

RIPON FORUM

With Senator
JAMES B.
PEARSON


OCTOBER, 1969

VOL. V, No. 10

ONE DOLLAR

The Southern Strategy

What is it? Will it work?



ALSO:
LINSKY ON
MASS. HOUSE RACE
———
PROFILE OF
SENATOR SAXBE
———
BLUE GRASS REPORT

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

GUEST EDITORIAL

Senator James B. Pearson (R.-Kan.) writes about TV time and political campaigns, and discusses his bill to lower the cost of paid political announcements. —3

POLITICAL NOTES

—4

RIPON ENDORSEMENTS

—5

PROFILE

One of the most misunderstood men who ran for office in 1968, Senator William Saxbe of Ohio, has delighted his former foes and irked some of his home-state supporters. Terry A. Barnett, Saxbe's campaign research director, explains the freshman's reaction to the frenetic yet tedious life of a U.S. Senator. It seems that Saxbe's apparent about-face is, in reality, just one more twist in the course of a persistent and thoughtful maverick. —7

THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY

Ripon's analysis of the Southern strategy as documented by Kevin Phillips in *The Emerging Republican Majority*. Phillips tries to justify a Goldwater-Wallaceite course for the Republican Party, relying on inevitable historical cycles and a bundle of facts, charts and statistics to prove his thesis. Ripon questions not only the practical value but the philosophical import of this strategy — and counter-proposes a safer and less nationally divisive way for Nixon and the party to win the country. —9

SPECIAL ELECTION REPORT

It's now four of five special congressional elections that the GOP has lost since Nixon was inaugurated. FORUM contributor Martin A. Linsky tells how the GOP again found electoral egg on its face, this time in the Bay State. The newest victim was Bill Saltonstall, and the metaphoric egg was thrown by the victorious Democrat, liberal, McCarthyite Michael J. Harrington. —21

STATE SPOTLIGHT

This month turns to Kentucky, where Ripon correspondent Eric Karnes highlights a number of young GOP hopefuls who just might save the state from a Democratic resurgence in the '70's. —23

14a ELIOT

—27

LETTERS

—27

PUBLICATION ORDER FORM

—28

TO OUR READERS

You may have noticed that your September and October issues are arriving later than usual. The Society and the editorial staff of the FORUM wish to apologize to you for this delay, occasioned by the special contents and extraordinary length of the September FORUM. Assembling and editing the Report on Youth simply took longer than a normal issue. The FORUM will be back on schedule by the first of the year.

The FORUM also would like to announce the appointment of a new editor. He is Michael S. Lottman, Ohio native and 1962 graduate of Harvard College. Mike served three years as a reporter for the Chicago Daily News and was a founder and editor of The Southern Courier from 1965 through 1968. Most recently, he has been updating Ripon's Southern Republicanism and the New South.

We want to thank you for your interest in the FORUM and the Society, and promise even better (and more prompt) issues in the future.

THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC. is a Republican research and policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in ten cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of sub-chapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor \$25 or more; Sustainer \$100 or more; Founder \$1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

NATIONAL GOVERNING BOARD

Officers

*Peter J. Wallison, **Chairman of the Board**

*Christopher T. Bayley, **Chairman of the Executive Committee**

*Howard F. Gillette, Jr., **Vice President**

*Robert L. Beal, **Treasurer**

*Frank E. Samuel, Jr., **Secretary**

Cambridge

*Sam Sherer
Howard L. Reiter

Chicago

*Harold S. Russell
John A. Bross, Jr.
Benjamin C. Duster

Dallas

*Neil D. Anderson
Howard L. Abramson
Robert A. Wilson

Hartford

*Nicholas Norton
Alvin Dozeman
William S. Glazier II

Los Angeles

*Melvin H. Bernstein
Edward H. McAniff
Richard J. Ward, Jr.

New Haven

*William E. Craig
Paul C. Capra
William H. Jeffress, Jr.

New York

*J. Eugene Marans
Robert L. Musser
Judah C. Sommer

Ex-Officio At Large

Robert D. Behn, **Research Director**
Michael F. Brewer, **Political Director**
Bruce K. Chapman, **National Director**
Clair W. Rodgers, Jr., **National Executive Director**
Michael S. Lottman, **Editor of the Ripon FORUM**

*National Executive Committee Member

**Past President or Chairman of the Board

Philadelphia

*Richard R. Block
Paul Niebanck
Roger Whittlesey

Seattle

*Thomas A. Alberg
Camden Hall
William Rodgers

Washington

*Patricia A. Goldman
Stephen E. Herbits
Linda K. Lee

At Large

Christopher W. Beal
Richard E. Beeman
Thomas A. Brown
Richard M. Conley
Carter G. Ford
Emil H. Frankel
**Lee W. Huebner
Philip C. Johnson
William J. Kilberg
Robert C. Kirkwood, Jr.
Martin A. Linsky
W. Stuart Parsons
Thomas E. Petri
**John R. Price, Jr.
**John S. Saloma III

THE RIPON FORUM is published monthly by the Ripon Society, Inc., 14a Eliot Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Second class postage rates paid at Boston, Massachusetts. Contents are copyrighted © 1969 by the Ripon Society, Inc. Correspondence addresser to the Editor is welcomed.

In publishing this magazine the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for fresh ideas, well-researched proposals and for a spirit of criticism, innovation, and independent thinking within the Republican Party. Articles do not necessarily represent the opinion of the National Governing Board or the Editorial Board of the Ripon Society, unless they are explicitly so labelled.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES are \$10 a year, \$5 for students, servicemen, and for Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteers. Overseas air mail, \$10 extra. Advertising rates on request.

Editor: Michael S. Lottman

Associate Editor: Evelyn Ellis

Technical Editor: Janet Beal

Contributors: Christopher W. Beal, Walter (Rusty) Crump, Duncan K. Foley, Peter Iseman, Philip C. Johnson, John McClaughry, William D. Phelan, Jr., Howard L. Reiter, Paul Szep, Andrew T. Well.

Circulation Dept.: Joanne Bing

Correspondents

Mrs. Barbara Mooney, **Conn.**
Maggie Nichols, **California**
Alex M. Hehmeyer, **No. Calif.**
James F. McCollum, Jr., **Florida**
Cullen Hammond, **Georgia**
Michael McCrery, **Idaho**
Blaine Edwards, **Idaho**
J. Kenneth Doka, **Indiana**
Burton Southard, **Indiana**
Terrence Dwyer, **Iowa**
Gary Scott Nunley, **Kansas**
Henry Bernstein, **Louisiana**
William A. Merrill, **Mass.**
Don Fowler, **Maine**
Terrence Dwyer, **Michigan**
Douglas C. Watson, **Minnesota**
James L. Robertson, **Mississippi**
John Evans, **Missouri**
Arthur F. McClure, II, **Missouri**
William Harding, **Nebraska**
Charles O. Ingraham, **New York**
William K. Woods, **Ohio**
Eric R. Blackledge, **Oregon**
Richard Ober, Jr., **Pennsylvania**
Donato Andre D'Andrea, **R. I.**
Bruce M. Selya, **Rhode Island**
William H. Linder, **So. Carolina**
Stanford M. Adelman, **S. D.**
T. William Porter, **Texas**
Robert R. Murdoch, **Virginia**
W. Stuart Parsons, **Wisconsin**
John R. Lazarek, **The South**

Prime Time for Candidates

Of the many persistent dangers which threaten the integrity of the American political system, perhaps the most insidious is the rapidly rising cost of running for public office. The high price of election is forcing many well-qualified men out of the political arena, and the nation is much poorer as a result. These high costs are also increasing the pressure on all but a wealthy few to obligate themselves to an unhealthy degree to well-heeled interest groups anxious to obtain leverage over our official decision-making processes.

The 114 percent spurt in campaign spending since 1952 is the result of a number of factors, the major one being the vastly expanded use of television. For make no mistake about it, television has revolutionized American politics. Today in virtually every major contested election, television plays the predominant role. And television is costly to use. Television rates rose by 30 to 40 percent from 1961 to 1967, and TV time now accounts for 40 to 50 percent of many campaign budgets.

Clearly, then, television has become the single most indispensable — and expensive — ingredient of any well-run campaign for major public office. And if we are to accept the premise, which I for one find irrefutable, that today's soaring campaign costs are dangerously limiting access to the political arena, the obvious place to begin to reduce these expenses is with the television industry.

BIPARTISAN SUPPORTERS

In an effort to come to grips with this problem, I recently introduced a bill entitled the Campaign Broadcast Reform Act. This legislation, which is co-sponsored by 37 other Senators and which has already been the subject of three days of hearings by the communications subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, was drafted in cooperation with the bipartisan National Committee for an Effective Congress. Simply put, this bill provides 60 one-minute spots of television time for candidates running for the House of Representatives at 30 percent of the prime rate. Candidates for the Senate would have the opportunity to purchase 120 such spot announcements at the same discount. Both types of candidates would also be encouraged to use longer, hopefully more educational segments of broadcast time by being given the additional chance to buy 30 minutes of program time at 20 percent of the prime rate.

The television industry is singularly well-suited to serve the objectives sought by the Campaign

Broadcast Reform Act. Television broadcasters, unlike the publishers of the printed media, are licensed by the Federal Government to operate in the public interest. Thus, the Government has the right and the obligation to set the criteria by which these licenses are granted. Certainly it is not unreasonable to suggest that one of these criteria should be the provision of a minimal amount of air time at reasonable rates to insure that all qualified candidates have the opportunity to get their views heard.

Moreover, the television industry is in a position to afford this slight reduction in its profits every two years. In 1968 the average network VHF station received an 82.7 percent return on its investment, while return for the average non-network VHF station was 76 percent.

REDUCED RATES AS A RIGHT

There has been a great deal of discussion in the industry, most of it since the Campaign Broadcast Reform Act was introduced, about voluntary rate reductions. But voluntary reductions are unlikely to occur on the scale needed. Moreover, voluntary action also tends to place the candidate more in the local station's debt than would legislation that would provide him reduced rates as a matter of right, in the public interest. And obligations or debts of a political character owed to the television industry are just as undesirable as similar debts owed to any other interest group.

The argument that reduced rates would flood the air with political broadcasts in major metropolitan areas is specious. In our large cities, air time would still cost most candidates more than they could afford. Moreover, even if they could afford it, candidates would not find it cost-effective to use the medium, because so much of their money would be spent for coverage of areas outside their district and hence of no value to them.

Public confidence in our institutions can be maintained only by reforming obvious inequities. The Campaign Broadcast Reform Act offers a mild but effective remedy for one of the most unfair aspects of our present political system.

THE AUTHOR

Senator James B. Pearson of Kansas, along with Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, introduced the Campaign Broadcast Reform Act on September 10. An identical bill was filed in the House.

Political Notes

COLORADO: we bombed at the Broadmoor

The National Governors Conference could be described as the spatial implosion of a thousand screaming egos forced to be gracious.

It is not in the nature of Governors to perform well in group decision-making situations. They are used to being top dog, and have difficulty compromising with their equals. Thrust together for four days and expected to produce something meaningful, they failed.

The Conference — like a high school student council, the Academy Awards, or the Miss America Pageant — is half devoted to neo-Babbitry, and half to a superficial search for relevancy. No time is left over for substantive activity.

The resolutions that emerged from Colorado Springs had been written in advance by committees, and evidently were the product of the public relations staff rather than the research staff. They were designed — successfully — to be adopted without dissent or meaningful discussion. Reporters covering the Conference confidently expected to see a resolution which would have appeared to favor motherhood, on balance. Apparently, however, the drafters assigned to that issue could not reconcile the group who favored taking a stand for motherhood with the group who could not vote for such a resolution unless it was qualified by the words "in wedlock."

So the Conference, in general, was a model of ego-saving corporate efficiency. But you can't please all the people all the time; and the persistent whine of the Governor of Georgia, Lester Maddox, with his Baseball Bat and Total Immersion philosophy, was often heard in objection to some meaninglessly obtuse policy statement.

It was Governor Maddox who finally produced the only newsworthy press release of the entire Conference, the unnerving revelation that

"Racial, contradictory and revolutionary ideas and forces are at work to further divide, fragment and destroy us, often aided, assisted and abetted by deceived segments of our citizenry and by powers sinister and supernatural, and we too often seem to use God to implement our own ideas and ambitions and naively we assume that the State and God are aligned and all would end well." (Emphasis supplied.)

Most of the time, reporters lounged around the press room at the Broadmoor Hotel, drinking free cans of beer, staring out the window at the golfing Governors, and waiting for something to happen. Hardly anything ever did, and the delegates from the fourth estate — who outnumbered the Governors at the Conference by about 20 to 1 — spent long days and nights trying to come up with enough trivia and balderdash to justify the expense of their attendance. But their most enter-

prising efforts could not disguise the hard fact that there was no news at the National Governors Conference.

— KIRK WICKERSHAM

LOUISIANA: same old problem

In a New Orleans election to fill a vacant seat in the Louisiana House of Representatives, Republican Loyd Myles was defeated by Democrat Ben Bagert, Jr., by a vote of 9,551 to 1,589. It was inevitable that the liberal, black Republican would lose to his white Democratic opponent, the 25-year-old son of a local judge. What was surprising, though, was the magnitude of the GOP defeat.

While Myles was forced to operate with a very small campaign chest, the major cause of his defeat was a lack of enthusiasm (and therefore votes) in the district's black community, coupled with a massive turnout of white voters for his opponent. In essence, the September 30 general election was a replay of the Democratic primary, in which Bagert defeated another black candidate, Charles Elloie, 10,331 to 7,760. However, blacks, unlike whites, did not return to the polls in the general election; in one precinct, for example, Elloie defeated Bagert in the primary, 394 to 20, but on September 30, the vote was Bagert 88, Myles 59.

Myles — who failed to win a seat on the Louisiana convention delegation as a Rockefeller supporter last year — offered the voters a progressive platform, but to no avail. While making the obligatory statements about law and order and justice for all, he also favored state housing and rent-control laws and called for the improvement of educational and vocational training facilities.

But the general election showed that Republicans, particularly in states like Louisiana, cannot win Negro votes merely by putting an occasional black candidate on the ballot. The Louisiana GOP's recent treatment of Negroes — including Myles himself — still rankles in the black community.

N. DAKOTA: a loser, but no winners

GOP officials and detached observers are taking a dim view of the party's chances of toppling Democratic Senator Quentin N. Burdick at the polls in 1970.

It might logically be expected that Burdick would be vulnerable, in fact a prime Republican target, in 1970. He is, after all, one of 14 Democratic Senators who will be running in a state carried by President Nixon last year. Moreover, Nixon's share of the vote in North Dakota was a substantial 56 percent and Burdick is a rather obscure liberal, who won his Senate seat by 1,100 votes in a 1960 special election by capitalizing on the farmers' hatred of Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson and who stayed in office in the 1964 anti-Goldwater landslide.

Those factors, however, are more than offset by Burdick's political assets. His surname is well known in North Dakota. His father, the late Congressman Usher

L. Burdick, served 20 years in the nation's capital. Further, the Senator has worked hard within the Interior Committee for North Dakota reclamation projects, and has said all the things farmers like to hear. As noted by the Bismarck Tribune, "He is personable and helpful to his constituents and has managed to spend nine years in the Senate without really offending anybody."

For a while this year, Republicans harbored the hope that Burdick's vote against deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in North Dakota and Montana might develop into a useful campaign issue. But then several weekly newspapers took a poll which showed North Dakotans opposed to Nixon's ABM proposal, 49 percent to 42 percent.

No Republican has announced for Burdick's seat. In fact, potential candidates have begun to withdraw. U.S. Representative Thomas S. Kleppe has declared that he will seek re-election in 1970, rather than run for the Senate. Kleppe, a Nixon Administration stalwart, lost to Burdick in 1964.

The GOP's best, perhaps only, hope lies in Congressman Mark Andrews, the party's champion vote-getter, who won stunning 2-1 victories in 1966 and 1968. It is generally believed, however, that Andrews is inclined to stay where he is until at least 1974, when Senator Milton R. Young, a Republican, may retire. At present, Andrews is keeping his options open.

ILLINOIS: too many moderates

The probable successor to moderate Illinois Congressman Donald Rumsfeld is a hawk who advocates closing the Panama Canal to ships from countries that send supplies to North Vietnam. Philip Crane, who led a field of eight Republicans in the October 7 primary also believes that the minimum wage has been injurious to the economy, and that there is no such thing as hunger in the United States (malnutrition yes, but hunger no).

The 13th District in Chicago's northern suburbs, which Rumsfeld represented until his appointment as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, has been characterized as the safest Republican district in the country, as well as one of the most affluent and highly educated. Its Republicanism has been moderate, and remained so in the October primary, despite Crane's victory. Crane's 17,800 votes, plus the 15,700 polled by Samuel H. Young, a "classic" conservative who finished second, gave the right-wing candidates a total of 33,500. But the rest of the Republican field, which reflected more moderate views — and which also included perennial office-seeker Lar (America First) Daly — received a total of 43,200 votes.

The leading vote-getter among the moderates was 35-year-old Joe Mathewson, a Dartmouth graduate and former Press Secretary to Governor Richard Ogilvie. A dynamic speaker who outlined his views at hundreds of neighborhood get-togethers during the campaign, Mathewson earned the endorsements of the Chicago Sun-Times and the Daily News. "He is a man with ideas — sound, forward-looking ideas — and the talent

to express them clearly and persuasively," the Daily News editorialized. "We believe his ideas come close to representing the mainstream of thinking in the unusually enlightened district he seeks to represent." With the moderate vote badly split, Mathewson had to settle for third place.

Crane, a former Bradley University history professor, will face State Representative Edward A. Warman, a liberal Democrat who has called for immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, in the general election November 25. Meanwhile, Republican moderates in the district will try to pull themselves together before the next congressional primary in March of 1970.

- continued on page 26

Ripon Endorsements

Most of the election battles this fall took place in the cities; and though these contests, with the exception of New York's, received little national attention, their outcome could have a profound social and political impact. As voters select the men who will lead them into the 1970's, the Ripon Society encourages and endorses the candidacy of progressive and intelligent Republicans who can deal with the problems of the cities and who can communicate and empathize with the varied ethnic and interest groups who make up today's urban society.

The following is a list of Ripon endorsements which were released two weeks before the November elections. They do not purport to be the result of a thorough study of each and every race. While in some cases the candidate actively sought Ripon's support and provided background material, in others the Society could not compile sufficient information on which to base a judgment. Furthermore, a number of candidates who were offered Ripon's endorsement felt compelled to decline it. The fact that a given Republican candidate does not appear on this list, therefore, indicates neither a positive nor a negative attitude on the part of the Society.

The endorsements:

FOR GOVERNOR

New Jersey: William T. Cahill

FOR MAYOR

Atlanta: Rodney Cook

New Haven: Paul C. Capra


New York: John V. Lindsay

Pittsburgh: John Tabor

Seattle: R. Mort Frayn

FOR DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Philadelphia: Arlen Specter



PROFILE: Senator William Saxbe

How you gonna keep him back in the woods after he's seen D. C.?

A year ago, the national media reported that the race in Ohio for the U.S. Senate was between a young, red-haired, articulate liberal and an older, backwoods-sey, tobacco-chewing veteran of the conservative Republican organization. CBS television showed pictures one night of the liberal crusader, with Kennedyesque finger, castigating his opponent as a "cracker-box politician." Then the bad guy came on, slouching in an easy chair and chewing his tobacco. The crusader had no money; the other guy had a well-heeled machine. The crusader was concerned with the poor, the young, and the cities; the other guy spoke only of law 'n' order.

It made a neat black-and-white picture, even for viewers with color sets. Never mind that the image was more than mildly distorted.

Nine months after that telecast, with a successful election campaign behind him, Republican William Saxbe put aside his tobacco and slouched over to the Senate — to cast his vote against the Nixon Administration's ABM proposal. For five months, Saxbe had outspokenly opposed deployment of the anti-ballistic system. Before the President had even announced his plans for the ABM, Saxbe sent him an open letter in opposition. Later, he sarcastically predicted that the ABM's only service would be as a museum piece in the Air Force Museum. When the Administration issued its detailed defense of the system, Saxbe inserted a point-by-point rebuttal in the *Congressional Record*; when conservative Ohioans asked him to address their dinners, he spoke about the dangers of the ABM.

SENATORIAL INCENDIARY

In the words of four Ohio newspapers, "Senator Saxbe has proved a surprise."

Billed by the media as an organization man, a one-dimensional rustic, Saxbe has emerged in real life as an independent, progressive and forthright Senator. "If he isn't yet a bomb-thrower," wrote Alan L.

Otten in *The Wall Street Journal*, "he certainly has been tossing a few firecrackers."

In his 10 months in the Senate, Saxbe has served as the sole Republican sponsor of a "national priorities" conference that condemned the military-industrial complex; co-sponsored a bill to end testing of MIRV multiple warheads; supported a resolution asserting a greater Senate role in sending troops into foreign wars; urged the President to move more quickly into arms talks with the Russians; and called repeatedly for quick troop withdrawal, not only from Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia, but from Europe as well. While criticizing the Administration's watered-down voting rights bill as a "step backward," Saxbe has praised the President's new welfare and revenue-sharing programs. Back in Ohio, Saxbe tells audiences that "the complex" must be brought under control, that more funds must be allocated to the cities and to non-military foreign aid, that student dissenters "should be listened to," and that America's middle class is "wallowing in materialism."

Some of Saxbe's listeners are a bit disturbed at all this. "Next time I shall vote for the Democrat rather than a phony Republican," said one constituent's letter. Party leaders have acknowledged that some big contributors have complained. And two newspapers that endorsed Saxbe for Senator have attacked his subsequent performance.

But while many are dismayed, more are pleased. The Senator receives more letters from appreciative Democrats and independents than he does from unhappy Republicans. His opponent of last fall, John Gilligan, says, "If I'd known Saxbe was going to act like this, I'd have voted for him myself." And John Kenneth Galbraith told an Ohio audience that "Saxbe is the most impressive junior Senator I have seen in a long time, even though John Gilligan is one of my dearest friends." The Ohio AFL-CIO has given Saxbe an "A" for his performance thus far.

What happened? Has Saxbe changed, or was the press wrong about him to begin with?

A TICKET ON THE TITANIC

The truth is that Saxbe is a type of man not easily understood by Eastern media or Establishment liberals. The 53-year-old Senator is a country lawyer-philosopher whose relaxed manner and rural phrases recall an earlier era. Yet Saxbe can reel off statistical predictions about America in the

TERRY A. BARNETT was Research Director for William Saxbe's 1968 Senatorial campaign. He is an ex-member of Ripon's National Governing Board and former president of the Cambridge chapter. Mr. Barnett currently is on leave from the Harvard Law School and working for a Master of Public Policy degree at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

year 2000, and he speaks with passion of the great changes he feels we must make in order to survive that long:

"This is a transitional period in history, and it's going to take a gigantic, almost superhuman, effort to adjust. We have to adjust to change — change from a rural to an urban society, change from an era of scarcity to one of abundance, change from a society keyed to work to one keyed to leisure, change from conventional to nuclear war. It's a little startling when you come down here to Washington and find that no one is really discussing any of these things. The people back home feel a much greater sense of urgency.

"We have to find a better way than war to solve our differences. Time is running out, and our thinking is still back with the War of the Spanish Succession. Maybe Honduras and El Salvador can solve their differences with war, but the U.S. and Russia cannot. To maintain our current foreign policy is a ticket on the *Titanic*."

Saxbe hails from a one-stoplight country crossroad called Mechanicsburg. His friends call him "the squire," and his neighbors know him as "a good cattleman." He lives in a sprawling home, much of which he built himself, on a 12-acre mini-farm, where cattle ("they are non-violent, don't shed like cats, and peacefully coexist with mice"), trees, and hunting are his main concerns.

Along with his love for the simple country life, Saxbe harbors an intense dislike for formality and ritual. He calls Washington cocktail parties a "disease," and escapes to his farm whenever possible. Looking out over his farm last July, Saxbe turned to an aide and remarked, "When I look at that out there, I wonder why the hell I ever agreed to run for this thing."

ABOUT TO QUIT WASHINGTON

And in fact, Saxbe has found his first months in the Senate both disappointing and discouraging. In late spring, he told the conference on national priorities that the participants should organize their legislative efforts outside the established congressional structure, which is dominated by conservatives out of touch with the rapidly changing mood of the people. And by August, Ohio papers were printing rumors, sparked by the Senator's own words, that Saxbe would not even return to Washington after the summer recess. The Senate's deadly formalism, its lengthy and dull committee meetings, and its ritual orations simply went against his grain. Going into the fall, Saxbe not only had yet to make his maiden speech, but was saying he never intended to make one.

Those who have followed the Senator's 20-year

career point out that although the Ohio Republican Party places a high premium on team spirit, Saxbe has always been something of a maverick — at least by Ohio standards. In 1954 — after six years in the Ohio House, the last two as Speaker — he unsuccessfully opposed the party's choice for the Senate, conservative George Bender.

In 1958, when "right to work" was on the Ohio ballot, Saxbe — running for a second term as Attorney General — was the sole Republican candidate to speak out against it. As Attorney General again from 1962 to 1968 he issued opinions which did not always please the industrialists who finance Republican campaigns. Saxbe was also the leading author of a reapportionment plan which resulted in the election of 12 blacks, most of them Democrats, to the Ohio House of Representatives — the first blacks so elected.

Nevertheless, polls taken in the early summer of last year's campaign showed that Ohio voters, while recognizing Saxbe's name, knew little about his views. The same was probably only slightly less true in November, when they elected him with a 116,000-vote margin. The problem, according to Saxbe, was not that he did not state exactly where he stood, but rather that the newspapers did not report his stands, or that the voters just did not bother to listen.

It is true that the media, especially the national media, unjustly pictured Saxbe as a law-and-order candidate. They ignored his oft-repeated statement that "we must end our over-commitment in Vietnam and correct our under-commitment in our ghettos," and they ignored his call for troop withdrawal within six months, his endorsement of a modified income tax and an all-out full employment program, and his progressive campaign statements on the problems of the elderly, education, mental health, civil rights, pollution, and economic management. While Saxbe did speak a great deal about the crime problem, he could hardly have avoided doing so, since he was both Attorney General of the state and Chairman of the Ohio Crime Commission. Saxbe's statements on crime, however, were always geared to solutions, and never came close to an attack on Supreme Court decisions (he agrees with the *Miranda* holding on confessions).

SOFT-PEDALLING ON THE ISSUES

On the other hand, it is also true that Saxbe's campaign did not emphasize the issues. Ohio Republicans can count on winning statewide elections on party strength alone, provided there is no overriding issue, such as "right to work," which unites and mobilizes the Democratic and union bosses. So Saxbe's strategy was to make his name well known, without

- continued on page 26

It's Not That Simple

Long ago, in the hot valleys of the Tigris, Euphrates and other Near East cradles of civilization, human culture began in the warm womb of a land where people could live without technology, but during later millenniums (sic) far greater civilizations evolved in temperate zones where climate, like necessity, mothered progress and invention. Today, however, a reverse trend is afoot. Spurred by high pensions, early retirement, increased leisure time and technological innovation, the affluent American middle class is returning to the comforts of the endless summer, which they can escape at will in swimming pools and total refrigeration.

—Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority*, page 437.

Not in recent memory has a book on American politics stirred such a storm of controversy as Kevin Phillips' *The Emerging Republican Majority*. Quoted by almost everyone and read by almost no one, the Phillips book has received extensive attention in the national press as the official outline of a new conservative Republican strategy. This treatment is due primarily to Phillips' central role in the campaign of 1968 — when his knowledge of political minutiae bedazzled advisors from John Mitchell on the right to Leonard Garment on the left — and to his continued proximity to Mitchell, the Attorney General and still the President's chief political strategist. The months immediately before and after publication of Phillips' book have seen such developments as the Administration's retreat on voting rights (led by Mitchell), the joint cave-in of HEW and the Justice Department in the case of the 33 Mississippi school districts, the nomination of Judge Clement F. Haynsworth (cleared by Mitchell), and the presidential courtship of Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. and possibly other wavering Democrats. Thus the claim of the publisher (Arlington House, of course) — that the book represents the Administration's strategy, both during the campaign and since — seems all too credible.

Furthermore, the book has won a nationwide reputation for what many believe to be its thorough and scientific documentation of American political trends. Everyone who has reviewed the book to date has been obsessed with its 47 maps and 143 charts (one of the charts, incidentally, was lifted *in toto* from a copyrighted Ripon Society publication, without at-

tribution). These maps and charts, backed up by an impressive volume of political and sociological information (such as the somewhat strained example quoted above), are designed to lend credence to the book's central theme — that there is an emerging Republican majority in this country, based in the South and West, and that this majority will rule American politics for the next 30 years.

DAWNING OF THE REPUBLICAN AGE

Phillips bases his argument that the 1968 election "bespoke the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in American politics" on a combination of historical precedent and his analysis of what he perceives to be trends toward and away from the Republican Party by various ethnic groups. But the historical precedent, in fact, is no more than the simplistic notion that American political cycles last either 32 or 36 years, and that such a period has elapsed since the formation of the New Deal coalition. "It is as a lawyer rather than an academician that I have propounded my theory," Phillips confesses in the preface to his book; and it is Phillips the lawyer who later remarks, "The Nixon Administration seems destined by precedent to be the beginning of a new Republican era."

The heart of Phillips' thesis, then, rests on his analysis of voting trends and his examination of the voting habits of various ethnic and religious groups whose westward migration he traces both before and after the Civil War.

It is this methodology which Phillips uses, and certainly not the conclusions he reaches, that led Theodore White, in a footnote to *The Making of the President 1968*, to describe the Phillips book as "novel." Similarly, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, in a recent column, described it as "creative research." In fact, it is neither of these things. The methodology of the Phillips book is to be found in the writings of Samuel Lubell, particularly *The Future of American Politics*. Lubell traces the migrations of various ethnic groups across the country and within political subdivisions, and outlines the social, economic, and political influences these groups exert at different times; these observations are leavened with significant (if often obscure) statistics and capsule biographies of key figures. This is the same approach that Phillips uses. Indeed, he draws heavily upon Lubell for the historical data and insights in which, it must be said, *The Emerging Republican Majority* is rich.

But Lubell's major work was published in 1952, and as Phillips' narrative approaches the present, the quality of his analysis and the incidence of real insights drop sharply. This is not to accuse Phillips of direct appropriation of Lubell's writings, or to criticize him for building upon the work of earlier scholars — indeed, he would be subject to criticism if he ignored their findings. The point is that the simplicity of Phillips' approach to present-day politics is in marked contrast to his involved analysis of the past.

THE DEATH OF THE NEW DEAL

Phillips' approach to the politics of 1969 is to divide Americans according to their attitudes about what he calls Democratic "social programming." In 1968, he says "(t)he Democratic Party fell victim to the ideological impetus of a liberalism which had carried it beyond programs taxing the few for the benefit of the many (the New Deal) to programs taxing the many on behalf of the few (the Great Society)." And the few who benefit from the latter policy are blacks: "The principal force which broke up the Democratic (New Deal) coalition is the Negro socio-economic revolution . . ."

This, according to Phillips, is the major cleavage in American politics, not North-South, East-West, urban-rural, or rich-poor, although all these divisions reinforce it. Those on one side of this cleavage, Phillips says, are Democrats, or soon will be. Socially, besides blacks, they include "Establishment" types and the residents of "silk stocking" suburbs. Occupationally, they are "the research directors, associate professors, social workers, educational consultants, urbanologists, development planners, journalists, brotherhood executives, foundation staffers, communications specialists, culture vendors, pornography merchants (!), poverty theorists and so forth . . ." In other words, Phillips consigns to the Democratic minority most of the same groups that the authors of *An American Melodrama*, in describing the opposition to the Vietnam war, call "a large proportion of those activist classes without whose consent American affairs can scarcely be managed."

On the other side of this cleavage, then, are the Republicans. According to Phillips, they include both Nixon and Wallace voters. They include union rank-and-file. They are "populists." They are the Catholics, led by the Irish Catholics of the Conservative Party of New York State, and the Scotch-Irish, the Southern whites, and the non-silk-stocking suburbanites. Individuals in these categories who have not yet discovered that they are Republicans will find out soon enough, Phillips contends; he views the 1968 Wallace voters as an electorate in transition from Democrats to Republicans.

SIMPLY A MATTER OF ADDITION

Ascertaining the presidential potential of these parties is, under this theory, a matter of simple addition. Democrats are people who voted for Humphrey, or 43 percent of the population. Republicans are people who voted for Nixon or Wallace, or 57 percent of the population. These calculations are neither "novel" nor "creative," but are merely a repetition of those of the Goldwater strategists. In terms of electoral politics, Phillips looks to the relative strength of various ethnic groups in a given state; those states where Yankees, blacks, and Jews constitute a majority are relegated to the Democratic column, at least for the next 30 years.

Thus, Phillips concludes at various points in his text and in his maps that Republicans cannot win Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Michigan, West Virginia, Washington, Hawaii or the District of Columbia. Further, he admits that "the GOP is not on the upswing in Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin — old Yankee-Scandinavian party strongholds — but it remains likely to win Iowa's and Wisconsin's share of 31 electoral votes." A maddening inconsistency between charts and maps often makes it difficult to tell what Phillips is saying, but he appears to hedge on some other states as well. He sees the South (including the deep South), the Great Plains, and the Mountain states as solidly Republican; the states left over, the largest of which are California, Illinois and Ohio, become "battlegrounds." (This aspect of Phillips' thesis will be explored more fully below.)

From this scenario, Phillips draws two conclusions, and only two, about public policy. One is that civil rights legislation, especially on voting rights in the South, should be vigorously (though quietly) enforced, so that blacks will flood the Democratic Party. It logically follows from this that if, while registering Negroes as Democrats, a Republican administration can convince white Southerners that it is doing all it can to slow integration and the growth of Negro power, the polarization of the races by party will be speeded up.

The second major policy pronouncement grows out of what Phillips sees as the stagnation of the cities, located primarily in the "Democratic" states of the North and East. "The GOP," Phillips writes, "is particularly lucky not to be weighted down with commitments to the political blocs, power brokers and poverty concessionaires of the decaying central cities of the North, now that natural growth is shifting to suburbia, the South and the West. The American future lies in a revitalized countryside, a demographically ascendant Sun Belt and suburbia, and new towns

— perhaps mountainside cities astride monorails 200 miles from Phoenix, Memphis, or Atlanta.” In other words, let the blacks have what’s left of today’s urban centers, and get the hell out.

LET THE EAST FLOAT AWAY

As one well-known political columnist recently remarked, “All Phillips is saying is what many Republicans have been telling each other over drinks for many years.” Indeed, the Phillips thesis is beguiling to many Republicans who are convinced that the party cannot successfully compete for black votes in any case, and who are now offered a rationale with some pretense of scholarly objectivity for not doing so. These are the Republicans who, with Barry Goldwater, would as soon see the Eastern seaboard, Phillips’ “Yankee Northeast,” float out to sea. Most beguiling of all is the notion, which Phillips strives so hard to implant, that all of this is the result of inevitable historical forces.

To that end, Phillips has been at great pains to describe his book as a thesis and not a strategy. He has done so in appearances on national television and in defending himself to party professionals who feel the book should never have been written. His position is quite misleading, because the Phillips thesis, or strategy, is the perfect example of a self-fulfilling prophecy — and Phillips himself played a major role in its fulfillment in 1968 by his participation in the Nixon campaign staff’s conscious decision to go South. This decision — or series of decisions — influenced both the size of Nixon’s vote and its geographic distribution, as Phillips successfully argued for the strategy that focused on Wallace and ignored Humphrey.

During the campaign, Phillips waved his statistical tables, graphs and maps in support of his Southern strategy. Now — after Nixon refused to seek the support of disillusioned McCarthyites, blew what everyone saw as a gigantic lead, and barely limped in with a minority of the popular vote and no clear mandate — Phillips tries to pass off his handiwork as inevitable and just a matter of voting trends. The fact that some Republicans can be beguiled by his pretense says more about their predispositions than it does about the validity of Phillips’ contentions. The Phillips strategy is not a Republican strategy; it is a conservative strategy, which calls upon the party to renounce its historical commitment to human rights, forfeit much of its present strength, and jeopardize its ability to govern effectively.

It is therefore the thesis of this article that Phillips’ book and its reception can only be understood against the backdrop of the internal struggles of the Republican Party during the last decade. It is necessary, then, that Republicans understand the high risks and potentially great losses the Phillips strategy entails for the party, and the possible motivations for such a

dangerous strategy on the part of those who would be served by it — the Phillips coalition.

TOO SIMPLISTIC A THESIS

According to the Phillips thesis, which simplistically divides all voters into “liberal” and “conservative” camps, the 1968 election results were proof of the existence of a new Republican majority. This is the core of the Phillips book — add Wallace’s vote to Nixon’s and you get a 57 percent majority. But it is not that easy to analyze the 1968 returns, because the presence of a third party candidate does not permit direct comparisons with previous years and because there is no clear source of information as to the second choices (if any) of the Wallace voters. Phillips attempts to solve this problem by simply describing Nixon and Wallace as the conservative candidates and lumping their combined votes into what he calls the “Anti-Democratic Right.” However, it should be noted that none of Phillips’ charts or maps provides any data to justify this interpretation. The repetition of platitudes and dubious assertions, the heavy emphasis on historical background and analogy, and those omnipresent charts and maps all serve to dull the reader’s senses, until — rather than attempting to sort out the arguments and critically examine the supporting evidence — the reader succumbs to Phillips’ almost hypnotic style of argumentation.

But the flaws are there. For example, Phillips occasionally describes both Nixon and Wallace as the populist-conservative candidates. This is possible because of the author’s curious definition of populism. To Phillips, Senator Joseph McCarthy was a “symbol of Southern, Western, German and Irish populism,” whose dream was spoiled by Yankees like lawyer Joseph Welch and Senator Charles Tobey, Ralph Flanders and George Aiken. Today, Phillips’ “populism” really reduces to the same basic ingredient that makes up what Phillips chooses to call “conservatism” — that is, opposition to black social and economic advances. But Phillips’ populism leaves no room for the economic liberalism that is so much a part of the American populist tradition, in the South and elsewhere. Tom Watson and Huey Long were racists, to be sure, but that was not the extent of their appeal; it was their economic liberalism that distinguished them, for racist politicians, then as now, were no novelty to the South.

Phillips recognizes Wallace’s success in “blending populism and some legitimate complaints about American society with an unspoken opposition to further government aid for Negroes,” but having made this recognition, he proceeds to ignore it. The fact is that Wallace far outstripped the 1948 Dixiecrat showing in the “upcountry, pineywoods and bayous” of the Deep South and the Black Belts of the Outer South (Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Florida), where white voters in 1948 had largely clung to their Demo-

cratic loyalties. And in most of these areas, he shook loose voters who had remained loyal to the Democratic Party during the 1964 Goldwater campaign. As Phillips correctly notes, the 1948 election split the white voters of the Deep South into two camps — the white professionals and businessmen of the Black Belt and the cities, and the poor whites of the mountains and foothills. In the predominantly white upcountry areas — and in Outer South counties where race was not everyone's major preoccupation — the economic policies of the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society loomed larger than the essentially conservative, white supremacist policies of Thurmond and Goldwater. "Outside the Black Belt and middle-class urban areas," Phillips says with rare insight, "many poor whites did not share this socio-economic commitment to a system which excluded them."

ANOTHER ASPECT OF POPULISM

But in 1968, Wallace attracted many of these voters — and voters like them, with similar interests, all over the country. Why? It had to be more than racism, because the same voters resisted the racially tinged appeals of 1948 and 1964; it had to be the second principal component of Wallace's makeup, the economic liberalism that led him to institute a system of free school textbooks when he was Governor of Alabama and to argue in his campaign against the oil depletion allowance and against tax exemptions for church property. As Professor Nelson Polsby of the University of California (Berkeley) observes in his brilliant article on Phillips in *The Public Interest*:

It is not easy to predict the ultimate decision of a voter torn between what he conceives to be his economic self-interest and his racial prejudices. For many voters, especially those not reached by labor union campaigning in 1968, a vote for Wallace avoided the dilemma, since Wallace was neither a plutocrat nor an integrationist. But future Republican candidates may or may not come to be seen in that light. In some respects, 1968 combined all the elements least favorable to the Democrats for this group of voters — high prosperity, depressing the salience of economic issues; extremely visible urban turmoil, increasing the salience of race and law-and-order; and the availability (on) every ballot of a populist, racist alternative.

Thus if Nixon's and Wallace's totals can be added together as the conservative vote, it is equally logical, if not in fact more logical, to count the votes for Humphrey and Wallace as the populist majority. Indeed, it was Nixon's decision to identify himself with Wall Street, the oil interests, and the military establishment that enabled Humphrey to resurrect the "old Nixon" and to paint himself once again as the

candidate of the people. Adding Wallace's vote to Humphrey's produces a 57 percent populist majority; but the obvious differences between Wallace and Humphrey, like those between Wallace and Nixon, illustrate the foolishness of this sort of apples-and-oranges arithmetic.

A VERY SCANT MAJORITY

But Phillips' conservative majority, even viewed on its own terms, is less substantial than it first appears. The author confesses that as a result of the conservative course he recommends, "perhaps several million Republicans and independents from Maine and Oregon to Fifth Avenue" will never again cast a presidential ballot for the GOP. On the basis of Nixon's 31,000,000 votes in 1968, the loss of "several million" reduces the GOP's 43 percent to 40 percent. According to Phillips' own estimate, "Three-quarters or more of the Wallace electorate represented lost Nixon votes." Three-fourths of 14 percent is 10½ percent, which, added to the GOP's base of 40 percent, produces a cliff-hanging 50½ percent "majority" — hardly the stuff of which political dynasties are made. It hardly seems reasonable to adopt a strategy that rejects Republican moderates from Maine to Oregon, but can only promise victory by one percentage point.

Moreover, Phillips' estimate of the Republicanism of Wallace voters — an estimate that is never documented — is open to serious question. In a recent survey, the results of substantial polling showed that of those who voted for Wallace, only 50 percent preferred Nixon as a second choice, while 39 percent favored Humphrey and 11 percent had no preference. And some 56 percent of the Wallace voters said they considered themselves Democrats, as against just 35 percent who called themselves Republicans and 9 percent who were independents. Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, in a paper delivered to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, reported that the proportion of Wallace voters in the South who considered themselves Democrats was 68 percent, while only 20 percent were Republicans; in the North, the figures were 46 percent Democrats and 34 percent Republicans.

Polls taken by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center over the past 16 years, furthermore, fail to substantiate Phillips' contention that the third party movement of 1968 was a "way station" for millions of voters in transition from the Democratic Party to the GOP. In October, 1952, 47 percent of those polled identified themselves as Democrats, 27 percent as Republicans, 22 percent as independents, and 4 percent as apolitical. In October, 1968, by which time some large-scale defections should have been evident, the responses were 44.6 percent Democrats,

of a Johnson landslide. In general, a small turnout would be expected to help the Republicans somewhat, but the pattern in 1968 contributed disproportionately to the GOP's success. The rate of voter participation actually rose 7 percent among Southern blacks, as a result of civil rights gains since 1964, and the rate among Southern whites correspondingly jumped 2 percent. Thus the decline was concentrated in the rest of the country, but even there whites fell off only 3 percent, while Northern blacks — the most reliable source of Democratic support in previous elections — sagged an astonishing 11 percent. Even so, the Democratic ticket finished in a virtual dead heat with Nixon-Agnew nationally, and actually forged a slight plurality in the North. But Phillips' confidence in the existence of a 57 percent GOP majority — which is really a 50½ percent majority — is based solely on the results of this election.

The Phillips strategy looks equally risky when viewed from the standpoint of the Electoral College. (Barring an unforeseen show of purpose by the President, Congress, and at least 38 state legislatures, the Electoral College will still be with us in 1972. If it is not, the emerging GOP majority submerges even further; it will no longer be possible to alienate the most populous section of the country, the Northeast, and hope to counter Democratic landslides there with narrow, or even generous, Republican margins in the thinly populated South, Plains, and Mountains.) In this light, it becomes painfully apparent that Phillips is proposing a Southern strategy, geographically as well as ideologically. According to the Phillips battle plan at the end of his book, nearly half the necessary 270 electoral votes, 128, must come from the 11 Southern states. Richard Nixon, after all, carried just five Southern states, with 58 electoral votes, in 1968. The dreamlike quality of this basic Phillips assumption is demonstrated in the author's expressed hope that

The conservative Deep South and Arkansas (totaling 53 electoral votes) will join GOP ranks — by default — against Northern liberal Democrats, provided simply that Republican policies pay sufficient attention to conservative viewpoints to undercut third party movements and create a national Republican vs. national Democratic context.

BUT WILL THE DEMOCRATS COOPERATE?

narrow appeal. The 1968 Democratic ticket, whatever its appeal to other regions of the country, fairly begged for repudiation in the South. Even in the black precincts across the South, the vote for Hubert Humphrey — though it ran nearly 100 percent Democratic, and though the turnout was greatly increased over 1964 — was far below what it might have been

This assumes, first of all, that the Democrats will cooperate by once again nominating candidates with

for a Bobby Kennedy. Humphrey's running mate, Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, won the plaudits of much of the nation during the campaign for his understated and thoughtful observations. Nonetheless, the choice of Muskie was a significant departure from recent Democratic tradition, in that the South (or at least, the Border states) went unrepresented on the national ticket for the first time since 1940. Yet in 1972, a Democratic ticket of, for example, Muskie and John Connally of Texas would directly undercut GOP potential in Wallace's two principal 1968 strongholds — the South and the Northern Catholic enclaves. Indeed, one must be wary of reading too much into the failure of the Humphrey-Muskie ticket to carry more than one Southern state (Texas) in 1968. After his nomination in Chicago, Hubert Humphrey was faced with the impossible task of bringing three groups back into the Democratic fold — the peaceniks, the labor unions, and the South. In selecting a running mate, he could not appease all three; and with the choice of Muskie, the decision was made not to contest the South. Phillips' confidence that the Democrats will be as divided in 1972 as they were in 1968, or that they will not attempt to offer candidates with national appeal, is symptomatic of his entire simplistic approach. If the Democrats' strategy in the South in 1968 was to hope for Wallace to defeat Nixon — or throw the election into a Democratic House — it was a strategy that failed, a fact the Democrats can hardly be expected to overlook.

Even if one grants for the sake of argument that the Democrats will acquiesce in all this by continuing to put up ideologically and geographically unbalanced slates, it takes a touching sort of faith to count the Deep South states in the GOP column. The Goldwater failure amply demonstrated that an appeal to the Deep South on its own terms will successfully alienate the Outer South, the Border states, and nearly everyone else. In two elections against the most un-Southern of all recent Democratic nominees, Adlai E. Stevenson, Dwight D. Eisenhower managed to carry one of the Deep South states one time, thanks to a vigorous Republican effort in Louisiana in 1956; Richard Nixon carried none of them in his race against the more liberal John F. Kennedy in 1960. And Arkansas has never in this century given a majority to a Republican presidential candidate; in 1968, even while backing George Wallace for President, the voters of Arkansas also gave a solid 59.1 percent endorsement to one of the country's leading doves, Senator J. William Fulbright, and to the South's ranking Republican moderate, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller.

BUT WILL WALLACE COOPERATE?

Nor is it valid to assume that "moderately conservative" policies — or even policies that out-Wallace Wallace — will keep George Wallace from making the

race again in 1972. But this assumption also underlies Phillips' prediction of GOP victories in Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, which "are vulnerable only to Republican Administration policies which keep alive third-party sentiment"; and in Texas, which will go Republican "without third-party interference." The question, as yet unanswered, is what it will take in the way of concessions to white segregationists to keep Wallace out of the race. From the anguished Southern response to even the Nixon Administration's first tentative efforts in areas like school desegregation, it appears unlikely that the Wallaceites will be mollified by anything less than a total pullback on federal civil rights activity. And so the GOP — which may have been the recipient of some of the South's "aginner" vote in 1968, will not be eligible for any in 1972.

The consensus of opinion among political observers in the South, in any case, is that Wallace will run again. Though he has said he would never seek state office again, there is reason to believe he will run for Governor in 1970; if he does, it will be a sure sign that he still has his eye on the White House, since he was never particularly interested in the job of Governor when he held it before. To Wallace, the joy has always been in running for office, and the only campaign that offers him the challenge he seeks is the quest for the Presidency.

A recent Gallup Poll, moreover, reported that the Wallace movement is showing unprecedented staying power. "Historically," Gallup observed in *The New York Times*, "a third party candidate fades rapidly following a Presidential election, but Mr. Wallace is defying this pattern. While support for Mr. Humphrey has fallen off sharply since last fall's election, when he received 43% of the . . . vote, Mr. Wallace is nearly as strong today as in November, when he won 13.6% of the popular vote." Of course, if Wallace should be defeated in his bid for Governor in 1970, the bottom would drop out of his presidential stock; but no one seriously contends that Wallace can be beaten in Alabama.

WHO IS THE RIGHTFUL HEIR?

But even if Wallace doesn't run, the GOP cannot assume that it will be the natural heir of all or even most of the 5,072,554 votes he polled in the South in 1968. For in many Southern states, the 1968 election was not so much a case of Wallace's keeping the Republican Party from an even stronger showing, but rather of his making a close GOP victory possible. In North Carolina, Professor Preston Edsall of North Carolina State University has estimated, Wallace cost the Democrats 380,000 votes and the Republicans just 110,000; since the GOP's margin over Humphrey-Muskie was only 163,000, Wallace clearly could have made the difference. Similarly, in South

Carolina, the Alabamian ran strongest in the heart of Democratic territory, the traditionally Democratic Piedmont and scattered rural areas, and did less well in the Republican pockets of the Coastal Plains and in the increasingly Republican metropolitan areas. The impression that Nixon's 38.1 percent represented the extent of Republican strength in South Carolina was reinforced by GOP nominee Marshall Parker's virtually identical showing in a two-man senatorial race.

Besides the Deep South, the Phillips strategy also counts on the Outer South states of Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, which "are not only conservative but ever more reliably Republican in Presidential elections." But is this contention based on anything but hope? North Carolina has been one of the most stubbornly Democratic states in the presidential elections of the past two decades, going Republican precisely once, in 1968. The Republican percentage performance in North Carolina, in fact, has been on the decline since reaching a high of 49.3 percent in 1956; it was 47.9 percent in 1960, 43.8 percent in 1964, and 39.5 percent in a three-way race in 1968. Tennessee's Republican credentials are in slightly better order; Eisenhower squeaked through in 1952 and fell short in 1956, Nixon polled a solid 52.9 percent in 1960 (thanks to considerable anti-Catholic sentiment), Goldwater plunged to 44.5 percent in 1964, and Nixon earned his slimmest victory margin anywhere with 37.8 percent in 1968. On the other hand, Virginia and Florida have been solidly Republican in presidential elections since the beginning of the Eisenhower years — with the important exception of 1964. In the year of the alleged Republican breakthrough, these states that had regularly given their vote to moderate Republican candidates turned their backs on the conservative rantings of Goldwater and his followers. On the available evidence, in other words, these "ever more reliably Republican" states of the Outer South are indeed within the grasp of future GOP presidential candidates, but only if the Republican nominees avoid a relapse into the negativism and extreme conservatism that characterized the Goldwater campaign.

THE TEXANS DEFY PREDICTIONS

The new Republican majority is also designed to include Texas, with its 25 electoral votes. "Without third-party interference," Kevin Phillips says, "Texas will support moderate conservative national Republicanism." If only it were so simple. There was no third party interference in 1960, when Kennedy carried Texas with 50.5 percent of the vote, or in 1964, when Lyndon Johnson swept his home state with 63.3 percent. And in 1968, Texas gave Hubert Humphrey his only Southern success (though here, more than in any other Southern state, Wallace probably helped the Democrats). From all appearances, Texas — with its

urban-suburban clusters, its conservative outlook, its general prosperity, its growing cadre of Northern technocrats, and its relatively low percentage of Negroes — ought to be the most solidly Republican state in the Old Confederacy. But in point of fact, no Republican presidential candidate has carried the state since 1956.

Another serious flaw in Phillips' view of the South is revealed in one of his two attempts to suggest a substantive course of policy. Phillips strongly recommends continued enfranchisement of Negro voters, because

Maintenance of Negro voting rights in Dixie, far from being contrary to GOP interest, is essential if Southern conservatives are to be pressured into switching into the Republican Party. . . .

Unless Negroes continue to displace white Democratic organizations, the latter may remain viable as spokesmen for Deep Southern conservatives.

Phillips actually aims to turn the Democratic Party into the party of the Negro:

With Negroes as the national Democratic Party's base, Deep South whites — once third parties no longer seem plausible — should follow the opinion-making classes into the Republican Party.

But recent developments indicate that Southern whites are not yet ready to let go of the Democratic Party, and that the national Democrats have not yet written off the white South. Evans and Novak recently reported that Mississippi Governor John Bell Williams — one of the white Southern Democrats most ardently wooed by the GOP — and other white Mississippians were plotting a new device, direct election of convention delegates and National Committee representatives, to recapture the party from the black loyalists. White Democrats in North Carolina and Arkansas have spoken openly of strengthening their state parties — not by excluding blacks or whites, but by seeking to attract more voters, particularly young ones, of both races. And the national party, for its part, recently helped the cause in Alabama by turning aside a Negro loyalist challenger and seating a new national committeeman from the ranks of the "regulars," whose electors were pledged to Wallace in 1968. In doing so, the party appeared to be following the advice of a white Southern conservative, Governor Robert E. McNair of South Carolina, whose voice was being heard with increasing frequency in high Democratic councils. Clearly, there are still ties that bind Southern whites to the Democratic Party.

JUST A SHADE MORE MODERATE

— except possibly Mississippi — to force whites out of anything. Phillips has let Negro successes in challenging a few convention delegations and winning several local offices obscure the fact that blacks make up just 12 to 36 percent of the voting-age population in the

Besides, there are not enough Negroes of voting age in any Southern state

Southern states. Especially if the GOP limits itself to conservative and racist candidates, white Democrats who are just a shade more moderate will be able to use the Negro vote to keep themselves in power.

The Southern strategy, for all its recent popularity, has not been particularly effective in the South. While the election of Senators Strom Thurmond in 1966 and Edward Gurney of Florida in 1968 were clearly conservative triumphs, many of the GOP's top Southern office-holders — including Governor Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas, Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, Congressman George Bush of Houston, and Mayor George Seibels of Birmingham, Alabama — have won by appealing to just those groups that the Southern strategy rejects. And Senator John Tower of Texas, cited by Phillips and others as proof of the validity of a conservative strategy, owed both his 1961 and 1966 elections to strong support in the Mexican-American community and to the defection of Democratic liberals disgusted with their own party's candidates.

FUN IN THE SUN BELT

Phillips' "Sun Belt" — which he thinks proves so much about American politics and for which he has such high hopes — is really just an extension of the South through New Mexico and Arizona and into parts of Southern California. In these Southern and Southwestern states, Phillips focuses on the new resort, retirement, military, and space communities, many of whose residents are admittedly white, successful, and conservative. He draws particular satisfaction from the fact that his "Sun Belt" is gaining in population; indeed, in the 93rd Congress, California will add six congressional seats, Florida two, and Texas and Arizona one each. And so Phillips says one of his innumerable charts

illustrates how the conservative Sun Belt cities are undergoing a population boom — and getting more conservative — while the old liberal cities of the Northeast decline. . . .

The suburban-urban trends of Florida and Texas are among the best proof in the nation that the overall demographic thrust of the youthful middle class is conservative rather than liberal in political implication.

There are two elements in Phillips' consideration of the Sun Belt — its growing importance and population, which can be demonstrated, and its growing conservatism, which cannot. But the distinction between these two elements is blurred, perhaps deliberately, by using the words "Republican" and "conservative" as synonyms. So Phillips can write that

the conservative streams of 1964 became a torrent in 1966, electing Republicans in Sun Belt upsets from California.

The epochal conservative triumphs of 1966 followed the general geopolitical lines which the Goldwaterites had postulated in 1964.

But in documenting the "epochal conservative triumphs of 1966," Phillips fails to distinguish between conservatives and Republicans. For example, he cites as evidence of this conservative boom the GOP's gubernatorial victory in New Mexico. But he fails to mention the successful candidate, David F. Cargo, by name, for to do so would be to remind the reader that Cargo is an eminently progressive Republican who shares none of Phillips' conservative beliefs. Phillips also relies on John Tower's 1966 re-election, but if either of Tower's elections proved anything, it was that a Republican cannot win in Texas without the aid of disgruntled Democrats and at least some degree of minority support.

Attempting to provide proof that "Sun Belt conservatism in the 1968 presidential race lived up to the promise of 1966," Phillips notes that the "GOP elected three new Sun Belt congressmen — one in Dallas and two in New Mexico." Certainly, Phillips can cheer about the election of conservative Ed Foreman in New Mexico; but the victories of Manuel Lujan, Jr., in New Mexico and of moderate-conservative Jim Collins, who succeeded former House Un-American Activities Committee chairman Joe Pool in Dallas, hardly indicate a swing to the right. Furthermore, though Collins won his race (against a more conservative Democrat), two conservative Republicans lost House races in Dallas County, while liberal gubernatorial candidate Paul W. Eggers carried the county over conservative Democrat Preston Smith. (Bad — not to say deliberately misleading — examples like this abound in the Phillips book; this article does not even point out all those that have been discovered.)

A SIMPLE CONFUSION

As Professor Nelson W. Polsby points out, furthermore, "it is not true that all growing Sun Belt cities are traditionally conservative. Over the last decade, for example, most of the liberal Democratic Congressmen from Texas have represented the growing cities of Houston, Galveston, Fort Worth, Austin, Beaumont, and San Antonio" And Polsby makes an even more telling point, that

Phillips' belief that traditionally conservative cities of the west and southwest will necessarily remain so as people from all over the country pour into them is based on a simple confusion between container and contents — a mistake he does not make when contemplating the migration of southern whites into the liberal, industrial cities of the north.

Phillips is careful not to include increasingly cosmopolitan and liberal Miami in his list of "Sun Belt Conservative Cities," because it so clearly disproves this theory. He does include Atlanta; however, the recent city election there — in which a liberal Jewish Democrat and a moderate Republican led the field for

Mayor, while a black Democrat defeated a white conservative for Vice Mayor — ran directly counter to Phillips' thesis. Phillips rejoices that

By and large, Sun Country was pro-Goldwater in 1964, at least in comparison with the rest of the United States.

This sort of observation illustrates the strained quality of all his arguments about the so-called Sun Belt. In 1964, the Arizona Senator actually won only his own home state and its five electoral votes outside the Deep South. Indeed, that piece of evidence alone should be sufficient to demonstrate that the GOP will not capture Phillips' Sun Belt merely by adopting a conservative strategy and nominating conservative candidates.

Phillips' hopes for the Northern Catholic working man, including his beloved New York City Irish, are also more fanciful than real. In fact, the inclusion of this component in his emerging majority is nothing more than an elaborate red herring.

STATISTICAL BLARNEY

He wants to prove that the Catholic labor force in the North not only liked what George Wallace was saying, but also is "trending" Republican. But this contention can be supported only by blatant manipulation of isolated data. For example, a chart titled "The 1960-68 Catholic Trend to Nixon in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut" lists 3 to 7 point increases in Nixon's percentage of the two-party vote from 1960 to 1968. Even allowing for the distortion caused by using only the two-party figures from 1968, this chart's impact is diluted when one recalls the name of the Democratic presidential candidate in 1960. Yet this chart is one of the few pieces of evidence supporting Phillips' claim that

The emerging Democratic and liberal coalition of Negroes and silk-stocking voters is engendering an important conservative (and increasingly Republican) counter trend among working-class and lower-middle class Catholics.

The conclusion that Catholics are becoming more Republican is simply not borne out by the facts. Dwight D. Eisenhower polled 44 percent of the Catholic vote in 1952 and 49 percent in 1956, while Nixon's showing in 1968 was just 33 percent, or 36 percent of the two-party vote. These figures from George Gallup on the Eisenhower vote — cited and then ignored in Phillips' book, like so many other significant statistics — indicate that the GOP is now far below even its recent peak among Catholic voters.

The inclusion of the New York City Irish in many of Phillips' descriptions of his majority appears to result from emotional, rather than political, judgments. "Richard Nixon, himself a black Irishman whose family came from counties Cork and Kildare,

was elected to the presidency in a campaign substantially planned by New York Irish conservatives," writes Phillips, himself a New York Irish conservative (47 percent Irish by his own estimation). His romantic portrayal of this group, which has the avowed purpose of defeating Republican candidates, absorbs a substantial portion of his chapter on the Northeast. But when Phillips, at the end of his book, finally gets down to identifying the states that will make up his new electoral majority, the entire Empire State is written off — as are most of the other states with substantial Catholic working-class populations.

LIST OF CONCESSIONS

What then is included in this new majority? The South, including the Deep South, contributes 128 electoral votes, and the "rock-ribbed conservative sections of the Heartland" (the Plains and Mountain states) add 61 more. But even if all these states are conceded to the Republican candidate flying the banner of the Southern strategy, the GOP's success is less than assured. Even Phillips recognizes that if the Administration goes to the conservative lengths necessary to capture South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas, other states will be irretrievably alienated. And so his battle plan makes no mention at all of the New England states, New York, and Michigan. Furthermore, at various places throughout the book, he writes off a number of other states. The District of Columbia and Hubert Humphrey's top ten states in 1968, he admits, will be "the core of national Democratic strength"; besides the states already ignored, this concedes Hawaii, Washington, Minnesota, and West Virginia to the Democrats. Phillips also waives the Pacific Northwest, including Oregon and presumably Alaska. His discussion of the "Non-Yankee Northeast" is particularly unpersuasive, abandoning all hope for Pennsylvania and raising little for the other states:

Of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland, the latter three (30 electoral votes), all pushing below the Mason-Dixon Line, are particularly likely to participate in the emerging Republican majority.

Finally, though Phillips does not write off Kentucky, it shares with West Virginia a Democratic history and a high incidence of Appalachian poverty. Kentuckians will vote for moderate Republicans like Senators John Sherman Cooper and Marlow Cook and Congressman William Cowger — and even, in a bad year, for Governor Louie B. Nunn — but a conservative strategy will drive them back into the Democratic camp.

One may quarrel with the assignment of certain of the above states to the Democrats; but most of them are made explicitly by Phillips himself on grounds as insubstantial as those he uses to award the entire South

to the GOP. As indicated above, Phillips' treatment of the South may be the weakest part of the entire Southern strategy. After doing the arithmetic (on the basis of current electoral votes), one finds that the GOP has 189 votes, the Democrats 211, and the battle for the Electoral College is narrowed to three groups of states: California, with 40 votes; Ohio and Illinois, with 26 each; and Missouri (12), Wisconsin (12), Iowa (9), and Indiana (13), with a total of 46. To win the election, the Republican candidate must carry two of these three groups — no easy task, on the basis of recent election results.

WINNING THE MIDWEST

Phillips himself grants that the "GOP is not on the upswing" in Iowa and Wisconsin, though he still argues that a Republican can win there. But a national strategy aimed at winning the Deep South states will not bolster the sagging GOP fortunes in Iowa and Wisconsin; and it will be incompatible with Republican success in Upper Midwest industrial states like Illinois and Ohio, where Richard Nixon, even in the law and order atmosphere of 1968, won less than substantial pluralities. In Ohio, one of his strongest states in 1960, Nixon barely squeezed out a 90,000-vote margin in 1968; and it is not necessarily true that a more conservative pitch would have helped, since the GOP's vote in Ohio plunged dramatically — from 53.3 percent to 37.1 percent — when Goldwater ran in 1964. And even in Illinois, scene of the disruptive and embarrassing Democratic convention, where Republicans scored near sweeps in statewide and Cook County races, Nixon's lead was just 135,000 in 1968. This margin, too, is subject to rapid evaporation if Democratic luck improves — and especially if the GOP obliges by resorting to a Southern strategy.

But a strategy that included New England, New York, and Michigan — which Phillips completely ignores, would not be anathema to the Midwest. The old Northeast-Midwest cleavage that so long dominated Republican intraparty politics disappeared almost unnoticed in 1968. In 1952, during the Eisenhower-Taft convention struggle, Everett Dirksen of Illinois could shake his finger at Tom Dewey of New York and rasp, "We followed you before, and you led us down the path to defeat." But at the 1968 convention, Governor James Rhodes of Ohio stayed with Nelson Rockefeller of New York even after Nixon had won all three of the close Southern state caucuses, and even though Rockefeller offered to release him; and conservative Senator Jack Miller of Iowa offered to nominate John Lindsay of New York from the floor for Vice President, if Lindsay would agree not to withdraw his name until a vote was taken. Both incidents showed that the Eisenhower-Taft cleavage was no

longer the dominant one in Republican policies. The new generation of Midwest Republicans has produced men like Charles Percy of Illinois and William Saxbe of Ohio, who have joined with Republicans from the Northeast on such issues as the ABM.

A final point about the Midwest is that it, along with the Northeast, pays the taxes that support military and space spending in the South. Phillips criticizes the Great Society for "taxing the many on behalf of the few"; but taxing other regions for the Sun Belt's military and space programs is another variation on the same slogan. In the 1940's, some of Robert Taft's support came from businessmen who resented paying high taxes for military preparedness. Now, when Phillips himself regards the Great Lakes states as a future battleground, perhaps the decisive one, he ignores the regional conflict of interest which is already beginning to link the Midwest with the Northeast in a taxpayers' revolt against further arms and space races.

A HIGH-RISK APPROACH

The success of the Southern strategy Phillips proposes, it must be granted, is not beyond the realm of possibility; but the question arises — what is the point of such a high-risk approach? The eight states that are totally ignored by Phillips are at least as fertile Republican territory as those the GOP would end up fighting for if it follows Phillips' advice. Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Michigan are presently represented by eight Republican Senators (and eight Democrats), and five of the eight states are led by Republican governors. And even a Richard Nixon can tap this Republican potential. A little-publicized indication of Nixon's possible strength in New York was the Crossley poll commissioned by Nelson Rockefeller in late July, 1968. Even before the Chicago convention, Nixon was running 5 percent ahead of Hubert Humphrey in the statewide poll, with 43 percent of the vote. The fact that later campaign decisions deliberately dissipated this lead in New York (and similar) states does not diminish its significance. It is barely credible, therefore, that these eight states are being forfeited in the furtherance of a legitimate Republican strategy.

Who then is served by the Phillips strategy? In 1956, Dwight Eisenhower campaigned for re-election on a platform of "Peace, Progress, and Prosperity," which aptly summarized a highly successful first term. But Phillips frankly admits that he would have Richard Nixon seek a second term on the far more cynical and limited basis of "patriotism, pentagon (*sic*) and paycheck." He makes no bones about the fact that his strategy, particularly in the South and the Sun Belt, is aimed at those who share in the profits of the country's vast military-industrial complex. Indeed, in one of his

few mentions of the Vietnam war and its effect on the 1968 elections, Phillips writes that

the opinion of the man in the street was more hawkish. For one thing, Sun Country in general and California in particular house a vast complex of military bases and defense plants. Defense is one of Southern California's leading industries, and employees of the vast Southwestern Military-Industrial Complex (SMIC) logically tend to support patriotism, pentagon and paycheck.

(Note Phillips' somewhat surprising use of the modish "SMIC" designation; he is one of the few writers, however, who views it as a term of endearment.) Besides the concentrations in California, Texas, Georgia, and Florida, military emplacements are vital to the economies of underindustrialized states like Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and of the underpopulated states of the Plains and Mountains — all included in Phillips' bastions of conservative strength.

ALLOWANCES AND SUBSIDIES

In the South, Phillips' conservative strategy also inures to the benefit of the oil interests, who are sustained by the 27½ percent oil depletion allowance, and to the cotton-textile industry, which the government allows to discriminate with impunity against blacks and unions, and which it maintains with its cotton subsidies on the one hand and its federal contracts and import quotas on the other. In the Midwest, Plains, and Mountains, it is the huge corporate farms who benefit from agricultural subsidies, and the mining interests who rely on generous depletion allowances. And in the cities, though Phillips goes on at length about the New York City Irish, it is not the Irish so much as the leaderless Slovakian laborers — who know they are overpaid, and who also know they have been protected by the federal government since the New Deal — who would be attracted to his new conservative majority.

All these groups, which predominate in Phillips' major target areas, are dependent on government largesse or protection; they do not subscribe to that backbone of traditional Northeast Republicanism, the Yankee ethic. Coincidentally, except for the conveniently leaderless workers, these interest groups rather accurately represent those who hold the power in the Republican Party — power, that is, expressed in terms of money. This coincidence may be unintentional; but Kevin Phillips, born and raised in the New York conservative milieu, has outlined a strategy that might, or might not, win a presidential election — at no cost to these Republican power brokers. And these are the men of whom it has been said more than once that they would rather keep control of the Republican Party than win an election.

Curiously, for a strategy that is allegedly designed to build a party, Phillips' plan for the GOP pays al-

most no attention to the party's very real problems at the state and local level; somehow, building a party is defined to mean winning a majority of electoral votes, and only that, at whatever cost to the rest of the ticket. In 1968, this was the prevailing attitude in large parts of Phillips' prime area, the South, with disastrous results in South Carolina, Texas, and Georgia. No good can come of this "high road" approach; it is not the way to build a permanent, vital new majority. State and local organizations provide the shock troops for party efforts at every level, and they are the only source of new young leaders for a party with national aspirations. Moreover, the state legislatures chosen in the coming elections will draw the lines for new congressional districts after the 1970 census. Republicans will ignore these most basic of local races at their peril; for the outcome of these legislatures' deliberations, and of the congressional elections that follow, can determine the success or failure of future national administrations.

TEAR US APART It remains, finally, to note the moral inadequacy of the course Phillips proposes. Both of his two meager policy pronouncements, and much of what he says elsewhere, ask the Republican Party to pursue a cynical and racially divisive path that can only end in tragedy. Can any party long succeed if it restricts itself to only those policies that appeal to the comfortable white

conservatives of the South and the nation? Can any administration survive if it tolerates hunger and poverty in the midst of plenty, if it passively watches the cities decay, if it does nothing to curb — in fact, if it encourages — the racial hostility that may yet divide the country into two armed camps?


The party that abdicates its considered judgment of the nation's needs and priorities to the fears and prejudices of a narrow class of voters may profit temporarily, though even that is doubtful; but in the end, it is bound to fail. And the government that keys its programs to the excesses and injustice of the white South will find to its shame that it has sown the seeds of tragedy across the nation. For as Howard Zinn has observed, if the South is "racist, violent, hypocritically pious, xenophobic, false in its elevation of women, nationalistic, conservative, (with) extreme poverty in the midst of ostentatious wealth," then "the United States, as a civilization, embodies all of those same qualities." The task of government in the next decade is not to nurture these tendencies, but to combat them wherever they exist.

THE AUTHORS

This Ripon Society analysis of The Emerging Republican Majority was written and edited by Christopher W. Beal, Robert D. Behn, Clair W. Rodgers, Jr., and Michael S. Lottman.

AVERAGE ANNUAL RAINFALL IN THE CONTINENTAL U.S.?

No, just one of Phillips' incredible maps: the 1968 Wallace vote.



Another Morning After

On September 31, for the third time in six months, Republicans awoke the morning after a special congressional election to find that they had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. First it had happened in April in Wisconsin, where Democrat David R. Obey carried a district that had gone 64 percent for Melvin Laird the previous November. Then in Montana last June, Democrat John Melcher captured the seat previously held by Republican James F. Battin, who had polled 67 percent of the vote just eight months earlier.

In September, the scene of the disaster was Massachusetts' Sixth District, where State Representative Michael J. Harrington, 33, a Harvard-educated anti-war Democrat, defeated a moderate Republican from one of the state's most renowned political families, State Senator William L. Saltonstall. While only 6,577 votes, just over 4 percent of the total, separated the two candidates, the outcome upset most of the predictions and sent the political analysts back to their typewriters to try to make some sense out of the results.

95 YEARS WITHOUT DEFEAT When the Sixth District's 20-year incumbent, William H. Bates, died back in the early summer, the situation for the Republicans still appeared to be well in hand. The Sixth District — seven cities and 23 towns on a peninsula to the north and east of Boston — has been represented by Republicans in Congress without interruption since 1874. The towns, in fact, are among the bastions of Yankee Protestantism that Republicans have relied on over the years for the overwhelming majorities needed to overcome the lead built up by Democratic candidates in the cities. Back in the days of paper ballots, when long nights of counting the vote were *de rigueur*, the Republican rallying cry of "Wait until the towns come in" was an early evening source of comfort to more than one nervous GOP candidate.

All victorious statewide Republican candidates in this decade have won the district handily. Even in his losing 1962 gubernatorial campaign, Republican John A. Volpe carried the Sixth District communities with votes to spare. Though Democrats now hold a slight edge over Republicans in registration, more

voters are enrolled as independents than as members of either party.

The logical successor to Congressman Bates appeared to be Bill Saltonstall, a two-term State Senator and son of Massachusetts' "Mr. Republican," Leverett S. Saltonstall. Saltonstall announced early, brought much of the Republican organization quickly into his camp, and looked forward to a smashing primary victory over his liberal activist challenger, four-term State Representative Francis W. Hatch, Jr.

Governor Francis W. Sargent, who had barely defeated Hatch for the Lieutenant Governor's nomination in 1966, scheduled the primary for August 26, the earliest date he could have picked. This gave Saltonstall a distinct advantage, since he was far better known, already represented more than a third of the registered Republicans in the district, and had begun his campaign promptly. An early poll showed Saltonstall with a lead of 2 to 1.

ON THE DOVISH SIDE OF SALTY

The Hatch campaign started late, moved slowly, and lacked adequate professional staff. But three factors which became increasingly significant in the general election combined to close the gap between Hatch and Saltonstall. First, Hatch was simply a very attractive candidate — young, dynamic, independent, and willing to tackle the establishment. Second, he emphasized issues, and staked out positions against the ABM and on the dovish side of Saltonstall. Finally, as a result of these factors, he was able to attract young and independent voters in greater numbers than his better-known opponent.

By the weekend before the primary, the Saltonstall forces felt it necessary to hire telephoners to get out the maximum votes in the cities, where whatever vestige that remained of a Republican organization was sure to be responsive to the Saltonstall name. Saltonstall's eventual winning margin of 2,587 votes — almost exactly matched his 2,548-vote plurality in the three old cities of the district — Haverhill, Lynn, and Salem. In the four towns that both candidates represented in the legislature, Hatch led by 1,059 votes, trailing in only one of them, Saltonstall's home town of Manchester, and there by only 52 votes.

On the Democratic side, Harrington rolled up a clear majority of the vote in a three-man race, losing only one town other than the home towns of his opponents. The size of the Harrington victory was impres-

MARTIN A. LINSKY is Massachusetts State Representative from Brookline. He is a Riponite of long standing and an at-large member of Ripon's National Governing Board.

sive; his nomination was achieved over the active and vocal opposition of organized labor, but with the virtually solid support of the 1968 McCarthy campaigners and the New Politics groups.

RIPPLES REACH WASHINGTON

The combined impact of Harrington's victory and Saltonstall's close call was felt as far away as Washington. Both the Republican National Committee and the Congressional Campaign Committee sent full-time operatives to the district to put the pieces together. A letter from Hatch pledging full support for Saltonstall went to every Republican in the district, and Hatch himself organized a group of his legislative colleagues to cover areas in which the Republican organization was simply not functioning. Things started rolling more smoothly, and with three weeks left before the general election, an air of quiet confidence began to pervade the Saltonstall headquarters.

The polls showed Saltonstall still ahead, although not by much. But Harrington was pounding away on the war, on Saltonstall's votes in the state Senate against an anti-ABM resolution and against lowering the voting age, and on Saltonstall's unwillingness to meet in debate. The debate issue, particularly, was getting to be a thorn in the side of the Saltonstall camp. The candidate himself, to his credit and against the unanimous recommendation of his advisors, decided he could not refuse all the offers of free air time and platform space, and a series of three debates was arranged.

At the same time, Richard M. Nixon "called" Saltonstall to Washington, and the candidate "conferred" with the President for an hour. The visit was well publicized in the district, and Saltonstall began to insert the phrase, "I have spoken to the President about that and he said . . ." into his speeches. But this may have played into Harrington's hands, since the Democrat used the otherwise uneventful debates to tie Saltonstall to Nixon — the President, after all, had collected only 37 percent of the district's vote against Hubert Humphrey. Harrington also stressed the similarities between himself and Francis Hatch.

It was over very quickly the night of September 30. Harrington carried only six of the district's 30 communities, but five of these were the five largest cities, and his plurality there was 16,377 votes — about 10,000 more than he needed to make up Saltonstall's smaller-than-usual margins in the towns.

DEFECTION BY THE INDEPENDENTS

What had happened? Obviously, a substantial number of people who normally support successful statewide Republican candidates did not vote for Saltonstall. But very few of the deserters were Repub-

licans. For purposes of analysis, it is safe to assume that President Nixon's 37 percent was the bedrock Republican vote. The President's total, with a 92.3 percent turnout, was 80,351; thus the projected bedrock GOP vote in the district is 87,054. The turnout in the September 30 election was 56 percent, and 56 percent of 87,054 is 48,750; but Saltonstall's total was 65,453. So even if it is true that partisans vote at a higher rate than independents in special elections, the figures indicate that very few committed Republicans defected.

What is clear is that many independents who normally vote Republican switched to the Democrat. Elliot Richardson's 54.6 percent in his hard-fought 1966 Attorney General's race was a typical Sixth District performance for a successful statewide Republican candidate; but Saltonstall's percentage fell far behind Richardson's in virtually all of the district's suburban middle class communities, where GOP registrations are not high, but where the margins for Republicans winning statewide elections have been substantial. Saltonstall failed to attract the large share of this suburban vote that Republican candidates must get in order to win elections in Massachusetts, or in the other major industrial states. The reasons for this failure seem obvious, at least in retrospect.

First, Saltonstall was on the wrong side (for this constituency) on too many issues — Vietnam, the ABM, the voting age reduction — and he spent a disproportionate amount of time discussing inflation and belt-tightening. Two of his most effective campaigners in the district, Senator Edward Brooke and Congressman Silvio Conte, were on the other side with him on the first three questions and did not make a major issue of fiscal integrity.

WHO NEEDS ENEMIES?

Second, there was the presidential albatross. Saltonstall's visit to Washington, the resultant publicity, Harrington's strategy, and Saltonstall's unwillingness to seek issues on which to stake out his independence from the President all combined to tie the GOP candidate to the coattails of the man who received 37 percent of the vote in the district in 1968. Third, Harrington's cerebral style — talking about change and emphasizing issues — was suited to suburban audiences, and particularly to young voters. Saltonstall was earthy, talked about continuing in the Bill Bates tradition, and emphasized service rather than issues.

Fourth, Harrington, a maverick, united Democrats of all stripes, the New Politics people outside the party structure, and hundreds of kids — an estimated 2,500 young volunteers participated in his campaign. But Saltonstall, a party regular, had to rely on an outdated party organization which did not defect but

- continued on page 26

Turned On in an Off Year

Kentuckians have the opportunity — or misfortune, depending on your point of view — to participate in the electoral process every year. This November's lineup includes races for state Auditor, the General Assembly, and numerous county and city offices.

As is usual in an off-year election, most voter interest is focused on locally important races for County Judge, Sheriff, Commonwealth Attorney, and the like. The 1969 election, however, also features a meaningful contest for the seemingly minor office of Auditor. The post would normally not be up for election until 1971, along with the other state offices, but a vacancy arose when the Auditor elected in 1967, Republican Clyde Conley, died earlier this year.

The position of Kentucky state Auditor is not widely sought after by ambitious young politicians; it offers none of the dramatic possibilities open to a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Attorney General. But in 1969, the contest for Auditor may serve as a bellwether for Republican fortunes in the 1970, 1971, and 1972 elections, because of the present posture of the Republican Party in Kentucky. The Governor and most officials elected statewide are Republicans; so are both U.S. Senators and three of the state's seven Congressmen; and Republicans control city or county governments in Kentucky's two largest urban areas. Democrats are trying to stage a comeback this year that will carry them back into the Statehouse in 1971 and into the Senate seat of retiring Republican John Sherman Cooper in 1972.

The 1969 election may determine whether the Republican Party will continue to grow in Kentucky, or whether the state will fall back into the lethargy of old-line Democratic domination. And 1969 may also reveal whether the GOP has really learned its lesson from the 1964 Goldwater disaster. Older, conservative Republicans would like nothing more than to see the party's rising young progressives defeated in 1969, so they can pick up the pieces; but if the many new moderates on the ballot can win this November, the

THE AUTHOR

Mr. Karnes, 24, the FORUM's Kentucky correspondent, is a native of Louisville and a graduate of the University of Kentucky. Now residing in Lexington (Kentucky), he is an agent and trainee for Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and a consultant with Interstate Development, Inc., a real estate development and urban planning firm.

outlook for responsible Republicanism in the most Republican of the Southern states will be greatly enhanced.

A STRANGE FEELING

The outlook for Republicans would be good this year, were it not for a strange and hard-to-define feeling among the voters. Republicans in state government and in the Louisville city administration have been forced to undertake unpopular but necessary programs to deal with the problems left by their Democratic predecessors. As a result, there is an anti-incumbent mood in the air that may spell danger for the GOP resurgence that has swept the state since 1964.

Republican James Thompson, who was appointed by Governor Louie Nunn to succeed Conley temporarily as Auditor, is seeking election in his own right this November. A wealthy young insurance executive with a progressive outlook, Thompson has sought public office only once before, and then unsuccessfully. In 1966, he challenged M. Gene Snyder for the GOP congressional nomination in Louisville's suburban 4th District. Snyder won the primary, and went on to become the most conservative member of the Kentucky congressional delegation.

Thompson, who was appointed by Nunn partly to bridge the traditional gap between urban and downstate Republicans, faces a close contest against grandmotherly Democrat Mary Louise Frost. The Republican candidate was slow to get his campaign organization into high gear, and he is further burdened by the unpopularity of Governor Nunn.

While Nunn can point to several substantial accomplishments since 1967, he has failed to sell his program to Kentuckians. He promised no new taxes during his 1967 campaign, but then had to raise them once he became aware of the serious financial problems bequeathed to him by the previous Democratic administrations. Furthermore, while Kentuckians like their political leaders to stay close to the people, Nunn has not taken to the stump in the old Kentucky tradition to explain his program and confront his Democratic critics. Because of this communications gap between the voters and the state government, Thompson and other Republicans may face a difficult time in November.

FEARING LARGE LOSSES

The GOP now has its largest legislative delegation in Frankfort since the Republican era of Governor Edwin Morrow in the 1920's. Forty-three of the 100

members of the House are Republicans, and 14 GOP Senators sit in the 38-member Senate. Republicans fear substantial losses in the House, and some setbacks in the Senate. Should the Democrats re-establish two-thirds majorities in both houses, they could effectively tie the Governor's hands on many matters.

Republicans have controlled the city and county governments in Louisville, the state's largest urban area, since the 1961 Republican sweep led by William Cowger as Mayor and Marlow Cook as County Judge. Cowger was elected to Congress from the 3rd District in 1966, a year after Cook's landslide re-election; and in 1968, Cook succeeded Thruston B. Morton as a U.S. Senator.

The present Republican Mayor of Louisville is Kenneth A. Schmied, a businessman who is a creditable administrator but an undramatic and colorless politician. During Schmied's tenure, city government has been efficient, but not as innovative as it was during Mayor Cowger's four years in City Hall. The GOP's position in the city seems to have declined under Schmied, especially on the Board of Aldermen. In 1965, the Republicans controlled all 12 wards; today, only one Republican sits on the board.

To succeed Schmied, who cannot seek another term, the GOP chose John P. Sawyer, a businessman and city planner. Sawyer is a political unknown, but his early campaign efforts marked him as a progressive in the Cowger-Cook tradition. The 46-year-old Sawyer has strong Democratic opposition in November from machine stalwart Frank W. Burke, a Congressman during the 1950's. Burke asserts that the Republicans have not offered the leadership the city needs, but his personality is even less colorful than Schmied's. Wounds are still visible from last May's Democratic city primary, which saw Burke defeat a young, liberal State Senator, Romano Mazzoli, and another machine Democrat. Republican Sawyer will need votes from Mazzoli's Democratic supporters in order to win in November.

Republican hopes in the County Judge's race were struck a cruel blow this fall, when E. P. Sawyer, who had been appointed by the Governor to serve out Marlow Cook's unexpired term, was killed in an auto accident. Armin Willig, who succeeded Sawyer as County Judge and as the Republican candidate for a full term, has made a good first impression, but he is hardly better known than his Democratic opponent, young liberal Todd Hollenbach.

BLUE GRASS GOP HOPEFUL

Unlike Louisville's, the city elections in Lexington, the state's second largest city, are non-partisan. But the county races feature a determined battle between Republicans and the entrenched Democratic machine. The only Republican now in the county courthouse is young attorney Joe Johnson, the Fayette

County Judge. Even though all the other county officials elected in 1965 were hostile Democrats, Johnson has been able to reorganize county government and establish himself as the most popular political figure in Fayette County. His exploits against corruption and the old guard have won him a statewide following that may indicate a run for Governor in 1971.

Lexington, located in the heart of the Blue Grass country, is the 14th fastest-growing urban area in the nation. The influx of young professionals and of academics drawn to the University of Kentucky and Transylvania College has enabled the Republicans to carry Fayette County by large margins in every election since 1966.

Johnson is a product of the new growth in the Lexington area. After being reared in the mountains of eastern Kentucky, he attended law school at the University of Kentucky, and then remained in the city to practice. He was elected to the state House of Representatives in 1963 from a district in the northern suburbs, and in 1965, he won the office of County Judge.

In order to complete his clean-up of county government, Johnson has assembled a progressive young ticket for other offices, including the Board of County Commissioners, and has drawn a variety of young professionals and intellectuals into his campaign to advise him on issues and strategy. His efforts to draw blacks into the GOP have yielded one tangible result in the City Council candidacy of real estate salesman Bob Finn.

Democrats in Fayette County are divided between the old machine faction and the new liberals, who come mainly from the University. Johnson has quiet backing from the liberals because of his efforts to break the back of the oligarchy which still attempts to rule the city of Lexington.

CANVASSING ALONG DIXIE HIGHWAY

In Covington, an Ohio River town of 60,000, members of the City Council are elected on a non-partisan basis, but known Republicans rarely succeed. In 1967, however, residents of the Democratic stronghold elected 24-year-old Republican Ronald B. Turner to the council by a huge margin. Turner and his Young Republican associates combined with young, liberal Democrats to form a McCarthy-style children's crusade. Young people were everywhere, working for Turner — downtown in the shopping and business districts, along busy Dixie Highway in suburban shopping centers, and in the streets of the German and Irish communities, talking up the new candidate who wanted to clean up city government.

Turner's record in office has been distinguished; he has fought against the special interests and for a new approach to saving Covington from stagnation. The voters choose a new council this November, and

Turner appears to be a safe bet for re-election, although the old-line Democrats would like to see him silenced. Should he be re-elected in November, Turner will probably seek the Mayor's office in 1971. He could become the youngest mayor in the history of Kentucky.

Meanwhile, the state's 1970 congressional races are already heating up. The Democrats are planning a special effort to regain the 3rd District from William Cowger, who took it away from them in 1966. Cowger's margin in 1968 against a weak Democrat was considerably less than his 1966 plurality. Should Democrat Romano Mazzoli oppose Cowger in 1970, the GOP could conceivably lose this seat. Cowger may also face primary opposition from conservatives and the old Republican city-county organization; his support of insurgent William T. Warner in Louisville's May, 1969, mayoral primary did not set well with Mayor Schmied and other party veterans.

The race in the 6th District (Lexington) will probably be even more heated. Liberal Democrats are expected to back Gene Mason, a University of Kentucky political science professor, in an attempt to unseat conservative Representative John C. Watts. And the Republicans will probably have a three-way primary between Russell Mobley of Lexington, the ultra-conservative 1968 nominee who ran a poor race against Watts; Versailles farmer and stockbroker Hill Maury, member of an old Blue Grass family; and moderate Larry Hopkins, a Lexington investment counselor now running for Fayette County Commissioner. Hopkins, 33, has attracted considerable attention in Lexington by winning a heated primary in May and by making innovations in the County Clerk's office, to which he was appointed by County Judge Joe Johnson after the death of the incumbent Democrat. Hopkins opened voter registration offices in black areas of Lexington for the first time, thus winning many friends in the black community.

The 1971 Governor's race will develop openly after the 1970 General Assembly session is concluded next March. Should Senator John Sherman Cooper decide not to seek the office, Governor Nunn — who cannot succeed himself — is expected to support state Highway Commissioner Eugene C. Goss of Harlan County. Other possible candidates include U.S. Representative Tim Lee Carter of the 5th District (southern Kentucky), State Representative Gene Huff of Laurel County, and Fayette County's Judge Johnson. Maneuvering for the GOP nomination will begin in earnest once Nunn has made his choice, with several anti-Nunn candidates expected to emerge before the May, 1971, primary.

Democrats mentioned as gubernatorial possibilities include Lieutenant Governor Wendell Ford of Owensboro, U.S. Circuit Judge (and former Gover-

nor) Bert T. Combs of Lexington, Shelbyville attorney Robert Matthews, Attorney General John Breckenridge of Lexington, Superintendent of Public Instruction Wendell Butler, and state Treasurer Thelma Stovall of Louisville.

LOOKING FURTHER AHEAD

Further in the future, Republican contenders for the 1972 Senate race include all three GOP Congressmen, Judge Johnson, Governor Nunn, and State Representative Don Ball of Lexington, a brilliant young moderate who served as GOP floor leader in 1968. Democratic choices appear limited to former Governor Edward T. Breathitt and former state Commerce Commissioner Katherine Peden, both of Hopkinsville. Miss Peden lost to Marlow Cook in the 1968 Senate contest.

Kentucky Republicans seem to have a wide advantage over the Democrats in the number of attractive new candidates waiting in the wings. But the future of the GOP in the next several elections may well depend on what happens to James Thompson, John Sawyer, Joe Johnson, Richard Turner, and other progressive Republicans in November of 1969.

—ERIC KARNES

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369. Title 39. United States Code)

1. Date of Filing: October 1, 1969.
2. Title of Publication: The Ripon FORUM.
3. Frequency of Issue: Monthly.
4. Location of Known Office of Publication: 14a Eliot Street, Cambridge Massachusetts 02138.
5. Location of the Headquarters of General Business Offices of the Publishers (not printers): 14a Eliot Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.
6. Names and Addresses of Publisher and Editor:
Publisher: Clair Warren Rodgers, Jr.
Editor: Michael S. Lottman
Managing Editor: Evelyn F. Ellis
7. The Owner is: The Ripon Society, Inc., 14a Eliot Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Stockholders owning or holding 1% or more of total amount of stock: None.
8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1% or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities: None.
9. For completion by non-profit organizations authorized to mail at special rates: Not applicable.
10. Circulation:

	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months.	Actual No. of Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date.
A. Total No. Copies Printed (Net Press Run)	3,750	3,700
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales	297	174
2. Mail Subscriptions.	2,270	2,557
C. Total Paid Circulation.	2,567	2,731
D. Free Distribution (including samples) by mail, carrier or other means.	830	492
E. Total Distribution (Sum of C and D).	3,397	3,223
F. Office use, Left-over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing.	353	477
G. Total (sum of E & F—should equal net press run shown in A)	3,750	3,700

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.
Clair Warren Rodgers, Jr., Publisher.

HAWAII: of fighting, Fong, and finance

Hawaii Democrats are already fighting among themselves over the 1970 gubernatorial nomination. It appears almost certain that a primary battle will occur between incumbent Governor John A. Burns and maverick liberal Tom Gill, the present Lieutenant Governor.

The GOP plans to run D. Hebden Porteus, a State Senator with great popularity among party regulars. Porteus is 58 years old, handsome and intelligent, and has been a member of the legislature for 30 years. His only drawback seems to be a lack of exposure; the 1970 race will be his first try for statewide office.

Porteus may yet find himself in the middle of a three-man primary race, between liberal Judge Samuel P. King and conservative Richard Boone, former star of TV's "Have Gun, Will Travel."

As for the 1970 Senate contest, Republican incumbent Hiram Fong is riding high, and the Democrats will have a tough time finding a good and willing opponent. There is talk that U.S. Representative Patsy Mink would like to make the effort, but is having difficulty raising the necessary capital.

If Mrs. Mink decides to keep her seat in the House, she and fellow Democrat Spark Matsunaga will make a formidable twosome. The Hawaii GOP, unable to finance long-shot contenders for these seats, may virtually concede them to the incumbents.

Saxbe - From page 8

arousing any significant portion of the electorate. His campaign slogan — "At a time like this, it should be Saxbe" — did not answer the question "Why?" His speaking manner was reserved, both by nature and by choice. While his opponent tried to picture himself as a crusader, Saxbe preferred to come on as a less controversial, more reflective, man of reason.

But Saxbe can no longer remain non-controversial and also true to his progressive beliefs. Even though his actions may gain wide support among moderates in Ohio, rightists will become increasingly upset. The right wing in Ohio is having visions of grandeur. It would like to make a frontal assault on the entire Republican organization, but it is more likely to settle for sideline sniping at progressive office-holders. Those close to Saxbe expect that such criticism, if it comes, will only make him more outspoken. If so, the squire from Mechanicsburg will become an even more refreshing Senator.

—TERRY A. BARNETT

Saltonstall - From page 22


which simply could not win the election for him. Of the 180 members of the Lynn Republican City Committee, for example, only five volunteered for the vital election day effort.

It all comes down to this: the Republican Party in Massachusetts (as in New York) is in danger of not being able to nominate candidates — particularly local candidates — with the broad appeal necessary to win elections. The GOP needs to broaden its base — ethnically, ideologically, and geographically — even if this means financing and supporting men who are reluctant partisans, who do not represent the mainstream of party regulars, and who could be threatened by an organization candidate in the primary.

Another lesson of the Saltonstall defeat is that Nixonism is not a winning course in Massachusetts. Unless matters change dramatically, few Republican candidates will succeed in Massachusetts unless they demonstrate their willingness to be independent of the national Administration.

Finally, little has been done to change the face of the party at the local level. A lack of organization is not fatal with glamorous, well publicized statewide Republican candidates running against nominees of the old Democratic organization; but when the lineup is reversed, as in the Saltonstall-Harrington campaign, the GOP is unable to win elections in precisely those areas — the suburban communities — which have always been the most fertile grounds for Republican gains.

— MARTIN A. LINSKY



14a ELIOT STREET

• The October 11 issue of **Business Week** carried an article entitled "Nixon: Past, Present and Future," which analyzed the President's actions since the election in terms of the books by **Theodore H. White**, **Kevin Phillips**, and the **Ripon Society**. The article emphasized Ripon's belief that any Republican "wooing of the South" (Phillips' Southern strategy) would cause "irreparable political harm . . . to Republican interests in the Northeast and, in the long run, across the nation."

• The Cambridge chapter has begun the school year with a big membership drive. Recruiting efforts have been made at the Harvard law and business schools, and at MIT. The October 1 meeting of the chapter, attended by more than 50 people, featured **John Price**, former Chairman of the Board of the Ripon Society and currently counsel to **Daniel Patrick Moynihan's** Urban Affairs Council. Price outlined the Administration's new welfare proposal, and told how it was formulated. The Cambridge group is planning several projects for this year, including an investigation of the Justice Department's actions (particularly on narcotics laws, civil liberties, and civil rights); campaign work for **Lester Ralph**, running for mayor of Somerville; development of proposals for Governor **Francis W. Sargent's** 1970 legislative program; and advance planning for two 1970 congressional candidates.

• In Dallas, the group recently held a reception, with **Arthur Fletcher**, Assistant Secretary of Labor, and **Charles Green** of HEW as guest speakers.

• Ripon's new Hartford chapter has been particularly active. The group has worked with the **Rev. Robert Goodwin**, teacher and founder of Hartford's Center for Human Development, to establish training projects for day care workers. On October 6, the chapter held a meeting to discuss a series of recommendations entitled "Proposed Measures Concerning Justice and Order," drawn up by the group's vice-president, attorney **Robert**

Smith. Smith participated in a panel discussion with **Collin Bennett**, Republican candidate for re-election to the Hartford City Council, **Goodwin**, and **Benjamin Goldstein**, Hartford police official now associated with the Travelers Research Center. Hartford members also conducted a poll of voter opinion on the greatest problems facing the city. Among other things, respondents felt that maintaining order was the No. 1 concern, and that the city, not the neighborhood, should be the controlling force in school management.

• The Philadelphia chapter held an Input/Output session on housing with guest panelists **Charles Orlebeke**, Executive Assistant to HUD Secretary **George Romney**; **Kenneth Hawthorne**, Executive Director of Governor **Raymond P. Shafer's** new cabinet-level Urban Affairs Council; **Paul Weinberg**, Deputy Development Coordinator of the City of Philadelphia; **Ira Harkevych**, student leader of a housing sit-in demonstration at the University of Pennsylvania; **Dr. Paul Niebanck**, Chairman of the Department of City Planning at the University; and **Jay Silber**, a TV reporter who has investigated the housing situation. By having both local and federal groups represented, the chapter hopes to improve communications between Philadelphia and Washington.

• Ripon member and FORUM correspondent **Donato Andre D'Andrea** has been elected to the school committee in largely Democratic Newport, Rhode Island, running strongest in the city's most heavily Democratic precinct. At age 25, D'Andrea is perhaps the youngest person ever to serve on the school committee.

• Former FORUM editor **Doug Matthews** is now in the employ of the NET network. He urges all his former fans to watch "The Advocates" every Sunday night at 10 o'clock. Doug will continue to serve the FORUM in an advisory capacity and still retains a mail box at 14a Eliot (as well as a place in our hearts).

LETTERS

WOULD YOU BELIEVE . . .

Dear Sir:

Would your readers believe an article in the inside front cover of a Ripon FORUM reading:

"Everybody knows about the prestigious oil percentage depletion program, but fewer know that it is in very serious danger of financial asphyxiation. John Doe, Ripon official and former president of Stateside Oil, tells the dispiriting tale."

Yet this is word for word from the July FORUM except for the substitution of "oil percentage depletion" for "Fulbright-Hays fellowship," "John Doe" for "Frank Samuel," "official" for "secretary," and "president of Stateside Oil" for "Fulbright."

What is the difference? Both programs are special interest subsidies defended on the grounds of "national interest" but the one benefits "them," the other "us".

Self-righteousness is never so smug as when it is harnessed to self-interest.

Milton Friedman
Department of Economics
University of Chicago
Chicago, Ill.

P.S. I am a former Fulbright grantee myself.

NOT JUST THE MIDDLE

This letter concerns Mr. Kevin Phillips' controversial treatise on building a Republican coalition along the lines of Richard M. Nixon's supposed "Southern strategy" and "the silent middle." Whether Richard Nixon did use a "Southern strategy" or not, and whether he is planning to create a Republican Party of the "silent middle," I cannot say. I wasn't there. But Mr. Kevin Phillips says he would like to; hence I can answer him, at least.

In his analysis of where Republican votes can be gathered, I see no mention of whether we should do so,

only of whether we can. On the principle of one vote counts the same as another, to distinguish "should" from "can" might seem idealistic folly. But I think not.

The Republican Party, I believe, should try to build a coalition of all those whose legitimate desires as citizens were not realized under the Democratic administration. It seems practically desirable, as well, that the "out" party should seek to bring together all the discontented, not just some. The "silent middle" constitutes only one segment of the discontented in our society. What about blacks, Spanish-speaking, and young idealists? What about men displaced by coal companies in Appalachia? What about police, frustrated and looked down upon?

I cannot understand why only a Kennedy, among established politicians, can get worked up by the plight of the darker-skinned and the Mexican-American poor; or why only a Gene McCarthy and an Allard Lowenstein can speak for those of our generation whom we call radicals, who dare, who aspire to better things. The only explanation seems that the American political structure of men cares only for self-advancement and security, cares to rest only on the most accepted, most existent modes of doing things. Can't we see that those established modes, the bureaucratism-industrialism of the Democratic Era (1945-68) are the thing to be changed?

I think the Republican Party would be irresponsible to deliver itself only to restructuring our system. That's only part of the task. The task is to bring back into contentment those who have been left out, but also not to discontent those who have been taken care of. I see nothing in Mr. Phillips' purely statistical analysis that takes into account these human needs and goals, without which we would not have a politics, for men to seek fortune and fame in.

J. Michael Freedberg
Chairman
Ward 11 Republican Committee
Jamaica Plain, Mass.

