When a handful of Republican Congressmen suggested in early 1994 the GOP could take control of the U.S. House of Representatives that fall, the concept was the source of disbelief, even ridicule. When it actually happened, it was a cataclysmic beginning of 21st Century American politics and governance.
Control of the House brought with it responsibilities for governing which had not been faced by Republicans for 40 years. As someone who had the privilege of sitting at the GOP leadership table at that time, I can say first-hand that we did some things well as we discovered that governing is hard. And we made our share of mistakes. I can also say that the new Republican House majority, after a hiatus of four years, can find some wisdom and challenge in our successes and our failures.
The Contract with America was an unqualified success. It had proven to be a valuable political statement, but it became an even more valuable governing document. For the first few months of the 104th Congress, we were able to stay focused on enacting the promises laid down in the Contract. That period was one of enormous cohesion among the Republicans in the House because of the shared belief that accomplishing what was set forth in the Contract was essential to our political future. And we won. All elements of the Contract passed the House save one that required a Constitutional amendment. And by the end of the 104th, almost 70 percent of the Contract had been enacted into law.
As someone who had the privilege of sitting at the GOP leadership table at that time, I can say first-hand that we did some things well as we discovered that governing is hard. And we made our share of mistakes.
But in the midst of that success there were some hard lessons. First, we had given ourselves minimal time to do a very heavy lift. We committed to enacting the Contract within 100 days, a timeframe that had a nice political ring to it, but was very difficult to achieve inside the operational rules of the House. Legislation required committee markups, in several cases referrals to several different committees, time for pulling together the final versions of the bills, layover time before Rules Committee action and further layover time before consideration in the whole House. All of this crammed the 100 day obligation and forced us to keep Members in Washington for extended periods. This meant the newly-minted Congressmen were not getting back to their Districts regularly, which not only was politically troublesome for them, but in many cases caused huge family strains.
Another problem was the way committees got organized. Because we had a very clear legislative agenda and because one of our commitments was to reduce the numbers of subcommittees and committee staff, we organized in a way to amplify the production of legislation. What we largely forgot was the importance of the committee oversight role. When subcommittees were reduced and staff was cut, it was often the oversight subcommittees that were eliminated. The theory was that the legislative specialty subcommittees would perform the oversight, but with our compressed legislative agenda, the focus was on passing bills, not doing oversight. And once the committee culture was established that way, we never seemed to get back to doing substantive oversight, despite efforts later in the Congress by the leadership to refocus the committees on that role.
Those things that brought us to power got lost in the lust for staying in power. Balanced budgets and fiscal discipline gave way to deficit spending and a proliferate use of earmarks. As a result, the American people decided that we no longer deserved their trust.
After the Contract had been completed, we needed to turn to a new agenda that would define a Republican Party prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Speaker Gingrich had a plan for turning our attention toward the challenges of an economy on the verge of transitioning from industrial to informational. He foresaw the forthcoming explosion of use of personal computers, and the economic implications and applications which would follow. He made an effort to sell our colleagues on that vision, but they were seemingly too tired to take on a whole new crusade.
…the party needs to learn from the successes and failures of 1995. But above all, they need to stay true to the mission the American people sent them to Washington to do.
The default position became to focus on balancing the Federal budget. We had tried to pass a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, which proved to be a bridge too far. But what we could do was to pass budgets that had the long-term goal of getting to balance and could pressure the Clinton Administration to join us in the effort. That agenda came to a head in late 1995 when we used the need for the government to raise the debt limit as a wedge to engage the Administration in serious talk about balancing budgets. We went through government shutdowns, and in the course of the legislative battle lost the public relations battle with the White House. But we ultimately succeeded in the overall outcome. We got agreement on a seven-year plan for balancing the budget without new taxes, a goal that was reached in only three years. And, a year later, Republicans survived the congressional elections with our majority intact.
The 112th Congress presents Republicans with an opportunity to regain that trust. To do so, the party needs to learn from the successes and failures of 1995. But above all, they need to stay true to the mission the American people sent them to Washington to do.
The lessons of 1995 may have relevance to 2011, but the real story rests in what happened later. Those things that brought us to power got lost in the lust for staying in power. Balanced budgets and fiscal discipline gave way to deficit spending and a proliferate use of earmarks. As a result, the American people decided that we no longer deserved their trust.
Robert S. Walker is Chairman of Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates. He represented the 16th District of Pennsylvania in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1977 to 1997.