance of committee sessions.

196. Passage of the bill under suspension of the rules increasing to \$3,400,000 the authorization for the Civil Rights Commission. (Vote yea)

205. Passage of the Trade Act of 1970 establishing import quotas for textiles and footwear, providing for quotas on other commodities and liberalizing assistance to businesses and workers adversely affected by imports. (Vote nay)

219. Boland motion to table Yates motion instructing House conferees to accept Senate amendment deleting \$289.9 million for development of the supersonic transport. (Vote nay)

Political Notes *from page 6*

GEORGIA: Suit's new populism

With less than a year gone by since Democratic Governor Jimmy Carter took office, Georgia already has its first announced candidate to succeed him in 1974. Carter's defeated opponent, former newscaster Hal Suit, announced his candidacy August 15 for the Republican nomination for governor, along with an interesting campaign program.

Suit won a surprising and wide victory in the 1970 Republican gubernatorial primary, then lost to Jimmy Carter in the general election by another surprisingly wide margin. One national newscaster commented that Suit's voting strength on election day correlated with the broadcasting area of WSB-TV, Suit's former employer.

The day after his recent announcement, Suit published a large ad in the Atlanta Sunday Journal and Constitution, stating his political position and announcing "Club 1974." Anyone who pledges \$10 per year until 1974 will receive "a regular newsletter that will cover a lot more than just politics; a membership card that will only buy good government; and an unusual lapel pin."

In his statement, Suit makes it clear he's turning to the New South Populist politics that earned Jimmy Carter a cover spot on TIME magazine. Suggesting that he lost in 1970 because he told it like it is, Suit says his program is being enacted by Carter. He

even jumps on Carter's bandwagon: "He has had and will continue to have my support." That's a safe position since Carter cannot succeed himself. Attacking the high cost of campaigning, Suit asks, "Will you invest \$10 a year — 3¢ a day — toward a better Georgia?"

Suit has a rough row to hoe in gaining control of the Republican Party in Georgia. It has been controlled since 1964 by ex-Talmadge men like Bo Callaway and Jimmy Bentley who switched parties to support Goldwater in '64 and Nixon in '68. Suit's surprising victory over Bentley in the 1970 primary set him up as a major force in Georgia politics. The contrast with the country club Republicanism of popular Congressman Fletcher Thompson will be glaring. If Suit can now use the New Populism to gain control of the party and get himself elected governor, he will have done a service to the Republican Party.


California Corner *from page 21*

the minorities back into the Republican Party. An alliance of well-educated white-collar whites and disadvantaged minorities can provide more progress in social justice than can the shaky coalition based on working-class solidarity, which crumbles whenever part of the class achieves solidarity against another part. The Republican alternative, a coalition of conscience, was the coalition that made the GOP the majority party for most of its history and the coalition that would provide the political leverage to further the emancipation the GOP began.

MICHAEL HALLIWELL

CALIFORNIA CORNER

Who Needs the Democrats?



Leaders of California's two most vocal minority groups — the blacks and Mexican-Americans — have been seizing every opportunity to serve notice on the Democrats. It has been the lack of credible political alternatives, not just a slowness of "political awakening" among their less educated followers, that has kept these groups in the Democrats' pocket this long.

Consider their grievances in California legislative politics alone. Ever since the backlash emerged in 1964 in the 2-1 voter approval of a proposition to abolish all fair housing laws, the role of blacks and Mexican-Americans within the Democratic Party has been reduced.

ANGLO FAVORITISM

In 1964 John Moreno, the only Mexican-American in the Legislature, had been defeated in the Democratic primary; in 1965 the Democrats reapportioned Moreno's old district to cut down the proportion of Spanish surname voters and protect the new Anglo incumbent, Jack Fenton. Democrats also reapportioned the State Senate in 1965, splitting the Mexican-American community in Los Angeles among several districts to give favored Anglo Assemblymen the inside track for all seats. In San Francisco and Alameda counties special 2-member seats were created to avoid drawing any 1-member districts with black voting majorities. In the 1967 congressional reapportionment Democrats protected three Anglo incumbents by cutting the proportion of blacks in the 7th and 31st districts and reducing the voting strength of Mexican-Americans in the 29th district.

During this period Democrats Hugh Burns and Jess Unruh kept a tight grip on the Legislature. Few bills that might have forced a choice between working-class white and minority group interests ever reached the floor of either House and little was done to alleviate deteriorating social conditions in the ghettos and barrios. Warning signals such as the Watts riots of 1965 and the massive defection of Mexican-Americans to Ronald Reagan in 1966 were ignored. In 1968 declining minority group support cost the Democrats an Assembly seat in L.A. County and a strong minority vote for Republican Tom Hom unseated another Anglo Democrat in San Diego.

When Unruh decided to run for Governor in

1970, he entered a black protégé against the black chosen by a black community caucus in his district. This kept Unruh's 65th Assembly District seat in Anglo hands; the two blacks split 16,267 votes, both losing to the white candidate's 10,796. Further disappointments for minorities occurred in 1971, when black Assemblyman John Miller lost his post as Democratic leader to Anglo Bob Moretti and Anglo Assemblyman David Roberti won the official Democratic endorsement over Mexican-American Assemblyman Alex Garcia for a vacancy in the State Senate.

WORKING WITH THE GOP

Faced with declining influence within the Democratic Party, minorities are torn between splitting off into a separate party and trying to use the Republican Party as a vehicle. Those who favor working within the two-party system are encouraged by frontlash sentiment within the GOP electorate. In 1964 the wealthiest county in California (Marin) led the state in opposition to the proposition abolishing fair housing laws, and in 1970 this county gave black Wilson Riles his largest percentage in his successful nonpartisan race against Max Rafferty for Superintendent of Public Instruction. In the heavily Republican 28th Congressional District, Alphonzo Bell was easily renominated in a 1970 campaign in which the major issue was Bell's support of black Thomas Bradley's 1969 candidacy against Sam Yorty for mayor of Los Angeles.

Though no black has ever won a statewide nomination from the Democrats, California Republicans nominated black James Flournoy for Secretary of State in 1970. Returns from Republicans in Orange County were especially surprising: Flournoy and another black ran 1st and 2nd in a field of 7 candidates (54 percent of the GOP vote). Only in the 30th district has a Mexican-American been able to win the Democratic nomination for congress, while Republicans have nominated Bill Orozco in the 29th CD, Mark Guerra in the 9th CD, and Phillip Sanchez, recently appointed OEO director, in the 16th CD.

Moderate Republicans have been able to put this frontlash sentiment together with minority votes in winning combinations. Pete McCloskey got 53 percent of the total black vote in winning his congressional seat. Fresno Republican Ken Maddy polled an unusually high vote in black and Mexican-American precincts as he won a 60 percent victory in a 30 percent Republican Assembly district.

Other instances could be cited; but these indicators show the opportunity that exists in California to bring

- turn to page 20

14a ELIOT STREET

● Tanya Melich has been added to the at-large membership of the National Governing Board. Tanya, a native of Utah, now lives in New York City. She has been very active in New York and YR politics for many years. She has done political writing and research for Lindsay, 1965, 1969 and Rockefeller, 1966, 1968, and served as research director for Senator Charles Goodell in 1970.

● Ripon member William J. Kilberg has again been promoted in the U.S. Department of Labor. Bill's new title is Associate Solicitor for Labor Relations and Civil Rights. Bill, a former White House Fellow, is moving up from his current job as General Counsel to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

● Washington, D.C. Ripon member Robert N. Meiser is a candidate for the Virginia State Senate. He's seeking to unseat Democratic incumbent Adelard Brault in the 34th Senatorial District, central Fairfax County. Meiser, an attorney, has been active in Virginia and Fairfax County GOP politics for several years.

● Ripon President Howard Gillette, Jr. and McCloskey staffer Michael Brewer were the Republican speakers at a youth in politics conference at the University of Florida on August 28. Some 350 student leaders from around the state attended. Other speakers at the gathering included presidential hopeful Senator Fred Harris and former Congressman Allard Lowenstein.

● The New Jersey Ripon Chapter, which has recently been befriending libertarian refugees from YAF, was addressed in September by Richard J. Sullivan, the state's aggressive Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Affairs, recently the author of new automobile emissions control legislation.

● The Memphis, Tennessee, Ripon Study Group, currently in the process of applying for Provisional Chapter status, sponsored a meeting on September 12 to which all Republican candidates for City Council and School Board were invited to attend and speak, reports the group's president, Edward W. Miller.

LETTERS

MILLER UNDERESTIMATED?

Dear Sirs:

I noted with interest the September FORUM which rates Jack Miller's Senate seat as a swing seat likely to be captured by the Democrats.

Of course you have access to much more information, and all I have is a personal opinion, but I think you might be underestimating Senator Miller's strength. He will have problems next year, but he must, in my view, still be considered the favorite. Despite Harold Hughes and John Culver and 18-year-old voters, Iowa is a solid GOP state, and Miller has backing from all wings of the Iowa GOP. I do not like his conservative record on domestic issues, but respect him as an honest and dedicated Senator, with great expertise on fiscal matters. There are many Iowa conservatives who are worse.

C. R. CONNELL
Mt. Vernon, Iowa

GRIFFIN DEFENDED

Dear Sirs:

I was most surprised to read the Ripon Society's gloomy predictions concerning U.S. Senator Robert Griffin's chances for reelection in 1972. I do not believe them to be accurate; indeed they do the Society a disservice.

To say that the seat will "swing" to the Democrats is in error. To list it as "vulnerable" is accurate, for any Republican candidate for statewide office is "vulnerable" in Democratic Michigan.

When Ripon lists the Griffin seat as "swing" it ignores the fact that Griffin won his last race by 300,000 votes, that as the incumbent he has established himself as an independent thinker and doer, and that he holds high leadership in the U.S. Senate, which contrary to popular belief, is not a detriment according to the polls.

I have yet to see a poll that shows the Senator trailing any Democrat. The polls by the way have been taken when the President was at his lowest ebb, further emphasizing the Senator's strength.

Your analysis practically ignores the probability of

a divisive Democratic primary and the possibility of a damaging Democratic National Convention while playing up the wholly unlikely possibility of a Republican primary with a man who has left the Party to form his own and a Congressman who recently declared that he would not be a candidate.

Your analysis plays up the formation of the Conservative Party and the votes it would take from Griffin, but ignores the formation of the Human Rights Party and the votes it will take from the left.

I believe your Michigan analysis is as accurate as your remarks on New Mexico where you state Governor Cargo received "48 percent against Montoya." Cargo did not run against Montoya — he lost in the primary.

I would hope that Ripon would stop spreading gloom and start helping the GOP to win. If we have less gloom and more work, Griffin will move from "vulnerable" to "safe."

WILLIAM McLAUGHLIN
Chairman
Republican State Central Committee
Lansing, Michigan

Ed. Note: Because of lead times required in producing the FORUM magazine, the Ripon Senate survey was based on information received several weeks before publication. These weeks were strikingly eventful in the Senatorial election scene; and after publication our judgment, information or typography were questioned in a number of instances, notably Michigan, Iowa and Nebraska. While we will not revise our findings individually now, we acknowledge that some of them could be modified and we plan to review all the 1972 races frequently in coming months. And we predict that Senator Griffin's progressive stance and combative qualities (he has been indomitable, for example, in fighting for welfare reform on the Finance Committee) will allow him to overcome his present difficulties. In any case, he has our fervent best wishes; and our correspondents have our gratitude for their corrections and amplifications.

CALL TO EXCELLENCE

Dear Sirs:

When I initially subscribed to the FORUM several years ago, it was with the idea the Ripon Society would concern itself with the Republican Party as it might be, a progressive humanitarian force in American society . . . There was (in 1964) a bold call for "excellence in leadership" which suggested the Society would not be content with mediocrity . . . This call seems considerably muted today.

Even admitting that the Nixon administration has had its moments of excellence, their scattered infrequency makes the call for excellence as insistently needed now as in 1964. The administration has deliberately taken steps to undercut those members of its own party most likely to support it at its best (yes, Charles Goodell, we do remember) and thus assure us it is likely to achieve its best with even less frequency in the future. And can one point to a single progressive measure which has engaged half as much energy on the part of the administration as the effort to assure greater mediocrity on the Supreme Court or to bail out a failing company?

The whole focus of the administration has been turned away from the real concerns of the people to whom I talk. Most of them thoroughly approve the President's proposed trip to China . . . But they are far less concerned with the danger of falling into the hands of the Chinese than they are with the danger of falling into the hands of the local hospital, where the reckless inflation of health care costs threatens to strip anyone coming within its grasp of everything they have worked to build up over the years. An increasing number of middle class people seem to be resigning themselves to being medically and dentally indigent. They perceive far more danger to themselves from this than from the Chinese or the Russians . . .

Perhaps I merely misjudged the Ripon Society from the beginning, and all it was ever really interested in was the distribution of a few relatively trivial loaves and fishes by an entrenched Republican administration. During the coming year, I hope to observe in the FORUM a greater concern for the kind of domestic problems so grievously neglected by the present administration.

RUSSELL E. WARNER
Carrboro, N.C.



Washington Viewpoint

Save the Cities

It didn't take John Lindsay long after leaving the Republican party to announce that he would be leaving the New York City mayoralty as well. Furthermore, he predicted, most of the other mayors on the Legislative Action Committee of the U.S. Conference of Mayors would give up their positions "unless something happens and happens quick."

"Something quick," according to Lindsay, is finding the money he and the members of the Legislative Action Committee have been trying to wring out of Federal and state agencies over the last year.

Although money is clearly needed, I wonder, however, whether money is the only answer. Having entered politics when Richard C. Lee was known as the Model Mayor of the Model City of New Haven, I have real doubts. Lee was so good at parleying political favors in Washington that in the 1960's New Haven acquired something like five times the per capita spending for urban renewal as New York City. Nothing impresses like success, so it was no surprise that John Lindsay hired away Lee's top urban renewal assistant, Mitchell Sviridoff, to try to repeat New Haven's miracle 80 miles down the pike.

Sviridoff was no wizard and was dropped from the Lindsay administration before the 1969 election. Lee also was not the wizard he was made out to be.

One very hot summer night in 1967 Paul Capra, as the young chairman of the Republican Platform Committee, scheduled an open platform session in a New Haven school scheduled for demolition in favor of a highway out to the suburbs.

The meeting grew increasingly agitated as many of the young people in the audience, black and white, voiced their protest and asked why the Republicans didn't provide a better alternative to Lee. Duly shaken, the Committee retired to write a landmark Republican platform which said in part: "Existing programs for redevelopment have failed to meet the problems of the modern city . . . New Haven residents have been pushed from one neighborhood to another to make way for highways, parking lots, and renewal projects. Neighborhoods have been destroyed rather than invigorated by the imposition of alien suburban values on urban communities. For every program of physical renewal, the city has had to develop programs for human renewal to patch up the damage done."

The Republican platform did not help elect Lee's opponent in 1967 or to head off the riot that broke out in the same depressed area of the city, less than a month after the platform hearing. Capra ran for mayor in 1969, losing to Lee's successor by a whisker; this year he is given a good chance.

Paul Capra keeps running, but in the meantime what have Republicans done about the cities? The White House, properly refusing to accept a simple prescription that money alone can solve urban problems, has taken some initiatives to make it easier for big city mayors to get help from the federal bureaucracy. What is missing still is the sense of urgency felt by the mayors themselves and an articulate and public strategy to save the cities. Too often, the White House seems to take seriously the bad advice of conservatives like Kevin Phillips who urge the President to turn away from the cities, particularly Eastern industrial areas which are losing population, in favor of the growing suburbs.

This apparent indifference, exemplified in the regressive tax formula for the Nixon general revenue sharing plan, is not only shortsighted but potentially disastrous for the nation.

Thirty-three years ago Lewis Mumford wrote in *The Culture of Cities*, "The city, as one finds it in history, is the point of maximum concentration for the power and culture of a community . . . Here is where the issues of civilization are focused."

According to Mumford, we face not just "city problems" in the urban environment, such as crime or waste disposal, but the critical question of saving the entire civilization from inhumane and socially malignant tendencies.

"If the destructive forces in civilization gain ascendancy," he wrote back in 1933, "our new urban culture will be stricken in every part. Our cities, blasted and deserted, will be cemeteries for the dead: cold lairs given over to less destructive beasts than man. But we may avert that fate: perhaps only in facing such a desperate challenge can the necessary creative forces be effectually welded together. Instead of clinging to the sardonic funeral towers of metropolitan finance, ours to march out to newly plowed fields, to create fresh patterns of political action, to alter for human purposes the perverse mechanisms of our economic regime, to conceive and to germinate fresh forms of human culture."

If young people still ask why Republicans haven't done more about the cities, it is because Republicans still have not met Mumford's challenge in creating "fresh patterns of political action" to replace the worn-out Democratic machines.

Lewis Mumford is scheduled to speak before the American Studies Association in Washington October 22. The President would do well to shut down his bureaucracy for a day to give his staff time to digest what Mr. Mumford has to say.

HOWARD GILLETTE, JR.