

THE RIPON FORUM

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Postscript on Reagan ..	4
'68 Races	11
Poll Results	22
Foley	24

VOL. IV, No. 1

Towards a Wider War?

The co-authors of the Ripon Society Vietnam paper present sixteen factors impelling the United States towards an invasion of North Vietnam. Such an invasion, they contend, is risky, unnecessary, and motivated in part by domestic political considerations. But militarily it is a perfectly feasible maneuver that has been discussed at the highest levels of government. See pages 5-8.

The Nixon Strategy

"Nixon's campaign will remain deliberately low key, for he knows that the passage of time is on his side. The nearer the time for the convention approaches without the occurrence of some cataclysmic political event or the emergence of Reagan or Rockefeller as a strong rival, the safer and surer becomes Nixon's carefully planned route to the nomination." See page 3 for Philip Johnston's follow-up to last month's analysis of the 1968 convention.

Republican Governors Association

J. Eugene Marans and John R. Price have between them been to more Governor's Conferences than any incumbent save Nelson Rockefeller. On page 9 they assess the results of the most recent conference at Palm Beach and call for an active role by the RGA in the coming election year.

Multilateral Foreign Aid

There is a better way to give foreign aid, and this Ripon Research paper outlines it in full. It presents the arguments for channelling U.S. aid dollars through multi-lateral agencies, and it describes the international institutions that already exist to foster stable economic development in the Third World. The study deserves careful consideration if the United States is to be saved from repetitions of Vietnam, where bi-lateral aid artificially extended our 'vital interests.' See pages 13-21.

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THE RIPON SOCIETY is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic, and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with chapters in Boston, Los Angeles, New Haven, and New York, and National Associate members throughout the fifty states. The Ripon FORUM is published monthly by the Society. Application to mail at second-class postage rates is pending at Boston, Massachusetts. To those who wish to subscribe to its publications and support its programs the Society offers the following options for annual contribution: FORUM, \$10; FORUM (student), \$5; Contributor, \$25 or more; Sustainer, \$100; Founder, \$1000. Correspondence addressed to the Editor is welcomed.

THE RIPON SOCIETY
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LETTER: Rural Initiatives

Dear Sirs:

I think it is time to do a job of major research on rural development and redevelopment as the real solutions to urban problems.

Republican emphasis should be on farming or rural living as a way of life. The first aim should be independent living and self-support for the poor, with surplus sold for cash. The poor may destroy the cities which offer no hope, but they will never destroy the land if it is theirs. On the land there is hope for the poor, if some of the billions being wasted on city anti-poverty is put into constructive loans for basic simple housing, cooperatives and self-support. With some education and county-agent advice, and with diversification of land use rather than mass production of the big operators, the land can maintain and support those who respect it.

I submit that what has been lost in this country is a reverence for the land, and the almighty dollar is a poor substitute. Many who will still flood the city welfare rolls may be persuaded to stay where they are if some hope is offered. Many who are desperate in the cities might be encouraged to return to a life they actually prefer.

A party offering a major program in this direction will have something tangible and lasting to offer rioters, and the country would also benefit.

Secretary Freeman is well aware of this, and before President Johnson runs off into it in a useless program of anti-poverty spending, I suggest that real constructive brains be applied in this direction. It is long overdue. People were never meant to live layered in millions on a pad of concrete. They never can.

(Miss) RUTH THOMPSON
Greenwich, Connecticut

1430 MASS. AVE.: Full-time Editor

On December first, Josiah Lee Auspitz became full-time editor of the Ripon FORUM. Auspitz, 26, a Philadelphia native, is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard College, where he was an editor of the *Crimson*, the *Harvard Review* and *Mosaic*. He has also worked on local newspapers in Lagos, Helsinki, Jerusalem, and Monrovia. Auspitz attended Oxford University in England on a Marshall scholarship. More recently he appeared on Public Broadcast Laboratory television interviews with Walter Lippman and Dean Acheson.

Auspitz's appointment represents a quantum jump forward for the Society. It will enable Ripon to implement expansion plans to turn the FORUM into a monthly magazine with appeal to an audience beyond its immediate membership. The Ripon Society now has four full-time and three part-time employees.

During the year past a group of Dallas, Texas Ripon members, under the leadership of attorney Neal Anderson, has laid the foundation for the formation of a new Ripon Chapter. The group's emergence attracted the attention of the Dallas *Times Herald* (see cartoon).

On November 30th in New York, the Society held a well attended fund-raising cocktail party.

Congressman Donald Reigle met with the Boston chapter December 3rd and Massachusetts Attorney Elliot Richardson addressed Ripon's Boston Businessmen Luncheon Group on December 5th.

National Ripon President Lee W. Huebner's article in the November FORUM, "Where We Now Stand," reviewing GOP Presidential prospects has gained wide recognition as an important piece of political analysis. Summaries by the Associated Press and by columnist William Buckley appeared in scores of newspapers.



NOMINATION GAME: The Nixon Strategy

In the peculiar game called "winning the Republican presidential nomination," Richard Nixon is a master. He has an obvious advantage in experience over the other players in the game. He harbors fewer illusions about which objectives are more important in amassing a winning score. He knows, for example, that a few loyal friends in a state party organization are worth more than a sheaf of polls. And, while other players have shuffled in and out of the game in response to the rise and fall of the shouts of their supporters and of their own ambitions, Richard Nixon has since 1960 never stopped studying the game and playing it. As the nomination game progresses, then, one may predict with utmost confidence that Nixon, the master player, will take full advantage of his political strengths and will make deliberate moves to modify the effect of his own weaknesses and the strongpoints of his rivals.

BASIS OF STRENGTH

The typical state presently counted in the Nixon for president column has about 20 delegate votes at the convention and is located in the geographic and political middle of the country. (See, Delegate Projection and Map, December 1967 *Forum*.) Among the Nixon states are Southern states with sizeable Republican voting blocs - Virginia, North Carolina; border states - Tennessee, Missouri and perhaps Kentucky; traditional Midwestern GOP strongholds - Iowa, Indiana, the Dakotas; and scattered states in the West. There are, notably, no large state delegations included in this assessment of Nixon's basic support. The largest of the Nixon states will be represented by 26 or 28 delegates at the convention.

The Nixon nomination strategy emerges from this profile of his base of support. It is a strategy which recalls the pattern of Nixon successes that appeared in the 1960 presidential election, when Nixon won the bulk of the less-densely populated, less industrialized states of the nation. In the nomination game, the prospects for success are much greater than they were in the electoral college. The Nixon strategy is to use the votes of these small and middlesized delegations to create the bandwagon effect necessary to swing over a few larger blocs in order to shape a winning total. More subtly, Nixon hopes that the diffuse nature of his support will help him in creating the impression among delegates and party leaders that he is the candidate acceptable to the most Republicans, the one who can be nominated without the uncertainty and political upheaval which might result from an all-out moderate-conservative fight over the nomination. The work of firming up this base of support and of forming this special consensus about himself as "the logical and safe nominee" is the task Mr. Nixon undoubtedly has planned for himself in the coming months.

ORGANIZATION PEOPLE

Nixon supporters are largely "organization people." The hard core Nixon backers in the states are the county chairmen, local committeemen, fund-raisers, and other party perennials who have endured in their positions over the years regardless of Republican electoral fortunes. These people have become acquainted with Richard Nixon during three national campaigns and at countless dinners and party functions.

Their allegiance is based on more than debts of gratitude for past services, however. The organization people are for Nixon largely because they know him, they respect him and more than all the other possible candidates, they trust him to run a "good campaign." They anticipate that Nixon will take positions on the issues with which they agree and that his candidacy will not attract unruly elements - youth, militant conservatives - which might challenge their positions in the party. Nixon's supporters will desert only if the primaries reveal that he cannot win or, less likely, if the pressures exerted by other candidates are so great as to erode organization control of state delegations.

THE PRIMARIES

It has been the unquestioned view for some time that Richard Nixon's history of defeat requires that he win a series of primary victories in order to remain in contention for the nomination. The question of Nixon's performance in the primaries seems to have become at this point not one of survival, but of whether or not he will have to face any real contest at the convention. Foremost among the factors which lead to the conclusion that the primaries will be more a Nixon opportunity, and less an obstacle, is the apparent weakness of Governor Romney. Romney has slipped badly in the polls since announcing his candidacy. He has failed to add discernably to his initial support. The Michigan governor has not rallied support in neighboring states and enjoys only lukewarm backing from most Eastern Republicans.

The Nixon-Romney race in New Hampshire on March 2 may become analogous to the Kennedy-Humphrey contest in West Virginia in 1960. That is, Romney may be a set-up for Nixon just as Humphrey was for Kennedy. As John Kennedy demonstrated in 1960, a landslide victory, even over an opponent who never really had a chance, can be made a convincing selling point in the campaign for delegate votes in other states. It is certain that Nixon enjoys a significant initial edge in New Hampshire and the hour is already late for a Romney drive that will impress enough New Hampshire voters to change the outcome of the election. New Hampshire appears to be Nixon's best chance to win an election convincingly enough to paper over the "no-win" flaw in his image as a candidate.

A New Hampshire victory could provide enough impetus to Nixon's drive for the nomination, even if he does less well in Wisconsin and other primaries. The New Hampshire primary is the first, and thus its propaganda value is potentially greatest. Even now the Republican governors have acknowledged that Nixon's candidacy must be given "serious consideration." Those who fear a Reagan candidacy must have been heard to mumble about accepting Nixon early in order to foreclose that possibility. A clearcut victory in the New Hampshire primary might well provide the spur that would enable Nixonmen to put the Republican herd instinct in motion to cinch the nomination long before convention time arrives.

SOFT SPOTS

While Nixon's stature as the Republican party's ranking veteran of national political battles is the foundation of much of his support, it is also the source of his greatest weakness. His defeats in the 1960 presidential race and

in California in 1962, and the manner in which he achieved them, evoke few fond memories among Republican politicians. Richard Nixon is a political loner with a proven lack of charisma. It is difficult to imagine him inspiring more than perfunctory endorsement from any current figure in the party not directly in his employ. In other words, the Nixon candidacy is based on a coldly rational appeal to the party pragmatists. It is thus highly vulnerable to any development that would significantly alter the political picture in the country or boost the candidacy of another man.

Certainly Eastern Republicans, particularly the supporters of Governor Rockefeller, are basically hostile to the Nixon candidacy. And, although he has paid court to some of them, it is difficult to believe that the "new breed" Republicans - Senators Brooke, Percy, Hatfield, Baker and others - are at all enthusiastic about the prospect of Nixon's nomination. Ironically, perhaps, if Romney's candidacy remains unpromising and Rockefeller's latent, these same people could find themselves in the Nixon camp after all in order to prevent the nomination of Governor Reagan.

REAGAN THREAT

It is Ronald Reagan who currently poses the major threat to the Nixon candidacy. Reagan does present a strong emotional appeal and already commands a sizeable bloc of potential delegates who rank him as their first choice. (See December *Forum*.) Partisans are active in the South and elsewhere in the California governor's behalf. The success of their efforts in behind the scenes struggles with Nixon supporters to control delegate selection is difficult to assess at this time.

POLITICAL NOTES: Postscript on Reagan's Fib

General conclusion to the Drew Pearson-Ronald Reagan credibility debate seems to be that the California governor did indeed have homosexuals on his staff and did, well, lie when he denied he had; but that he lied at least in part to protect the private reputations of the men involved, which many consider an attempt — however politically mishandled — to do the decent thing.

As to the original problem, the episode indirectly may stir some public soul-searching over the current taboo against homosexuals in government positions, which is especially questionable where national security is not at stake. Certainly some more humane lines need to be drawn.

However, one very sour note lingers on. What kind of "morality" and what kind of political sensitivity was manifested by this "Communications Director" of Reagan's, Lyn Nofziger? It is known in Sacramento that Nofziger had long resented the moderate political influence of the alleged homosexuals he sought to oust from the Reagan staff. Maybe it was politically necessary to ask them to resign once discovered. But that apparently wasn't satisfactory to Nofziger, particularly after one of the men showed signs of continuing an interest in state politics. So a little mischief was undertaken to damage the former staffers permanently: a "confidential" revelation to the members of the national press. Of course, the matter got into the papers and not only were the former staffers hurt, so was Nofziger's boss.

It is rumored, at least, that Reagan people have caused Senator Tower to back away from declaring support for Nixon in Texas and that West Tennessee Reaganites are contemplating a challenge to Senator Baker's leadership of his state's delegation. For many to whom Reagan appears as the millennial candidate that Goldwater was not, the recent Nixon rhetoric designed to curry conservative favor is unconvincing. Many party professionals may harbor the suspicion that Reagan would be a much more salable item than would Nixon. As Nixon well knows, he must head off the Reagan candidacy before it gains momentum enough to carry away the votes essential to his own nomination.

LOW KEY

Richard Nixon is today the frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination. As a master player of the nomination game, he may be relied upon to work studiously to maintain his advantage. He will undoubtedly increase his attacks on the Johnson administration while avoiding all controversy with fellow Republicans. He must run in the primaries, but his high recognition by voters obviates the need for an aggressive campaign that would invite counterattack.

Nixon's campaign will remain deliberately low key, for he knows that the passage of time is on his side. The nearer the time for the convention approaches without the occurrence of some cataclysmic political event or the emergence of Reagan or Rockefeller as a strong rival, the safer and surer becomes Nixon's carefully planned route to the nomination.

—Philip Johnston

Many Republicans in California feel the vindictiveness of gossiping Nofziger is far more reprehensible than his victims' illness, Pearson's sensationalizing or Reagan's fibbing. Moreover, a California poll shows that 36 per cent of the state's electorate think the governor has been set back by the incident, which certainly makes Nofziger as much a political liability as his erstwhile colleagues.

Everett McKinley Dirksen has long been known for his mellifluous voice and his slippery stands on issues. How does one place him on Vietnam? At first he seemed to be a hawk, ardently me-tooing the President. In recent weeks he has turned dovish, calling for negotiations. But after his appearance with Congressman Gerald Ford on national television, no one can much doubt what kind of old bird he really is. Ev is neither hawk nor dove; he is an albatross about the neck of the Republican Party.

At last, Arizona county chairmen have moved to purge the party organization of the United Republicans of Arizona, a far-right organization that aims at taking over the Arizona GOP. At the invitation of State Chairman Harry Rosenzweig eight state county GOP chairmen voted unanimously "that any member of the United Republicans of Arizona who holds an official position in the Republican Party immediately resign that position or his membership in UROA, since the two are not compatible." Five chairmen were absent from the voting, including Charles Miller from UROA-infested Maricopa County; Miller resigned his post the next week.

VIETNAM: Towards a Wider War?

In the analysis of Vietnam policy published in the September issue of the Ripon FORUM, the Ripon Society recommended a strategy to keep the American commitment in South Vietnam within prudent limits. It urged new programs for winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese people, reducing the cost of United States involvement and providing a basis for a peaceful settlement. Its "confederal strategy", which proposed decentralized political initiatives, piecemeal negotiations and selective disengagement of military pressures, is coming to be recognized as a fresh and significant contribution to debate on the war.

In the course of preparing this analysis, Ripon members accumulated a backlog of research and interviews on the several aspects of American policy. Recent developments, both in Vietnam and in the United States, give some of this research a special urgency. For when set in the context of past plans and discussions, a number of publicly recorded events point in the direction of a wider war. We believe that there now exists a case for public concern that the present war may spill beyond the borders of South Vietnam. The Ripon Society calls for levelheaded inquiry into this possibility.

I. Past Invasion Plans

When President Johnson decided to increase the U.S. troop commitment beyond that of an expeditionary force, contingency plans for American operations in Asia had to be revised. Before the increase in troops, we understand that U.S. contingency plans were based on the assumption that large numbers of American men would not be committed to the Asian mainland without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. With the increased U.S. involvement, planners developed a new set of operations that did not depend on nuclear support.

Beginning in the spring of 1965, we understand there was discussion in the highest circles of government about invading North Vietnam. By the end of the year at least one new plan had been prepared for such an invasion to be executed two years later, in the fall or winter of 1967-68. It was, of course, only a plan — one of many drawn up to prepare policy-makers for all eventualities.

FULL-SCALE ASSAULT

In more general terms, three kinds of invasion of North Vietnam have been discussed in government at various times. The most ambitious type involves the seizure of Hainan Island (China) and the occupation of Haiphong and Hanoi. Such a plan was recommended to President Eisenhower by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in 1956. It was, according to a recent NEWSWEEK interview with Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (ret.) headed off only by the opposition of General Matthew Ridgway.

The grand scheme then was for an American expeditionary force and a direct assault on North Vietnam. This meant landing and taking Haiphong, the seizure of the whole Hanoi Delta, and on to Hanoi itself. Both the Navy and Air Force were all for it. The Navy insisted, moreover, that its passage into the Tonkin Gulf had to be protected by the capture of the Chinese island of Hainan.

And they accepted whatever consequences *that* meant . . . Everyone including Secretary Charles E. Wilson was for it — except Ridgway. He bypassed everyone — including Charley Wilson — and went directly to Eisenhower with a letter setting forth our dissent and fears. It worked. And we were spared — until years later.¹

Gavin's reminiscences were made public after three U.S. Senators and two former ambassadors to Saigon had declared their opposition to an invasion. General Maxwell Taylor, for instance, on September 28 told a Birmingham, Alabama audience that he doubted whether the American people would be willing to pay the price of a full-scale assault on North Vietnam, which he said would require 500,000 additional troops. He called himself a "dove" if the American aim in Vietnam were only obliteration and destruction and warned that a high risk would be run by looking for a World War II victory by conquering real estate in Vietnam.²

General Ky in Saigon a month later said: "If there is a landing above the de-militarized zone, South Vietnamese troops will lead the way."^{2a}

'TRAP PLAY'

The second and most limited type of invasion would be a "trap play" or "end run" around the DMZ. Such a maneuver might begin with the withdrawal of American troops from Con Thien and Gio Linh. After a sufficient number of North Vietnamese troops had moved south to take up this territory, an American amphibious force would land behind the Communist force a few miles up the coast and cut it off from the north. If such an operation were successful, 10-20,000 North Vietnamese troops could be trapped in a pocket and presumably forced to surrender.

This operation, in conjunction with search and destroy missions across the Cambodian border, was proposed at the highest levels of government in May 1967. At that time, Secretary of Defense McNamara successfully opposed it.

AMPHIBIOUS LANDING

A third type of invasion plan was leaked to the press last May.³ This called for an Inchon-type landing aimed at establishing a lodgement at the northern neck of the "panhandle" section of North Vietnam. A feasible target for such an attack is a triangular area between the city of Vinh and the rivulet running east-west above Ha Tinh, bounded on the sides by the coast and the rivers Ca and Ngan Sau. American control of this area could block all major lines of communication between North and South Vietnam, could trap the bulk of the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) stationed between Vinh and the DMZ, and could cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail at its source by interdicting new supplies from the major access routes to the Laotian frontier (Highways #8 and #15 and Routes #137, #102 and #103). As many as 200,000 North Vietnamese troops might face an exhaustion of their supplies and fierce aerial attacks involving full

1. Newsweek October 16, 1967.

2. New York Herald-Tribune International Edition (AP) September 29, 1967.

2a. Washington Post (AP) October 24, 1967.

3. Washington Star (Orr Kelly) May 28, 1967; New York Times (News of the Week in Review) May 28, 1967.

use of a new generation of anti-personnel weapons.

Since punitive bombing has not brought Hanoi to its knees, it might be argued that a lodgement at Vinh would prove to all Vietnamese communists that they can never win the war. American occupation of parts of the panhandle, moreover, would provide a tangible object to trade the North Vietnamese in return for the withdrawal of their troops and the cessation of supplies to the South.

Such an Inchon-type invasion conjures up the specter of a new Chinese intervention similar to that which occurred in the Korean War, and the press leaks in May 1967 took special care to report the arguments within government that dismissed such intervention as unlikely. As long as American activity was kept south of Vinh, it was argued, the Chinese would not enter. As for the analogy to the Korean War, it was suggested that if the force which McArthur landed at Inchon had confined itself to destroying North Korean forces to the south and not moved northwards beyond the narrow "neck" to the Yalu River, there would have been no Chinese intervention.

II. Sixteen Developments

Against the background of past plans, sixteen recent developments suggest that pressures for an invasion of North Vietnam may prove irresistible. For not only is the capability for such an invasion available, but there are also unstable factors both in the United States and in Vietnam that may push the president toward some decisive military low.

There are, to begin with, a few signs that the military situation in Vietnam is unstable.

1. INVASION THREAT

Over the last few months North Vietnam has built up a force of several well-trained divisions which is not tied down in anti-aircraft or support operations. This force was described by James Reston on November 22:

Hanoi has large reserves of trained and organized units in the North, but they are not committing them to the battle fast enough to win a single major engagement with the U.S. forces. They could do so, despite the U.S. air attacks, Westmoreland and Bunker assert, but something is holding them back from committing their reserves in effective numbers.⁴

These free North Vietnamese troops are the inevitable counterpart to the decline in infiltration which General Westmoreland mentioned so often during his recent visit. It may be that a desire not to widen the war restrains Hanoi from sending all available troops south, but American military men think that those troops are tied down by the threat of an amphibious invasion.

Since last spring, the Joint Chiefs have urged that an American invasion force be maintained as a means of tying down North Vietnamese troops in coastal defense.⁵

General Westmoreland admitted the existence of an American invasion threat in the first phases of his reply on MEET THE PRESS on why Hanoi is not committing all available troops: "Well, he has to secure his own shores; . . ."⁶

4. New York Times (James Reston) November 22, 1967.

5. Le Nouvel Observateur (Oliver Todd) March 8-15, 1967.

6. Meet the Press, November 19, 1967, p. 18.

2. SOVIET MISSILES

Unfortunately, the Soviets may be forcing the Administration to decide whether the invasion is just a bluff or a real threat to be executed. The real challenge to the invasion option would be Styx-type missiles which could be used against American ships, like the missiles that sank the Israeli destroyer "Elath" off the Egyptian coast in October. One American publication already cites "foreign military strategists" as claiming that the Soviets are delivering such missiles in North Vietnam right now.⁷

Even before the major escalation in the air war, the North Vietnamese had 180 SAM launching sites.⁸ Present American estimates credit North Vietnam with having received 5000 fin-stabilized rockets, only a small part of which have been sent to the south.⁹ Even SAMs and 122 mm. rockets could be improvised against an invading force. How long will the Soviets refuse their Communist ally in Hanoi the missiles already given to Nasser?

If the Administration believes that North Vietnam's preparations against an invasion — with or without new Soviet rockets — are effective, then the President faces a hard choice. He can either shift the present invasion force into defensive positions south of the DMZ and try to prevent a land invasion from the North, or he can quickly expand the invasion threat and execute it before the North Vietnamese are able to contend with a large amphibious force.

3. MORE TROOPS

In conventional military terms, there is little prospect of quick success in the South. Contrary to General Westmoreland's optimistic speeches, North Vietnamese units in the South are using increasingly heavier weapons and can mount strong enough surprise attacks on fixed American positions to draw our troops away from "pacification." General Peers, the American commander in the Dak To area, emphasized the effectiveness of the heavier Soviet rockets and rifles used by the North Vietnamese around Dak To.¹⁰ In the first three weeks of November, 14,000 allied troops had to be shifted suddenly to defend Dak To.¹¹ Most of these troops were Americans, out of a total of perhaps 80,000 American combat troops in all of South Vietnam. Can President Johnson afford politically to send more troops to the South, to avert disasters where he has already claimed successes? If not, he may have to make some dramatic attempt to change the balance of forces.

The manpower situation during the next year may counsel swift action.

4. MANPOWER SQUEEZE

The big Vietnam build-up of 1966 was politically painless (especially in not mobilizing the reserves) because it could draw on the post-World War II baby boom, which peaked in 1947. From now on, the Administration will have to lower draft qualifications and reduce skilled job and graduate school deferments to avoid mobilizing the reserves.

Large defense contractors have already been warned of tighter job deferment rules next year, and twenty-five important contractors were informally advised on October 19 by Robert Borth, Chairman of the Man-

7. Parade, November 26, 1967.

8. New York Times (Hanson Baldwin) October 2, 1967.

9. New York Times (Hanson Baldwin) December 3, 1967.

10. NBC-TV News, November 25, 1967.

11. New York Times, November 23, 1967.

power Section of the Mobilization Readiness Division of the American Ordnance Association to prepare "the sort of manning tables we had in World War II."¹² These tables would help support job deferment applications and warn managements to train replacements and avoid impending bottlenecks when young skilled workers are about to be drafted. Graduate schools have already been warned to prepare for a 25% reduction in their entering classes next year. After college graduations this coming June, between one half and two thirds of the Administrations draftees will be college graduates.¹³ The Defense Department, meanwhile, has already announced that January's draft call will be 34,000, up from 18,000 in December and 18,000 in January, 1967.

5. POLITICAL PRESSURES As the President plans both troop movements and his election campaign he has to anticipate the need for a stronger justification of the war pinch to the families of skilled workers and college graduates, vocal groups that have hitherto not felt the manpower pinch.

Political pressures from these groups may dispose him to favor some dramatic change in the appearance of the war, either through decisive military action or negotiation. If the North Vietnamese persist in providing instances of their intransigence, an all-out military solution may seem to be the only alternative.

Capabilities for such a solution appear to exist, and it would not require high-level consultations to put them into effect.

The following industrial and troop capabilities, for whatever reasons they may have been developed, make the idea of an amphibious invasion a live option.

6. INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS America's amphibious invasion capability has been dramatically increased by a new cargo-handling technique involving container ships and flying crane helicopters. Unlike Normandy, future landings will not require floating docks and other cumbersome equipment. Nor will future invasions depend on unusually favorable tides and fair weather.

Flying cranes will pick up specially marked 10-ton containers of food, ammunition, and other supplies; and deliver them to the American troops on the beach. The supply ships can be stationed several miles off shore, well beyond any last-minute mines laid by the defenders.

One rigorous test of this cargo-handling technique has been widely advertised:^{13a}

... the seas ran eight feet high and the wind blew in gusts up to 50 mph. Yet if this had been Vietnam, all 462,000 pounds of cargo would have reached Marines five miles inland in five hours.

The equipment for an amphibious invasion is already available. Even in bad weather, three flying cranes, flying only four hours a day, can support an average American combat division (500 tons a day). Flying cranes are already in service with the First Cavalry "Airmobile" Division, and the small numbers needed to support a landing force could be gathered on relatively short notice.

The container ships of Sealand Service already carry 10% of American ocean freight to Vietnam, and the Matson Lines has three times as much additional

container capacity in the Pacific.^{13b}

The containers needed for an invasion are presumably available in a restricted but highly visible area north of Saigon described to us by a recent returnee from Vietnam.

7. TRANSPORT Two large passenger ships, originally subsidized by the U.S. government as potential troop carriers have been abruptly retired from passenger service. According to public announcement, the *Atlantic*, built in 1953, will go into mothballs while the *Independence* will be reconditioned as a floating hotel for open booking sometime after September 1968. Both these ships could be held in reserve for movement of troops to Vietnam, in case the crash program for fast deployment of logistical support now in progress under the Joint Chiefs of Staff is inadequate to meet increased troop requirements. The fast deployment program itself should give us the capability to increase troops soon.

8. TROOP MOVEMENTS The first phase of an amphibious invasion would need only a few divisions. One division, the *America*, was recently formed in South Vietnam for large operations. Since no large unit actions have been announced since its formation, this division, based at Chu Lai, appears equally available for deployment outside South Vietnam as inside the country. A second division is now being formed in Vietnam.

Two brigades of the 101st Airborne and one brigade of the 82nd are being flown one month early to South Vietnam to join with South Vietnamese ranger and airborne units to form "a mobile shock force for use in trouble spots."¹⁴ Since these 11,000 airborne troops form the most combat ready part of the strategic reserve, the dispatch of them to Vietnam is a clear sign that, short of mobilization, the President has thrown his last card into the Vietnamese war. If riots should occur in American cities the strategic reserve would be hard-pressed to handle them.

9. TOUR OF DUTY Other troops are available from two additional sources. In October the enlistments of Navy and Marine personnel were extended by four months while regular officers were made liable to selective extensions of up to one year. There are, moreover, 50,000 troops regularly stationed on Okinawa and every month an additional 70,000 pass through the island going to or from Vietnam.¹⁵ Since the enlistments of all troops extend for several months after their tour in Vietnam an invading force could be built up quickly by detaining on Okinawa troops coming home.

10. NAVAL MANEUVERS Eight thousand men and 45 ships participated in "Blue Lotus" off the coast of San Diego in late November. It was the largest naval exercise in three years.¹⁶

A variety of domestic pressures, meanwhile, provide an extra-military consideration for the use of force.

11. McNAMARA'S TRANSFER The abrupt transfer of Secretary of Defense McNamara to the World Bank removes from government a persistent opponent of escalation of the ground war outside the boundaries of South Vietnam. In late October, columnist James Wechsler wrote that

12. Boston Globe (David Deitch) November 14, 1967.

13. New York Times (Fred Hechinger) November 5, 1967.

13a. Aviation Week (Sikorsky Advertisement), December 4, 1967.

13b. Boston Globe (David Deitch) December 14, 1967.

14. Washington Daily News, November 18, 1967.

15. Newsweek, November 27, 1967.

16. New York Times (Reuters) November 29, 1967.

Mr. McNamara "has stood alone in opposing some form of ground invasion of North Vietnam." His continuing resistance to such a course was "a major reason why he is still at his post," Wechsler said.

At the very least, we can say that Mr. McNamara's successor will be facing strong military pressure for some kind of invasion at the same time that the President is facing strong political pressure for a dramatic success in the war.

12. IKE'S STATEMENT

Some important pressure has already come from former President Eisenhower, who recently went on TV to urge that an American force make an "end run" around the Communist emplacements and destroy them instead of withdrawing from the poorly-bunkered positions at Con Thien and Giolin or strengthening these positions and continuing the bombing and artillery duel.

13. CASUALTIES If the war continues at its present rate, there will be 100,000 additional casualties in the year before the 1968 elections. Politically, this may prove difficult for the President to handle unless some new demonstration of military support is made soon. An option which seems to hold the prospect of ending the war may prove beguiling in the coming year.

14. EXHAUSTION OF TARGETS Since September the number of untouched strategic targets has fallen from over 150 to 5 or less.¹⁷ The destruction of Gia Lam airfield and the Haiphong docks is no more likely to break Hanoi's will than the sudden increase in bombing this fall. The Administration, for domestic reasons if not military ones, needs another military action now that punitive bombing has failed to bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table.

There is, of course, a distinct possibility that the Communists may act first, and force a strong American military response. Their present state of mind seems to dispose them toward pre-emptive action.

15. COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS The North Vietnamese and their allies have been obsessed with the possibility of a limited American invasion. Indeed, the Soviet Defense Ministry has already warned that an American invasion of North Vietnam would meet "a suitable response."¹⁸ The North Vietnamese themselves have been preparing against an invasion for "several months."¹⁹ Over the past months Communist diplomats, the Soviet press, and the North Vietnamese leadership have talked openly of preparing against an American invasion.²⁰

16. RISKING AN INCIDENT In our position paper last September, the Ripon Society warned of the instability of the present military situation in Vietnam and cited numerous options open to the North Vietnamese for enlarging the war in South Vietnam and other neighboring countries. If the Northerners are convinced that the United States means to destroy their country, we argued, they might take up one of these options. "Such action might easily tip the balance in Washington in favor of a plan previ-

ously set aside for invading North Vietnam up to the narrow neck of country," we said.

Given North Vietnamese knowledge of the recent developments presented above, all of which can be deduced from a careful reading of public sources, there is a good chance that Communist forces may be aroused to take military action in South Vietnam, Laos or Thailand that would excite American opinion, produce a crisis atmosphere, and result in a snap decision to widen the war.

III. Conclusions

Let us summarize the thrust of these developments, so that there will be no mistaking the conclusions we draw from them.

The logic of the military situation in Vietnam requires major decisions either to redeploy U.S. forces or to reinforce and enlarge them. Since the administration has put so much investment in assuring the public that new troops will not be needed for present operations, it may feel constrained to start new operations before formally raising the troop commitment. An ideal operation would be one which promises to end the war quickly and eliminate the need for middle class draftees and high casualty rates during an election year.

Superficially, the plan for a limited invasion of North Vietnam somewhere below Vinh offers such a promise. It appears to force the North Vietnamese into quick negotiations and to give the United States a decisive military position from which to bargain. And since invasion plans have been subject to ongoing discussion in Washington for more than a decade, an amphibious landing would not seem a rash or novel course of action. The capability to initiate such an operation, moreover, is already in existence and its execution would no require high level consultations or visible preparations.

Since the North Vietnamese are obsessed with the idea, any signs that it was to be put into operation might lead them to take imprudent action that could provide a major incident that would justify sending U.S. troops outside South Vietnam. Options for escalation of the war into Laos and into the "I" Corps have long been open to Hanoi

LONG-TERM RESULTS

In this volatile situation, it is crucial to examine the long-term consequences of tactical maneuvers that claim to relieve hard-pressed U.S. troops. Actions taken now to achieve short-term ends could change the entire complexion of the war. After close study we believe that the risks, costs and long-term consequences of even a limited invasion of North Vietnam outweigh the possible benefits.

First, it is dangerous to assume that the Communist world would stand by while American forces rushed into North Vietnam or even into Laos. Whatever the Chinese may do, it is wrong to underrate the prospect of Soviet intervention in this 50th Anniversary year, especially after threats of retaliation have been made in the official organ of the Soviet Defense Ministry. However limited an invasion of the North might be, it would surely be interpreted by the two Communist powers as a prelude to a wider war.

(continued on page 12)

17. New York Times (Hedrick Smith) August 13, 1967; New York Times (E. W. Kenworthy) September 4, 1967; Boston Globe (William Tuohy) September 13, 1967.

18. Red Star (Col. A. Leontiev) October 18, 1967.

19. New York Times (Agence France Presse, Hanoi) November 10, 1967.

20. Washington Post (Anatole Shub) November 17, 1967; Christian Science Monitor (Earl W. Foell) November 18, 1967; New York Times (Manilla Times) December 3, 1967.

GOVERNORS: Beyond Palm Beach

1968 will be a critical year of testing for the Republican Governors Association. The RGA has been in existence only since summer, 1963. The group was too small and disorganized to have much effect on the outcome of the 1964 national convention. The National Chairman of 1963-64, William E. Miller, consistently attempted to throttle any independent action by the Association under its first head, former Governor Robert E. Smylie of Idaho.

Governor John A. Love of Colorado, Mr. Smylie's successor as RGA Chairman, helped the Association evolve into one of the established fixtures of the national Republican scene. He oversaw the establishment of a Washington office for the RGA and the successful Republican efforts to capture a majority of the statehouses (26 with the addition of Louis Nunn of Kentucky in 1967). The RGA now has a knowledgeable Washington staff (Executive Director, Press Relations Director, and two secretaries) to help coordinate some of the Association's meetings and projects. At the recent RGA meeting in Palm Beach the staff distributed the Association's first public newsletter, the *RGA Newslog*, which presented a helpful survey of GOP gubernatorial chances in each state for 1968. Republican governors and gubernatorial candidates have obtained significant benefit from the more frequent meetings and the superior campaign coordination resulting from establishment of the RGA.

CARNIVAL TRAPPINGS

For all of this progress, the RGA has been slow to exert leadership in the party. The vacuum created by the governors' default of leadership in 1963-64 was quickly filled by the more conservative elements in the Congressional wing of the party. The 1964 debacle threw the gauntlet of leadership to the Republican governors. A key question for 1968 is how they will respond to the challenge. The winter meeting of the RGA in Palm Beach, Florida, on December 7-9 provided the plan of battle for the coming year.

The main purpose of the meeting was to chart the Governors' role in framing the 1968 national party platform. However, this serious business was almost inundated by the festive trappings provided by the host governor, Claude Roy Kirk, Jr., known by now in Florida papers as "Claudius Maximus." The *panem et circenses* were laid on in the Breakers, on of the grand old Flagler palaces of Palm Beach.

The official business was sandwiched among a dozen or so fashion shows, cocktail parties, dinners, yacht receptions, Cape Kennedy excursions, a Perry Como shaw, and a Mai Kai "Night in the Tropics." The Florida Development Commission, attacked on the eve of the Conference for having paid for the photos and other expenses of Kirk's wedding, offered to pay for taping interviews with the various governors and for the air freighting of the tapes back to key television stations in their home states. The only condition was that Kirk had to appear in each of the interviews.

At most of the official sessions, the leading speakers were Congressional leaders, such as Congressman Bob Wilson and Senator George Murphy of the House and Senate Republican campaign committees, and the GOP minority leaders in Congress, Senator Everett M. Dirksen and Representative Gerald R. Ford. It seemed that

the RGA leadership had almost lost control of their own meeting, and that the Palm Beach might become more of a carnival than a caucus.

PLATFORM PROJECT

Fortunately, however, the chief RGA objective for the Palm Beach meeting was a modest one: to review the RGA Policy Committee's first step in the development of the Association's contribution to the Republican Platform for 1968. The initial step was the presentation of a statistical workbook outlining (with vivid charts and graphs) about 250 domestic problems in 20 critical areas, including civil rights, law enforcement, and government spending. The Policy Committee proposed, as its next step, to develop alternative solutions in these areas for consideration by the RGA in early 1968. The RGA in Palm Beach unanimously authorized the Policy Committee to proceed with the development of these proposed solutions.

The governors and staff took great care that the platform project did not get derailed by presidential talk about Nelson A. Rockefeller or by potential policy divisions among the governors. Since Governor Rockefeller serves as chairman of the Policy Committee, the RGA platform effort could have been misconstrued as a Rockefeller presidential soapbox. Although representatives of several other governors on the Policy Committee contributed to the Statistical Workbook, much of the work on it was done by Mary McAniff of the Rockefeller staff.

Governor Rockefeller was scheduled to narrate a slide showing of the selected graphs and statistics in the workbook, but at the last moment, to avoid personal publicity, he turned this task over to his secretary, Alton G. Marshall. The press inevitably ascribed credit to Governor Rockefeller for spearheading the platform effort, but he successfully minimized the significance of his personal contribution to the project and focused on the efforts of the Policy Committee staff.

REGIONAL HEARINGS

The RGA accepted the proposal of Governor Raymond P. Shafer of Pennsylvania for a series of seven regional hearings on domestic issues to develop materials for the governors' platform project. His proposal contemplates a series of hearings by groups of governors to ascertain "grass roots" sentiment about the 1968 GOP platform. Although Governor Shafer is a member of the Policy Committee, the proposal for the hearings was not a recommendation of the committee. Shafer apparently developed this proposal without proper consultation with Governor Rockefeller and other members of the Policy Committee. It is significant, moreover, that the arrangement of these hearings was not placed under the direction of Governor Rockefeller's Policy Committee. The hearings will be treated as a project of the entire Association and probably will be organized by Governor Shafer and his staff.

The governors indicated that they would coordinate the regional hearings with the Republican National Committee and with the GOP Congressional leadership. However, details regarding conduct of the hearings were not decided by the end of the Palm Beach meeting.

Several old Republican hands expressed doubts at Palm Beach about the hearings proposal. F. Clifton White, chief strategist of the 1964 pre-convention Gold-

water drive, said that the hearings might be useful to the party but warned that they could prove an embarrassing failure if haphazardly organized. Similar hearings had been held by the Eisenhower Administration, he said, but the only successful meeting was the one that Ike himself attended. The Republican National Chairman, Ray C. Bliss, reportedly has reserved judgment on the RGA hearings proposal; but he is said to frown on the idea, especially since the Platform Committee itself traditionally holds regional hearings prior to the national convention.

SHAFTER AS CO-CHAIRMAN As another prong to their 1968 platform efforts, the Republican governors agreed to recommend that Governor Shafer be appointed co-chairman of the 1968 National Platform Committee. This was considered to be in part a recognition of his initiative in making the regional hearings proposal. The recommendation has gone to National Chairman Bliss, who is expected to defer decision on it until spring. "I haven't given any thought to it," he said in Palm Beach. "We'll look at that later." Senator Dirksen, who has usually been suggested for the chairmanship of the Platform Committee, refused to comment in Palm Beach on the possibility of a Shafer co-chairmanship.

Conservative Congressman Melvin R. Laird, however, belittled the idea of a gubernatorial co-chairman of the Platform Committee at a Republican Coordinating Committee meeting December 11, 1967. Mr. Laird, who served as platform chairman in 1964, insisted that "one person has to be responsible for putting the platform together." He suggested that "six or seven" Governors "get themselves elected" to the platform committee and serve under Senator Dirksen. In talks with newsmen, Congressman Laird disparaged the RGA's platform efforts as simply an attempt to salvage their "mistake" in failing to keep the presidential candidacy of Governor Romney from "going down the drain."

In a broadside reply, Governor John Chafee, the

new chairman of the RGA, said, "I have talked with a number of my fellow Governors, and it is fair to say that we are dismayed and completely puzzled by the hostility and divisiveness of Congressman Laird's remarks."

Mr. Chafee added: "We cannot believe that, upon more mature consideration, Congressman Laird will want to do anything but to welcome the rightful participation of the state Republican parties represented by these Governors in developing a platform of the broadest appeal to the American people."

Congressman Laird's hostility to the RGA platform efforts have won little support even in conservative circles. Aides of former Vice-President Nixon termed Mr. Laird's remarks "a bit childish" and "immature." Ronald Reagan was one of those who agreed in Palm Beach to recommend that a governor should share the chairmanship of the platform committee.

A THIRD FORCE?

Chafee's quick reply to Laird may indicate his desire to build the RGA into an independent force within the Republican Party, subservient neither to the Congressional leadership nor to the National Committee. Three vehicles for asserting this independence were set in motion at Palm Beach: 1) the development of platform proposals by the RGA Policy Committee; 2) the plan for regional platform hearings; 3) the proposal to name a governor as co-chairman of the Platform Committee at the 1968 Convention.

Since the inception of the RGA the Ripon Society has urged it to exert this kind of independent leadership in the Republican party. The twenty-six Republican governors may be the party's greatest assets. These men, who have the front line responsibility for solving America's most pressing problems, owe it to the party and the nation to exert the strongest possible influence in the national Republican campaign of 1968, and in the years to come.

—J.E.M., J.R.P., JR.

RGA POLITICS: Kirk's Plan Fails

A year ago in Colorado Springs, the GOP governors, jubilant at the increase in their number, adopted an agreement whereby John Love of Colorado would serve as RGA Chairman through 1967, handing over the reins to John Chafee of Rhode Island for 1968. All of the governors convening in Palm Beach had been parties to that accord except Governor-elect Louis Nunn, of Kentucky, elected this November.

Despite the agreement, as early as the National Governors' Association cruise on the *Independence* this fall, there had been some rumblings about the succession of Chafee to the leadership because he was an open backer of a presidential aspirant. Most of these expressions of concern were limited to the desire that he publicly make clear that he would separate his roles, and not try to cast the mantle of the Republican Governors around his candidate, George Romney. The attitude was made public in a press conference held in Oklahoma by Governor Bartlett at the beginning of the week prior to the Palm Beach meeting.

Governor Kirk, however, is reported to have been the main protagonist in an effort to prevent Chafee

from becoming Chairman. Kirk apparently hoped that he himself could be named co-chairman with Chafee, on the understanding he would succeed to the chairmanship a year later. It was reported that he made advances to several of the governors, including Governor Rhodes of Ohio and Shafer of Pennsylvania, suggesting that they should become candidates for the chairmanship.

The issue was quickly resolved when in closed session Governor Chafee stood up and made clear his intention to discharge his role of Chairman independently of his support for Governor Romney. There was no further discussion, and Governor Chafee, as anchor man in a brief press conference held in the courtyard of the hotel, outlined his position for the public. The *Miami Herald* the next day headlined the defeat of the Kirk ploy.

Presidential Prospects

Nixon aides at Palm Beach almost outnumbered the governors on the Executive Committee of the RGA. In a low-keyed way they dominated the public politics

of the conference in almost polar contrast to their total absence from the autumn meeting aboard the *Independence*. Many press by-liners were written telling readers that if the moderate-inclined Republican Governors were not yet crying doom on the hopes of one of their number being the nominee, at least they would find "acceptable" a Nixon candidacy. There seemed to be the widespread sense that Governor Romney's absence spared him the embarrassment of seeing that he had picked up no new support from his colleagues, and that many had written him off altogether.

Yet the degree of the acceptance of Nixon should not be overestimated. The precondition placed on acceptance of him in every case was the one he has set for his own candidacy: success in the primaries. And there were numerous reservations expressed about his strength if backers of Governor Reagan were to mount strong campaigns for delegates. Governor Tiemann of Nebraska, for instance, said that though Nixon was now favored to win the primary in his state, if Reagan were to come into the state a couple of weeks before the election, the result would be in doubt. Governor Williams of Arizona said that right now the sentiment is for Nixon in his state, but that there is great underlying Reagan support.

While Reagan supporters struggle to decide how much to challenge Nixon strength, a few moderate

governors have moved a firm step closer to backing Nelson Rockefeller. As Robert Novak reported from Palm Beach, the powerful Governor of Ohio, James Rhodes, indicated that he will work to draft the New York governor, who for the first time in an informal hallway news conference in the hotel indicated that if a draft "... actually did happen, I'd have to face it."

While Nixon appeared to be riding high, polls released in the week after the conference showed him running behind Johnson, a change from earlier sounding in which he had, along with many other GOP non-candidates, been leading the President. Also, not all the governors are willing to count ten on Governor Romney yet; some feel that his style may prove helpful in New Hampshire, and that his personal appeal as a stand-in for any number of other moderates, including Rockefeller, Percy or Lindsay, is not too sophisticated an argument to make to New Hampshire and Wisconsin voters.

The die is not yet cast.

• Norbert Tiemann of Nebraska, the most forthright gubernatorial supporter of Richard M. Nixon, proposed in closed session that the governors resolve to endorse the presidential candidate who wins the majority of the contested primaries. His resolution got only one vote, his own.

STATE BY STATE: 1968 Races Take Shape

ALASKA

Eighty-one year-old Senator Ernest Gruening will almost certainly be opposed by Republican Elmer Rasmussen, who last month left office as mayor of Anchorage, his first elective job, to mount his Senate campaign. Gruening seems to be preparing for a tough fight. He is already stumping the state to assure voters of his physical vigor, and during the coming year he plans to publish two books (*Vietnam Folly* and *Alaskan Reader*) to supplement his recent opus, *The Battle for Alaskan Statehood*. Gruening's attacks on LBJ's Vietnam policies are not expected to hurt him.

IDAHO

Idaho's Republican Attorney General Allan Shepard, mentioned as a possible GOP nominee in 1968 for the Senate seat now occupied by Democratic incumbent Frank Church, has recently taken stands on what he believes to be important issues for '68. In so doing, Shepard has placed himself somewhat to the left of the Idaho GOP, which has been ultra-conservative since the 1966 primary defeat of moderate Governor Robert E. Smylie.

Shepard considers the Poverty Program ineffective and inadequate. He complains that present policies try to have the poor better their position from within the slums and ghettos of the cities. Believing this creates little incentive or initiative, Shepard would provide jobs, opportunities, and resettlement for poor people *outside* the slums and ghettos. Says Shepard: "There's got to be a substantial job of retraining, and I think there are many decent people who want to better themselves."

On the question of Civil Rights, Shepard thinks that "this country has gone about as far in the law making field as it is possible to go." Main emphasis, he thinks, should be in stronger federal law enforcement of existing statutes. Pointing out that some labor unions still maintain color barriers, Shepard would "deny bar-

gaining powers" to such unions until prejudice is eliminated.

On the question of Vietnam, Shepard has given strong support to Administration policies. "Dove" critics advocating disengagement, and those of the opposite extreme favoring increased, stepped-up escalation are, in Shepard's view, "irresponsible." Though believing that debate should have preceded a commitment like Vietnam, Shepard advocates closing ranks once policy is formulated. This stand puts him somewhat to the right of Church, one of the Senate's leading war critics on the "dove" side, and to the left of a large part of the Idaho GOP, which favors escalation.

IOWA

Man to watch: David Stanley, 39, young, attractive, articulate, wealthy and running for the Republican senatorial nomination, regardless of whether incumbent Bourke Hickenlooper decides to seek reelection. Rumors are ripe that Hickenlooper will bow out, though it is unlikely that he would favor Stanley. Hick has told friends that he thinks Stanley "too liberal" and that he would prefer a candidate like former Congressman James Bromwell, an important leader of the Iowa GOP's old guard.

Stanley began his campaign for the nomination last August, one of the earliest starts in Iowa history. As early as September he was spending six days a week on the road and making as many as six appearances a day. In September alone he drove 5000 miles and appeared in sixty counties.

All this activity is seen by Stanley as more than an investment for the nomination; it is also advance preparation for what all observers expect to be an uphill fight in the election. Stanley expects the worst, a race by popular Democratic Governor Harold E. Hughes, who can expect strong financial backing. "We've got to talk face-to-face with hundreds of thousands of Iowans," Stanley says. "If not, Republicans won't win."

MISSOURI

Now that Congressman Thomas B. Curtis has declared his candidacy for the seat of Senator Edward V. Long, prospects for the election of a Republican Senator from Missouri are brighter than they have been since 1946. Senator Long has been accused by *Life* magazine of misusing his influence to aid Jimmy Hoffa and of receiving fees from the St. Louis law firm which represents Hoffa. Democrats are sharply split, and Long is being opposed in the primary by Lt. Governor Thomas Eagleton. Curtis has made public his financial worth and the income he receives from law practice. His record in Congress is exceptionally distinguished and his local ties are strong.

Lawrence K. Roos, St. Louis County Supervisor has announced his candidacy for the governorship of Missouri. Roos was considering a race for the congressional seat now being vacated by Curtis, but announced that "the need to revitalize Missouri from within is so critical that I cannot in good conscience turn away from it." Roos attacked the failure of Democratic administrations to develop Missouri's potential in education and essential health and welfare services. Roos was first elected County Supervisor in 1962; since then Republican strength has increased in this important county (population: 900,000). In 1966 Roos was reelected by 84,000 votes. A potential running mate is State Senator Lem T. Jones of Kansas City, who would give the ticket geographic balance.

Wider War

(continued from page 8)

Second, amphibious invasions are always risky, and our series of successes in World War II should not blind us to the fact that high risks should be taken only when a clear return can be gained. In the case of Vietnam, the resources needed for executing and supporting an amphibious invasion could be used defensively within South Vietnam to reinforce the already hard-pressed American position. Our fear is that President Johnson may be unwilling to give this alternative proper consideration. His previous record of over-optimistic statements may make him unwilling to admit that he needs more troops to avert disasters where he has already claimed successes.

Third, even in the case of a fully successful landing, if the North Vietnamese refuse to negotiate immediately and to exchange a total withdrawal of PAVN forces from South Vietnam for U.S. evacuation from Vinh, then large reinforcements will have to be sent to support the American landing party against attacks by surrounding units of the North Vietnamese army.

Alternatively, PAVN forces in the panhandle could move south to seize key points in the I Corps area, as a bargaining counter to American occupation of Vinh. Such action would require additional American troops to defend South Vietnam. An amphibious invasion could thus lead to a larger war over a wider and more hostile terrain.

Finally, the global implications of a new American initiative could well outweigh even a success in Vietnam. Any further diversion of our resources and moral energies into Southeast Asia could well kill NATO, undermine the dollar and put American investments in Europe under strong pressure. New Soviet moves in the Middle East could also result.

NORTH CAROLINA

Businessman Jack Stickley of Charlotte has officially announced his gubernatorial candidacy. He will probably face a primary challenge from Congressman James Gardner, who recently rose to news-worthiness when he was labelled an "ultra-conservative" by Drew Pearson. The primary will be the first significant intra-Republican contest in recent years. Stickley has the support of most respectable Republicans, including Congressmen Broihill and Jonas and 1964 gubernatorial candidate R. L. Gavin.

OHIO

Republican Party leaders may break with precedent and endorse a candidate for the U.S. Senate to oppose incumbent Democratic Senator Frank Lausche in next year's general election. The chief argument for the break is that endorsement may eliminate the need for a primary campaign costing several hundred thousand dollars and enable the endorsed candidate to concentrate his resources on the general election. Mr. Lausche's opponent will be one of three men: Mr. Sherman Unger, a 40-year-old Cincinnati attorney, who served as an advance man for presidential candidate Richard Nixon in 1960 and headed the Republican National Committee's big city program in 1964, Representative Robert Taft, or Ohio Attorney General William B. Saxbe. As Taft and Saxbe are reluctant to undertake what will clearly be an uphill fight against the popular Lausche, current betting is that Sherman Unger will win the endorsement.

CALL FOR INQUIRY

The time to consider the full costs of an escalation in Vietnam should not be postponed until a moment of crisis and excitement. The matter should be discussed now and the full implications examined. Both Congress and the press have a duty in this regard, and we call the matter to their attention not to spread alarm but to encourage sober debate and responsible inquiry.

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion President Kennedy told Turner Catledge, then managing editor of the New York TIMES, "If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake" And Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said on the Senate floor: "I only wish I had been consulted, because I would have strongly advised against this kind of operation if I had been."²¹ This time we hope that discussion and consultation will occur before any major new step is taken.

NIXON'S OPPOSITION

An example of the kind of intelligent discussion that is needed was given recently by former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, when he opposed an "end run" into North Vietnam. While he gave full attention to the military advantages of such a plan, he said that wider, long-term considerations made it advisable. He thus avoided the counsels of impatience that increase the pressures of ill-considered military action.

The sixteen points we have listed are not designed to predict an invasion of North Vietnam or a new Gulf of Tonkin incident. They do, we think, when taken in the context of past plans and statements, add up to a case for public concern.

—J.L.A., C.W.B.

21. Quotes reprinted in the New York Times, June 2, 1966, p. 14.

MULTILATERAL FOREIGN AID

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THE RIPON FORUM
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A Better Way To Foster Development

America's involvement in Vietnam is costly and tragic — a reminder that it is unquestionably in the national interest to use our resources in an attempt to guide the "revolution of rising expectations" in the developing world along a peaceful path to prosperity, stability and freedom. Former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon put it succinctly in the October 1967 issue of *Foreign Affairs*: "There can be no security, whatever our nuclear stockpiles, in a world of boiling resentment and magnified envy." A central instrument for the task of eliminating this resentment and envy is the foreign assistance program.

Two decades of experience in foreign aid now lie behind us. The results have been disappointing, matching neither the needs nor the expectations. The Congressional appropriation for economic aid in fiscal year 1968 is the lowest in twenty years — approximately \$1.9 billion. But the problems of our current aid effort are not limited to an inadequate level of expenditure; this is merely symptomatic of an underlying confusion as to both the dimension of the task and the goals of our policies. Foreign aid has been used to rebuild war-ravaged nations, bribe governments, stop Communism, maintain dictators, and develop national economies. Immediate tangible results are demanded for objectives whose fulfillment can be evaluated only with the perspective of decades.

Certainly the Marshall Plan proved that aid dollars — properly spent — can be immensely effective, although such precedents should not be warped to rationalize different programs with other goals. The contention that foreign aid can be used to stop Communism is absurd. Its usefulness for diplomatic blackmail is dubious and too often counterproductive; its use to guarantee life to nonrepresentative governments contradicts the basic tents of our society. Even mere progress toward the goal of developing the economic self-reliance and prosperity of emerging nations is unattainable unless the aid is distributed to ensure maximum impact.

If foreign aid is to become a truly positive force in the developing world, we must radically realign both our concept of the program and the methods of implementing our policies. *The Ripon Society proposes that direct or bilateral assistance for economic development be phased out and that future funds for the development of the Third World be channeled through international, multilateral agencies.* The United States must exercise its leadership in the developed world by revitalizing and expanding the existing multilateral aid network. Only then can foreign aid become an effective tool for the task of development, rather than a useless

device which embroils the United States in unwanted controversy and commitments to stagnant societies.

I. Our Current Aid Effort

A. CONFUSION OF GOALS

Any discussion of our foreign aid program must recognize the absence of a consistent underlying strategy. From an initial concern with the reconstruction of war-shattered Europe, our focus has shifted first to a reliance upon military assistance and "defense support" in areas bordering the Communist bloc, and then to the present effort which promotes the simultaneous military and economic buildup of "friendly" nations throughout the "free" world. The goals of foreign aid are described variously as the desire to block Communist expansion, win new friends for America, spread the democratic system, enlarge world markets, or relieve the world's misery. Frequently contradictory, these aims are also unsupported by a clear understanding of the possibilities for success or the ordering of priorities.

Even more dangerous for the long-term future of the assistance effort is the fact that both officials and public have failed to recognize that foreign aid *alone* could never achieve this panoply of purposes. Economic assistance programs have been oversold: too many results have been promised within too short a time-span. As misery and backwardness, hostility and suspicion, Communist subversion and totalitarian rule continue to flourish in the less developed countries, the resulting disillusionment focuses on foreign aid, and leads to suspicion of waste and misuse and to cries for abandonment. But, as Egon Neuberger of the RAND Corporation has noted:

The fault is not fundamentally one of poor administration of the program, but rather the imposition of goals that are beyond the possibility of achievement with the instrumentalities of aid. . . . These excessive expectations explain in large part the disillusionment with foreign aid.¹

To a significant degree these excessive expectations were a result of the brilliant successs of the Marshall Plan. These were interpreted as evidence of an optimistic future for the field of economic development. Yet the job of helping the less developed nations to achieve self-sustaining growth has been different, both in degree and kind, from the tasks of the Marshall Plan. Hans Morgenthau has noted:

In contrast to the underdeveloped nations of

Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the recipients of Marshall aid were among the leading industrial nations in the world, whose economic systems were but temporarily in disarray.²

The less-developed countries, usually new nation-states, are more accurately described as "pre-developed." The task is not one of reconstruction; in many, the whole fabric of education, commerce, and industry, and political life is in its earliest stages. Modern social institutions, management, and a supply of skilled labor are almost nonexistent. Even as assistance continues, the less developed countries are wracked by chaos more pathetic and complex than the turmoil in Europe in 1947. C. E. Black has estimated that it is "likely that there will be ten to fifteen revolutions a year for the foreseeable future in the less developed societies."³ Political unrest, which unfortunately postpones or cancels economic development, now seems an unavoidable part of the development process. The enormity of the task is clear. Under such conditions, what should our goals properly be?

Foreign aid should be recognized as only *one* means — although an essential one — for promoting the goal of a stable and decent world order. Insofar as foreign aid promotes well-administered government and a growing economy, it works to minimize popular discontent. A nation in which all citizens have a stake in a strengthened economy and a decent social order is a nation better able to defend its independence and to devote its own efforts to a peaceful world order.

Where the will to achieve these aims is absent, foreign aid cannot provide a substitute. As the Republican Citizens Committee observed, its true purpose is:

to strengthen the will and capacity of newly developed countries — which themselves are so determined — to maintain their national independence and, by peaceful means, to make sound accelerating progress toward national strength and dignity with increasing individual freedom.⁴

Nor should foreign aid be utilized solely to prop up established regimes. A commitment both to stability and decency requires that aid should be a positive revolutionizing weapon to overcome the barriers to full social, economic, and political participation.

While foreign aid is properly extended out of a concern for human dignity and a humanitarian conviction that no man's suffering should go unheeded, it is

far more than a charitable undertaking. The national interest of the United States requires an involvement in aid to economic development for yet another reason: the promotion of prosperity abroad is an aid to prosperity at home. Far from injuring the U.S. economy, the promotion of economic development enables other societies to purchase American exports. The connection between the increase in per capita incomes and foreign purchases in the American market is well documented, as Table I⁵ illustrates.

Given a realistic set of goals and purposes, and an awareness that foreign aid exists as only one instrument for achieving them, policy-makers and the public alike can divest themselves of pie-in-the-sky expectations and appreciate the *real* possibilities of foreign assistance.

Fourteen Western European nations, in addition to Japan, Lebanon, and Iran, no longer require American aid. Greece, Israel, Taiwan, Mexico, and the Philippines will be added to the list in the near future. But even nations such as India which still cope with gigantic economic and social problems, have achieved much during the last two decades. Since the early 1950's, India's steel production has increased sevenfold, her electrical power capacity in 1972 will be ten times the level of 1953, four times as many of her children are attending school, and malaria has been reduced from 100 million cases annually to less than 50,000 in 1966.⁶ Foreign assistance, together with able administration, has indeed achieved an exemplary record.

B. THE GROWING GAP Despite such successes, prospects for future achievement are very much in doubt. George Woods, President of the World Bank, has offered the following gloomy assessment:

The available amount of international development financing is falling further and further behind the economic capacity of higher income nations to provide it, and further and further behind the capacity of developing countries to use it productively.⁷

How much growth is required if the gap between rich and poor nations is to be narrowed? In 1966 the per capita gross national product of the U.S. was \$3648; in India it was \$104, in Indonesia, \$70, in Nigeria, \$117, in Bolivia, \$149. The average gap between these four and the U.S. was \$3538; in 1960 this figure was \$2896 — a six-year increase of 22%. To fill this gap halfway by raising per capita incomes to \$1000 per year would require 200 times the current aid flow;

TABLE I. Income of Other Nations and Their Purchases From the United States

	1935.		1966	
	Per Capita Income	Purchases from U.S.	Per Capita Income	Purchases from U.S.
Japan	\$93	\$225 million	\$922	\$2.9 billion
Mexico	\$61	\$66.4 million	\$470	\$1.7 billion
Iran	\$50	\$23.3 million	\$220	\$83.7 million
Venezuela	\$92	\$125.7 million	\$895	\$1.1 billion

to achieve the equality of the poor with the rich in 50 years would take \$65 billion annually.¹⁸ Yet, as Table II shows, the present rate of aid flow has levelled off, and grants to multilateral agencies have in fact decreased.

How does the present effort of the developed countries compare? The average total economic aid from all sources to the less developed countries from 1961-65 was \$6.7 billion annually, one-tenth the "equality" requirement. What proportion of even *this* burden does the U.S. bear? In 1962, U.S. bilateral assistance accounted for 56% of the non-communist aid; in 1965, less than 50%. But, while our total share is still impressive, our commitments seem less so in terms of our relative ability to pay. In 1946-48, our total aid budget represented 2.1% of the GNP; in 1949-52, 1.8%; in 1965, 0.9%. When *economic* aid alone is considered, the 1965 figure falls to 0.6%, and the 1968 figure to one-quarter of 1%. The relatively modest goal urged on the developed countries by the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is a level of aid amounting to 1% of the GNP. This, we too believe, is a *minimal* commitment in light of the enormity of the task. Yet, as John Pincus of RAND has concluded:

Donors apparently are much less concerned in practice than in theory about the possible dangers stemming from a world permanently divided into rich and poor nations.⁹

C. DEFICIENT TECHNIQUES A discussion of confused goals and inadequate levels by no means exhausts the catalogue of ills in our current foreign aid effort; very serious problems exist in the techniques through which current United States assistance is administered.

1. LOANS VS. GRANTS It is essential to note that the recent shift in emphasis in aid distribution from grants to loans does not represent to the United States a significant reduction in monetary expenditure. From the developing nations' view, it does, however, almost negate the possible accomplishments of the program.

In the early years of the U.S. foreign aid program, assistance was given primarily in the form of grants

of U.S. dollars to foreign governments. From 1948-52, 90% of our aid took this form. By 1965, however, only one-third of our bilateral economic assistance was disbursed as grants. This shift was political: Congress' concern with saving the taxpayers' money, plus the insistence that the exercise of the discipline to repay a loan strengthens the moral fiber of the borrower and demands that he use his resources more economically.

The Executive's initial response was to utilize "soft" loans (those repayable in local currencies) to achieve economic effects comparable with those of grants while protecting itself from the "giveaway" charge. In 1961, the Kennedy Administration — faced with the prospect of rapid increases in the amounts of American-owned, inconvertible currencies — announced a shift to long-term, low-interest loans, repayable in dollars. Even this policy has since changed; on these loans the interest rate, payable after the "grace period", has now risen to 2.5%.

Is a grant really a "giveaway", and does it constitute "unbusinesslike relations"? To the businessman supplying the equipment purchased by the recipient through his foreign assistance there is no difference between a loan and a grant. The profit realized by the exporter is the same. To the importer in the recipient country, the end-user of the equipment, there is also no difference: he pays his government in local currency and, if the transaction results from a grant, the money is deposited in a "counterpart fund" in the United States. For both supplier and user the transaction is businesslike. As for the stimulus to more efficient allocation of resources which is alleged to flow from loans, John Lewis has aptly remarked that, if the immediacy and urgency of the domestic needs are not sufficient stimuli to efficiency, "it may be doubted that much marginal stimulation will be afforded by deferred repayment obligations."¹⁰

And Robert Asher concludes:

In the foreign aid business, the character-building virtues of loans versus grants are for the most part figments of the imagination.¹¹

On the contrary, it can be argued that loans of the current type, repayable in dollars at 2.5% interest,

Table II. Net Foreign Aid Flow from Non-Communist Developed Countries to Less Developed Countries, 1950-64 (in billions of U.S. dollars)

Year	Bilateral Grants	Bilateral Loans (<i>net</i>)	Grants to Multilateral Agencies	Total	Average Yearly Rate of Growth in Aid
1950-55 (Average)		1.8	0.1	1.9	
1956	2.6	0.5	0.2	3.3	
1957	3.0	0.4	0.4	3.9	15%
1958	3.2	0.8	0.4	4.4	
1959	3.1	0.9	0.3	4.3	
1960	3.6	0.6	0.7	4.9	
1961	3.9	1.3	0.8	6.1	0%
1962	4.0	1.4	0.6	6.0	
1963	4.0	1.7	0.4	6.1	
1964	3.9	1.8	0.4	6.0	

Source: G. Ohlin, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered*, Paris, 1966

actually *retard* the economic development of the recipient. The ability of the recipient to service the loan depends not, as is usually argued, on the profitability of the project for which the loan is made, but on whether all its industries and services together earn enough foreign exchange to pay for essential imports and provide a surplus to be applied to debt servicing. Given present skyrocketing public debts in the less developed countries, the existence of this ability to repay is highly doubtful.

In the past decade the public debt of these nations has risen from \$10 billion to \$45 billion. A World Bank survey revealed that in 1963, 73 aid-recipient nations were forced to spend \$2.9 billion of their foreign exchange in repayment of past loans. Debt service in Latin America now amounts to 47% of all aid expenditures that region receives from the U.S. It has been estimated that, if the present volume and terms of lending remain unchanged, the net benefit to the poorer countries — the incoming aid minus the outgoing payments — will drop to *near zero* by 1975. In the next twelve years, India alone will need \$18 billion in foreign assistance, of which \$14 billion is required for debt servicing.¹² It is evident that foreign assistance loans, on their present terms, are mortgaging away the futures of the less developed countries.

One alternative, repayment of loans in local currencies, differs little in its economic effects from a grant. Yet the political reaction in foreign countries to the large claims on local currencies accumulated by the United States is severe. For the U.S. to lend these currencies back to the recipient is no solution, for, as Douglas Dillon has explained:

So long as local currencies cannot be used to provide a net addition to a country's resources by transferring resources to it from some other country, they cannot be used to reduce the requirement for U.S. dollar assistance.¹³

A final objection to loans concerns the deceptive element they represent in the calculation of our total aid burden. The only genuine transfer of resources or subsidy involved in soft loans results from the lower-interest rates and longer repayment terms. Their large presence in the U.S. foreign aid budget falsely inflates the level of sacrifice represented by the aid program. In 1962, for example, when the *nominal* level of U.S. Canadian, and Western European aid was \$7.7 billion, the actual transfer of resources (counting only the "subsidy" element involved) was \$5 billion (\$4.7 billion if PL 480 Food-For-Peace aid is valued at world market prices).¹⁴ This level of "giveaway" is not very likely to bankrupt the donors, but the "non-giveaway" element — loan hardening — may well ruin the recipients.

2. "TYING" AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

led the government that year to begin to tie American aid very tightly to purchases from American producers. By 1965, 80% of American economic assistance was tied.

Critics of U.S. foreign economic policy have claimed that tying was merely a device for "dumping" surplus or over-priced U.S. goods. In addition, they con-

tended that this process was creating a dangerous degree of aid-recipient dependence on American industry and commerce — in clear contrast to our stated aims of promoting economic *independence* abroad.

Charges of economic colonialism appeared strengthened when President Kennedy and AID chief David Bell, in attempting to develop increased public and congressional support for foreign aid, stated that foreign aid would reshape trade patterns in areas which had formerly traded almost exclusively with Europe. And in the mid-1960's, legislation was passed which prohibited the use of aid to support projects which could result in export goods competitive with U.S. products. As a result, Professor John Montgomery has noted, "the nation seems to be becoming mercantilist in spite of itself."¹⁵

Besides creating resentment, tying substantially reduces the efficiency of foreign aid. It harms both donors and recipients. So long as aid-giving nations adhere to this practice, each is deprived of the opportunity of earning funds from the expenditure of others, to the detriment of its most efficient producers. In addition, tying prevents the less developed countries from expanding their purchases from each other. In general, Asher notes:

the tying process tends either to raise the total cost of aid programs over what they would be if purchases were made in the cheapest market, or to procure less aid for the same amount of money.¹⁶

The inefficiency is heightened by the fact that for fifteen years prices of American machinery and industrial equipment — items most frequently procured by aid — have been among the most inflationary items in the U.S. price structure and have risen much more rapidly than comparable prices in other industrial countries. Quality differentials are usually insufficient to close this gap. AID itself estimates that the average aid dollar's value to the recipient decreases at least 15-20% as a result of tying. In a sample of twenty development projects financed by six different countries, an item-by-item comparison of the lowest quotations from the tied source with the lowest quotation in international competitive bidding showed the weighted average to be 51% higher from the tied source.¹⁷

What effect has tying had on the U.S. balance of payments deficit? Commerce Department figures show the direct balance-of-payments drain resulting from the heavily-tied 1966 foreign aid program to be \$750 million. But a recent study demonstrated that whereas the 1958 (pre-tying) U.S. trade imbalances with 25 recipients of non-military assistance was \$1.8 billion, in 1965 — *with* tying of aid — the imbalance had shrunk by only \$200 million.¹⁸ John Lewis has concluded that:

the balance of payments improvement that can be accomplished by tying American aid to dollar purchases is comparatively slight since, even without country-of-origin tying, a substantial portion of American loans would be spent in the United States anyway and since . . . some of the loans spent elsewhere would indirectly facilitate additional dollar exports.¹⁹

At any rate, aid tying is no *solution* to the basic problem, the relatively poorer competitive position of American exporters. Tying in effect subsidizes these exporters, removing them from the necessity of re-

sharpening their competitive talents and conditioning themselves for the long pull.

In conclusion, not only does tying distort and reduce the true economic value of the aid funds to the less developed countries, but it also, as George Woods argues, makes "aid become a hypocritical misnomer, a disguised subsidy to domestic manufacturers in the export business."²⁰

3. THE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVITY OF BILATERALISM

The proportion of U.S. economic aid channeled through multilateral agencies from 1956-65 averaged 6.5%. Clearly our aid program, like those of most developed countries, is conducted overwhelmingly on a bilateral basis.

Yet bilateralism has become a channel for the distortion of the goals of foreign aid. Programs which were conceived and justified in long-term perspectives have been too readily convertible to the use of short-range interests. In the early days of assistance, the foreign offices of the developed countries quickly learned that aid provided a convenient and expedient political lever. Gifts in money and kind, an old and embarrassing tool of foreign affairs but now relabeled as assistance, became an open and respectable means of bribery. Donors came to use assistance in a number of ways: to preserve power in a former colony; to sweeten negotiations for a military base; to obtain a manifestation of resistance to Communism; or to gain or close access to markets. During the 1950's when rice was listed as a U.S. surplus item, aid was denied to Vietnam's most important domestic crop. Irrigation, pest control, and extension services went unaided; all would have had the forbidden effect of increasing rice production.

By the time foreign aid reached its present level, it was inextricably bound up with the short-term external political and economic ambitions of the donors. Yet it continued to be justified with promises of long-range mutual benefits. Tailored to fit these political policies of the donors, bilateral assistance has become counter-productive, working against the interests of both donor and recipients.

EFFECTS ON DONOR

When financial and technical assistance are undertaken on a bilateral basis, a complicated relationship is born binding the donor to the recipient. Rigidities arise which, in effect, pre-commit the donor to a future course of action, a course that the donor may find undesirable in the future.

To the extent that the donor's diplomats, parliamentarians, and public are conditioned to supporting foreign assistance for reasons of national self-interest, this assistance is increasingly seen as an "investment" in the recipient. The more aid is "invested" in a less developed nation, the more the donor is forced by public and parliamentary opinion to defend its own investment in the recipient country. *The United States' increased sensitivity to the internal affairs of the recipients of our aid results in artificial extension of our vital interests.*

Periodic violence, turmoil, and reversals of policy seem unavoidable in the less developed nations as they grope for a capability for self-government. As a program of assistance develops, the donors may be tempted to involve themselves with such unpredictable events.

The result is the increased possibility that the donor

will respond in a manner far out of proportion to its actual interests when an unfriendly act occurs in a recipient nation. The response is often in the form of a termination of all assistance; e.g., the abrupt withdrawal of German aid from Tanzania.

The more serious possibility of military response from the donor is also implicit in the aid relationship. Bilateral assistance tends to relate the great powers more closely to the unpredictable events in the Third World and increases the possibilities that accidental or planned chaos in some remote nation will involve them intimately.

Assistance locks the donor and the recipient into a downward spiral; incidents within the recipient nation result in the donor's retaliation, which further accents the recipient's bitterness. Aid-giving nations, hoping to bank a fund of goodwill, often find themselves staring only at red ink. The experience of the U.S. foreign aid program in Burma is a classical example of bilateral assistance actually creating resentment. As John Montgomery notes:

So long as a sense of obligation remained . . . the Burmese were not able to free themselves of fear that their neutrality was somehow being weakened by the mere acceptance of U.S. aid.²¹

EFFECTS ON RECIPIENT

While donor nations have shown exaggerated reaction to events in the countries linked to them by aid, this reaction is usually minimized by the stability of their own governments. The less developed nations, however, enjoy little stability, and aid is often the most important national issue. Thus any adverse effects of aid tend to be greatly magnified in their impact on both a recipient's economic and political development.

The flow of bilateral assistance often begins with a stream of pre-development study teams which flock to the new country, monopolize the few efficient ministers' and economists' time, and often merely duplicate the efforts of previous survey groups. Once projects are chosen, the U.S. often has to "sell" the local government on the project that corresponds to our particular interests. The recipient government, unable to match the competence of the American technicians, accepts a project it half wants and half understands. Backed by the donor for its visibility and the recipient for its political value, a particular assistance program can leave the recipient committed to the local costs and the long-range servicing of the loan, often with sizeable interest rates. Thus saddled with the recurring costs of a number of such projects, a recipient can no longer afford to borrow on any terms.

In sharp contrast, as the Clay Committee noted, a multilateral organization, having no political or commercial interests of its own to serve, is able to concentrate on obtaining the greatest possible return, in terms of economic and social development, for each dollar of aid funds invested.²²

Bilateral aid may also create difficult external and internal political problems for the developing nations. The U.S. is often tempted to employ aid as a means to persuade the recipients to follow our foreign policy. When these nations defy a tenet of American foreign policy, they can usually measure our displeasure by the size of the cut in the next year's funds. The see-sawing

aid levels to Egypt and Yugoslavia are two of the sharpest examples of the influence of Congressional pique. The process of granting bilateral aid, with its roots in the donor's short-term foreign ambitions, cuts the young government's freedom of action and can propel it into an unnecessary foreign crisis.

The seeds of difficulty are sown as the recipient government begins to serve two masters, its own constituents with their mounting desires for land and the products of technology and its donors with its relatively inflexible view of stability and desire for protection of private investment. When the local government is drawn from the privileged class, we and that class are together on one side of a widening gulf between their government and their people.

The recipient, then, is expected to dance to the foreign policy tune played by the donor and maintain a stable and westernizing society in the face of the tremendous internal pressures inevitable in newly independent states. Because of the nature of bilateral assistance, the donor, even when its aid springs from a well of good intentions, denies the recipient government both a freedom of choice in foreign policy and tools of government which would broaden its support and increase its long-term stability.

INEFFICIENCY Assistance to less developed nations is necessarily difficult and frustrating. Even at best, however, bilateral assistance is an inefficient means for the development task.

The greatest inefficiency is also the most obvious: each donor must maintain an entire backup administration for its assistance programs, necessitating an enormous number of government personnel both in the capital and in the field. When administrative overhead is multiplied by the dozen major donors, the waste involved is enormous. Ironically, the legislative suspicion that aid is waste has resulted in a very costly supervision of each project at every stage by an unwieldy number of bureaucrats and their attendant red tape.

The bilateral system with its dozen potential donors makes it impossible for one donor to represent all foreign assistance efforts. The bilateral system has no "high command" at the source of all assistance to take a global or even regional view of assistance and to determine priorities. The donors, with the exception of an occasional consortium, continue to act independently of the regional or global needs and continue to employ foreign assistance to implement immediate policy interests. In the 1950's the World Bank's insistence on private ownership of a steel mill it was financing in the Philippines was undermined when the U.S. Export-Import Bank provided a loan for a publicly-owned mill.²⁴

The waste and destructive components of bilateral assistance are inherent in the very nature of the donor-recipient relationship. The many renovations and reorganizations of the bilateral programs have done little or nothing to lessen the naturally corrosive effect of these bilateral aid relationships. These arguments have been summarized by Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., who recently observed that bilateral aid

certainly does not seem to be winning us many friends, even in the recipient countries, and there is some question about how much true help is being given to the economic development of these countries. . . . It leads to all sorts

of ill feeling in the recipient countries when we try to impose a minimum of control over how our money is being spent. . . . One way to avoid such pitfalls is by channeling our aid dollars through multinational lending institutions. . . .²⁵

II. A Multilateral Aid Program

The Ripon Society proposes that the United States discontinue the extension of bilateral foreign economic assistance through the mechanism of tied loans and that it move toward a multilateral aid program. The emphasis should be on aid funds which are untied and are disbursed by Congress as grants to the multilateral agencies. Respected institutions through which a large part of an expanded multilateral aid program could be channeled are already in existence.

A. THE IBRD FAMILY

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and its associated institutions, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Development Association (IDA), are institutions of proven ability. The World Bank is financed through subscriptions by member government, a fixed percentage of which is lent to applicant governments, and the remainder of which exists as a guaranty fund for private investors. Only 40% of its loans are made from its own capital; the rest is financed through the sale of bonds on the public market. The voting power of the member-nation directors is weighted according to the size of subscriptions, with the U.S. currently holding 30% of the vote.

Made in the currency desired by the applicant, loans from the World Bank are not tied to purchases in any member country. These loans have concentrated primarily on the development of "infrastructure" — power, communications, transportation, and the modernization of agriculture. Loans are extended only after a thorough investigation by the Bank's staff into the applicant's economic situation; they act as a "guarantee of a nation's probity,"²⁶ and are usually followed by an increased flow of private investment.

Free from the taint of power politics and backed by its ability to raise money from the most skeptical donors, the bank's professionalism stands in sharp contrast to the political maneuvering which usually characterizes the bilateral approach. IBRD loans have been used to dredge the port of Bangkok, to free Baghdad from floods, to electrify the Cauca Valley in Colombia, and to reorganize the Ethiopian telephone system, among other projects. Its good offices have been made available to relieve international tensions which impede development: it mediated the issue of compensation for the Suez Canal; provided advisers to represent the Congo and Belgium in their disputes; and conducted a nine-year mediation between India and Pakistan which culminated in the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement. The Bank's standards, based on financial rather than political criteria, are rigidly enforced in the interests of sound economic development.

The World Bank, however, disburses "hard" loans and, while its accomplishments are legion, it has almost been priced out of its market due to the shortage of countries that can afford to get further into debt.

Thus, it is the Bank's "soft loan" affiliate, the IDA, which can serve a more crucial function in the current aid crisis. Extended on a long-term basis — a ten-year grace period followed by 40 years repayment — IDA loans require no interest payment and only a small service charge (3/4%). Thus IDA is more able to invest in enterprises which are not immediately commercially profitable, but, for the same reason, is forced to rely on its members' munificence for funds rather than the private market. The IDA is currently out of funds, and has met with only limited success in attempting to increase government subscriptions. The U.S. government should drop its attempts to achieve a tying arrangement within IDA and should substantially increase its grants to this, "the agency best equipped to cope with . . . the growing debt burden of the poor."²⁷

The World Bank should also be given authority and funds to institute a supplementary financing program as proposed by UNCTAD. Less developed nations which submit country development plans and policies for scrutiny by the Bank and which agree to adhere to certain financial standards should be eligible for compensation in the event of a loss in export earnings due to events beyond their control. While costing donor nations only \$300-400 million per year, such a program would substantially lessen the severe foreign exchange fluctuations of poorer nations and enable them to plan development more confidently. The appointment of Robert S. McNamara as World Bank president provides a new opportunity to strengthen this international institution.

B .THE UNDP The United States and other developed nations should make more funds and personnel available to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), an excellent conduit for the massive technical assistance and pre-investment work required by less developed nations. This body was created in 1965 through a merger of the Expanded Program for Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund, which have together conducted 2500 separate projects in developing countries. Laying the groundwork for institution-building and human resource development programs, and emphasizing pilot plant projects and pre-investment surveys, this agency's work aids nations by increasing their ability to absorb investment funds. Twenty-five of its projects costing a total of \$19.2 million have called forth \$751 million in additional foreign investment.

C. CONSORTIA In addition, a multilateral approach to foreign aid would be conducive to a healthier use of the consortium of donor nations to channel funds through a multilateral body. The annual rounds of concerted aid to India or Peru, for example, already coordinate the aid efforts of different countries and international organizations within the scale of requirements and priorities of the recipients. In particular, the funding of costlier projects could be resolved at the consortium level, thus preventing an excessive drain of funds from the IBRD family and regional banks, while still retaining for the donors a considerable degree of flexibility.

IBRD-led consortia now exist for India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, East Africa, Colombia, Thailand, and Malaysia. An Inter-American Bank-led consortium exists for Ecuador, and a Dutch-led group, for Indonesia. Greatly expanded use of this multilateral device would lessen the strains and stresses of bilateral

giving and promote a sounder division of labor among developed countries. Robert Asher has concluded that, "Unless some such system is institutionalized, the requirements of many of the emerging nations will not be met and, in those instances in which they are met, the burden of meeting them will be inequitably shared."²⁸

D. REGIONAL BANKS

The Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Central American Bank for Economic Development should be provided with greatly expanded development funds by the United States. These channels combine a professional, non-political approach to development with a healthy stress on regional development, a combination lacking in the bilateral approach. The Mekong River development project is an example of the coordinated regional efforts which can be undertaken by these banks. This project united in a common cause Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand (some of whom had no diplomatic relations with each other); none of the states involved could have undertaken significant action alone, nor through a fragmented bilateral arrangement.

One possible device for generating increased support in the legislatures of the developed world for increased bilateral aid would be a parliamentary forum, enabling a frank and full exchange among legislators of developed and underdeveloped nations alike of the problems and prospects of aid. Such a healthy and humbling exchange could produce more influential, knowledgeable, and committed congressmen who would support an expanded aid effort through multilateral channels.

But the United States should take the lead in persuading other donor nations of the advantages of multilateralism, through the example of its own deeds.

III. The Advantages

The shift from bilateral to multilateral foreign aid would eliminate the inherently disadvantageous features of the present program. The funds would be channeled into those projects which are both significant and economically viable. The selection and operation of these projects would contribute to political education and the growth of responsible democratic institutions. Meanwhile, the U.S. would not find itself a prisoner of internal political events in which it has no interest.

A. AID SEPARATION

A gradual shift toward channeling economic development aid through multilateral agencies will achieve the advantage of clearly demarcating development aid and military assistance, long-term aims and stop-gap security measures. The current overlapping in authorization and operation of bilateral military and economic assistance gives rise to the constant possibility that recipients will suspect that conditions attached to one form of aid are in reality intended to advance the purposes of the other. A requirement, written into the Mutual Security Act in 1950's, that recipients of economic aid pledge to use their full resources to defend "the strength of the free world" led ten countries to refuse assistance under such confused terms. These two functions — development and military aid — should be separated to ensure the economic integrity of econ-

omic development programs both in the mind of the recipient and in the policy of the U.S. As the Republican Critical Issues Council stated in 1964, aid for short-term or military purposes "should not be confused with economic and technical assistance directed toward what we believe is foreign aid's appropriate role in achieving longer-range purposes." An end to the confusing of development and security goals is especially imperative in the wake of the Vietnam experience.

B. ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE

Whereas bilateral aid has tended to create ill-will rather than good-will among the parties involved, multilateral aid has the advantage of allowing developed nations to achieve their long-term goals in the development of the Third World without poisoning their relations with these highly sensitive states. Henry Cabot Lodge has noted that multinational organizations "can push a recipient government in a way that no sovereign government can ever push another. No international prestige is involved, nor can the cry of 'imperialism' be raised when it is the gently friendly pressure of the . . . United Nations. How much better it is for us not to be the ones who cause disapproval or displeasure."²⁹ Even a former administrator of AID has admitted that

"there is no doubt that an international agency operates from a position where it can ask for a meeting of technical standards without carrying any particular political overtones, whereas the United States has a somewhat more delicate job."³⁰

In addition, by making greater use of international and regional bodies in which the less developed countries could share the responsibility of distributing aid, an increased recognition and appreciation of the inherent problems of allocating scarce resources would follow. Professor H. G. Johnson has suggested that

In the process, [these nations] would have to become hardheaded and hardhearted about each other's economic policies and performances . . . the educational effects in the longer run could be of tremendous value in improving the efficiency of the use of foreign aid and of development planning in general.³¹

C. COORDINATED EFFORTS

Uncoordinated bilateral efforts to promote development cannot deliver aid of the pertinent type, in the appropriate amounts, to the right places, at the correct times. The limited amounts of aid which are now disbursed bilaterally could achieve far greater results if they were distributed on the basis of a coordinated strategy. If a handful of aid sources working together were to replace the many existing individual efforts, confusion, duplication, and the existence of pockets of neglect would become much less of a problem. Regional development would be encouraged rather than frustrated.

IV. Possible Criticisms

There are several possible objections which could be raised against a shift toward multilateral foreign assistance. Most of them, in fact, stem from the confusion as to our real purpose in providing such aid.

A. "IT CAN'T FIGHT COMMUNISM"

The argument that increased use of international agencies which are non-political or which encompass a variety of political ideologies would deprive the United States of political control of its aid overlooks the stark fact that past attempts to exercise such short-term control have been not only a major cause of our current difficulties but also absolutely fruitless. Economic aid *should* not be used to "buy friends" abroad; its true purpose is to promote more stable and independent regimes which will be better able to resist such pressures. Furthermore, it *cannot* be used in such ways; the use of aid to bribe or punish creates resentment and undermines the popular support of governments willing to comply with such tactics. Far from increasing our flexibility, it ties us in rigid relationships from which we cannot escape. We have programs of military assistance with which to strengthen our allies — the task of economic development should remain distinct and separate. Nations which receive our economic assistance through multi-lateral channels without political strings will, indeed, have an *increased* respect for our motives and policies.

It must be observed that this proposed shift in the emphasis in our aid program would in no way prohibit us from engaging in a massive one-shot aid program to boost an ally over the economic hump. We could always initiate another Marshall Plan or offer substantial bilateral assistance to another Taiwan. But the obvious absence among the current aid recipients of nations capable of properly absorbing this type of aid, demands its discontinuance.

B. "THE AID WILL BE WASTED"

The argument that close Congressional and Administration scrutiny of all details of aid is necessary to prevent "waste" of assistance is deficient on two counts. First, aid distributed multilaterally is not uncontrolled; thorough surveys are made of requirements and resources and the standards enforced are based on strict economic criteria. The substitution of "businesslike" criteria for short-term political purposes will *increase* efficient utilization.

But to expect *no* unwise use of resources by less developed countries is visionary. If these countries could invest capital as efficiently, maintain machinery and equipment as well, administer enterprises as smoothly as developed nations, they would not be as poor as they are. "Waste and inefficiency should be looked on as normal companions of an accelerated development effort, not to be encouraged or placidly accepted, but as elements that can only be reduced gradually," comments John Pincus.³²

C. "OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT WILL BE WORSENERD"

This argument is, on the surface, more reasonable. Multilateral aid, for reasons of maximum efficiency and value of aid, is not tied to purchases in the subscribing countries, and might threaten to increase the net drain on a donor's currency. But, as argued above, the tying of foreign aid has not actually reduced U.S. trade imbalances significantly, and is certainly no permanent answer to the problems of exporters who cannot compete competitively.

It is important to note, moreover, that even though contributions to multilateral agencies are not tied, many of the purchases made with these funds will still be going to U.S. exporters. David Bell has estimated that about 75% of the money currently given to the World Bank was returning to the United States in the form of purchases by World Bank loan recipients. The U.S. contributed 44% of the foreign exchange used by the Indus Basin Fund, and received 54% of the contracts let by this agency. Of total contributions we have made to eight U.N. aid agencies, we have received back in U.S. procurement approximately 70%.³³

At current levels of assistance, the difference between this proportion of return and the 80% currently returning to us as a result of our tied, bilateral programs would amount to about \$200 million extra drain on the balance of payments. The recently approved improvement in the system of international credit providing guarantees of adequate support through the International Monetary Fund for any currencies which might come under pressure could help alleviate these added effects if such assistance proved necessary. But we would conclude that the international political and economic benefits to be derived from untried multilateral aid are worth far more than the tiny differential that such expenditures would entail in the U.S. balance of payments.

V. The Political Opportunity

The Ripon Society is not the first to be impressed with the great benefits of an expanded multilateral aid program. Both Republicans such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Senator Howard Baker and Democrats such as William Fulbright have argued that it is the only method of implementing long-term economic development, the true goal of foreign aid. The Society believes that even wider support, from both the private sector and our public officials, can and should be mobilized for a frank appraisal of the problems and opportunities.

The benefits of an internationally supported multilateral aid program can be realized without the labor pains which accompany the birth of any international political institution. The agencies necessary to implement the multilateral approach are established and respected. All that is required is for the United States to resolve to bury its misconceived and unrealizable goals. Foreign aid should — and need — no longer be either a subsidy to inefficient American exporters or a crude instrument for bribery and pressure of foreign governments.

The Ripon Society calls on Congress and specifically its Republican members to support a program of multilateral assistance. America can no longer tolerate the incompetence of the Democratic Administration which has permitted our contributions to international aid agencies to stagnate at an insufficient level, while embroiling themselves in the hell of bilateral dependency. Only such narrowness of vision could have precipitated the Vietnamese war.

The Republican Party's traditions in international diplomacy should foster independence and self-reliance. The multilateral approach to foreign assistance embodies such principles.

As the President monopolizes public disenchantment,

today's electorate cries for intelligent leadership. The men they will trust must have a vision of the future. A Republican plank that demands the wise investment of our foreign aid funds through multilateral agencies can contribute to the security of America's future, and to a Republican victory.

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This paper was written for the Ripon Society by Robert H. Donaldson, and approved by the National Governing Board. Those contributing supporting research and assisting in reviewing drafts included: Ralph J. Thomson, Edmund M. See, Thomas A. Sargent, Walter H. Corson, M. Leo Juodeikis, Robert K. Huffman, Abraham Hirsch, Peter Hoagland, J. Lee Auspitz, Howard F. Gillette, Jr., Richard A. Zimmer, Thomas A. Brown, and Robert D. Behn, Research Director. The original draft was prepared by Michael W. Christian; titled, "Problems and Opportunities of Developed Countries as Seen by a Younger Generation," it was presented at "Commemoration Marshall" in Brussels, Belgium, June 7 - 8, 1967.

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RIPON POLL: Rocky si, Ronnie no

Readers of the Ripon FORUM want Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York to be their Republican Presidential candidate, partly because he of all the potential nominees stands the best chance of defeating President Johnson in November 1968; but former Vice President Richard M. Nixon has the best chance to receive the nomination. These are the most immediately apparent results of a preliminary analysis of the returns from the poll the FORUM sent out to its readers last October. With over a 20% response, the returns provide a clear indication of the preference of moderate Republicans, and in so doing reveal some interesting effects of the shifting fortunes of the major contenders.

ROMNEY WEAK

As can be seen from the tables on the facing page, the preference for Rockefeller is almost overwhelming; more than 60% of the

respondents make the Governor of New York their first choice for President of the United States. Significantly, this support holds up in the second-choice balloting, where Rockefeller is tied with Senator Charles Percy of Illinois with 19% of the vote. Richard Nixon stands seventh in average ranking behind Rockefeller, Percy, Lindsay, Romney, Hatfield, and Scranton. The former Vice President ties for third with Percy on the first-choice ballots, but slips to fifth in the second-choice voting. Governor Reagan comes so low in the preferences that his candidacy might have divisive results.

The most noteworthy result, however, is the poor showing by George Romney; the Michigan governor comes in fifth in first-choice votes and only fourth overall. If any large group of Republicans could be expected to be receptive to Romney's candidacy that group should be the readers of the FORUM. This lack of support from his most immediate ideological constituency reveals a serious weakness in Romney's drive for the nomination. That both Senator Percy and Mayor John Lindsay (who has received little public notice as a potential nominee) place ahead of Governor Romney is sharply indicative of the extent to which he has fallen from the favor of moderate Republicans.

ABILITY TO BEAT LBJ

The overriding preference for Nelson Rockefeller is due in large part to the belief that he has the best overall ability to defeat President Johnson in November 1968. Rockefeller's margin here is even higher; better than three out of every four respondents feel that, given the nomination, he would fare better than any other Republican against LBJ. Richard Nixon places second in both the first- and second-best-ability voting, but because a number of other readers feel his ability to defeat the President is poor, he places fourth overall.

Governor Romney shows much stronger here; although closely followed by Percy, who is in theory "locked-out" of the nomination by both Romney and Nixon, Romney maintains second place in the moderates' estimation of who can defeat the President. But

this suggests a paradox: If Romney ranks second in ability to beat LBJ, why is he the fourth-place choice for the nomination? The answer may be that moderates are perhaps just as doctrinaire as conservatives in their appraisal of candidates; Romney, while somewhat of a general-election "winner," may not be so ideologically pure, from the moderates' point of view, as Percy and Lindsay appear to be. Of course, another answer may lie in the moderates' estimate as to who is actually going to win the nomination.

CHANCES FOR NOMINATION

Once again the opinion is clear: Richard M. Nixon is an odds-on favorite to deliver his second Presidential-nomination acceptance speech next August. Over 70% of the respondents named Nixon as the best bet to carry the convention in Miami Beach. Surprisingly, a fair number (14%) think (or hope) that the convention will be a "brokered" one, which will allow Nelson Rockefeller to emerge as the nominee because of his clear-cut ability to win. But overall, Nixon is the man to beat and Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan are the men to do it, if anyone is. Governor Romney has only the fourth chance to receive the nomination and perhaps this explains his poor showing in the other departments. As far as moderate Republicans are concerned, Romney is sinking fast; he must either revive his candidacy immediately, impressively, and permanently, or give way to another candidate from the moderate wing of the Party.

VIETNAM

The two questions on the War provoked considerable comment and criticism. Many felt that the alternatives were ambiguous and not, perhaps, mutually exclusive. Those who did choose split as follows:

<i>The U.S. should follow its present basic course in Vietnam</i>	16.8%
<i>The U.S. should substantially increase its military effort to achieve victory in the Vietnam War.</i>	8.8%
<i>The U.S. should de-escalate the military approach in Vietnam and take new political initiatives to reach a negotiated settlement with the Viet Cong and North Vietnam.</i>	74.4%

And the response to the statement: "United States withdrawal from Vietnam would be preferable to continuing the Vietnam War for another five years." was:

<i>Yes</i>	45.4%
<i>No</i>	27.1%
<i>Uncertain</i>	27.5%

—R.B.E., Jr.

In the February FORUM: The Candidates' images.

THE RIPON POLL RESULTS

What is your order of preference for the nomination for President? (The candidates were ranked from one up through ten.)

FIRST CHOICE		SECOND CHOICE		AVERAGE RANK	
Rockefeller	60.2%	Rockefeller	19.0%	Rockefeller	1.8
Lindsay	9.4%	Percy	19.0%	Percy	3.5
Nixon	7.1%	Lindsay	17.4%	Lindsay	3.6
Percy	7.1%	Romney	10.5%	Romney	4.3
Romney	6.4%	Nixon	9.7%	Hatfield	4.6
Hatfield	3.4%	Scranton	8.9%	Scranton	4.8
Gavin	3.0%	Hatfield	6.7%	Nixon	5.2
Scranton	1.9%	Gavin	5.0%	Gavin	5.8
Reagan	1.5%	Reagan	3.7%	Reagan	7.2
				Lemay	9.1

How do the candidates rank according to their ability to defeat President Johnson in the general election?

MOST ABLE		NEXT MOST ABLE		AVERAGE RANK	
Rockefeller	78.0%	Percy	19.8%	Rockefeller	1.3
Nixon	6.5%	Nixon	16.1%	Romney	3.5
Lindsay	4.2%	Rockefeller	15.7%	Percy	3.6
Romney	4.2%	Reagan	12.5%	Nixon	4.0
Percy	2.3%	Lindsay	11.7%	Lindsay	4.1
Reagan	2.3%	Romney	11.7%	Reagan	4.8
Gavin	1.1%	Gavin	4.8%	Scranton	5.6
Scranton	1.1%	Scranton	4.8%	Hatfield	6.1
Hatfield	0.4%	Hatfield	2.8%	Gavin	6.6
				Lemay	9.4

How do the candidates rank according to their chances of receiving the Republican Presidential nomination?

BEST CHANCE		SECOND-BEST CHANCE		AVERAGE RANK	
Nixon	70.6%	Reagan	31.0%	Nixon	1.4
Rockefeller	14.1%	Rockefeller	22.2%	Rockefeller	3.0
Reagan	8.4%	Nixon	20.7%	Reagan	3.0
Romney	5.3%	Romney	19.2%	Romney	3.6
Percy	1.5%	Percy	6.1%	Percy	4.2
		Scranton	0.8%	Scranton	6.5
				Lindsay	6.7
				Hatfield	6.9
				Gavin	7.6
				Lemay	9.3

NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT

What is extraordinary about our present political crisis is that so many people are generally agreed on the way to end it. The dissent against our national policies from all sides is beginning to converge to a coherent and practical alternative. There is a common theme to expressions of malaise: that our aims should be less grandiose and that the means we use to pursue them should be in better proportion to our knowledge of opportunities and costs.

One message is coming through especially clearly. Our chief concerns are social and we do not understand very well how societies work. Let us begin at home and depend primarily on accelerating or hindering tendencies we can see naturally forming in people and societies. In foreign policy this means allowing vacuums of power to develop and tolerating the diversity of social orders that will evolve. Domestically, it means putting more responsibility on people, local governments, and the private sector to act, using the Federal government's power to control incentives and to redistribute income to guide decentralized responses toward a healthier society.

It is also extraordinary that much of this practical and sensible alternative philosophy agrees so well with traditional Republican thought. The setting seems to be complete for a classic exercise of democratic choice. It seems worthwhile to sketch out the broad shifts in the uses of our wealth and power that could implement this alternative national policy.

First, we must clearly get our commitments and expenditures in Vietnam into better proportion with the benefits we are likely, even with incredible good luck, to gain. Practical proposals to move in this direction exist. We can immediately stop offensive operations of American troops, and apply ourselves to holding small, densely populated areas. Complete withdrawal, given our fantastic investment in Vietnam and the logistic complexities can probably not be achieved for a long time after the decision is taken. There will be time for the Vietnamese to resume the burden of settling their own affairs.

The recent Ripon paper on the politics of Vietnam shows how many different possibilities there are for such a settlement. The result will not be neat, or clean, or entirely satisfactory to men who have dedicated their lives to building an anti-Communist fortress out of Vietnam's backward society. But is such an unlikely construct worth the moral and physical price we will pay in trying to enforce an unnatural social structure by military force? I think Republicans can and should provide a clear option this year for America to answer no.

Second, we need a massive reallocation of re-

sources to meet the demands of the poor and the cities. In financial terms we must think of spending about thirty billion dollars a year more in this area to achieve minimal social justice and stability. This money can flow into the cities in many ways: through a negative income tax to be spent by citizens, through encouraging private investment, through bloc grants to cities and states, or through Federal programs for employment and training. The people, the cities, and the states spend money on houses, clothes, food, education and social services. The diversion of funds to these purposes will match a decline in our spending on military projects of marginal usefulness as the Federal government gives up control of the resources. Again, the Republican party has an opportunity and responsibility to offer the country the chance to choose.

The thrust of these changes is that our greatest influence in the future will be by example, not intervention. The majority of people in the world are facing cataclysmic social change as they adopt productive technologies. Economic development is violent and bloody. Revolutions, wars and neuroses are an integral part of the process. We cannot successfully manipulate social events of this magnitude because we do not understand how they work. A persistent attempt to do so will lead only to greater violence, and perhaps the destruction of our own society.

But there is a more important task at hand. We are the first people to achieve mass comfort, and we are the first to have the chance to make a free and decent society. If we succeed in doing this we need not worry about other countries of the world failing to follow us as they become rich. This is not an easy task, either, and we must realize that others can see ahead to a future in which the quality of life counts for everything because quantity has been everywhere achieved.

To shift our priorities and philosophy, from grandiose dreams of enforcing a theoretical social order centrally and by force, to modest attempts to make our existing society a little more decent, free and just, will not be easy or unanimously approved. But a large part of the nation has come to see such a shift as a desperate necessity. We see ourselves adrift, as possible betrayers of the American dream, as alienated and powerless to feel or inspire confidence in our goals. The first steps on the way out are clear enough, and the Republican party now has the chance to lead the nation to them. Can we find a leader to go with the program that history has made for us?