

# RIPON FORUM

AUGUST, 1971


VOL. VII, No. 9

ONE DOLLAR

## A Guide to the Democrats

- The Candidates
- The Convention
- The Primaries
- The Winning Strategy

*by Clifford Brown*



### ALSO THIS MONTH:

#### **The Economics of the Nixon Doctrine**

*Robert E. Hunter*

#### **Convert the Converted**

*Robert D. Bebn*

#### **A Weapon in the War on Crime**

*Lyndon A. S. Wilson*

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## THE ECONOMICS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE

Robert E. Hunter writes that foreign policy may soon turn less on matters of missiles, military hardware and other concerns of statesmen and more on the art of commerce. Economics, once the "weak sister" of American foreign policy, is now taking its place along side of military science and diplomacy. The Nixon administration has done much to recognize the changing conditions in international relations, end U.S. preoccupation with armaments, and make policy innovations in the areas of aid and trade. —7

## A GUIDE TO THE DEMOCRATS

Whether for reasons of education, strategy or just general interest, it might be a good idea to examine the strengths and weaknesses of President Nixon's probable opponent in 1972. This "Guide to the Democrats" will be in two parts; next month, the dark horses. This month, Clifford Brown takes the convention mathematics, the primaries and the three strongest contenders — and devises winning strategies for them —9

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## 14A ELIOT STREET

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# EDITORIAL

Progressive Republicans often display a severe ambivalence toward the Nixon administration. We say Nixon is "potentially the best and most constructive President in recent decades" and we mean it; but we strongly criticize his Administration for some of its actions and for a strategy that corrupts his higher aims — and compromises his own and his party's electoral prospects.

The conflict between the Administration's policy and its politics — between often exemplary nominal purposes and sometimes disabling electoral designs — is epitomized by the President's performance in international economic affairs, discussed in part by Robert Hunter in this issue.

On the positive side, the President has reshaped the White House foreign policy apparatus to give international economic policy the key role it deserves. By establishing a White House Council on International Economic Affairs with status equivalent to the National Security Council, Nixon has institutionally acknowledged, as his predecessors failed to do, that in most countries around the world our economic policy has a much greater impact than our diplomatic or military presence. In addition, he has appointed to key Administration positions in this realm men of extraordinary competence and vision. Pete Peterson, head of the International Economic Affairs Council, is a committed free trader with a fine record in an industry that has long competed effectively in international markets. Lewis Gilbert, the President's Special Trade Negotiator, was a principal contributor to an excellent study of U.S. trade policy by a commission appointed and ignored during the final years of the Johnson administration.

Administration policies have also been commendable. One of the greatest anomalies in U.S. trade policy has long been the maintenance of our highest protectionist barriers against the exports and potential exports of the poorest regions. The Nixon administration, however, has now laudably joined the other industrial countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in their call for universal trade preferences for the products of the less developed countries. This new U.S. policy, little noted in the press, promises ultimate benefits to the Third World and to U.S. relations with it far exceeding the contributions of our diminishing foreign aid and our embattled Peace Corps.

Other laudable policies include the untying and multilateralization of foreign aid, the relaxation of restrictions on trade with China, and the retrenchment of controls on private investment

overseas. And Secretary of State Rogers' recent appeal for a new conference on international commercial policy, to prevent eruption of a trade war, displayed the kind of leadership long absent in U.S. international economic policy.

And yet . . . all these potential gains, which together project a grand design of Administration leadership in a realm of growing importance in world history, are jeopardized by an unpromising domestic political strategy, embodied in a commitment to a declining Southern industry and to a South Carolina politician whose time has passed. Directly athwart the new presidential designs stands the deal on textiles made with Strom Thurmond for help at the convention in 1968. And further limiting the President's flexibility is the appointment of John Connally, made in hope of political benefit in 1972.

The tragic fact is that the commitment to protect the domestic textile market cannot be reconciled with a commitment to give meaningful preferences to Third World exports. For textiles are *the* chief manufactured product of the developing countries, accounting for about a third of all their manufactures and over 40 percent of their manufactures privately produced. It is a political fact, moreover, that textile quotas cannot be enacted alone by the Congress. Presidential support for one politically preferred industry makes it difficult for Congressmen to explain failure to indulge their own politically preferred business. The result may be collapse of a domestic stance consistent with Secretary Rogers' appeals for new international negotiations.

The Connally problem is similar. It is difficult to maintain a position of enlightened international economic leadership while acclaiming as our chief financial spokesman a man who knows little of international economics and speaks in the "dog-eat-dog" idiom of old fashioned mercantilism.

So the Nixon administration finds itself once again in a difficult dilemma. As on welfare reform and other key proposals, it must decide between its right wing political strategies and its ambition to offer the nation the leadership demanded by our historic predicament — and by its own historic vision.

We, of course, believe that the dilemma is essentially false — that by meeting the historic test the Administration can best assure its reelection. But until the President clearly sees and acts upon this reality, progressive Republicans will withhold full support from his Administration. And the McCloskey campaign will beckon irresistibly to some.

# Political Notes

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## THE SENATE: Saxbe on Pakistan

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In a statement to the FORUM Senator William Saxbe described the policy of Pakistan's President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan in East Pakistan as "the most brutal and deliberate genocide since Adolph Hitler."

Saxbe called on the U.S. to halt all assistance to Pakistan "until distribution of food and other relief measures, supervised by international agencies, takes place on a regular basis throughout East Pakistan," and "until the majority of [East Pakistani] refugees in India are repatriated."

These terms correspond to the requirements of an Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act introduced in June by Senator Saxbe and Frank Church (D-Idaho), which had 31 co-sponsors when we went to press.

Stressing the danger of famine, the Ohio Senator said he had been told by "high government sources" that by October "there will be a shortfall of three and a half million tons of feed grain." Even if Yahya would allow delivery of that much food, at present no organization exists in East Pakistan capable of distributing it, Saxbe said.

The Senator concluded: "I sincerely hope that we can dissuade President Yahya from his present course, or as an alternative, help change the course ... of continued [American] commitment to the Yahya regime's reign of terror."

The Saxbe-Church Amendment has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and is expected to come up for a vote in September. Resolutions condemning Yahya's policy and urging an aid cut-off have been introduced by Senators Case and Mondale, by Senator Mathias, and by Congressman F. Bradford Morse (R-Mass).

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## THE MAYORS: candidate display

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The National Conference of Mayors in Philadelphia last month also became a national display of Presidential hopefuls.

Applying soporifics to a nodding group of municipal leaders were Senators Hubert Humphrey, Edmund Muskie and Birch Bayh; and conspicuously in attendance, despite his budgetary crisis in New York, was Mayor John Lindsay, whose political prospects continue to glow fitfully through a dark cloud.

Recent reports, for those who are still listening, indicate that the mayor is negotiating with New York Democrats in preparation for his resignation as mayor and announcement as a Democratic presidential candidate. In Philadelphia he was a frequent and effective voice for a Vietnam withdrawal resolution ultimately adopted by the meeting.

In any case, it is safe to say that none of the current Presidential aspirants captured any new supporters with their addresses at the conference, although some of the mayors filmed by the CBS local affiliate

during the Muskie speech seemed to be having pleasant dreams.

Muskie explained his new revenue sharing proposal, which greatly increases the share of the money assigned to the cities, and irritated some mayors with premature thanks for their support for the plan. The only new Muskie backer evident was Cleveland's suave and ambitious lame duck, Mayor Carl Stokes, who may be expected to emerge at some point as leader of a Mayors for Muskie Committee.

Sad commentary on the GOP in the cities was the small number of Republicans present. Although a number of smaller cities have Republican mayors, the only "big city" Republican besides "independently" elected Lindsay is Richard Lugar — now President of the National League of Cities — a post he snatched away from an inattentive Lindsay two years ago.

While retaining an image of independence, Lugar has done an astute job of representing the Administration on urban matters. Selecting his issues carefully he has recently made points with the White House and on the Hill by his testimony on Government Reorganization and Revenue Sharing, easily managing the questions of both Chairman Wilbur Mills of Ways and Means and John L. McClelland of Government Operations. In a question and answer Committee session Lugar's wit and intelligence take him beyond his usual Nixon-like speechmaking style.

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## MAINE: up against an institution

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The only thing definite about the 1972 Maine elections is that a newcomer will play a significant role. Multimillionaire Robert A.G. Monks, 37, promises to treat Maine residents to a "Madison Avenue" type campaign — perhaps for the U.S. Senate.

But Monks has numerous problems to overcome if he is to be elected to the Senate. Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith has insisted that she will seek reelection. Party regulars don't like bitter primaries. The Democratic benefactor in this case will probably be popular second district Congressman William D. Hathaway. Hathaway surpassed Muskie's percentage in the 1970 election and would be a formidable opponent.

Monks, if he enters the primary, will be trying to defeat what some Maine people claim is an institution — and who at least rates as a genuine folk-hero. Mrs. Smith has held the Senate seat since 1948 and has averaged over 59 percent of the vote in four general elections. She spent less than \$5000 in her 1966 campaign.

Some Republicans feel that Monks made a costly mistake when he donated \$2500 to Hathaway's 1968 Congressional campaign. While Monks claims that amends have been made, Denny Shute, a Republican moderate who opposed Hathaway that year is still in the red from his campaign expenditures.

Another problem hindering Monks is the belief that he is a carpetbagger, and an intellectual at that. Monks graduated from Harvard Law School, was a member of a Boston law firm from 1958-66 and has seldom lived in Maine full-time. Even with unlimited financial resources, it is doubtful if he can convince Maine Republicans to retire Senator Smith.

As a possible compromise, Monks might run for a congressional seat. He would most likely face incumbent Democrat Peter Kyros. But Monks prefers the Senate and seems unwilling to wait for the possibility of a vacant Muskie seat or Mrs. Smith for reasons of health being unable to serve a full six years.

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## MARYLAND: the man for '74

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Maryland Republicans may already have the man to run for governor in 1974. He is Joseph Alton, chief executive of Anne Arundel County, south of Baltimore, who was passed over when he sought the chance to oppose incumbent Governor Marvin Mandel last year.

Alton's chances for the GOP nomination improved greatly in the wake of William O. Mills' victory for the First District Congressional seat vacated by Rogers C.B. Morton when he became Secretary of Interior. It is Alton who is being credited with engineering Mills' 2,500 upset in Anne Arundel county, sealing his 31,165 to 27,234 victory over State Senator Elroy G. Boyer. Boyer had the strong support of both Governor Mandel and Lt. Governor Blair Lee, III. The State House is in Alton's county.

Alton's work led some to recall that he contacted party leaders over two years ago and asked for an opportunity to take on Mandel. Alton's efforts were halted abruptly when Vice President Agnew refused to give his sanction and other party leaders declined to wrangle with the Vice President. Instead of Alton, Agnew chose C. Stanley Blair, his administrative assistant, to oppose Mandel, who had been chosen governor by the Maryland General Assembly after Agnew resigned. Mandel won an overwhelming victory and helped elect Democrat Congressman Goodloe Byron to a House seat the Republicans had held for ten years.

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## CONNECTICUT: last resort

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Last November, Connecticut voters approved a referendum in favor of annual sessions of the state legislature instead of the traditional biennial sessions. As if in answer to that vote, in 1971 the General Assembly may have set a record for unachievement and inefficiency. Lost were such progressive measures as "no-fault" auto insurance, a far-reaching consumer credit code, a number of human rights bills, a low-cost housing program, a presidential primary bill and election law reform. A strong code of ethics for all three branches of government and a bill establishing a powerful state Department of the Environment did pass — as did a dubious legalized gambling package.

At the end of five months, the two major problems — adoption of a budget and state reapportionment — were still left unresolved. Reapportionment was shunted off to a special panel which must report in October, while controversy over new taxes still rages.

The fiscal crisis caused a bitter battle between the Democratic-controlled General Assembly and Republican Governor Thomas Meskill. The \$250 million operating deficit for the 1969-71 biennium (racked up by former Democratic Governor John Dempsey) made

new taxes inevitable. But neither party wanted to take the blame for initiating a state income tax. After two weeks of secret negotiations between Meskill and legislative leaders, a Democratic tax package was passed and vetoed by the governor. Further discussions finally produced a hodgepodge compromise which included almost every conceivable means for avoiding an income tax: a 6 percent sales tax, a 10 percent tax on capital gains and dividends, commuter taxes, luxury taxes, and an array of other taxes already in effect.

Not surprisingly, the compromise package produced a stream of public protest and a new onslaught of lobbying activity at the State Capitol.

The House became embroiled in the tax controversy when the Assistant Majority Leader, John Papandrea, decided to oppose the luxury tax. (Connecticut has a strong jewelers lobby.) Some 13 amendments were then added before the bill was passed. The House rebellion spawned rebellion in the Senate. A group of nine Democrats and nine Republicans, led by Republican Roger Eddy and Democrat Luis Cutillo, pushed through an amendment replacing the entire tax package with a graduated income tax. A 21-21 victory in the Senate was quickly followed by approval in the House (with the support of Republican Minority Leader Francis Collins and the new Republican state chairman J. Brian Gaffney). Meskill allowed the bill to pass into law without his signature as a "last resort."

But the end's not in sight. The income tax bill, hard on middle-income families, inspired a genuine taxpayers revolt. Legislators who had voted for it hastened to attack it. So the General Assembly will again reconvene the first week in August, probably to repeal the income tax. Meskill is now asking for a 7½ percent sales tax.

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## NEW YORK: still standing

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The 1971 New York City Budgetary Charade, starring Nelson Rockefeller and John Lindsay, closed last month after a record-long Broadway (location of City Hall) and off-Broadway (Albany, the capital) run of seven months.

The morning after the new budget (which was almost \$60 million less than the Mayor's original "survival" budget) was passed, not even the most naive New Yorker was surprised upon waking to find that the City was in fact still standing. All of the Mayor's threats — that hospitals would close, that 90,000 city employees would be dismissed, that there would be no freshman class at City University — and the City Council's vows to eliminate line-by-line "every ounce of fat" proved to be empty words. But then again, by asking for an inordinate amount, and skillful theatrics, the Mayor got pretty much what he wanted.

As a reflection of their feeling that the Lindsay administration is "inept" and that local governments in general are no longer capable (if they ever were) of effective governmental problem-solving, the Albany forces have further encroached upon the City's principle of "home-rule." The State Legislature, with the Governor's approval, has created a special commission with vast powers to investigate the governmental operations of New York, and has put the traditionally in-

dependent City Housing and Health Departments under State jurisdiction. In addition, the state took title to arterial highways within the city. A commission appointed by Rockefeller during his reelection campaign and headed by former Mayor and Ambassador to Spain Robert F. Wagner is due to present suggestions soon for the clarification of the home-rule principle.

This conflict between Albany and New York City is personified by the increasingly bitter and increasingly public personal feud between Mayor Lindsay and Governor Rockefeller. The latest incident occurred when the Governor wrote the Mayor, warning him not to try the same old budgetary tricks again next year. The Mayor replied — in a letter that was released to the public before Rockefeller had a chance to receive it — that the Governor shouldn't be the one to talk about governmental efficiency, in view of the mismanaged Albany Mall construction project which will gobble up about \$1.5 billion.

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## VIRGINIA: post Holton preview

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In addition to electing the entire state legislature this November Virginia voters will choose a lieutenant governor to replace Democrat J. Sargent Reynolds who died earlier this year. Republican and Democratic conventions will select the parties' official nominees — the GOP convention is August 20, the Democratic gathering a week earlier.

The leading Republican contender is State Representative George P. Shafran, a moderate from the D.C. suburbs. Republican Governor Linwood Holton would undoubtedly like to have Shafran join him in the State House, but Holton probably will take no active part in the campaign. Another GOP possibility is State Representative George Mason Green, less progressive and more closely aligned with the Byrd-Broyhill forces.

The Democrat who wants the job most — State Senator Henry Howell — is too liberal to get the approval of the Virginia Democratic regulars. Howell is threatening to run as an Independent. The Democrats will probably nominate someone from the General Assembly — a ruling by Democratic Attorney General Andy Miller permits state legislators to run simultaneously for their seat and for the lieutenant-governorship. (The ruling favors the vastly outnumbered Republican legislators, who hold only seven state senate and 24 state house seats.) Miller, it seems, might like to see a low-key Democratic candidate — since he plans to be the Democratic nominee for governor in 1973.

Apparently Shafran, who might like to step into Holton's shoes in 1973, has a real chance of winning, especially with Howell in the race. The GOP could also change the arithmetic in the state senate. At least a quarter of the incumbent Democrats are retiring, giving the GOP a chance to more than double its state senate delegation.

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## ALASKA: third time around?

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There has been a great flurry of activity in Alaskan political circles since the November elections. U.S. Senator Ted Stevens, the leading statewide

votegetter with almost 60 percent of the total, was the only major GOP winner. Incumbent Governor Keith Miller was turned out of office by former two-term Governor Bill Egan. The Congressional seat turned Democratic, with Nick Begich running about 4,000 votes behind Stevens and garnering about 55 percent of the vote.

Shortly after the election, former Governor Wally Hickel was ousted with great fanfare from the Nixon Cabinet. Alaskans took much pride in one of their own being high-up in the Administration, although Hickel had stepped on many toes back home and had done little to assist construction of the proposed trans-Alaska oil pipeline.

The delay in granting the pipeline permit (to run from the oil-rich North Slope over 800 miles to Valdez) has hurt the Nixon Administration. Almost any national Democrat would have a better than even chance of prevailing over Nixon, but Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson of nearby Washington would be the strongest candidate.

With Hickel still nursing a grudge against the White House, and still a political powerhouse in Alaska, he could have created great difficulties for the President if Governor Egan had not vetoed a presidential primary bill, introduced by Democratic State Senator Joe Josephson, which set the election for February 29 — first in the nation. As of now, it remains unclear whether Nixon can win the state for a third time.

There are a host of younger Republican politicians on the way up in Alaska politics. State Senator Terry Miller, the liberal Majority Leader, who is seen by some as a cross between Machiavelli and Talleyrand, looks longingly at Begich's solo seat in Congress. He is probably the most viable contender other than former Congressman Howard Pollock. State Senators Cliff Groh, Ron Rettig, Lowell Thomas, Jr. and Jay Hammond, the Senate President, all are possibilities for statewide races in 1972, as are State Representatives Mike Colletta and Dick Randolph.

The popular Thomas, however, likely will wait for 1974 and go either for Governor or for Senator Mike Gravel's seat, depending on Hickel's moves. State Senator C. R. Lewis, a Bircher, is a conservative threat in the Republican scheme, and it is possible he could challenge Stevens, thereby making the incumbent look more liberal than he is in reality.

The State Legislature went from a 22-18 Democratic edge in the House and 11-9 Republican majority in the Senate to a 31-9 Democratic lead in the House and 10-10 split in the Senate. Republicans controlled the Senate, however, by electing Hammond as President and Miller as Majority Leader.

The Legislature lists a host of Democratic candidates for statewide office in either 1972 or 1974. Stevens, filling out the last two years of the late Bob Bartlett's term, will be running again in 1972, probably with no open opposition from his own party.

But there is no end in sight of possible Democratic challengers, most of them legislators and some of them formidable. Governor Egan, Lieutenant Governor "Red" Boucher, Congressman Begich, Speaker of the House Gene Guess, Senate Minority Leader Josephson (loser in the 1970 primary for the U.S. Senate), State Representatives Jay Kerttula and Dick McVeigh, State

*continued on page 20*

# The Economics of the Nixon Doctrine

Economics has long been the weak sister of American foreign policy. Only recently have we begun to realize that our position in the world, as well as the way we provide "security" for ourselves and our Allies, requires a serious concern with economic as well as military and diplomatic matters.

The tragedy of Vietnam has led some observers to lament that we have spent more than \$100 billion on a war when earlier provision of a few billion in economic assistance might have done just as well — or better — in giving Southeast Asia some stability and independence. We are now beginning to recognize the dimensions of economic difficulty that could arise from a return to trade protectionism, or from a failure to evolve new forms of international monetary cooperation. And we are now gradually becoming aware that the underlying strategic stalemate between the U.S. and the USSR is forcing economics closer to the fore in determining relative power and influence.

## THE MILITARY HABIT

These insights, virtually absent under the last Democratic Administration, are emerging under the Nixon Administration, and are providing a new test of its ability to adapt to changing conditions of international relations. Its record so far is a mixed one, reflecting in part the natural reluctance of Americans to accept a challenge to long-standing attitudes about the primacy of military force in international affairs.

The foreign policy of the Nixon Administration has been most apparent in the collection of attitudes called the Guam, or Nixon Doctrine, emphasizing a "low profile." What is meant by this is unclear; but in addition to our taking fewer independent initiatives, it does seem to indicate that the *basic forms* of our governmental involvement, chiefly military in most of the world, will be retained, though at a lower level of effort and visibility. Associated with an "era of negotiation," this approach permits lower levels of both strategic and conventional arms and especially a reduced U.S. presence in Asia. So far however,

there has not been much of an *economic* element in the Nixon Doctrine to complement the desire to place dwindling emphasis on military relations.

In the developing world, for example, the U.S. will no longer assume such a direct role, either in situations that could lead to future Vietnams, or in staffing field offices of the Agency for International Development (AID). Yet the Nixon Doctrine compensates for its retrenchments primarily with military assistance programs that resemble those adopted during the 1950s. Foreign economic assistance, in all its forms, continues to decline at a time when it could both provide developing countries with a greater chance to do things for themselves, and retain for the United States a constructive relationship with them that would be less likely to lead us into direct military ventures. Of course, this view is disputed by observers like Senator Fulbright, who fear any U.S. involvement may lead us into compromises and dilemmas. Yet it is clear that the U.S. will retain some involvements in vast areas of the world, whatever the outcome of Vietnam, as a simple function of trade, investment, travel, and communications. *How* we are involved, however, could be very important. A doctrine of transferring more resources to developing countries could prove more palatable to all in the long run than one that centers on military forces, whatever uniforms these forces wear.

## STUNTING THEIR GROWTH

So far, the Nixon Administration has followed its predecessors in neglecting this non-military approach to the problems of the developing world and their impact on us. This was particularly apparent in the narrow defeat last year of a Bill to restrict the import of certain goods into the United States. In the Administration's view, the ostensible target was Japan, particularly in textiles. But this view was erroneous. The Japanese are themselves shifting out of the very commodities that would have been most affected by the Trade Bill. The countries that would have really suffered were those with low-wage structures, such as Hong Kong, Indonesia, Taiwan, South Korea, and Malaysia. In other words, the Trade Bill would have hurt the very area of the world over which we have been fighting a bitter and tragic war. Thus, developing countries only just entering into international trade with light manufactured goods would be further penalized in their efforts to sustain their own development efforts.

Such trade legislation directly conflicts with a

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positive step pledged by the Nixon Administration. Along with the other 15 member states of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, we have pledged to enact legislation that will permit preferential access to our markets for the industrial goods of developing countries. Even if there were a strong lead from the White House this legislation would be unlikely to pass the Congress this year; indeed, it might be so weighted down with protectionist measures left over from last year's Trade Bill that the net effect would be to reduce rather than increase developing-country trade with us.

This conflict between preferences pledged to the developing countries and protection pledged to the textile and shoe industries has not been resolved, either by the Congress or by the Administration. Yet the President has taken another step that could help the Third World. He has undertaken a limited untying of aid — that is, eliminating the requirement that bilateral loans and grants made by the U.S. government be spent in this country, where prices are often higher. Under the new rules, aid recipients can spend the money either here or in other less developed countries. The President has also committed himself to a general untying of aid, provided that an agreement satisfactory to the interests of U.S. suppliers can be reached with the other members of the Development Assistance Committee.

### **INTRINSIC VALUE**

As another part of the Nixon Doctrine, the Administration has pressed for shifting of the bulk of U.S. aid lending to multilateral rather than bilateral channels. While significantly reducing the dilemmas of involvement long implicit in direct U.S. lending, this change would also reduce our control over the actual uses of the funds. This shift, therefore, suggests a recognition of the value of development assistance in itself. In addition, we would take part in a truly international cooperative effort, recognizing the far greater shared responsibilities, and the benefits accruing to all from a successful process of development in the Third World.

This is the most salutary and far-sighted aspect of the Nixon Administration's foreign economic policy as it affects the developing world. At the same time, the Administration has proposed a comprehensive set of changes in the way we administer our bilateral aid programs. AID would be abolished; in its place would appear four new agencies: an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (established in 1970); an International Development Corporation that would administer loans; an International Development Institute that would do research and provide technical assistance; and a foreign military assistance agency that would probably be vested in the State Department. Implicit in these changes is a truly im-

portant development: the functional separation of aid designed for different purposes. Disaster relief would be separated from economic aid, and both would be separated from military assistance. Thus, there would be some institutional way of preventing the confusion among functions that has so often in the past led to an emphasis on military aid when economic aid would be more appropriate. Of course, in the competition for funds, it is likely that economic aid, now bracketed with military aid, would tend to lose out to the latter in the halls of Congress.

### **FUNDING CRUNCH**

These proposals will not pass the Congress in the near future, if at all, to a great extent because of the delay before they were submitted by the White House. They came too late to be enacted before the existing legislation expired in July, and the Congress planned to replace it by a simple extension of the Foreign Assistance Act. And though these proposals remain significant, their importance pales against the question of the actual levels of funding the Administration is willing to ask for and the Congress accept, just as it will pale beside questions of trade protection and preferential access for developing-country goods.

These issues of foreign economic assistance to the developing world are standard ones in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, although rarely seen to be of central importance. From the point of view of U.S. interests, however, the truly central issues in foreign economic policy are now coming in other areas. This is particularly true of Atlantic relations, where economic, political and military considerations are becoming more closely related. The Trade Bill of 1970, for example, almost brought on a major crisis in our relations with Western Europe. It could, indeed, have set off an Atlantic Trade War that would have undermined some of the confidence that Europeans require in our commitment to their future development and prosperity. The Trade Bill was, then, at least in part an issue of "security," that even a firm commitment of U.S. troops on the Continent would not entirely offset.

### **ENTWINED WITH POLICY**

Fortunately, the bill was stopped. Yet the Administration did not appear to understand fully the conflict between this legislation and the wider objectives of Atlantic foreign policy. It is not clear that the lesson has been completely learned even now. Similarly, there has been widespread criticism of the way in which the Government handled the Euro/dollar crisis this spring, not so much for what we did as for the haphazard methods used to arrive at critical decisions. Again, these issues of international monetary cooperation are becoming increasingly important, as our relations with the developed countries of Europe

*continued on page 20*

# A Guide to the Democrats

### I. Introduction

With less than a year left before the Democratic nominating convention in Miami it seems opportune for us to scrutinize the Democratic candidates, evaluate their political strengths and weaknesses within their own party, and try to assess the probability each has of becoming President Nixon's opponent in 1972. Naturally any attempt at prediction of this sort must be highly speculative, and so many totally unpredictable events can intrude in such a decisive way (as they did in 1967-1968) that efforts at prophecy often seem futile. Indeed, many states are still debating the advantages of instituting a primary, while others are revising their primary laws. But some points can be made, some parameters defined, and some lasting strengths and weaknesses of the various actors elucidated.

### MIAMI MATH

The Democratic convention of 1972 will differ from its predecessors in several significant ways. It will be larger — having almost 400 more delegate votes than in 1968. More of these delegates will be elected in primaries, more will be bound by voter instruction in presidential preference polls, and for the first time there may be a number of highly significant *Southern* primaries. The trend toward more voter participation in the selection process will be offset to some extent by a dramatic redistribution of delegate votes among the states. In 1972 nine states (California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas), only two of which have binding presidential preference primaries, will have a majority of votes at the convention. In 1968 the number was thirteen. This concentration of voting strength may well provide a field day for those power brokers who can command a large state delegation — although we may note that in a legal sense the unit rule is no longer in effect. These “constitutional” innovations together with such “political” changes as the vast number of candidates and the shifting ideological contexts may combine to make this convention one of the most

fascinating in modern political experience.

### II. The Distribution of Power

As the convention approaches it will be possible to speculate on the basis of relatively accurate delegate counts which will list “committed,” “leaning,” and “undecided” votes in each state delegation. At this time, however, such counts are really impossible, although in a general way it is both feasible and necessary to examine the mathematics of the nominating process to get a feel for the strengths and weaknesses among the candidates.

For purposes of analysis the larger states must be treated individually; the smaller can be grouped to some extent. The following nine categories will serve to reduce 55 units (States + D. C. + Territories) to a more manageable 22:

#### A. The Big Nine

The convention has 3,016 delegate votes, of which the Big Nine have 1,527 or somewhat more than the 1,509 needed to nominate. If the convention meets without an obvious winner these states will play an enormously powerful role in the selection process and our speculations must begin with them.

Only two of these states have binding presidential preference polls: Massachusetts, which commits its delegates for one ballot only, and California which has a pledged slate of electors, presumably hand-picked by the organization of the candidate who won the primary, and presumably committed to vote for him until released. These votes are only “presumably” committed because intense pressure can be placed upon the primary winner to release the delegation — as was the case with the Kennedy and Stevenson forces in 1960 when favorite son Pat Brown completely lost control of the situation and did release the delegation under pressure, and as might have been the case in 1968 at the Republican convention where there was intense speculation about President Nixon's ability to “break open” the California delegation committed to Governor Reagan.

Of the remaining seven states virtually all have some form of non-binding primary — either a simple selection of delegates poll or an optional presidential preference primary, usually both. The relative bargaining strength of these state delegations in a doubtful situation will come not so much from their size, but from their fluidity or negotiability — itself a product of the domestic political situation.

For instance, we may surmise that between one half and two thirds of the delegates from New York

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will be strong liberals — extrapolating from the trend of 1968 when half of the delegation supported Senator McCarthy. These liberal delegates will probably vote for McGovern or perhaps Kennedy, but will be much more reluctant to vote for Humphrey, Muskie or Jackson. Despite a strong streak of expediency that runs through American liberal politicians, there are limits beyond which these delegates will probably not go as long as the convention remains open. Hence a very sizable part of the New York delegation is “non-negotiable.”

### NOT IN CONCERT

The same can be said of Pennsylvania and New Jersey — but for different reasons. In Pennsylvania the three centers of power will probably be in competition, not in concert. Pittsburgh has a “liberal” mayor, William Flaherty, who can have a lot to say about the Allegheny County delegation. Philadelphia may have a “conservative” mayor, former Police Chief Frank Rizzo, with as yet untested political qualifications. He will not have too much time to consolidate his control over the Tate machine, but his law and order instincts will probably strike a responsive chord throughout the organization and he may well be able to influence the selection and voting choices of a large part of the Pennsylvania delegation. Governor Schapp in Harrisburg would like to be in charge of his delegation, but his endorsement of Green in the recent Philadelphia primary and his increasing difficulties with the legislature do not at all further this aim. Normally the governor of Pennsylvania can exercise tremendous power. So far Schapp has shown himself incapable of it. Pennsylvania will be a hunting ground for all candidates; it will not be able to negotiate as a bloc at the convention and its political clout will be thereby diminished.

If Pennsylvania is divided, it is serene in comparison to New Jersey. In the absence of a Governor, power in the Garden State devolves upon the county organizations and the county chairmen. Although their power has declined of late, and although reform elements can be expected to make inroads, one can safely assume a badly divided delegation, reflecting historic rivalries between Union, Hudson, and Essex counties, between liberals in Bergen and traditionalists downstate, although Mayor Gibson of Newark may be able to strike some alliances with the northern liberals. To the extent that the liberal reformists make inroads, the state will be non-negotiable in the sense New York will be; to the extent that the county organizations retain control, it will be divided between various barons each negotiating with candidates, but unitable behind no one, save possibly Ted Kennedy.

Ohio and Michigan present a somewhat more coherent picture. Governor Gilligan seems to be much more in control of the party situation at present in

Ohio than Schapp is in Pennsylvania. To date most Presidential hopefuls have been treading lightly, although Muskie has secured defeated senatorial candidate Metzzenbaum to his cause and is making noises about challenging Gilligan's slate in the May 2 primary. Gilligan has very close ties to the Kennedy family, who have helped to finance his campaigns, and close ties to the liberal wing of the party. He could carry a comfortable majority of Ohio's 153 votes to Kennedy or to Muskie, less to McGovern. As long as any of these are viable candidates the chances are that Gilligan will not move to Humphrey, Jackson etc. Hence Ohio is in a much stronger bargaining position — limited, however, by Gilligan's own personal relations and political predilections.

Michigan, with no governor at the head of the party, can still be united and largely directed by the unions — and hence becomes a relatively negotiable bloc of votes. Muskie, Kennedy, Humphrey all have possibilities in Michigan; any one might get a large percentage of her 132 votes — given various scenarios.

Texas, with 130 votes, is most maneuverable, Kennedy being presumably the only totally unacceptable candidate, although George McGovern is probably not far behind. In fact the Texas delegation may have only one object in mind — to maneuver as deftly as possible to prevent a Kennedy nomination. As long as the heirs to the Johnson-Connally

### DELEGATE COUNT IN COURT

*Of great interest to convention watchers of both parties is the recent ruling by D.C. federal district judge June Green that the current apportionment of delegates by the Democratic National Committee is invalid since it did not “meet the tests of a rational basis.” For purposes of analysis we are proceeding on the assumption that the current apportionment ultimately will stand.*

*If it does not and a “One-Democrat-one-vote” standard is adopted incredible power will be concentrated in the largest states. On the basis of 1968 figures, the Congressional Quarterly reports that seven states can then nominate; eight on the basis of a 1960-1968 average. Although the ADA and other liberal organizations are behind the suit to create such a concentration, it is difficult to see how this exercise in contemporary expediency will serve liberal causes in the long run. Of these seven (or eight) states, only two have binding presidential preference primaries, and the rank-and-file Democrat in whose name such calculations are being made will end up having even less opportunity to express his views in this power-broker milieu than he has at present.*

machine retain the control they have exercised in the past, there is no reason not to believe that over 100 of Texas' votes can be shifted from Jackson to Muskie, to Humphrey or whomever with a fair degree of rapidity — largely to prevent a Kennedy nomination — or to extract the most if one appears inevitable. Texas because of its maneuverability must rank high in the calculations of Muskie and Humphrey; to Jackson's aspirations it is crucial.

### DALEY'S DESIRE

Which brings us to Illinois. By far the largest bloc of negotiable votes at the convention will belong to the Mayor of Chicago — probably around 160 out of Illinois' 170, and he is sufficiently pragmatic and shrewd not to commit himself until the decisive hour. He can keep the nomination open in all probability until next summer — unless some candidate sweeps the primaries and becomes the clear choice of the rank and file. Daley can literally deliver the delegation to Muskie or Kennedy or Humphrey or Jackson or most of the favorite sons. He can tie Illinois to Stevenson as its own favorite son and await developments. His extreme flexibility and lack of commitments create his power. Since this may well be his last convention, he will attempt to play a role of the first magnitude. Above all else, however, Daley must want vindication for 1968 — rightly or wrongly he has been held responsible both in the press and in the councils of his party for the defeat of Hubert Humphrey. His aim will be to nominate and elect a president and thereby to erase the stigmas of error, barbarity and defeat attached to his name.

#### B. *The "Little" Six*

The next six largest states — those states with more than 60 votes but with less than 100 — share 425 votes between them. Added to the Big Nine these votes bring the total almost to the 2/3 mark, indicating that the remaining forty states, territories, and the District of Columbia have between them only about 1/3 of the convention vote. (Nineteen states, the District, and the Territories have less than one percent of the convention vote apiece; combined these twenty-four units have only about 12 percent of the total convention vote.)

The "Little" Six contain four primary states — Florida, North Carolina, Indiana, and Wisconsin, together with Missouri, and favorite-son state Minnesota. The primary states we shall deal with presently, and there is little to be said about Minnesota — Humphrey presumably can hold his delegation as long as he wants.

Missouri, with its 73 votes, is currently split between conservative and liberal factions with the edge at present towards the liberals. Another hunting ground for candidates.

#### C. *Remaining Favorite Son States*

In the fifteen states which comprise the Big Nine and the "Little" Six, there are four which might be considered "Favorite Son" states — the homes of Kennedy, Humphrey, Proxmire, and Bayh. Aside from Minnesota, however, these states may well not cast their first ballots for their native son, Massachusetts because Kennedy may not decide to announce candidacy and enter his own primary, Wisconsin and Indiana because their primaries may result in the defeat of their own candidates.

There are, however, several states which probably can be regarded as genuine favorite son states which will tie up a few votes since the candidate involved may still regard his chances of being the presidential nominee as finite or may still be a committed crusader. Mills' Arkansas, Muskie's Maine, McGovern's South Dakota, and Jackson's Washington must be regarded as being in this category — for a total of 116 votes.

### WHAT'S LEFT

#### D. *Historic Primary States Remaining.*

There are 179 votes in the six historic primary contests not included in the above categories — Maryland, Nebraska, and Oregon committing their delegates to the winner of the presidential preference poll either on a state-wide or congressional district basis, and New Hampshire, D.C., and West Virginia providing for election of candidates with pledges of varying degrees of commitment.

The following five categories simply group the remaining states on a convenient geographic basis. The Territories are arbitrarily grouped with New England — perhaps in memory of the late James Michael Curley of Boston who served as a delegate from Puerto Rico in the 30's; the two deepest of the Southern states are given a special category because their delegations will probably vary ideologically from their Southern neighbors because of the split between party factions and credentials fights.

E. *Remaining New England and Territories* (101 votes). Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Territories.

F. *Remaining Border States* (148 votes). Delaware, Tennessee (a primary) Kentucky, Oklahoma.

G. *Remaining South* (182 votes). Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana.

H. *Deep South* (62 votes). Mississippi and Alabama.

I. *Remaining Farm Belt, Mountain, and South West States* (276 votes). North Dakota, Kansas, Montana, Indiana, Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Iowa.

#### III. *The Candidates*

The cast of candidates is enormous. Three must be examined in great detail: Muskie, the alleged "front-

runner," Humphrey and Kennedy, presuming his candidacy. These three in any event will dominate the preliminary calculations and probably the first ballots if the convention goes for more than one ballot. The second echelon of candidates — McGovern, Harris and Bayh will play an important role in the nomination process, could serve in the role of giant killer, and at least two of these have a chance to emerge as a not-so-dark, dark horse.

Jackson and Mills, the two "conservatives," may well play a decisive role in the selection process by providing quasi-viable alternatives for conservative delegates (especially from Southern and border states) which may deny a middle of the road candidate (Muskie, e.g.) the possibility of a quick or non-negotiated victory. It is, frankly, quite difficult to envision Jackson emerging as the nominee. It is impossible to envision Mills. The congressman from Arkansas, whose intellectual capabilities probably put him in a category above all of his competitors, and whose political accomplishment demonstrate him to be a most able man, suffers from several fatal disadvantages. He is a fiscal conservative in a party whose rank and file are not — an economic conservative in an ocean of big spenders; he is suspect on the whole racial question — the Democratic party cannot afford to lose its grip on the black vote; and his appeal to the party worthies in the Big Nine states (aside from Texas) must be totally lacking. Politics may make strange bedfellows, but there are limits. He may well play a role in the nominating process, he might make an excellent running mate for certain candidates, but as a possibility of being the nominee, Harold Stassen has a better chance of upsetting President Nixon in 1972.

### THE LONG SHOTS

The prospect of other dark horses may not be as dismal, but their road is uphill.

Proxmire of Wisconsin could be nominated, but he would have to have an incredible amount of good luck — a very, very long shot. Stevenson of Illinois may be a much better bet for a number of reasons, but events leading to his selection are emphatically in the hands of others. Ramsey Clark, John Lindsay, Sam Yorty, and others of this description had best stick to their present jobs unless they think they can sweep the primaries. Fred Harris is already running; after all, he was one of the seven "potential candidates" gathered by Larry O'Brien last winter to pledge to be polite to each other. Lightning might strike — but that is just about what it would be if he were to succeed.

There is always the possibility that some total unknown might be picked in the waning hours of an exasperated and deadlocked convention — but for

the time being, it would seem that there are sufficient extant names to serve the purpose.

### OUT IN FRONT

#### IV. *Muskie*

Some General Observations.

Ever since the election of 1968, Senator Muskie has been regarded as the "front-runner" for the Democratic nomination. His performance in the election of 1968 received high marks from the press and public, and he emerged from the contest with much good will and little antagonism from his fellow Democrats. The events of August 1969 appeared to eliminate one important rival, and his selection by Larry O'Brien to deliver a response to President Nixon on the eve of the 1970 elections seemed an almost official confirmation of his status. His efforts in that election on behalf of candidates throughout the country were reminiscent of President Nixon's performance in 1966, and Democratic successes in that election seemed to point to interesting parallels. His own comfortable re-election victory in November and a further blow to his most threatening rival the following January in the Senate Whip race left Muskie at the beginning of this year in a dominant position in the minds of party chairmen, rank-and-file Democrats, and the public-at-large, as various surveys indicated.

But the advantages of the front-runner position — the publicity, the aura of victory, the possibility of a bandwagon psychology — all are of little avail unless the candidate can parlay his position into hard cash and hard delegate commitments. So far Muskie has not succeeded in either, and he is now beginning to confront the liabilities of his position.

First of all, an early front-runner often finds it difficult to generate tremendous enthusiasm because "everyone" tends to be hyper-critical during the early phases of a presidential campaign: everyone is still looking for the perfect man, whereas at the end most everyone is settling for far less in order to avoid catastrophe (or so it seems). Second, intense press coverage can be a mixed blessing. Third, we need not dwell on the fact that the front-runner invariably becomes the target of "stop-X" movements. Most important, however, is the liability of unfulfillable expectations which the front-runner position creates. Not only must this would-be President create the hope that he can solve all of the nation's ills, but he cannot afford to dash the expectation that he will triumph politically in repeated encounters with his rivals — especially in the primaries. Not only must Muskie *win* the New Hampshire primary, for example, he must win with a margin concurrent with the expectations surrounding his position: he could "lose" the primary by receiving a less-than-impressive plurality. It goes without saying that this front-runner must continue to win primary victories throughout the season —

or have an excellent reason for any given loss. For primary victories, even in small states, will deeply influence the expectations and commitments of the power brokers in the "Big Nine."

These liabilities become especially acute for Muskie since his support within the party, while currently wide-spread, is also very thin. Successful nomination aspirants usually go into a convention with a large reserve of die-hard supporters upon whom they then build their majority. This was certainly true of Kennedy in 1960, Goldwater in 1964, Humphrey in 1968, and President Nixon in both 1960 and 1968. Muskie has no equivalent; his support rests upon a mild — not feverish — gratitude for past services and an expectation of victory in both convention and election. If this expectation is bolstered by primary victories, poll performances, delegate commitments, and other signs of momentum, all will be well — but one slip of any magnitude and his support will begin to disintegrate, disintegration will feed upon itself, and disintegration will go very far indeed because there is no *deep* commitment to Muskie within any segment of the party.

### STUCK DEAD CENTER

Furthermore, it is a curious fact that Muskie's middle-of-the-road position on the issues works against him, not for him, at the present moment. Having the strong support of hardly anybody, he needs the mild support of almost everybody to give credence to his compromise candidacy position. But the old chestnut of the probability of pleasing nobody when one tries to please everybody is especially true of *early* front-runners in a deeply divided party. If Kennedy emerges as a strong rival, Muskie needs most of the Southern vote — hence he cannot move too far to the left, yet without support from a fair segment of the left from within the Big Nine, he cannot win either. The more issues-oriented the contest becomes between now and next spring, the more difficult will be his position — and there are several candidates whose entire position will rest upon making it into an issues-oriented campaign. Also, the center-of-the-road position makes it extremely difficult for Muskie to say the dramatic things and formulate the dramatic proposals to maintain momentum in the press — it is increasingly apparent that he cannot get his campaign off dead center so-to-speak. But a front-runner needs momentum at least as much as anyone else.

It is ironic that Muskie might well be intrinsically in a stronger position if he were not the alleged front-runner. A compromise candidate often does emerge a winner, but people do not usually embrace compromises at first — only after they have been driven to them by necessity — and the "front-runner" needs early embraces to win.

## WAITING FOR JANUARY

### The Campaign

Phase I: *Now until the end of 1971*. For Senator Muskie the next five months will be agonizing. He must survive the current doldrums, maintain the image of most probable convention winner, and hope that the polls will continue favorable. He must try to do the dramatic to create press, yet he must avoid moving too far from the center. He must hope for administration attacks upon him to lend credence to his status and to create publicity. It will be extremely difficult for him to reach the end of the year without serious doubts about his campaign — he will arrive in New Hampshire sorely in need of an impressive victory — with much press speculation about his "sagging" efforts.

Phase II: *The Primaries*. Whether or not Muskie is slipping by December, the year's end will force the Senator's managers to pay very close attention to the conclusion of their adding machines, and these conclusions will be largely governed by whether or not Ted Kennedy has credibly removed himself from the running. If he has, the situation will ease considerably, for Muskie can then make significant inroads in the Big Nine, figure on additional votes from primary states, New England, and some of the Plains and Mountain areas, and ignore the South. He can then move a bit to the left, and knock his lesser competition off in primaries and back rooms. In such a situation he would need to win in New Hampshire, Wisconsin (and perhaps Tennessee), Oregon, and California, adding one or two other states in which his polling might indicate some strength — the purpose being to maintain his psychological position and to collect the large California bloc of votes. Primaries such as Indiana and Massachusetts he might let go by default in hopes of votes on the second ballot. His winning vote projections might look like column one of the table on page 14.

### WITH KENNEDY IN

This does not mean that he has a guaranteed win in these states — far from it — but at least his task would be clear even though there would be no guarantee of nomination at this point.

If Kennedy is in the race, however, the picture becomes much more harsh. The adding machines will dictate 500 votes from Southern and Border states as absolute musts, since Kennedy is easily capable of tying up that many or more in New England and in the Big Nine. Hence Muskie will have to knock out Jackson (and Mills) early enough to give the South the appearance of no viable first choice. His winning vote projections might resemble column two of the table.

Under the assumption that Kennedy will be very much in the race, the Muskie strategy will probably dictate going for broke in the first three primaries: Winning big in New Hampshire to achieve a strong psychological position and to damage McGovern, Harris and Bayh — not to mention Kennedy; winning — even marginally — a week later in Florida, hopefully giving a very serious set-back to Jackson in the one Southern state where Muskie *could* beat Jackson, and then three weeks later winning impressively in Wisconsin — delivering a fatal set-back to Humphrey in a primary which Humphrey must either enter or avoid by signing an affidavit that he is not a candidate. It would seem difficult for Humphrey to do this, given his own personal make-up and his probable political position at the time.

Such a triple punch — if successful — would eliminate virtually all rivals except Kennedy, would give legitimacy to Muskie's front-runner status (enabling him to pick up some hard commitments), and would deliver the South and Border states largely to his banner to stop Kennedy. Kennedy would probably have to surface at this point if he wishes the nomination. (The California filing date is three days after the Wisconsin primary — although much advance preparation in terms of signatures is necessary). Muskie admittedly would have to win some more primaries — necessarily California, but with these victories he would be in a most commanding position. It can, of course, be argued that Muskie might well get conservative support against Kennedy, Florida or no Florida. But again the front-runner problem intrudes. If Kennedy is breathing down his neck, he cannot afford to seem afraid of contesting so early a primary,

and it is the only opportunity he has to demonstrate strength in a Southern State.

### New Hampshire

It is not too curious a fact that in the age of polls and pundits the unexpected is called the significant. If a candidate is expected to get 50 percent of the vote and gets but 45 percent this is considered a poor showing. If he is expected to get 40 percent but actually receives 45 percent this is considered a significantly strong showing. Intrinsically the same 45 percent should have the same significance but the media's focus on the unexpected often tends to distort intrinsic performances. Senator McCarthy's performance in New Hampshire last time was intrinsically impressive, but a vote total in the high 40 percentile range was turned into a landslide victory by the expectation that his total would be in the mid-twenties — an expectation, incidentally, created by both the polls and the Johnson forces.

### NUMERICAL MANIPULATION

Candidates, aware of this phenomenon, often try to manipulate the expectations — if they know what they are doing ("If we get X percent of the vote, we will consider it a victory" — "X" being below their anticipated performance). Muskie, however, may find it difficult to play this game in New Hampshire. Current polls show him with a comfortable lead — in the high 40 percentile range against the field. If the press, the party and the pundits are to be really impressed at his victory, he will have to exceed this margin.

Can he do it? Possibly, but by no means certainly. Who will be the field? McGovern and Bayh are making noises — both have indicated that they will enter. Sam Yorty has also appeared upon the scene. Humphrey will probably declare that New Hampshire is a favorite son state — and will stay out — he would be well advised to. Others, like Harris, Jackson, Proxmire, may enter. The big imponderable is a Kennedy write-in candidacy.

The Democratic primary electorate is composed largely of blue collar workers and families, although a growing suburban vote especially in southern Rockingham County may change the complexion of the electorate significantly this time. The 18-year-old vote will also have an impact, mitigating the hard-core working class vote in Manchester, Nashua, Portsmouth, and other mill towns throughout the state. Despite these mitigating influences, the decisive part of the electorate remains low income families, largely of French-Canadian, Irish, Italian, and Polish extraction. Ethnic ties to Muskie will be very strong and no other candidate, save Teddy Kennedy, can cut into these still-conscious ethnic groupings as well as the Senator from Maine.

	Total votes	Col. # 1*	Col. # 2**
<b>BIG NINE (1527)</b>			
New York	278	140	75
California	271	271	271
Pennsylvania	182	110	75
Illinois	170	150	10
Ohio	153	100	30
Michigan	132	55	50
Texas	130	20	125
New Jersey	109	85	30
Massachusetts	102	0	0
<b>"LITTLE" SIX (425)</b>			
Florida	81	0	75
Indiana	76	45	25
Missouri	73	40	30
Wisconsin	67	50	50
Minnesota	64	0	0
North Carolina	64	0	64
<b>FAVORITE SON</b>	116	20	20
(Ark., Me., S.D., Wash.)			
<b>HISTORIC PRIMARY</b>	179	125	164
(D.C., Md., Neb., N.H., Ore., W. Va.)			
<b>N.E. REMAINDER &amp; TERR.</b>	101	75	20
(Conn., R.I., Vt., & Terr.)			
<b>BORDER REMAINDER</b>	148	35	125
(Del., Ky., Okla., Tenn.)			
<b>MISS. &amp; ALA.</b>	62	5	0
<b>SOUTH REMAINDER</b>	182	35	170
(Ga., La., S.C., Va.)			
<b>FARM - MT. - S. W.</b>	276	150	100
(N.D., Kan., Mont., Ind., Wy., Colo., Nev., Utah, Ariz., N.M., Iowa)			
	3,016	1,511	1,509

\*Muskie - 2d Ballot Victory. Minimum Requirements. Kennedy out - S. Lukewarm.

\*\*Muskie - 2d Ballot Victory. Minimum Requirements. Kennedy in. South Friendly, Humphrey in

Of course, New Hampshire is famous for its quirks and surprises, and its political differences of opinion. The *Union-Leader* alone could probably guarantee a "conservative" candidate such as Jackson or Mills a vote of around 10 percent — *one* conservative. The student invasion from the colleges of Massachusetts which was so decisive in McCarthy's campaign will probably be repeated — and the chances are that Muskie will not be their man. A well-run campaign by a figure such as Senator Bayh will probably net several thousand votes. Muskie, then, can be nibbled at — by Loeb's editorials, by McGovern's students and suburbanites, by Bayh's energy and organization. But the only man who can trim Muskie down to size is Kennedy, for he is the only one who can cut into Muskie's basic strongholds in the urban centers of the Merrimack valley where the vote really lies.

### DISCREET WRITE-IN

Will Kennedy be a factor? If he has credibly removed himself, Muskie will win big. If he is, however, very much in the running, his managers will be faced with some interesting questions.

Kennedy is the man who least needs primary victories to get the nomination — although as we shall see he may well need a sizable chunk, if not all, of California's 271 votes to be nominated. A foray into the primaries would be risky — especially in New Hampshire. The scene is set for one of New Hampshire's famous write-in campaigns — so easy to organize, so easy to execute (except in Portsmouth and a few other places where machines are used). With a not-too-conspicuous amount of effort — and a strictly "unofficial" and "unauthorized" campaign, Kennedy might well get around 20 percent of the vote — perhaps more. He must, of course, be careful not to put his prestige on the line.

With Kennedy credibly out of the race, the outcome might look something like this (Kennedy will get some votes anyway):

Muskie	58%	Jackson	8%
McGovern	16%	Kennedy	5%
Bayh	10%	Rest	3%

But with Kennedy in the race, Muskie's total would certainly drop. Consider the following two outcomes:

Muskie	51%	Muskie	38%
Kennedy	18%*	Kennedy	24%*
McGovern	13%	McGovern	14%
Jackson	8%	Jackson	12%
Bayh	6%	Bayh	8%
Rest	4%	Rest	4%

\*Write-in

See how only a slight variation in the totals of the runners-up can heavily influence the Muskie total. The first scenario envisions a smashing Muskie victory — better than two-to-one over his nearest rival; the second is the portrait of a "victory" with such negative psychological impact that it might be considered

a setback. In such a situation the nature of the effort, the quality of the campaign and just plain luck can play tremendous roles. New Hampshire, as always, will be an interesting contest and Muskie is going to really have to be on his toes down to the wire.

### Florida

A week after New Hampshire comes Florida — a state where a candidate can spend a lot of money on media — and a state where the presidential primary is new. Politically Florida is a fascinating state — areas in the panhandle indistinguishable politically from neighboring Mississippi and Alabama, the great urban center of Miami, the resort towns, the rural areas of central and northern Florida, Tampa bay, each area with very distinct political traits. Traditionally the Democratic party has been conservative — Senator Holland, for example. Liberals, drawing upon Dade County, have been able to carry Democratic state-wide primaries, as in 1966, but really only when the opposition was divided. If all the liberals plunge into Florida against one or two conservatives, the outcome will not be to their liking.

### MUSKIE COUNTRY?

Yet Muskie strategists must recognize that Jackson, for instance, has many difficulties in Florida. Despite his "conservative" label he is a strong liberal in domestic affairs — the Boeing Senator is neither an opponent of government spending, nor a champion of states rights. Very little enthusiasm for his domestic views will be generated in the truly conservative areas of the state. Of course the aero-space centers will find in him a champion, but a serious effort for Mills would cut into Jackson severely — and if Mills is going let his name stand anywhere, Florida and North Carolina would have to be his best opportunities. Even without Mills to draw away votes, it is difficult to see massive enthusiasm for Jackson — or virtually any other candidate — in traditionally conservative areas. The vote in these regions might well be expected to be light. Moreover, Muskie would appear somewhat akin ideologically to newly elected moderates Senator Lawton Chiles and Governor Reubin Askew.

A Muskie victory in Florida is, then, not beyond the pale of the possible, and must constitute a tremendous temptation. A New Hampshire victory would give him a boost and a Florida victory would give important support to Wisconsin. If polls bear out the possibility of a Muskie victory, he might do well to put a lot of eggs into the Florida basket.

Because the primary is new, it is very difficult to assess. Would Kennedy do well in Dade County — is a write-in possible? Miami Mayor David Kennedy is now organizing a Bayh committee. With Kennedy out of the picture, would not Muskie be a really strong contender? All he needs is to win — even marginally

— but with so many unknowns, the risks as well as the opportunities have to be considered great.

### Wisconsin

Of the three early primaries, Wisconsin shapes up as the most important. In a very real sense all candidates may well survive New Hampshire and Florida, either by staying out of them or by doing excusably well in a tough situation. Wisconsin, however, must prove fatal to somebody.

Under Wisconsin law, an eleven-man committee places on the ballot the names of all presidential candidates "generally advocated or recognized in the national news media throughout the United States." A candidate may have his name withdrawn if he signs an affidavit of non-candidacy. Wisconsin also presents its voters with the option to vote for "none of the above."

### ACID TEST

Muskie will be on the ballot; the McGovern candidacy whether it is prospering or not will go as far as Wisconsin. If the Proxmire campaign is to go anywhere at all, it needs a victory in Wisconsin. Bayh will be on the ballot — and he must perform well, perhaps win, if his candidacy is to go beyond the favorite son status. The same might be said of Jackson and Harris. It seems that it would be extremely difficult for Humphrey to stay out of Wisconsin — it would not be credible for him to sign the affidavit and maintain his campaign — and it is probably against his nature to stay out of the fray. Besides, he may well feel that Wisconsin is the best place to take his first stand. Kennedy will probably still be maintaining his position of non-candidacy in February when the various Wisconsin deadlines occur, and so can remain off the ballot. The option of "none of the above," however, will present intriguing low-risk possibilities for his strategists.

There are really two contests in Wisconsin — a state-wide contest and a congressional district contest. The presidential primary winner state-wide receives a certain number of votes and the district winners receive a certain number of votes. In 1960, for instance, Kennedy won state-wide, but Humphrey won a sufficient number of congressional districts to constitute some form of moral victory. Another interesting fact about Wisconsin is that its primary is open. Anyone can vote in either primary (not, of course, both). Hence large numbers of independents will certainly vote in an exciting contest; some Republicans may as well.

Muskie's strategists can look to Wisconsin with a degree of measured optimism. The Senator will enjoy a strong ethnic appeal to the state's quite sizable Polish-American vote. His current favorability among independent voters — where he still leads Kennedy

comfortably in the opinion polls — can be turned into support at the voting polls in Wisconsin's open primary. He might well expect some fall-out from his New Hampshire and possibly Florida performances. And his historic commitment to environmental causes may go well in this environmentally conscious state.

The opposition also has its areas of strength, however. A serious Humphrey effort in Wisconsin might well get off the ground. Humphrey has campaigned the Dairy State and is well known. He has in his files the names of many former supporters who can form the nucleus of an organization. The proximity of Wisconsin to Minnesota and the media penetration of the Twin Cities into Wisconsin is probably a plus. Logistically it is easy to flood Wisconsin with Minnesota workers — as he did in 1960. Humphrey might also pick up support from organized labor. Quite significantly, freed from the fetters of prior primaries with their demands for money, candidate's time, organizational effort, and psychological capital, Humphrey could *concentrate* on Wisconsin while many of his opponents were shuttling between New Hampshire snow and Florida sun.

Kennedy also has areas of strength in Wisconsin. Governor Lucey, who may be neutral publicly, is a long-standing friend of the Kennedy family — and Jack Kennedy's chief political supporter in Wisconsin in 1960. He could probably give substantial support behind the scenes to the reservoir of Kennedy workers and organization left over from the past. The sizable black vote in Milwaukee could be expected to support Kennedy, as could a number of other traditional voting blocs. But Kennedy is likely to stay out of it — or perhaps use the "none-of-the-above" as a safe stand-in.

### SHAPE UP OR SHIP OUT

McGovern must make some hay in Wisconsin or retire from the field. Fortunately for his sake, he stands a good chance of carrying the congressional district containing Dane County — Madison. Such a "moral" victory could well keep his candidacy alive. He might do well to concentrate his efforts there and perhaps in one or two other districts with the purpose of embarrassing the front-runner, picking up a few votes, and keeping his hand in.

What, then, are Muskie's chances of delivering his triple punch — establishing his position in New Hampshire, knocking a conservative out as a possible future winner in Florida, and then destroying Humphrey and perhaps a few lesser figures in Wisconsin? It seems that this scenario is possible, but not likely. The odds against winning the triple crown are substantial. A marginal victory in all three would leave his opponents intact, although hurting. One

remembers Robert Kennedy's quest for the elusive knock-out blow in 1968 — a quest which he never fulfilled. It will be even more difficult to achieve a decisive victory in Wisconsin than New Hampshire. The loss of a few congressional districts, a strong showing by Humphrey, the success of a "none-of-these" Kennedy effort, all would be sufficient to deny Muskie his real need for early triumphs. The primary road beyond Wisconsin does not provide him with the opportunity for spectacular performances — and continues to present pitfalls. Muskie needs every penny he can get to contest California. His aides will have to begin to select which states not to contest. This is difficult for a front-runner who needs the votes to achieve an early ballot victory, as well as to preserve the aura of invincibility.

## ALL THE REST

### The Balance of the Primaries

After Wisconsin, the sequence of primaries, as things now stand, will be as follows: Rhode Island on April 11, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania on the 25th. D.C., Indiana, North Carolina, and Ohio take place May 2, Tennessee May 4, while Nebraska and West Virginia follow a week later on the 9th. Maryland is on the 16th, Oregon on the 23rd, and June 6 winds up the season with South Dakota, New Mexico, New Jersey and, of course, California.

It is useless at this point to speculate in detail about these primaries, but some points can be made.

- 1) Muskie must do well in California.
- 2) Oregon will have Kennedy's name on the ballot — affidavits or no affidavits. Muskie's chief antagonist will be in the open in Oregon — and a victory there is a must. Oregon will be extremely important if there is still a contest in the latter part of May.
- 3) If Kennedy credibly removes himself from the running, Muskie will be presented with the opportunity to enter Massachusetts — and face the peril of a peace candidate upsetting him in this most dovish of states.
- 4) Does Muskie contest Indiana? It would be tempting to defeat Bayh in his own territory yet a loss. . . .
- 5) Muskie must contest Tennessee — as must all other avowed candidates — perils and possibilities.
- 6) What of Maryland? Of Rhode Island?

If Muskie carries most of these primaries and wins with comfort in California, he is probably home free — no one can then deny him the nomination. If, however, he falters anywhere along the line, his chances become a function of the position of his rivals — and it is to them that we must now turn.

## V. Humphrey

Much press speculation in recent weeks has centered around Hubert Humphrey and some commentators have detected a groundswell for the Minnesota Senator within the party organization. He is certainly regarded as an important contender, and as the 1968 standard bearer, he has ample opportunity to receive much publicity and to keep his name before the public.

There are a number of basic assets upon which a Humphrey candidacy can draw. Humphrey's forte is his optimism, emotionalism, and tenacity. He ran a campaign last time which was a credit to these virtues, and the blame for the loss of which can be placed elsewhere. It was very close — and anyone who came that close can lay a significant claim to another try — as did President Nixon. Humphrey has always been a close friend of organized labor, and as the chief supplier of money and men to the Democratic Party in 1968, labor has a large claim to be heard in the councils of the party. If Humphrey becomes their man, it should be worth a large number of votes. It must not be forgotten that the left wing of the party sat on its hands for most of the campaign last time — it was labor who carried the ball, and labor has a right to remind the party of this fact. Humphrey also has a large number of historic IOU's in the party, is well known, and seems to have surmounted most of the antagonisms which dogged him in 1968.

## HUMPHREY RERUN

Furthermore, Humphrey's strategic position at the moment is enviable. He is not saddled with the difficulties of the front-runner position, but has many advantages of being "close on Muskie's heels." He can pick and choose his primaries — with a couple of exceptions — he can commit himself at a time of his own choosing — probably on grounds of his own choosing. Also the strength that he acquires is likely to be much more in-depth strength than that which Muskie could ever achieve. Support from labor, from friends within the party, from those who feel that with a little bit more effort on their own part he might have won — those who feel a bit guilty about the last time — is much harder support than that from those who are with a man because he might be a winner. It would be quite possible for Humphrey to stake out substantial in-depth support in states like Michigan and Pennsylvania, possibly Missouri, New Jersey, and upstate New York.

Furthermore his ideological position is not necessarily to his disadvantage. He can say things on the left of the spectrum without exciting mistrust among the rank-and-file. He is a known quantity in the party — he will not be feared for his views. This con-

dition may enable him to build coalitions more effectively than any of his rivals, save possibly Ted Kennedy.

Humphrey's liabilities are also substantial. There are lingering feelings of animosity among the left wing of the party: memories of Chicago have not entirely evaporated, his role in the war remains ambiguous. The South may still harbor lingering memories of his "ADA liberalism" — and of the fact that his performance in that region was the worst of any Democrat since Horace Greeley. His loser image is not restricted to the South.

### IT'S WHAT COUNTS

But Humphrey's largest liability is his apparent lack of support among the rank-and-file — a definite crimp in winning primaries.

Given these sets of conditions, what is Humphrey's best strategy — and what is his most likely strategy?

It would seem that Humphrey must either go the primary route just to obtain delegate votes (California is a mathematical necessity) and to dispel his loser image. His other hope is to emerge as a compromise candidate late in the balloting. There are obvious risks to both, but Humphrey's instinct for action will undoubtedly lead to his committing himself to several primaries. Here, again, the Kennedy candidacy is the great unknown factor. If Kennedy pulls himself out of the race, then Humphrey must enter at some point, or Muskie will sweep home. With Kennedy in the race, Humphrey might be tempted to cultivate his labor relations, try to bottle up four hundred votes somewhere, and await developments. Unfortunately for him, this sort of a scenario is simply not credible. He would have to have in the neighborhood of 800 votes to deadlock such a situation — the dynamics of conventions being as they are, he would not be able to hold on to his support with two men competing so vigorously, his vote being so low. He would have to have close to a third of the vote to deadlock, and he can get this only by contesting — and winning — a few primaries.

### ON HIS WAY

Hence, for reasons of his own personality as well as the mathematics of the situation, Humphrey will go the primary route — a limited primary route — unless polls indicate his case to be totally hopeless.

He may well start in Wisconsin, and we have discussed his chances above. A modest showing — carrying several congressional districts with their delegate votes would not be fatal to his chances, a victory would send him on his way.

A clever strategy for him might well be to try to turn the Pennsylvania primary into a real contest — to challenge Muskie or make as much capital as

possible from Muskie's refusal to enter — a victory over Muskie here would really get the ball rolling — although it is enormously expensive to campaign in Pennsylvania. Labor, if it wished, could put him over and his performance in this major industrial state could open up a lot of support in Michigan, New Jersey, and even in Ohio — areas he simply must get strength in.

Being selective, he might then contest either West Virginia or Nebraska (or both), then Oregon, then California. This total of five or six primaries is manageable — under certain circumstances they are winnable. With such victories, he would be in a very strong position, Muskie might be out of the race, and Kennedy would be neutralized in the areas of his greatest potential. Daley might even be impressed. Barring such a performance, however it is difficult to envision a Humphrey victory.

A defeat along the way would be almost fatal, and the way is fraught with peril. The way must lie through California: if Kennedy is a candidate, he probably cannot win without the votes of California. He can get them either by contesting the primary or by breaking the delegation — but the latter is difficult if his opponents have done their homework. Hence the Kennedy candidacy, too, must reckon with California — and with Kennedy in the race in California, Humphrey must be in serious trouble in that state.

### CANNOT BE FORGOT

#### VI. *Kennedy*

Much hangs, therefore, upon the intentions of the Senior Senator from Massachusetts. It is not necessary to go into detail with respect to the assets and liabilities of this candidate. The inheritance of the past in terms of organization, reputation, money, charisma, press attraction, etc., need not be reiterated. Nor need his liabilities be listed: the hatred of the conservatives, Chappaquiddick, the Whip debacle, his age, his still luke-warm performances in the polls against President Nixon. Some points however, can be made.

- 1) Chappaquiddick probably has not had a decisive lasting influence upon party calculations — nor, it would seem, upon rank-and-file Democrats who currently favor Kennedy over all comers in nationwide surveys (though opposition to Kennedy is also more intense than to the others).
- 2) The whip defeat has had only internal repercussions, and with passing time will have passing significance.
- 3) Counter-balancing the lack of negative weight with these liabilities, however, could well be evidence that some of his assets are hollow. The much-vaunted Kennedy organization may

turn out to be more of a paper tiger than many suspect. If the nation-wide organization is simply living on its reputation, holes may be punched in it obvious to all.

- 4) There is no doubt that he still has money — and can finance any manner of campaign.

The major questions are: Does he have the will to make the run and, if so, has he got the savvy to direct a campaign with the talent, drive, and efficiency which both of his brothers demonstrated. The evidence is still out on both questions.

If Kennedy does want the nomination, however, it is not simply going to be his for the asking — he is going to have to fight for it against strong antagonists — and he is going, in all probability, to have to enter the California primary — the final decision for which will have to come by the first week in April.

### THE CALIFORNIA IMPERATIVE

At first glance, one would expect that he, of all candidates, could avoid the primary route, let the competition knock itself out against itself, and with the aid of well-placed supporters, such as Daley and Gilligan, rally the votes from the Big Nine to his banner — a banner big enough to cover hard-hat labor and left-wing students — to cover virtually all of the party outside the South and border regions. The mathematics of the situation, however, demonstrates that without the 271 votes from California he will have a difficult time overcoming the opposition.

Even if Kennedy gets every other vote in the Big Nine, without California and Texas he will be about 400 votes short of nomination. It is unlikely that he could get a sweep of the rest if serious opposition remains — so he may be between four and five hundred votes short — to be made up elsewhere. Hunting rights in remaining categories are somewhat restricted. In the Little Six, Florida, Wisconsin, and North Carolina may well be denied him by law, as the primaries in these states will probably commit the votes to the winner. (Wisconsin, e.g., binds the vote until the winner has dropped below 1/3 of the convention total.) If the delegation has been well-selected, the winner can hold out longer. Minnesota offers little opportunity. Only in Missouri and Indiana (after the first ballot) can he pick up votes — perhaps around 100.

Most of the favorite sons from the favorite son states have an interest in a convention deadlock and may well be reluctant to bolt early: thin pickings here.

The historic primary states will have varying degrees of commitment to their winners — not too much here — perhaps 30 votes. New England and

the Territories could provide 75 votes; the Border and Southern states perhaps 25-30 votes; Mississippi and Alabama (largely black delegations) around 60 votes; and Farm-Mountain, etc., he might get 100 votes.

This would bring him around 400 votes — somewhat short of his requirement. But any real effort by remaining candidates could hold him to less — both in these areas and in the Big Nine. California's 271 would put him in clover. It would be mathematically possible but politically very difficult for him without California.

### ALL THE WAY

A Kennedy victory in California, however, would unhinge most everyone else's campaign and provide Kennedy with sufficient psychological strength to carry the nomination.

The timing of all this is crucial. Kennedy could commit himself as late as April 7 — if sufficient spadework were done in advance — thus avoiding for one reason or another entering any primaries save Oregon and California. The two months between April and June could be spent in "building" an organization and making the necessary preliminary inroads in the other Big Nine. Of course, there are other means of getting around the deadline. A stand-in, such as Bayh or Tunney, could run in his stead and release the delegation at the crucial moment. This would mitigate the damage of a loss — which could prove fatal — but still would increase the chances of some other contender.

Of the big three contenders, then, Muskie must deliver a triple punch to begin with, must do tolerably well in the middle primaries, and then should win in California; Humphrey must win a few selective primaries, hopefully a dramatic one, and win in California; Kennedy must win in California. There can be little question that in a three-way race or a multi-candidate race, Kennedy could win. Hence we may conclude at this point that the "intrinsic" front-runner in the Democratic party is Kennedy — if he wants the nomination. If he does not want the nomination, Muskie becomes the strongest candidate — but by no means a sure thing. Humphrey will remain a close runner-up to Muskie.

Should Kennedy decide, however, not to contest California, yet should he keep his hand in the game, then the spectre of convention deadlock arises. In such a situation — and three is the magic number to deadlock — a dark or not-so-dark horse might emerge.

CLIFFORD BROWN

*The second part of this article, discussing minor candidates and convention dynamics, will appear next month.*

## **International Economics** *from page 8*

and the Far East come to be affected fundamentally by exchange rates, capital flows, balances of payments, the role of the multinational corporation, internal tax laws, and the need for harmonization of a hundred trading and business practices.

Awareness of the foreign policy implications of all these questions has come late to the Administration, but the President has now taken one major step that is both unprecedented and potentially of far-reaching importance. He has created an International Economic Policy Council at the level of the National Security and Domestic Policy Councils in the White House. He has entrusted it to a talented businessman, Peter Peterson of Bell and Howell. The Council's mandate is far-reaching and represents a clear recognition that diverse issues like trade, international monetary policy, and the flow of capital need to be dealt with at one central point, close to the President himself.

### **LIFE AND DEATH ISSUES**

This is an ambitious beginning, that could lead to a widespread recognition in the United States of the central role that economic issues will play in our foreign policy as we find that we are no longer the undisputed economic giant, even in the Western world, and as we find that we have increasingly to act in concert with other nations. The immediate role of the Council is still unclear, however. In particular, the central clearing house for all major U.S. foreign policy decisions is still the National Security Council, under its polymath Special Assistant to the President, Dr. Henry Kissinger. For him, and presumably also for the President, economic issues do not intrude in an important way into the central concerns of war and peace, life and death.

This view may still be valid. But if the President does succeed in any significant way with his "era of negotiations," the United States will then find itself, with other major nations, entering a twilight zone of international politics where the role of military force will be severely circumscribed. We may even now be about to enter a period not unlike that which obtained in Europe after 1815, when firmly established understandings about a military "balance of power," and the limits placed on influence, will leave economic rivalries and issues as a prime sphere of activity and means for demonstrating relative national power.

The pace of these developments is not yet clear. Yet as the new period emerges, we will find that the very subject of U.S. foreign policy will turn less on matters of nuclear armaments, deterrence, and other concerns of statesmen, and more on the less exciting

practices and art of commerce. It may even be possible, with luck, for Japan to emerge as a "super-power" without ever acquiring significant military forces or nuclear weapons. Indeed, there is much that the United States can do to encourage such a development in Japan, beginning with an effort to think through again the assumptions about military force, especially with respect to Asia, that still dominate U.S. attitudes both within the Administration and without.

In general, therefore, the Nixon Administration has begun to respond to some of the new challenges that characterize the role of international economic policy as an important function of a broader view of foreign policy. Whether it succeeds in making the necessary intellectual and policy changes, however, will depend on the speed with which new currents abroad in the world are apprehended and understood; on the willingness of the Administration to reduce its preoccupation with armaments in fact as well as in pronouncement; and on the speedy conclusion of a conflict in Vietnam that now distracts so much attention as well as American material and human wealth. But with luck and imagination to supplement bureaucratic changes, this Administration could effectively preside over the beginnings of an era in which international economics will be an increasingly dominant force in world affairs. **ROBERT E. HUNTER**

## **Political Notes** *from page 6*

Senators Chancy Croft, Willie Hensley, Ed Merdes and Bill Ray, Fairbanks Mayor Julian Rice, Commissioner of Health and Welfare Fred McGinnis, and Attorney General John Havelock are all eager to run against Stevens. Many of the above are political opponents of Senator Gravel, who has alienated members of his own party over a number of events and circumstances; some might wait to tackle this more vulnerable incumbent in the 1974 primary.

What might determine the eventual statewide faceoffs in 1972 is the timing of candidate announcements. If Begich throws his hat in the Senatorial race early this could set off a chain reaction. The floodgates would then be open for the Congressional seat, and Begich's Senate bid would likely be contested by at least one other noted Democrat.

The overall outlook depends on the approval of the pipeline and to a lesser extent upon the resolving of the Native Claims issue. Without the start of the pipeline, and/or the final determination of the extent of Native land holdings, Nixon would be running in even worse trouble than now, and Stevens, too, would be jeopardized. With the pipeline moving ahead the President would be a formidable candidate in Alaska, with or without Hickel's support. Stevens in any case has to be the odds-on favorite at this point, but he is by no means impregnable. Begich also has the lead now, but his hold is more tenuous. Republicans, after a jolting setback in 1970, have much to look forward to in 1972 and later.

# Insurance In the War on Crime

The criminal justice system, composed of police, prosecutors, courts and corrections, needs a strong constituency if we are effectively to wage a war on crime. I believe that the insurance industry can and should provide impetus for strengthening and modernizing the entire system.

Components of the system, particularly the police, have been unable to keep pace with the tremendous demand for their services. The national crime clearance rate has fallen from mid-30 percent ten years ago to 19 percent of reported Class I crimes in 1970.

**LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS** Police, however, remain undertrained and under-equipped, court dockets are long, correction facilities bulging and prosecutors swamped. Businesses large and small pay higher and higher crime insurance premiums each year, if they are able to obtain it at all. Large sections of core cities are being abandoned because of the insurance drought.

While the Department of Housing and Urban Development is now directly writing crime insurance to provide some protection to small businesses in core areas, this is not the answer to millions of home owners nor businesses.

At the turn of the century, casualty companies faced a similar challenge from unchecked fires. The response was the creation in 1916 of a fire insurance grading system. This system grades cities and towns on a scale of 1 through 10, reflecting the extent to which the cities have taken steps and made an investment to reduce fire losses. A total of 5,000 negative points are assigned; the greater number of points, the higher the grade assigned to the city, resulting in higher insurance rates to the premium-paying public.

**FIRE DEPT. REPORT CARD** Illustrative of factors considered in grading are: (1) Whether the minimum number of firemen on duty for a given shift is adequate to respond to an anticipated level of fire activity, which has resulted in "full crew" standards for each city; (2) Whether the firemen receive adequate training from competent personnel; (3) Whether there is available adequate footage of proper hose and equipment; (4) Whether the department maintains adequate records; (5) Whether there is speedy response to fire alarms; (6) Whether equipment is maintained in operational condition; and (7)

Whether the fire houses are within a certain proximity to the property to be protected.

The creation of a relationship between premiums paid by a city's insured and local fire protection has resulted in a high caliber of fire service and reduced losses. The persons buying the coverage have made themselves heard in state legislatures, courthouses and city halls. The result has been a constant upgrading of fire departments and the ability to deter and combat fires.

It is my contention that a grading system reflecting law enforcement criteria, based on the existing fire grading model, would create public support for improvement of the criminal justice system.

**LAW AND ORDER LOBBY** One can only speculate about the impact of law enforcement grading, but the side effects of such an effort could be substantial. For example, the state insurance commissioner, state fire marshal, local and state police agencies, insurance agencies and companies and every elected official suddenly would view the crime problem with greater urgency, for calling on them all would be anxious members of the insurance-paying public, demanding greater allocation of public energies and resources to meet the crime crisis.

One of the objections to the creation of a criminal justice grading system is that there is a lack of standards in the field. Undoubtedly, much more must be learned, but the obvious police deficiencies provide ready criteria for grading. Some examples for grading factors might be: (1) Adequacy of police communication systems; (2) Number of police per thousand population; (3) Amount and quality of training received by officers; (4) Adequacy of equipment; (5) Intensity of patrol in high crime areas; (6) Lag time between calls for service and police response; (7) Rate at which known crimes are cleared; (8) Percent of officers on the force with advanced certificates; and (9) Extent of police department's public information efforts toward the prevention of crime.

Fortunately, the Federal government, through the Omnibus Crime Bill is beginning to funnel funds into planning and research that will refine standards upon which the grading system could be constructed.

*more on next page*

# 14a ELIOT STREET

## CHINA TELEGRAM

The following is the text of a telegram sent to President Nixon by Ripon president **Howard Gillette, Jr.**: "The Ripon Society heartily supports your decision to visit the People's Republic of China and wishes you well in your efforts to normalize relations with that country in the interests of world peace."

• The New Jersey chapter of Ripon has held an organizational meeting and elected a six-man steering committee. About thirty people showed up at the first meeting, held at Upsala College, where they were addressed by **Thomas H. Kean** of Essex, State Assembly Majority Leader and Ripon's National Political Director **Dan Swillinger**.

The members of the steering committee are: **Richard Zimmer**, one of the New Haven chapter founders, former president of the New York City chapter, NGB member, and now resident of East Orange; **Richard Poole**, Summit YR chairman; **Nancy Miller** of Springfield and secretary of the Union County YR's; **Virginia Benjamin** of Maplewood and president of the Smith College YR's; **Bud Schwartz** of Mountain Lakes and 1970 Bergen County Republican campaign chairman; and **Robert Franks** of Summit, a former TAR chairman.

• The **Paul Capra** for mayor campaign in New Haven is shot through with Ripon members. Chapter president **Hayward Draper** is volunteer coordinator and NGB member **Deke Karzon** is in charge of scheduling. **Phil Helms**, also a chapter member, serves as campaign coordinator.

• Three new people have been added to the at-large membership of the National Governing Board. They are: **Ralph Caprio**, **Dennis L. Gibson**, and **Martha McCahill**. **Marty**, a graduate of Wellesley, is now working on a drug education program at The Sanctuary in Cambridge. She ran the Ripon office for two years, planned and executed the Airlie Conference ("Wanted: A Republicanism for the 1980's"), was a director of Project Pursestrings during the summer of 1970 and worked on the Goodell campaign that fall.

**Dennis**, who is also vice president of the Detroit chapter, was recently appointed by Governor **William Milliken** as deputy director for administration in the State Department of Licensing and Regulation. He graduated from Kentucky State College, has done graduate study at Wayne State University, worked for the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce, served as chairman of the 13th congressional district "Michigan for Milliken" committee and as chairman of Milliken's "Black Strategy Committee," was a delegate to the 1971 Republican State Convention and is a member of the Republican 300 Club.

**Ralph**, originally from Chicago, has worked with OEO, Citizens Crusade Against Poverty, the Center for Community Change, and is now with the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial.

• The New York chapter has elected new officers. **Werner P. Kuhn**, a professor in the Department of Industrial Management, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn and legal counsel to the New York Council on Alcoholism, Inc.-ACCEPT, was elected president. **Richard W. Rahn**, also a professor at PIB, was chosen executive director. The other new officers: vice president for community affairs is **Richard Scanlon**, an attorney in the N.Y. State Attorney General's office; vice president for membership and finance is **Duncan Whiteside**, assistant treasurer of the Chase Manhattan Bank; vice president for politics and publicity is **Glenn S. Gerstell**, a junior at New York University; vice president for research is **Andrew Glassberg**, a professor of political science at the City University of New York; treasurer is **Peter Wallison**, an attorney at Royall, Koegel & Wells; and the secretary is **Anne Sinistore**, area supervisor for the American Field Service.

The New York chapter issued a press release July 8 urging that voter registration for the state's presidential primary be extended until May 20, 1972 and that absentee voting be allowed for that primary election. According to the present Election Law anyone registering and enrolling in a political party after October 2,

1971, will be ineligible to vote in his party's primary in June 1972 (though he will be able to vote in the November general election). The chapter wrote to Governor **Nelson Rockefeller** urging a special session of the legislature to change the present law.

• Ripon member **Bruce K. Chapman** has announced that he will campaign for election to the Seattle City Council. Bruce is the former publisher of the **Republican Advance**, author of two books, **The Party that Lost its Head** and **The Wrong Man in Uniform**, and former Ripon National Director and Seattle chapter president.

• **Benjamin C. Duster** of the Chicago chapter has been named chairman of the Illinois Commission on Human Relations. Ben, a Chicago lawyer, is a long-time member of Ripon's National Governing Board; he has written several studies on urban problems including "Education in Chicago's Inner City" and "A Solution to the Venture Capital Crisis in the Black Community."

• **Nicholas Norton** of the Hartford chapter has been named deputy state welfare commissioner. Nick was one of the founders of Ripon's Hartford chapter and its first president; he still serves on the National Executive Committee.

• **John A. Cairns**, head of the provisional chapter in Minneapolis-St. Paul, was reelected Minneapolis city alderman in July with over 60 percent of the vote.

• **Robert Behn** and **Peter Wallison** have been appointed to the State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in Massachusetts and New York respectively. Peter is also a member of HEWS National Evaluation Committee on the simplified form of income declaration for determining eligibility for public assistance.

• Favorable press department. From an editorial in the Fairmont, West Virginia, **Times**: "The Ripon Society is a Republican research and policy organization . . . Old Guard Republicans don't embrace it as warmly as the more modern breed, but it exerts a scholarly influence on all Republican strategy."

• Former FORUM editor **Doug Matthews**, moonlighting from law school, is one of the co-authors of "The Almanac of American Politics." The Almanac will be a fabulous source of information on the Congress. It includes not only information on Senators and Congressmen, but a formidable battery of statistics on their states and districts, their record on key votes, group ratings and much more. Published by Gambit later this year.

### Crime *from page 21*

#### ROLE FOR INDUSTRY

The research that would lead to the development of satisfactory grading standards would enable the insurance industry to counsel effectively with local law enforcement agencies, as is already done with local fire departments. Such counselling, as we have seen, can have a measurable impact upon the efficiency and effectiveness of such organizations. Law Enforcement would profit from the kind of assistance the fire departments have received from state and local fire marshals, state insurance commissions, rating bureaus, etc. At present there is no comparable infrastructure supporting law enforcement.

The insurance industry has a great deal at stake. Should it fail to move effectively to protect its crime insurance markets, they will be increasingly written directly by the Federal government. Yet if it can develop a support system for the criminal justice system, it may well maintain these markets and demonstrate once again the dynamics of the free enterprise system. **LYNDON A.S. WILSON**

# LETTERS

## DISMAY

Dear Sirs:

We must register our dismay with the Editorial in the July FORUM. The Editorial which consisted of a series of *ad hominem* attacks on virtually every conceivable Democratic Presidential contender was substantially below the intellectual standards to which we have become accustomed in our years of reading the FORUM. Certainly each of the Democratic contenders is open to legitimate and incisive criticism on substantive grounds. Yet personal attacks such as were abundant in the July editorial do nothing to illuminate issues or inform the FORUM readership.

Every other Ripon member with whom we have spoken who has read this editorial has expressed similar distress. Good editorialists, like even the best athletes, have off days. We do hope, however, that there will be no similar performances in the future and that the FORUM in discussing Republicans, Democrats or topical issues will emphasize substance rather than personal attacks.

CLAIR WARREN RODGERS  
JOHN C. TOPPING, Jr.  
CHRISTINE TOPPING  
PATRICIA GOLDMAN  
Washington, D.C.

## SIMILAR DISTRESS

Dear Sirs:

I found the editorial in the July FORUM so appalling and in such bad taste that I began to wonder whether I really understood the purpose of the FORUM and, indeed, the Ripon Society.

I yield to no one in my loyalty to the Republican Party, but I had thought that Ripon, in its quest for "excellence in leadership," recognized that all wisdom does not currently repose in the GOP. Some of the men you vilify in your editorial because they are Democrats have shown more capacity for leadership in recent months than any Republican who comes to mind.

Leave aside the casual brushoffs of Senator Hughes, whose career hardly deserves to be called "negligible," and of Senator Muskie, who admittedly owes his present prominence to the ineptitude of his 1968 competitors (and running mate). But Senator Bayh's campaign against Judge Carswell, so snidely dismissed in your editorial, meant a great deal in less intellectual quarters where equal justice and civil rights are not merely subjects for next month's editorial.

The insulting attempt to characterize Senator McGovern as a knee-jerk liberal conveniently ignored the fact that he had the courage to speak out on issues like Vietnam and hunger in America long before any of Ripon's current heroes.

Finally, there is the totally inexplicable slur directed at the two slain Kennedy brothers. I would be among the first to question Teddy Kennedy's presidential credentials, but I happen to feel that John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy did leave us a legacy of ideas, many of which are not inconsistent with Ripon's philosophy, and that this country would be an immeasurably better place if even one of them had lived.

It continues to astound me that Ripon can so effortlessly perceive the faults of these Democrats, but is still, after 2½ years of the most blatant misgovernment, trying to climb into bed with Richard Nixon.

ANON  
Washington, D.C.

## REAGAN, RIPON & CRLA

Dear Sirs:

Governor Reagan's feud with the California Rural Legal Assistance has drawn the attention of the FORUM. The FORUM seems to be lining up against Reagan. This phenomena is interesting because Governor Reagan, in fighting CRLA, is espousing Ripon Society principles such as "Reprivatization" and "Devolution."

(1) **Reprivatization:** CRLA and its kindred organ-

izations were created by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) over the protest of the local bar associations. Local bar associations endeavored to establish "judicare" programs.

The thrust of most "judicare" plans involves the qualification of the client as "indigent" or "semi-indigent"; referral of the client to a local member of the bar; and payment of the private attorney with government funds. The programs are somewhat akin to Medicare, except that the "semi-indigents" would pay something if they could.

The Ripon Society's concept of "Reprivatization" espouses that functions of the government be turned over to private organizations where possible and efficient. So does Governor Reagan's "judicare" program.

(2) **Decentralization:** Many of the fundamental decisions of OEO-funded legal services are made in Washington. Consequently, local legal services groups are fighting with Washington bureaucracy regarding what type of cases shall be taken and what type of personnel shall staff the local legal services law office.

There are instances where Washington has threatened the local organizations with a revocation of funding if they didn't take a certain number of cases which appealed to Washington (such as police brutality cases, etc.).

There are other instances where highly qualified personnel have been selected to staff the local offices but have been rejected by Washington because those people did not fit the ideological profile that Washington required.

The Ripon Society's concept of "Devolution" espouses that government control, where necessary, should exist at the governmental level (i.e. Federal, State, local) closest to the people. Reagan's "judicare" program accomplishes this goal.

(3) **Conclusion.** The result of OEO policies is that there are numerous instances where the poor are not being serviced in an effective manner.

I feel that the Ripon Society and the Ripon FORUM should not be attacking Governor Reagan on the CRLA issue.

It appears that Reagan is in the right and is espousing the progressive Republican ideals of reprivatization of governmental functions and devolution of power from a centralized bureaucracy to a local control.

H. GEORGE TAYLOR  
Pomona, Calif.

## RE TENNESSEE

Dear Sirs:

Re the Tennessee political note in the July FORUM. Brock was not "bypassed because of his barren conservatism." Brock's campaign organization was carefully put together during the year before the election. He had chosen his leadership well in advance of the efforts of either Tex Ritter or Winfield Dunn. While Dunn looked to both Baker and Brock for help in the gubernatorial race, the Brock forces were already busy with their own campaign and were not in a position to render "massive help" as was Baker.

Much has been made of alleged differences between the Brock and Baker wings of the Volunteer GOP. Such a division is more apparent than real. What rivalry does exist is likely to be subdued by Dunn's party reorganization. Governor Dunn will continue to move the leadership of the state party to the Statehouse, where it must be if a permanent grassroots organization is to be cultivated.

It is to that end that Kope Kopald's election takes on its significance. Kopald is highly talented in many areas, not the least of which is organization. Bailey's conservatism was of little consequence. Kopald seldom discusses issues. Kopald was chosen to prepare a nuts and bolts statewide organization and for his personal loyalty to Dunn. His task will be to design and build a vehicle that will carry Tennessee for Nixon, Baker and all the GOP congressmen. Equally important will be the attempt to capture control of the legislature.

STEPHEN A. SHARP.  
Charlottesville, Virginia



# Convert the Washington Viewpoint Converted

*Monday*, the Republican National Committee's glossy imitation of *Human Events*, is raising the hackles of some prominent Republicans. Governors William G. Milliken of Michigan and Francis W. Sargent of Massachusetts have taken exception to the "excessively strident and rigid ideological line" of *Monday*. Milliken first voiced his discontent with *Monday*, the weekly newsletter of the Republican National Committee, in a June 4th letter to GOP National Chairman Robert Dole. Milliken urged Dole to make efforts to broaden the GOP, and warned that:

If we focus our approach on the declining hard core, if we emphasize efforts to convert the converted I believe we will not only waste ammunition and efficiency, we will also turn away the independents upon whom we must depend for support, and for winning in 1972.

Of *Monday*, Milliken wrote that:

While it appeals to many, it alienates others to whom we must appeal if we are to reelect President Nixon and, of great importance to me also, if we are to reelect Bob Griffin.

Milliken, who is Vice Chairman of the Republican Governors Association, sent copies of his letter to each Republican governor. Sargent was receptive to the theme of Milliken's letter. He wrote his fellow Governors and Dole that, "it should be an absolute priority of all Republicans to broaden the base of the GOP." Sargent echoed Milliken's views on *Monday*:

I was disturbed that sincere opponents of the war in Indochina were labeled as engaging in "McCarthyism" and that Common Cause, which I feel constitutes an attempt of decent concerned people to organize a constructive outlet for their opinions was viciously attacked in *Monday*. If the Republican Party's historic tradition of dissent and tolerance is to survive, if the true consensus of our party is to emerge, then it behooves Republican spokesmen, leaders and publications to reflect our party accurately for all the diverse elements of the party as it is now and as we hope to make it.

It should be remembered that in two states written off by Kevin Phillips' "Southern Strategy," Milliken and Sargent won election to full four-year terms last fall with campaign strategies that differed substantially from the politics of exclusion advocated by GOP conservatives. Both had succeeded to the gubernatorial office in January 1969 when George Romney and John A. Volpe joined the Nixon Cab-

inet. In 1970 both incumbent Republican governors ran campaigns notable for their independence from the Administration and their efforts to attract Democrats and Independents.

In Massachusetts, Senator Edward Brooke is up for reelection in 1972. He has distinguished himself from the President on a number of issues — particularly on civil rights and foreign policy — and should have little trouble being reelected in 1972; there appears to be no Democrat of significant stature who is willing to enter the race.

However, in Michigan Milliken's concern for Griffin's reelection chances is well placed. Senator Robert Griffin is identified with the President's political strategy by virtue of his position as Senate Minority Whip and his support of the President on some key issues. In 1968, the President lost the state by 222,000 votes, and has done little since to broaden his base there. Many observers feel it will be difficult for Griffin to run far enough ahead of the national ticket to be reelected in 1972.

Lyn Nofziger, the National Committee's director of communications, when asked by the *Boston Globe* to comment on the two letters said that, "we are trying to present the other side of the story, that doesn't get printed — the positive approach to the president's programs." It appears a mystery then as to why *Monday* should remain completely silent on President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan for welfare reform. As the July 15th FORUM newsletter pointed out, *Monday* did not even deign to comment when Family Assistance passed the House of Representatives with a majority of Republican Congressmen voting for it. It is indeed odd that the Party's major publication fails to report on a bill the President labeled "the most important social legislation in 35 years."

It appears that the communications office of the RNC is only willing to support the President when he takes a position it defines as ideologically acceptable. After all, John D. Lofton, Jr., *Monday's* editor, moonlights as an associate editor of the *New Guard*, the unRepublican, anti-Nixon monthly publication of the Young Americans for Freedom. If Nofziger and Lofton aren't as willing to support President Nixon on his Family Assistance Plan, his National Health strategy, and his diplomatic efforts towards China as they are when he nominates a G. Harold Carswell or proposes an ABM, then perhaps Chairman Dole ought to replace them with some real supporters of the President.

ROBERT D. BEHN