


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# RIPON FORUM

FEBRUARY, 1973

Vol. IX No. 3

ONE DOLLAR



**PROTECTING THE PRESS**

**by U. S. Rep. Charles W. Whalen, Jr.**

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HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1884-1972

LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, 1908-1973

"We know there is injustice. We know there is intolerance. We know there is discrimination and hate and suspicion and we know there is division among us."

"But there is a larger truth. We have proved that great progress is possible. We know how much still remains to be done. And if our efforts continue, if our will is strong, if our hearts are right and if courage remains our constant companion, then, my fellow Americans, I am confident we shall overcome."

Lyndon Baines Johnson  
December 12, 1972

**THE RIPON FORUM** is published semi-monthly by the Ripon Society, Inc., 14a Eliot Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Second class postage rates paid Boston, Massachusetts. Contents are copyrighted © 1972 by the Ripon Society, Inc. Correspondence to the Editor is welcomed.

In publishing this magazine the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for a spirit of criticism, innovation, and independent thinking within the Republican Party. Articles do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Ripon Society, unless they are explicitly so labelled.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES are \$10 a year, \$5 for students, servicemen, and for Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteers. Overseas air mail, \$10 extra. Advertising rates on request. \$10 of any contribution to the Ripon Society is credited for a subscription to the Ripon FORUM.

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
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## • Margin Release

BREED'S HILL — In contemplating the subject of this column, I was struck by the necessity of assaying a topic which would be a suitable outlet for my moral outrage. I preferred to eschew the more popular objects of moral outrage in favor of a less celebrated, less villified target upon which I could heap all the burning epithets which I have hitherto reserved for the Boston Patriots. My difficulty was obvious. All of the choicer subjects for moral approbation had already been amply castigated by more proficient journalists who can lambast moral degeneracy at the strike of a carriage return. Not that I do not share most of the current moral outrage about moral outrages, but it is hard to write a column that is more outraged-than-thou-art. So, I was relieved to learn that the Charlestown Militia gathered the other night and released a salvo of musket fire down by the Old Mill Pond (which is now a less bucolic railroad yard). The Charlestown Militia brings back memories and among the dustier ones is a moral outrage. Back nearly 200 years ago (too bad this is not June or I could describe the celebration of Bunker Hill Day — a legal holiday in these parts), the British invaded this peninsula from across the Charles River in occupied Boston. The colonists, mindful of British intentions, prepared to resist. They issued orders to fortify Bunker Hill and instead fortified Breed's Hill (fortunately they got the Bunker Hill monument on the right hill — Breed's Hill). The British came and after a bit of stiff resistance from the Americans on the wrong hill, the British were successful in ousting the colonists from their redoubt. But first the British committed a moral outrage; they burned Charlestown. Fortunately, few of the current Irish residents appear too concerned (although one or two, I fear, resent my English fore-

bearers). The city of Charlestown, the oldest in the Commonwealth, was burned to the ground on the pretext of flushing out the guerillas. Now, we are all aware that the Americans fought dirty, but was such destruction necessary? Or was Bach Mai for that matter? db.



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## GUEST EDITORIAL

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# Protecting the Press

by Congressman

*Charles W. Whalen, Jr.*

In 1857, the *New York Times* published a story indicating that Congressmen had taken bribes. Reporter James Simonton was asked to reveal his sources before a select committee of the House of Representatives. He refused.

The House voted to find Simonton in contempt and he served a term of 19 days in the custody of the House Sergeant-at-Arms. In the meantime, without knowing Simonton's sources, the committee determined that his charges were true and recommended the expulsion of three members, who thereupon resigned.

More than a century later, the names have changed (substitute Earl Caldwell, Peter Bridge, *et al.* for Simonton) but the basic scenario has not. Reporters today are still going to jail instead of revealing confidential information to government authorities.

The general conflict between the government and the press, of course, has continued from Peter Zenger's time throughout American history. But the conflict has intensified in recent years and has reached disturbing proportions. The threat of Big Government dominating a once-independent media is a real one, and one of the most alarming aspects of that threat is the problem of reporters being forced to reveal information to government authorities or go to jail. When journalists are forced to choose between revealing confidential information and

going to jail, American citizens — all of us — are the losers.

It cannot be disputed that a free and independent press is the very foundation of our democratic institutions. As the Supreme Court once observed, if a representative system of government is to work, citizens must "receive the wildest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." (*Associated Press v. U.S.*, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 1945.)

Confidential information plays a vital role in the dissemination of information in both broadcast and print media. Walter Cronkite emphasized the importance of confidential information in broadcasting: "In doing my work, I (and those who assist me) depend constantly on information, ideas, leads, and opinions received in confidence. Such material is essential in digging out newsworthy facts and, equally important, in assessing the importance and analyzing the significance of public events. Without such materials, I would be able to do little more than broadcast press releases and public statements."

Reg Murphy, editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*, indicated the importance of confidential information in the print media: "I doubt that the *Constitution* has published a full edition in the last five years which did not contain confidential information."

Confidential information is used to expose crime and corruption, and it is also valuable in providing the public with news about normally inaccessible groups and unfamiliar issues. Even unpublished confidential information frequently furnishes reporters with important "background" data, enabling them to analyze and interpret the news with greater depth, insight, and accuracy.

Today, the flow of this valuable information to the public is imperiled, and it is not difficult to understand why. If potential sources cannot be assured that their identities will be protected they will not talk with reporters. For example, a government employee who knows of incompetence or corruption within his department or agency will not want to "spill the beans" unless he knows his identity will be protected, because if he is revealed he will surely lose his job. As the law stands now, there is no as-

urance that his identity will be protected. Instead, it is likely that the reporter he talks to will have to choose between revealing his identity or going to jail. The result: the employee knowing of corruption will choose to remain silent, the corruption will continue, and the public will remain uninformed.

In addition, reporters who know that they may be forced to make such a choice may be deterred from pursuing contacts with informants and possible controversial stories.

Thus, the government power to subpoena journalists — and the increased use of that power — creates a very real and dangerous "chilling effect." The free flow of information to the public is obstructed. Citizens know less about the realities of their government and the society in which they live.

Journalists have sought protection from the judicial branch of government, but it has not been granted. Reporters were denied a testimonial privilege in the courts in virtually every instance — and the few cases in recent years which ruled that information could be protected have been rendered moot by the Supreme Court's decision of June 29, 1972. (*Branzburg v. Hayes*, 40 U.S.L.W. 5025, U.S. June 29, 1972.) The Court ruled, over strong dissent, that the First Amendment does not afford reporters the right to protect sources and information from government subpoena. And the Court has emphasized that it meant what it said on June 29 by declining to hear the subsequent appeals of reporters Peter Bridge and William Farr.

The executive branch has not resolved the problem either. The guidelines issued by the Attorney General in 1970 reduced tensions somewhat, but the guidelines did not provide real protection for reporters. Subpoenas can still be issued when approved by the Attorney General, and when "emergencies and other unusual situations develop" the procedures outlined in the guidelines may be abandoned.

Nineteen state legislatures — beginning with Maryland in 1896 — have enacted some type of shield statute for reporters, and eight of those states have acted within the past eight years. In 31 states, however, journalists do not have statutory protection.

At the federal level, the first shield legislation was introduced in 1929 by Senator Arthur Capper (R-Kan.). Similar bills have been offered in 12 subsequent Congresses, and none have been acted upon.

The legislative outlook is improving, however. State legislatures are beginning to consider state shield laws. The Congress is becoming increasingly receptive as well. Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) conducted extensive hearings on free press issues in 1971 and 1972, and those hearings were initiated with testimony on shield legislation by Senator James Pearson (R-Kan.) and myself. A House subcommittee held hearings on proposed legislation in September and October 1972. Recent cases involving the jailing of reporters have brought the issue to the attention of the public and the Congress.

It is clear that Congress has the authority to enact a federal shield law, as the Supreme Court emphasized in the *Branzburg* case: "At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to address the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate." (40 U.S.L.W. at 5037.)

A variety of bills was introduced in the 92nd Congress and an even greater number is likely to be introduced during the 93rd Congress. Although there are numerous variations, there are three basic types of legislative approaches:

(1) Legislation which would make protection the exception rather than the rule. In such bills, the burden is placed on the reporter to demonstrate that his particular case falls within an exception allowing protection for his sources and information. The general rule would remain as it stands today: reporters must testify if subpoenaed or go to jail.

(2) Legislation which would provide protection in all cases without exception.

(3) Legislation which would provide protection as the rule, but which provides for one or more exceptions.

The first type of legislation, in my view, is too limited. The major purpose of shield legislation is to provide reporters and potential sources with assurance that, as a rule, their communication is protected, so that the public will receive a free flow of information from diverse sources. The first type of bill would not achieve that objective.

The other two types of legislation — the absolute bill and a bill with narrowly-drawn exceptions — both create a statutory privilege as the rule, and either would serve to promote a free flow of information.

The legislation I have introduced falls into the third category. It provides broad coverage, protecting all reporters and those independently engaged in gathering news before any body of the federal government. There is one specific exception, however: if a reporter is a defendant in a libel case and he asserts a defense based on the reliability of his sources, he may

not simultaneously refuse to name his sources and thereby preclude the Court from examining the merits of his defense claim. In other words, the exception simply prevents journalists from using the act (which is termed the "Free Flow of Information Act") to emasculate existing libel laws.

The Act also provides a means of divesting the protection under unusual circumstances. A party seeking divestiture must apply for an order from the United States District Court, and the application may be granted *only* if *all* of the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the person from whom the information is sought has information clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of the law; (2) the information cannot be obtained by alternative means; and (3) there is a compelling and overriding national interest in the information. This is the same standard which the dissenting justices on the Supreme Court would have established had they been in the majority.

Thus, the Free Flow of Information Act provides broad coverage, with a narrow libel exception and a procedure for divestiture in rare circumstances if stringent standards are met.

The enactment of a strong, effective federal shield law is a more realistic possibility now than ever before. A number of Republican Congressmen and Senators have been among the leaders of such an effort, but they (and other proponents) will need support from the public if a law is to be passed. Public officials must realize that such a law is not designed to benefit a special interest group. A shield law will benefit the entire society by protecting the people's right to know.

In addition, proponents of a legislative goal must be united to succeed in guiding a bill through a 435-member House and a 100-member Senate. The specific features of any bill must not become more important than the overall goal of enacting effective, broad protective legislation. We cannot afford to quibble over specifics: freedom of the press is in too much jeopardy for that. A federal shield law needs to be enacted to keep American reporters out of jail and to keep Americans informed. ■



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## Editorial Board COMMENTARY

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# Why Moderates Lose

by Howard L. Reiter

There is a game popular among members of the Ripon Society and other GOP moderates, and some day I am going to patent it and call it "Political Hallucination." The rules are simple: any number can play, and all you have to do is sit around (or type up a memo) and figure out how two hundred men and women, brave and true, can take over the Republican Party in 19— (date subject to change every fourth year). No resources are needed — money, volunteers, or political base — and the most points are scored by the most imaginative use of the concept "political network."

Of course, there is another game played by the Republican right, and were I to patent and sell it, I would have to call it "Political Reality." The reason they are playing a different game than we are is that they stopped hallucinating ten years ago and began to pay attention to the real world. Such real world can be delineated here, if only to provide a breathing spell between rounds of Political Hallucination.

(1) *Conventions don't decide anything any more.*

There are two kinds of political conventions — those that are decided on the first ballot, and all the rest. The first type of convention decides little or nothing, because the majority coalition is formed in the delegate selection process. Only when such a coalition is formed after the first ballot does the convention become an arena of power, with leaders and factions

determining the outcome.

The last Republican national convention which went beyond the first ballot occurred in 1948, before many of today's youngest voters were born. (The Democrats held *their* most recent multi-ballot convention in 1952.) The days of favorite sons, dark horses, smoke-filled rooms, and fifth-ballot deals are over. The reason is simple: *the old state and local machines are impotent.* No longer can they withhold votes from the front-runner.

(2) *You don't win nominations without candidates.*

If the old system has disappeared, what has replaced it? In both parties, candidates' personal movements have arisen to replace the ongoing machines of the past. Fueled by ideology (Goldwater, McGovern), orthodoxy (Nixon, Humphrey), or promises of electability (Eisenhower, Kennedy), these movements have solidified majorities by the first nominating ballot.

There are a couple of lessons here for serious players of Political Reality. One is, *start early* — two, better four, years early. Delegate-cornering is a long process. Some GOP moderates prefer to sit on the sidelines for the time being, remembering what happened to early starters like Rockefeller in 1964 and Romney in 1968 (as well as Muskie in 1972). Oddly enough, they forget that Goldwater and Nixon (and McGovern) also started early. An early start won't guarantee victory, but a late start will guarantee defeat.


The second lesson is that *networks without candidates don't win.* The system is geared for candidate movements, not political networks. The Republican right realized this in 1962; instead of trying to build a network, they built the Draft Goldwater (note that second word) movement. The Democratic left realized this in recent years — in 1967 with McCarthy, and more recently with McGovern. Whenever anybody asks me why McGovern carried Massachusetts, I recall a convention of Bay State peace activists I attended in early 1971. The purpose was to lay ground rules for choosing a candidate all would support for 1972. Eventually that candidate turned out to be George McGovern, who swept both the primary and

the November election in Massachusetts. The GOP right learned how in 1962; the Democratic left learned how in 1967; at this rate, the Ripon Society will learn how in about twenty years.

(3) *Put your money on Agnew.*


The third and most obvious facet of the real world is the impotence of the moderates. There have been five key roll-call votes at Republican national conventions in the past twenty years — the 1964 civil-rights platform amendment and Presidential ballot, the 1968 Presidential and Vice-Presidential ballots, and the 1972 fight over delegate apportionment (Rule 30). We could take heart at the fact that the liberals' share of these votes ranged from 15 percent to 32 percent if different states supported us at different conventions. But it did not turn out that way: nine delegations (seven in the Northeast, plus Michigan and Minnesota) were with the moderates in all three years; four were with us in two of those years; nine delegations supported us in only one year (usually 1964); and 32 were never with us. (See map.) *Regardless whether Ripon wins its suit*, in 1976 the loyal-liberal nine will cast about 25-30 percent of the convention votes; those nine plus the four usually-moderate will cast about 27-32 percent; and even if we add the nine one-timers, we get a whopping total of 40-44 percent. And this is ridiculously optimistic — in that third category are states like Utah, with us in 1968 because of a religious bond with George Romney; Ohio, with us on Rule 30 out of self-interest; and Maryland, liberal in 1964 but not since (especially unlikely to help us in 1976!).

There has been a lot of ballyhoo about the Rule 30 fight, as if anything really important was accomplished by us. It was 1964 all over again: ten out of the 12 delegations that supported us on Rule 30 had been with us on at least one of the two 1964 roll-calls. And those who attempt to explain away this fact by noting that the 1972 delegates (even in those same states) were different people from the 1964 delegates raise a trivial point; for the past thirty years, there has *always* been about an 80 percent turnover between consecutive GOP conventions. (This



**KEY**

**DELEGATION SUPPORT OF MODERATE CAUSE IN 1964, 1966, AND 1972:**



claim seems to have engendered some controversy within Ripon; those who dispute it are invited to recheck my figures.)

The Rule 30 fight was not even a moral victory. Had delegations voted purely on self-interest, we would have won narrowly. Indeed, four usually-liberal delegations would have benefited in apportionment by opposing us, and three of them did oppose us. On the other hand, 12 usually-conservative delegations would have benefitted in apportionment by supporting us, but only three were with us. In short, *the cross-pressured liberals chose expediency; the cross-pressured conservatives chose principle.*

The foregoing are some simple facts that players of Political Hallucination are invited to contemplate only at their peril, because the cold, hard realities are likely to take all the fun out of the theorizing. But luckily GOP moderates are not likely to let reality get

in the way of their enjoyment — already several moderates are considering making a try for 1976, thereby busting up the less-than-a-third strength we have, yet at the same time they are playing the waiting game used to such advantage by Scranton in 1964 and Rockefeller in 1968. And Ripon goes on its merry way building networks in the air.

To those of us who like to root our daydreams in some semblance of the real world, the players of Political Hallucination are often irksome, indulging in petty dishonesties like Presidential endorsements and pie-in-the-sky memoranda about truly Napoleonic campaigns, all in order to shore up the myth that the national party is more vulnerable to our influence than it really is. But being irksome is a minor sin that we all share. The really egregious effect is to hand the party (and maybe the Presidency) over

to Spiro Agnew, who will be nominated in 1976 barring a right-wing defection to someone even more conservative. (And Ripon will probably support him; after all, we dredged up a two-year-old speech of Nixon's to rationalize our endorsement of *him*; surely in fourteen years of public life Agnew will have delivered a speech we can use!)

After GOP moderates, including Ripon, marched in lockstep behind Nixon and Agnew in 1972, we see the fruits of the victory — Romney, Peterson, and Hesburgh out; Ash, Brennan, and Brinegar in; terror-bombing for Hanoi; and economic drift for you and me. It is the failure to plan realistically to counter in 1976 the continuation of policies of racism and blitzkrieg that make the playing of Political Hallucination more than irksome; under the circumstances, it constitutes criminal misfeasance. ■

# The Emerging Republican Youth

by J. Brian Smith

The Republican National Committee rose to the occasion of the 1972 campaign with uncharacteristic vigor on several scores, not the least of which concerned the GOP's attempt to attract young people. With the gutsy endorsement of the young and articulate RNC co-chairman, Tom Evans, and the financial sanction of the even younger deputy chairman, Ed DeBolt, it became possible to create and carry out a "Youth Issues Program." The goal: to bring the first-term record of

the Nixon Administration directly to the nation's college campuses — to demolish any notion that the Republican Party was not interested, or equipped, to take on critical young people.

This program was created to fill an embarrassing void, and therein lies the reason for the controversy which ensued. The clear emphasis of the Committee to Re-Elect the President's youth arm, Young Voters for the President (YVP), was blue-collar youth and not college youth. On the surface, this makes political sense. Seventy percent of all young people are not in school. But new majorities are rarely found on the surface. The future leadership of the nation presently resides on the nation's campuses. It is there that the issues are discussed and debated with the most fervor. And the news media, which had been observing with alarming frequency that the GOP had "written off" the youth vote, concentrates on the trends of campus thought and activity. Clearly, any party strategy which excludes college youth is not only irrelevant but politically disastrous.

Yet that is precisely what the YVP's did — excluded college youth. And that is why the RNC's Youth Issues Program was so very important. Despite a page-one, *Washington Post* article which described "a spate of memos" from YVP director Ken Reitz suggesting that the Youth Issues Program be curbed, the issues were brought to over 200 campuses in thirty-five states — from Harvard to Berkeley. A formal challenge was confidently issued to Sen. George McGovern to allow any of his youth representatives to debate the GOP "trouble-shooters" (in the words of Tom Evans) "on any campus, in any state." This program demonstrated to young people, many of whom had never seen a Republican on their campus, that the President had been able to effect significant reform and, moreover, that the GOP was receptive to young people and new ideas.

The inevitable question must be asked: Why did the YVP strategy exclude college youth? I will risk the wrath of the GOP hierarchy and flatly suggest that the exclusionary attitude of many of the men and women who called the campaign shots from 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue was in

many ways symptomatic of a deeply rooted Republican paranoia concerning the college constituency. To face the facts, Republicans have for too long been *afraid* of the nation's campuses. They view "college youth" as an unwieldy and untamed collection of leftist agitants who represent a direct threat to their concept of true Republicanism. It is an understandable surface concern, for more college students call themselves "liberal" than "conservative." This should explain why party moderates such as Senators Charles Percy and Edward Brooke and liberals such as Senators Jacob Javits and Mark Hatfield so forcefully advocate focusing party attention on the campus. The kids *agree* with them.

But let us take a closer look. Most college students do not classify themselves as either liberal or conservative (largely relative labels anyway), but use the more nondescript label, "middle-of-the-road." The truth is that the motivating factors on the campus these days are not necessarily ideological. F. Clifton White, who managed James Buckley's successful Senate campaign, tells with unconcealed pride anyone who cares to listen that his candidate — a conservative — had more youth support than his two liberal opponents combined. Why? "We made a place for them. We gave them a chance to get involved. We were the only show in town."

The fact is that those GOP strategists who advocate a party course which stays clear of the nation's campuses are frequently those who have not been on a campus in ten or twenty years. Where do they receive their impressions of college youth? From the news media — the same news media which, they maintain, portrays them so unfairly.

The issues have little to do with party ideology. Even conservatives score points on the campus by discussing the issues in a rational manner. William F. Buckley, Jr., who frequently travels the campus trail, is a master. More to the point, those who witnessed an appreciable lessening of hostility toward the Vice-President on the nation's campuses in 1972 and sought a reasonable explanation could easily have pointed to a significant change in the V.P.'s own approach to college

youth. The Agnew who inflamed students with his "effete corps . . ." statements of 1970 was winning solid kudos following a nationally televised debate with four student-body presidents and low-key, question-and-answer sessions on the campuses of Drake University and the University of Maine, Orono.

Moreover, the Youth Issues Program, launched by the RNC toward the nation's campuses, was done during the tenure of RNC Chairman Bob Dole — a conservative from Kansas.

An active and on-going effort to openly engage young people in discussions on the issues is hardly a veiled move to sabotage the GOP from the left. Conservatives have potentially as much to gain from increased party constituency as do liberals. The feather-headed observer would reach the following conclusion: the YVP's were sponsored by Sen. William Brock who is a conservative — the YVP's virtually ignored the campuses — therefore, an issues-approach directed toward college youth would benefit party moderates or liberals.

The Young Voters' approach was not a conservative approach but, from a long-range party perspective, an ill-advised approach. Reitz *et al.* strongly advocated that the RNC Youth Issues Program cease to operate on the nation's campuses. As a reason, they suggested that an issues-approach was "faulty." Significantly absent was any effort to demonstrate that an approach

based on discussion of the issues was politically disastrous. Of course not, for it could not be done. The RNC's youth-issues team was well received on campuses across the country, not only in safe Republican strongholds, but also in the "hot-spots!"—Berkeley, Yale, and Columbia. And as for political impact, the Youth Issues Program generated more positive media coverage concerning the GOP's standing with youth than any other single element in the '72 Nixon campaign effort.

No one has yet to demonstrate that a political party stands to attract more young recruits via a carefully planned and orchestrated series of rock concerts than a comparably well-planned attempt to send party representatives onto the campus to answer questions. Let me be blunt about it: Is the "average" American young person more likely to enlist in the GOP because he is exposed to the artistic achievement of Jerry Lee Lewis or Bill Haley and the Comets, or because an honest effort is made to articulate the GOP's position on, say, deficit spending?

Similarly, can Brenda Box, Miss Teenage America, adequately resolve the anxiety that a campus youth may have concerning Nixon's position on Bangladesh?

The answer should be obvious. It is *not* to do away with rock concerts and nostalgia shows, those hallmarks of the YVP effort. These devices play their role and are, in many ways, con-

structive. One cannot deny, for example, that what the GOP needed most in a youth sense at the Republican Convention was a visible display of youth support. And one cannot deny that, on that score, the YVP's came through admirably.

However, if a party — in this case, our party — is to ever achieve majority status, it must have more than rock concerts. In addition, it must provide young people with a *reason* to enlist. That is what the YVP's failed to do. That is the void that the RNC attempted to fill. "Why be a Republican?" "Why vote for the President?" These are questions which needed to be answered just as much at the University of Southern California as on Wall Street.

In response to President Nixon's stirring challenge for the Republican Party to become "a party of the open door," the YVP's put together an organization for "members only." That is the ultimate indictment of the YVP strategy. The GOP is a party out-registered by better than two to one. This was not the time for exclusionary politics.

Over one hundred years ago, President Abraham Lincoln delivered this bit of sage advice: "Let the people know the facts and the country will be saved." Looking ahead — to 1976 and beyond — this counsel may very well represent the way to a Republican Party composed of more young people than ever before. ■



# Centralizing the Decentralizing Process

*by Howard Gillette, Jr.*

The pattern now being set by President Nixon for his second term was predictable, given the lessons he learned from his first four years in office. The internal changes in the Administration are sensible in outline, but potentially disquieting for people who care about the fine details of policy.

As he entered his first term, Nixon made no secret of his paramount interest in foreign affairs, to the extent that he expected to relegate domestic policy to his Cabinet. He sought coordination and direction first through the Urban Affairs Council and later through a tightening up of White House controls through the domestic affairs staff of John Ehrlichman. The President not only announced that his Cabinet officers would serve as "their own men," but turned over the bulk of federal patronage to them (a move he identified almost immediately as "a big mistake"). The three former governors in the Cabinet — George Romney, Walter Hickel and John Volpe — were soon looked upon unfavorably at the White House as "disruptive," as much because of their evangelistic tendencies as for any of the programs they promoted. The implications of the White House reaction were obvious in the selection of the new Cabinet: no elected officials who might play to their own constituency are on the new Nixon team. Only thus

can the absence of a Richard Ogilvie or a Richard Lugar in the new Cabinet be explained. What the Administration lost in experience it gained in loyalty.

During the first term the President was reportedly depressed about the difficulty of managing the federal bureaucracy. It was therefore unsurprising when trusted members of the White House staff fanned out to fill powerful undersecretary positions in the different agencies. The decision to reorganize the Cabinet by executive fiat, along lines first proposed to the Congress in March, 1971, was more startling, but certainly in line with the President's goal of exercising control over the Washington bureaucracy. A decision must have been reached that such sensitivities as were offended in the Congress would be compensated for by benefits to presidential power.

The President's first goal under reorganization is to cut federal spending in line with one of the few promises he made in the campaign, to hold the line on new taxes. During the first term he was convinced by Patrick Moynihan that a conservative Administration ought not, for the sake of national political stability, dismantle the accomplishments of the previous liberal Administration. Now that he has been overwhelmingly re-elected, President Nixon no longer needs to hold any Great Society programs as sacrosanct. Moreover, he feels he has a right to oppose congressional programs approved against his opposition which would lead inevitably to higher taxes.

What ought to concern progressives is not that many Great Society programs will be scrapped and that some deserving new programs might not be implemented, but that the ultimate decisions on domestic policy will be made in isolation by people without practical experience in local government and with only the broad outline of political philosophy at hand.

The Great Society will be dismantled in the name of New Federalism. The Administration is in general agreement that national programs ought to be rationalized and that many activities now centered in Washington would yield better results if administered in the states and localities. Just what determines the fine details of such a program seems still in doubt, however.

In January, 1970, the President's chief speech-writer, William Safire, circulated a memo entitled "New Federalist Paper No. 1," which attempted to fit Nixon policy into an overall scheme of New Federalism. He characterized future federal policy as one of "national localism" which gave the federal government power to set policy (nationalized decision-making), while leaving the states the responsibility of carrying out that policy (decentralized administration). Safire did not recognize that his philosophy would diminish the power of the states and therefore of federalism. Most important, in giving the federal government virtual control over policy direction, he suggested that the will of the majority ought to reign:

When the national conscience forms around specific moral issues, it is often afflicted with 'pluralistic ignorance' — a case in which the majority opinion does not realize it has become the majority. National leaders can crystallize this concern, give the phantom majority its legitimate status, and turn its moral judgment into national policy.

This moral judgment would be determined not by the Constitution nor any time-honored principles, but by "what most people who think about morality at all think is moral at a given time."

Imagine how such a rationale might have been used as support for the President's stand against school busing (as justified by public opinion if not by the courts). When final decisions are made affecting the budget, those groups without a specific Nixon constituency, particularly blacks and the poor, will suffer most. In either case, the Safire argument provides an open invitation to bend policy to what Alexis de Tocqueville once called "the tyranny of the majority."

Safire's proposals did not go unchallenged in Administration circles. Richard Nathan, who was then in the Office of Management and Budget, countered with a standard of federalism which he called "responsible decentralization." Under his plan the federal government would stress restoration of service programs to state and local governments who held those powers before they were usurped by the Great Society: "The heart of the so-

cial reforms of the Nixon Administration is the re-establishment of the political ideas of American federalism plowed under by the Great Society."

Nathan, who has returned to the Brookings Institution from government, believes the Administration is sufficiently aware of the pitfalls of the Safire relativist position. Other former Administration officials point out that the loss of former governors to the Administration is not as important as it would seem, given the tendency among these officials to forget about their state experience once they take federal positions. The transfer of Elliot Richardson from HEW to Defense finds no such rationale, when a former state official was clearly on the verge of putting his special sphere of responsibility in Washington in shape.

Those who know him say John Ehrlichman, whose rise to power in domestic affairs is now complete, is open-minded and fair. But the people around him have not yet revealed the capacity for political growth, either in dealing with Congress or party officials. Sen. Bob Dole, like Ray Bliss before him, must have known he was slated for retirement as chairman of the national committee. But as in 1968,

the messages from the White House were confused, the lines of decision were muddled and another loyal Republican was put out to field with a legacy of bitterness. The story of Dole's dismissal follows almost exactly the account of the Bliss firing by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in *Nixon in the White House*:


'Nixon wanted Bliss out of the national chairmanship, and replaced by a party spokesman . . . But he buttered up Bliss with so much praise (calling his organizational work 'superb') that the chairman thought the President-elect was letting him write his own departure ticket — later, when things had calmed down, perhaps June or July or some other time.

The resulting newspaper stories, based on Bliss's account, were sheer disaster. 'Bliss Agrees to Stay as Chairman' read the headline in the *Washington Post*. The story said Bliss had agreed to 'continue indefinitely,' hinting his tenure might even last through the 1970 elections. To counter these stories, Nixon aides leaked reports that Bliss would go, and

would go soon. Things were back to where they had been right after the election, with party leaders justifiably angry that Richard Nixon was treating a true and loyal party functionary with undeserved shabbiness.

The President cannot act in isolation during his second term. He will need the Congress and he will need the party. He has public support for his desire to hold down government spending (Harris Poll, January 8), but at the time polls show that the public expects him to spend more money to "help minorities achieve equality" and to help the poor (Harris Poll, December 28). Clearly the Nixon Administration program will demand the kind of political sensitivity and judgment too often missing in the past if it is to succeed.

We need not be testy about President Nixon's prospects for success; all Republicans have a stake in the success of this Administration. But we will be watching closely whether the New Federalism will be executed in the months ahead with the kind of fairness and justice which can make us proud of Mr. Nixon's alternative to the Great Society. ■



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# POLITICS: REPORTS

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## ALASKA

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JUNEAU — Democrat Emil Notti, president of the Alaska Native Foundation, will face Republican State Sen. Don Young in the election to succeed the late Congressman, Nick Begich (D). Notti was nominated by a Democratic State Convention on January 13, defeating Begich's widow, Mrs. Pegge Begich, and State Sen. Chancy Croft.

Republicans appear to be giving their candidate much heavier support in this election than they did in November. Young will rely primarily on "surrogates" in his campaign, according to GOP State Chairman Jack Coghill, who will be Young's campaign manager, while Young spends most of his time in Juneau for the current legislative session.

For this session, Republicans have succeeded in assuming the leadership of both the State Senate and House, despite their minority status in the latter body. Although Democrats outnumber Republicans 20-19 in the House, the Democrats failed to organize themselves to gain leadership control for the fifth time in eight years — despite frequent majority status.

This year, three Democrats and one independent (an ex-Democrat) joined the Republicans to elect State Rep. Tom Fink (R) as Speaker of the House. Four other Democrats have said that they will vote with the GOP on procedural matters. One problem the Democrats faced was that the candidate of their liberal wing, State Rep. Mike Bradner, is from Fairbanks and a Fairbanks Republican, Terry Miller, had already been elected Senate President. The large Anchorage delegation, therefore, was hesitant to elect a second legislative leader from that city. Deals for committee leadership posts also aided the Democratic defection.

Miller, a 30-year-old liberal and six-year veteran of the legislature, will be assisted by Senate Majority Leader Lowell Thomas, Jr. of Anchorage. Fink, a firm conservative and respected

intellect, will work with House Majority Leader Mildred H. Banfield, a highly regarded moderate. ■

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## FUN CITY

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NEW YORK CITY — Although the election will be November 6, the next mayor of the City of New York will almost certainly be selected in late June, when the Democratic primary runoff will be held.

The current political situation, coupled with a ratio of more than three Democrats for every Republican, is likely to insure that a Democrat will control City Hall for the next four years. The last session of the state legislature passed a law that mandated the runoff for the top two primary candidates, should one fail to obtain more than 40 percent of the total vote. Although the purpose of this law is to produce a candidate of broad appeal, it is possible that the top two candidates could have only minority ethnic or regional appeals and lack city-wide popularity. This type of system fosters many primary entrants, and there are about 20 Democrats who are said to be considering tossing their hats in the ring. Actually, only about a third of that number will enter, mainly because a serious effort will cost at least \$500,000. (The campaign for the general election in November could well run into a couple of million dollars.)

The chief issue in the campaign can be summed up in one name: John V. Lindsay. Now in his eighth year as mayor, the former Republican has presided over "Fun City" while taxes, welfare rolls, the number of city employees, and the budget have gone up and safe streets and the management of city services have gone down. No matter how liberal he may be, the successful mayoralty candidate must take a tough stand against crime in the streets and promise a much more efficient city government. The Mayor has lately been spending more time tending to the details of city govern-

ment, and has been seen more frequently in the outer boroughs of the city; in spite of his unpopularity (and that is being charitable), Lindsay is undecided whether to seek a third term. If he does, he is likely to run on the Democratic and Liberal lines, and if elected, use the mayoralty as a springboard for a race for governor or senator (against Javits) in 1974. The Liberal Party must select their candidate prior to the Democratic runoff, so it is conceivable that they will pick Lindsay, only to see him lose the Democratic primary. In that case, Lindsay would try to repeat his astonishing 1969 victory by remaining on the Liberal line and getting an independent line on the ballot.

No matter what decision he makes, Lindsay will be a critical figure this year. Just as important will be Lindsay's old nemesis, Nelson Rockefeller. For a short time the Governor toyed with the idea of a fusion candidate (at the Governor's insistence, Republicans would endorse an acceptable Democrat, thus leaving the voters no real choice). The plan was designed to put a halt to the political career of John Lindsay. However, the Governor, having since dismissed the fusion idea as impractical, can be expected to provide significant resources to the right Democrat, should one appear.

On the Democratic side, the four leading contenders for mayor — all unannounced — are Comptroller Abraham Beame, a very popular figure backed by the powerful Brooklyn machine who lost to Lindsay in 1965; Bronx Congressman Mario Biaggi, a rather attractive, highly decorated 24-year veteran of the Police Department; Congressman Herman Badillo, the former borough president of the Bronx who is the nation's first Puerto Rican Congressman; and City Council President Sanford Garelik, the former police chief inspector who was Lindsay's 1969 running mate on the Republican and Liberal lines, but who has since charted an independent course. In the primary, Biaggi would be the more conservative candidate and could count on the votes of his fellow Italians, while Beame would be in the center and capture a large part of the Jewish vote. Badillo, a liberal who ran in the Democratic mayoralty primary four

years ago, has also demonstrated a strong appeal among Jews, who are disproportionately heavy voters in primaries.

There are several other Democrats who may run for mayor, but will settle for city council president or comptroller: Congressmen Edward Koch, a liberal who represents Lindsay's old "Silk Stocking" district; Hugh Carey, who has represented a part of Brooklyn since 1960; and "Battling" Bella Abzug, about whom little need be said; Manhattan borough president Percy Sutton, a popular black leader; consumer affairs commissioner and former Miss America, Bess Myerson; Environmental Protection Administrator Jerome Kretchmer, a liberal West Side ex-Assemblyman; Albert Blumenthal, the deputy minority leader of the State Assembly; and City Councilman Matthew Troy, the Queens Democratic Party leader. All, with the exception of Troy, are quite liberal.

In contrast to the plethora of Democratic candidates, the Republicans suffer from a near famine of aspirants. State Sen. Roy M. Goodman, an attractive Manhattan liberal, has decided not to run this year, but instead may try for a state-wide post next year. Fioravante Perrotta, Lindsay's 1969 running mate who managed Rockefeller's and Nixon's campaigns in the city in 1970 and 1972, has made a similar decision. The Republican candidate in 1969, State Sen. John Marchi of Staten Island, may run again. Republicans will probably lie low this year in the city and worry about retaining the Executive Mansion and Sen. Jacob Javits's seat in 1974. Many strategists believe the best hope for the GOP consists of Lindsay on the Liberal line, Badillo in the Democratic column, and a Jewish businessman from Queens or Brooklyn on the

Republican ticket. Even then, the odds are that the next "His Honor" will still be a Democrat. ■

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## KANSAS

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TOPEKA — J. S. "Jack" Ranson, a 43-year-old investment banker from Wichita, was elected Kansas GOP state chairman on January 8 at a meeting of the Republican State Committee.

Ranson defeated former State Sen. C. Y. Thomas by a vote of 51-41, apparently with the support of associates of Rick Harman, the party's 1968 candidate for governor. The election was held under a new state law which changed the date for the election of party chairmen from the post-primary to the post-election period.

In other races for state party leadership, Mary Nell Reece of Scandia was elected vice chairman, Robert Orth of Sublette was elected treasurer and 34-year-old Neta Pollom of Topeka was elected secretary. Mrs. Pollom had been a candidate for the state legislature but lost by 42 votes. ■

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## NEW YORK

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NEW YORK CITY — Gov. Nelson Rockefeller's creation of a state commission to examine "the role of the modern state in our changing federal system" will have broad national implications.

Rockefeller has appointed former Delaware Gov. Russell Peterson to be the commission's executive chairman. But the appointment of Peterson, who was defeated for re-election in November, is merely one indication of the breadth of the commission's responsibilities.

Rockefeller enunciated the commission's goals in a speech to the New York State legislature, but their importance was lost in the controversy that erupted over Rockefeller's proposals for stiff punishments for drug traffickers. The four-term governor told the legislature that the commission would do more than examine the nation's federal structure. It will "study the relations between nations and the extent to which functions can be shared or carried out by institutions, public and private, to help accomplish

society's objectives," said Rockefeller.

Rockefeller believes that the web of New York State's interdependence has global as well as national dimensions. Therefore, the study will examine the world and national impact on New York. In the end, Rockefeller hopes to determine what "roles, functions and responsibilities" of government should be discharged at what level: federal, state, regional or local.

It could be a biggie. ■

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## OHIO

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
COLUMBUS — Former Gov. James A. Rhodes (R) announced his candidacy for his former post in a press release January 13.

Rhodes made the early announcement of his 1974 campaign intentions to allow sufficient time for a court suit challenging the meaning of a constitutional provision which limits the governor to two consecutive terms. Rhodes maintains that since Gov. John Gilligan (D) has held office since 1970, the constitution does not block the former governor's candidacy.

Meanwhile, the outcome of another legal hassle will determine if conservative State Sen. Donald E. "Buz" Lukens can seek the gubernatorial nomination. Lukens has been barred from seeking public office in the state for five years by Republican Secretary of State Ted W. Brown. Brown says Lukens failed to meet the December 22nd deadline for filing the financial report for his recent legislative race.

Lukens claims that only a mixup in the mails prevented delivery. The chairman of the Butler County Board of Elections has acknowledged receipt of Lukens's report on January 2 and a hearing before the county board has been scheduled.

And in another curious permutation of Ohio politics, a longtime political associate of former Gov. Rhodes is moving to Washington to become a press aide to Republican Sen. William Saxbe. James Duerk, who handled public relations at the Ohio Republican State Committee before becoming Gov. Rhodes's press aide and political advisor, was originally offered the same job with Saxbe when the Senator was first elected in 1968. Duerk's new job may be an indication of Sen. Saxbe's plans for 1974. ■



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## POLITICS: PEOPLE

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● "The press has been good to the Republican Party, to the National Committee, to the Committee for the Re-election of the President. I appreciate that you reported the facts — now and then," said Sen. **Robert J. Dole**, hosting a press party as he relinquished his role as RNC chairman. The Kansas Senator admitted he will probably face a hard re-election battle in 1974 against Gov. **Robert B. Docking** (D).

● Mrs. **Grace Rohrer**, North Carolina Republican national committeewoman, has been appointed secretary of art, history and culture by Republican Gov. **James Holshouser**. It is the highest administrative office ever held by a woman in the Tarheel State.

● Freedom for Vietnam Department: While Americans bombed Hanoi to insure the freedom of South Vietnamese (leaders), the United States was assisting the Saigon government in limiting the freedom of exiled Vietnamese. One of these, **Ngo Con Duc**, the former publisher of the most popular Saigon daily, **Tin Sang**, who fled Vietnam after losing a rigged re-election for his seat in the lower house of the national legislature, has been trying to visit the United States to go on a speaking tour. The Catholic liberal cannot get a visa from the Nixon Administration. Another important exiled political leader, Lt. Gen. **Nguyen Chanh Thi**, has been prevented from accepting an invitation from Vietnamese exiles in Paris to join them for a meeting. Thi, the former I Corps commander, was ousted from his post for his outspoken stands, particularly in favor of a return to civilian government. The ouster led to the "1966 Buddhist Struggle Movement." Since his exile in 1966, Thi has been living in a shabby, Washington studio apartment. His four children are in a nearby religious home. He requested assurance from the Immigration Service that he would be allowed to return from the Paris meeting since he is currently in the United States on a tourist visa and did not want to be separated from his children. Such assurance has been officially denied.

● Washington Republicans have elected **Ross Davis**, a young lobbyist for Boise Cascade, to be the new GOP state chairman. Davis, who lobbied for Boise Cascade in both Washington and California, was the choice of Gov. **Daniel Evans**. He will be a full-time official and may move his office from Olympia to Seattle.

● Needed: Research assistants for Sen. **Bill Brock** (R-Tenn.). Pay: Little or none, but the job will look good on your resume. Apply: Harvard University Office of Graduate and Career Plans (ask for Charlie) or at other institutions of higher education.

● **Victor Gold** has left Vice President **Spiro Agnew** to other public relations devices. Gold, Agnew's erascible press secretary for the past two and a half years, was given a straightjacket last year by his fans in the press. A letter from Gold appeared in a recent issue of **National Review** damning the magazine for an article about his boss. Gold expressed "reluctance (to comment) because a) one expects a more balanced stan-

dard of Washington reportage from **National Review** than is generally found in the **Washington Post** and b) replying to the Evans and Novak fragmented bitching school of political correspondence, obviously viewed by your Man in Washington as worthy of emulation, is a maddening exercise in defending that which, had the full story been told, needs no defense." Break it up, boys.

● In North Dakota, 35-year-old **Allan C. Young** was elected state GOP chairman to succeed **Jack Huss**. The new chairman is a department store executive and a former Young Republican leader in the state. He previously was party vice chairman, and narrowly defeated **Peter Wold**, a GOP county chairman who represented a trio of Republican insurgents.

● Connecticut Gov. **Thomas J. Meskill** paid the State Department of Transportation \$931.25 pursuant to the completion of flying instruction in a state-owned plane which led to a pilot's license for the Governor. Some people will pay anything to get high.

● Former ACTION Director **Joseph Blatchford** has decided not to seek the job of Los Angeles mayor. Blatchford's decision not to file for the April election leaves **Joel Wax**, a liberal and former member of Congressman **Alphonzo Bell's** staff, as the principal Republican in the large field of candidates.

● Conservatives won leadership positions in the new class of freshmen Republican congressmen. Congressman **John Conlan** (R-Ariz.) was elected class president while other leadership positions went to Congressmen **George O'Brien** (R-Ill.), vice president; **Donald Mitchell** (R-N.Y.), secretary; and **Marjorie Holt** (R-Md.), treasurer. Liberals and moderates in the class, led by Congressman **Paul Cronin** (R-Mass.), had attempted to delay the vote in order to let the class become better acquainted. Congressman **Jack Kemp** (R-N.Y.), the president of the GOP's freshman class in the 92nd Congress, made a similar pitch to the frosh. But the conservatives ignored such logic and elected their slate.

● The **Washington Evening Star and Daily News**, President Nixon's favorite newspaper (or so it seems), has switched its editorial position on the Vietnam War. In an editorial on December 30, 1972, it stated, "It is good that the American bombing of North Vietnam apparently will be halted in celebration of New Year's Day. It would be better if, in celebration of the whole new year and of mankind's future, the bombing were not resumed." As the **Star** said, "Enough is enough. For God's sake, let us have done with it." Amen.

● New Hampshire's outgoing governor, **Walter Peterson**, was kept busy in the closing days of his term filling state posts that would otherwise have been filled by the new governor, **Meldrim Thomson**, who had defeated Peterson in last year's Republican gubernatorial primary.

● Retiring Sen. **John Sherman Cooper** (R-Ky.) is joining the Washington law firm of Covington and Burling as "counsel." Sen. Cooper will fill the seat in the firm once held by the late **Dean Acheson**. Firm partner **Ed Burling** is a prominent, anti-war Republican.

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## **Protecting Private Pensions**

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*The Ripon Society has been identified more with the problems of youth than with the difficulties of the nation's elderly. In this article, John K. Dirlam examines the deficiencies of private pension plans and some legislative remedies for these ills. The issues are technical, but the consequences of current procedures are too human in the distress they occasionally wreak on employees. Dirlam has experience in the pension department of a large Northeastern insurance company.*

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*by John K. Dirlam*

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the current controversy over private pension plans is that it did not develop sooner, for the operation of the private pension system in America has had a major impact on the nation's economy over the last three decades.

There are approximately 45,000 pension and profit-sharing plans in existence today, including over 30,000,000 people and controlling assets of over \$150 billion. There are presently well over 4,000,000 retired men and women receiving \$7 billion in annual pension benefits. For many of them, this income, coupled with Social Security benefits, constitutes their sole means of support.

At the center of most of the current criticism of the pension system is the plight of the long-service employee, who, under circumstances beyond his control, suddenly forfeits all or part of his retirement benefits. The primary causes of such forfeitures are termination of the retirement plan and termination of employment.

When financial difficulties force a company to suspend its retirement plan, or, in extreme circumstances, to declare bankruptcy, an employee at present has little protection for his accrued benefits. An average of 500 plans are terminated annually, involving approximately 25,000 employees. While this does not represent a major portion of

the total number covered, it is nevertheless a devastating blow to those who are affected. This is especially true when a large number of people in one particular area are involved in a plan termination. Perhaps the best known example of this is the Studebaker plan. When Studebaker declared bankruptcy in 1963, it was found that there were insufficient funds on hand to pay the vested benefits of both active and retired employees. This is the usual situation, since most plans are technically underfunded until the end of the 10-30 year amortization period. In the case of Studebaker, while all retired employees received lifetime pensions, over 4,000 active employees were adversely affected by the termination. Although this case is the most dramatic because of its size, it is not exceptional.

The other major cause of pension forfeitures is the restrictive vesting provisions found in some plans. The concept of vesting is crucial because when an employee leaves a company before retirement, whether his departure is voluntary or is the result of a lay-off or merger, he may lose all or part of his accrued benefit. Every pension or profit-sharing plan contains a provision outlining the steps by which an employee earns the irrevocable right to (i.e., becomes vested in) the funds contributed by the employer on his behalf. Most plans provide for partial vesting by

the fifth year of participation and full vesting sometime between the tenth and fifteenth years. Some also have an age requirement. This average schedule is not unreasonable, since it serves to reward the longer-service employees without unduly penalizing those who leave after a reasonable length of time. The problem lies with those plans that incorporate more stringent vesting schedules which result in the departure of employees after twenty or even thirty years of service with no vested benefits. Although such cases are not the general rule, they are common enough to raise a serious question of fairness.

Another factor compounding the problem is the lack of strong fiduciary standards and disclosure requirements for retirement plans. Only five states have laws requiring annual filing of plan statements. At the federal level, both the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor require annual reports, although the latter requires them only for plans involving 100 or more people. None of these reports, however, is comprehensive enough to present a complete picture of the financial condition of a plan.

In the absence of strong disclosure laws, fiduciary standards have at times been rather low. Although there are laws at both the state and federal levels dealing with actual malfeasance, few safeguards exist against financial practices which are technically legal, but clearly not in the best interests of the employees. Two examples are the extension of unsecured loans to friends or business associates and over-investment in the employer's own firm. These practices, while again not the general rule, tend to raise doubts about the fiscal integrity of retirement funds.

In recent years, several bills have been introduced in Congress aimed at providing greater protection for employees' interests under retirement plans. The best-publicized and most comprehensive of these is the one sponsored by Senators Jacob Javits and Harrison Williams, which died in the last session of Congress, but will be introduced again this year. The key provisions of the Javits-

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**"At the center of most of the current criticism of the pension system is the plight of the long-service employee, who, under circumstances beyond his control, suddenly forfeits all or part of his retirement benefits."**

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Williams bill are those dealing with vesting, re-insurance, portability, disclosure requirements and fiduciary standards.

1. Vesting. The bill tackles the problem of restrictive vesting schedules by proposing mandatory 30 percent vesting after eight years, with 10 percent additional each year thereafter. Full vesting is thus achieved after fifteen years of service, regardless of age.

2. Re-insurance. The bill calls for a re-insurance program as a guarantee against plan terminations. Since most plans do not provide for full-funding of benefits for a number of years, an organization resembling the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation would be created. Employer participation would be mandatory, and the organization would operate on the fees charged for its services.

3. Portability. The bill provides for a voluntary arrangement among employers that would allow an employee to transfer his vested benefits from one company to an-

other. The arrangement would be federally-sponsored and would seek to include as many employers as possible.

4. Disclosure requirements and fiduciary standards. The bill proposes more comprehensive annual reports and an independent statement of a plan's financial condition. The reports would be filed with the Department of Labor, as existing reports are now. Fiduciary standards would be tightened, and a specific limit would be set on the amount of employer stock that could be owned.

Among the other proposals in Congress during the last session was one sponsored by the Nixon Administration. This bill proposes a mandatory vesting schedule based on both age and service, using the so-called Rule of Fifty which states that when an employee's combined age and service equalled fifty, he would be 50 percent vested; the remaining 50 percent would be earned over the next five years. The Administration proposal makes no mention of portability, re-insurance, or disclosure requirements, but it does include a section strengthening fiduciary standards along the same lines as the Javits-Williams bill.

A unique feature of the Administration bill is a provision that would allow employees an income tax deduction of up to \$1500-a-year for contributions to their own retirement account. At present, only self-employed individuals enjoy this privilege (up to a maximum of \$2500-a-year), while those who work for an employer must provide for retirement after taxes.

A more radical approach to the private pension system has been suggested by Ralph Nader and endorsed by several prominent political leaders, including Sen. George McGovern. Nader proposes to abolish the system as it is presently structured and to establish instead a limited number of private institutions authorized to handle pension funds. Employees would designate which fund was to receive contributions made in their behalf and would have



a voice in how the fund was invested. Vesting would be immediate, and there would be a provision for re-insurance. Portability would not be a problem, since presumably an employee would continue to use the same fund throughout his lifetime. This proposal would obviously effect a major change in the entire pension concept, but it stops short of urging, as others have, that the federal government take control of the entire system through the expansion of Social Security.

It is important to note that changes which render private retirement plans too costly will in the end result in lower average benefits. The higher the amount of each pension dollar spent on short-service employees and administration, the lower the amount available for benefits for those who remain. Moreover, since pension costs are already high for many smaller businesses, substantial mandatory increases could threaten the continuance of some plans.

The Nader proposal, which would create an entirely new system for the funding of retirement plans, presupposes that the present system is basically unsound. However, the facts do not support this assumption. When specific ills can be diagnosed, it makes more sense to attempt to remedy them than to create an entirely new system that may not work as well. There are, in fact, some serious flaws in Nader's proposal. The establishment of huge, new funding companies, for example, will probably move the operation of pension funds farther away from, rather than closer to, the scrutiny of employees. In addition, the concept of immediate vesting, while outwardly quite generous, is in fact very costly and may result in lower average benefits, as employers are forced to fund for short-service employees. The longer-service employee will suffer a reduction in benefits in order to provide for those who are more transient.

Perhaps the most positive aspect of the Nader proposal is its elimination of the problem of portability. Under the Nader plan, the question of the transfer of benefits never arises, since an employee's pension fund always remains in the same place. Portability of this kind can be achieved more simply, however, by encouraging employers to allow the transfer of vested benefits from one plan to another. This could best be accomplished through the use of federal tax incentives closely tied to the existing deduction for employer contributions. The administrative burden might prove substantial at first because of the differences among plans, but the practice would probably become widespread once a uniform method was established. In this way, an employee's vested benefits would follow him from one job to another, with his full retirement benefit being paid by his last employer.

The real key to pension reform lies not with the concept of portability, however, but with the more basic matters of vesting, re-insurance, disclosure requirements, and fiduciary standards. These issues have been at the bottom of the most serious abuses of the pension system and must be corrected to restore confidence in the system. In this regard, the applicable provisions of the Javits-Williams bill are an excellent guideline for action.

The mandatory vesting provision of the bill presents

a reasonable schedule of vesting and one which is very close to the median schedule now in existence. The requirement that an employee be partially vested after eight years and fully vested after fifteen is an accurate reflection of the primacy of the long-service employee, yet recognizes the increased mobility of the labor force. It also does not entail excessive costs for the employer. This provision is preferable to the Nixon Administration's proposed

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**“ . . . few safeguards exist against financial practices which are technically legal, but clearly not in the best interests of the employees.”**

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Rule of Fifty since it provides a standard for the protection of all long-service employees, regardless of age. Moreover, the Rule of Fifty might well increase the likelihood of discrimination against the older job-seeker, since the cost of funding his pension at an earlier date would have to be taken into account. Since there is already a serious problem of discrimination here, legislation which might tend to increase it is not the answer.

The Javits-Williams provision on re-insurance is also basically sound. The creation of a self-sustaining organization along the lines of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation would go far toward solving the problem of plan terminations. The cost of insuring vested pension rights would not be excessive, considering the number of such terminations in proportion to the total number of plans. Some safeguards would be necessary, however, to insure that plans are terminated only because of absolute financial necessity. This would remove the temptation an employer might feel to capitalize on the benefit insurance in order to escape from a costly plan. With such safeguards as careful auditing, however, the system would function much like the FDIC, and employees would know that their pensions were as secure as their savings.

Another recommended change in the private pension system involves equalization of federal income tax treatment, as outlined in the Administration's proposal. Granting the proposed \$1500-a-year deduction to employees would be a major step in increasing their retirement benefits and would serve notice that the government recognizes their right to provide retirement security for themselves on the same basis as the self-employed. The self-employed would continue to enjoy a higher maximum deduction, of course, in recognition of the employer contributions made on behalf of employees.

One final recommendation involves disclosure requirements and fiduciary standards. Both must be tightened in line with the Javits-Williams proposal to insure the complete fiscal integrity of retirement funds. Together with the other proposed changes, full disclosure and a strong code of conduct will do much to reduce the number of problems that may arise in the future. Given assurance of proper fund management and protection against the sudden and capricious loss of benefits, Americans will begin to feel a new sense of confidence in the private pension system. And with these proposed changes, the system will finally be able to achieve its goal of providing retirement security for the employee at a reasonable cost to the employer. ■

## **CAMPAIGNS: Learning or Ritual**

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*In November 1971, Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo (D) defeated Republican Thacher Longstreth in a campaign notable for its stress on "law and order." Dr. Robert N. Spadaro, assistant professor of political science at Temple University, analyzed the campaign to determine if it constituted a joint learning process for politicians and voters. Since campaigns are supposed to serve educational as well as rhetorical and electoral functions, Spadaro questions the educational impact of political campaigns on the basis of surveys of politicians and voters made during the mayoralty race. The author was formerly director of research for the Pennsylvania Republican Committee and a campaign assistant to former Gov. Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas.*

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*by Dr. Robert N. Spadaro*

While a good deal is known concerning the impact of political campaigns on the American voter, there is little systematic knowledge of the politicians' perceptions, learning, and socialization experience in campaigning. Therefore, understanding of this key mass/elite linkage is limited.

Democratic theory assumes that the campaign interaction between the voters and politicians will result in a learning and feedback experience for both groups. However, most voters experience reinforcement of past beliefs rather than acceptance of new ones during campaigns. If the campaign experience essentially serves to reinforce politicians' predispositions, too, regardless of electoral reality, then serious questions can be posed as to the value of campaigns as cues to subsequent public policy. Otherwise, the campaign simply becomes an exercise in ritualistic reinforcement.

The following research explores two important areas

of this campaign linkage, the politicians' perceptions and performance on issues and the campaign techniques. The analysis tests the extent to which politicians accurately assess voters' perceptions and the extent to which politicians are concerned with issues vis-a-vis image/techniques. Current writings question whether the politician is more interested in affecting public opinion in "image" and "style" rather than in issue development and exchange. Leonard Hall, former Republican national chairman and 1968 Nixon advisor, has said, "you sell your candidates and your programs the way a business sells its products." Joe McGinniss, author of *The Selling of the President*, in writing that campaign managers are more concerned with image than with issues, has perhaps put it more succinctly: "politics, in a sense, has always been a con game."

A survey was conducted before, during, and immediately after a recent Philadelphia mayoralty campaign. The survey included 20 politicians and 141 voters. The politi-

cians' group included city-wide candidates, campaign and citizens committees' managers, and top organization and finance leaders. Lists of the issues were compiled from pre-campaign responses of politicians, journalists, civic leaders, and protests of voters. Open-ended questions were also given to both samples throughout the campaign. The 18 specific campaign techniques used as indicators were compiled from responses of politicians from both major parties, active in local, state and national politics, as well as from previous literature in political science.

The survey's findings indicate that some differences do occur in the campaign context between politicians and voters on issues; whereas lesser differences exist on techniques. Politicians did experience marginal change on the perceptions of issues they thought to be important to voters, but this change tended to be both minimal and a function of reinforcement as Table 1 shows. While voters' responses to the variety of general issues were mixed, the politicians primarily saw "law and order," viewed both from liberal and conservative viewpoints, to be the most important issue to voters and indeed increasingly shared this opinion over time.

As Table 2 indicates, these differences on the saliency of law and order, crime, civil rights, and on related economic issues, were somewhat reduced in voter responses to the open-ended questions. It also limited the possible question of overlap of issues evident in Table 1, e.g., law and order, jobs, cost of living, etc.

Politicians, in response to the same open-ended questions, consistently gave their "image" as the most important issue to voters. In contrast, voters identified candidates' "image" *per se* as an issue at two percent, four percent, and seven percent for the respective waves of the survey.

These results would seem to denote three areas of important differences. First, politicians were generally oblivious to the importance voters placed on air pollution, and many economic issues, though tax issues were used. Second, while 38 percent of the voters selected "law and order" on the first wave (administered just before Labor Day when we might expect the fears and events of summer to have an affect), "law and order" decreased somewhat in saliency to voters as the campaign progressed. Politicians, on the other hand, attached increasing importance to the issue, suggesting peer reinforcement and an "issue lag" in communication between voters and politicians even though or perhaps because polls were used. Third, the politicians were consistently "image" oriented though they regarded law and order as very important to voters on the general list of issues. An interesting corollary developed after the campaign when the politicians were asked what they thought had been the most important issue to voters and what they personally thought had been the most important campaign issue. The politicians still saw law and order as the most important issue to voters while they personally identified their own image and performance as the most important campaign factor. Of course, image and performance relate strongly to an issue such as law and order. Candidates are evaluated by their stances in this area. Nevertheless, the politicians relied primarily on their general and issue images rather than on the substance of the issues themselves.

Table 1  
Politicians' and Voters' Perceptions  
of Most Salient General Issues\*

	Voters Waves			Politicians Waves		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Civil Rights	16%	16%	18%	—%	—%	—%
Crime	16	19	16	20	10	20
Education	15	18	16	—	—	—
Cost of Living	17	13	12	—	—	—
Housing/Urban Renewal	10	10	10	10	—	10
Law and Order	12	10	5	50	60	70
Taxes	6	5	6	10	20	—
Jobs	6	6	4	—	—	—
Corruption/Graft in Gov't.	1	3	9	10	10	—
Transportation	—	—	4	—	—	—
Government Spending	1	—	—	—	—	—
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*p < .01 between samples for all waves (Chi Square).

Table 2  
Voters' Open-Ended Responses to Issues  
Most Important to Them\*

	1st Wave	2nd Wave	3rd Wave
Law and Order	38%	26%	21%
Economic Issues	31	26	21
Air Pollution	21	20	23

\*All other responses were mixed and below 7% for any one issue.

Table 3  
Voters' Perceptions of the Major Factors  
Influencing Their Vote

	Voters	
	Wave 3	post-campaign
Voted my party	52%	—
Don't know/Refused	11	—
Law and Order	30	—
Other	7	—

Table 4  
The First Choice of Politicians and Voters  
Of the Most Influential Mass Media Campaign Techniques\*

	Voters Waves			Politicians Waves		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Newspapers/Magazines	31%	31%	32%	10%	—%	10%
T.V.	24	27	34	60	70	50
Radio	10	6	6	—	—	10
Political Mail	3	4	1	—	—	—
Sound Trucks	2	2	—	—	—	—
Billboards	1	1	—	—	—	—
Campaign Literature	—	—	—	—	—	—
	71%	71%	73%	70%	70%	70%

\*p < .01 between samples for all waves (Chi Square).

Table 5  
The Second Choice of Politicians  
and Voters of the Most Influential  
Mass Media Campaign Techniques\*

	Voters Waves			Politicians Waves		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Newspapers/Magazines	23%	29%	32%	10%	10%	—%
Radio	22	22	16	50	60	50
T.V.	19	18	26	—	10	—
Political Mail	5	3	1	—	—	—
Sound Trucks	1	2	1	—	—	—
Billboards	1	—	—	—	—	10
Campaign Literature	—	—	1	—	—	—
	71%	74%	77%	60%	80%	60%

\*p < .01 between samples for all waves (Chi Square).

Even so, there was a massive switch in voting patterns. Whereas Democratic candidates had on the average attracted 72 percent of the black vote, in this election the more liberal Republican candidate received approximately 74 percent of the black vote. In contrast, Philadelphia's northeastern wards, though increasingly Republican in recent years, switched *en masse* to Mayor Frank Rizzo (D). The voters got the message. To this extent, the politicians, whether liberal or conservative, did read the public correctly. Table 3 reports the priorities of voters' reasons for voting as they did.

But how effective were the politicians in reading the voters in other areas? Do politicians' and voters' perceptions on the various direct means of campaign communications tend to converge, and if not, does the politician learn or again reinforce his predispositions? The campaign techniques that were surveyed can be subdivided into three general categories of campaigning; mass media, personal contact, and overt group contacts. (Personal techniques were: a political representative at your door, a neighbor as a party worker, handshaking, political phone calls, and political workers at the polls. Group techniques were: group meetings, the coffee klatch, group/ethnic endorsements, endorsements by well known public figures, political parades, and in-person political speeches and rallies, Mass media techniques were: political mail, sound trucks, billboards, campaign literature, newspapers and magazines, radio and T.V.) The voter sample was asked to rank the techniques

they thought were most influential to them, next, as a check, to select those they thought to be the most reliable, and then to select the techniques they thought to be the least effective. The politicians were asked to rank the techniques they thought most influential in reaching voters and then to rank those they perceived as the least effective to voters.

Those techniques pertaining to group contacts were rated extremely low as a cause for switching votes by politicians and voters alike and thus will not be shown in a table here. Approximately 72 percent of the voters and 70 percent of the politicians selected mass media techniques as their first and second choices for top campaign influence.

Table 4 shows that as a first choice voters selected newspapers and magazines at 31 percent at the first two waves. Television was their second choice with 24 percent at wave one and 27 percent at wave two. By the third wave, television passed newspapers and magazines or radio as alternatives.

These findings generally correlate with the voters' second choice as shown in Table 5. Newspapers and magazines rank first as a second choice followed by T.V. and radio where responses were almost evenly divided. As their second choice, most politicians selected radio but again the importance of newspapers and magazines was ignored.

The voters were also asked to select the technique they considered the most reliable. Results were consistent between the voters' perceptions on influence and on reliability. Voters picked newspapers and magazines as their most re-



Table 6  
Voters' Choices of the Most Reliable Campaign Technique

	Voters Waves		
	1st	2nd	3rd
Newspapers/Magazines	34%	38%	36%
T.V.	28	28	31
Radio	11	7	8
Political Mail	1	1	1
Sound Trucks	—	1	—
Billboards	1	—	—
Campaign Literature	—	—	—
	75%	75%	76%

Table 7  
Voters' Choices of Least Effective Campaign Techniques

	Voters Waves		
	1st	2nd	3rd
Personal Campaigning			
Handshaking	24%	18%	17%
Political Phone Calls	18	16	18
Neighbor as Party Worker	10	9	13
Representative at Door	4	7	3
Worker at Polls	3	1	1
	59%	51%	52%
Group Contacts			
Group/Ethnic Endorsement	8%	5%	4%
Group Meetings	6	2	—
Koffee Klatch	1	4	4
Political Parades	3	2	2
Political Speeches/Rallies	1	1	1
Public Figure Endorsement	—	—	1
	19%	14%	12%

Table 8  
Politicians' and Voters' Evaluation of the Impact and Interest of the Campaign

	Voters Waves			Politicians Waves		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Dull Campaign	74%	70%	80%	10%	10%	20%
Other*	26	30	19	—	—	—
Going Well, voters interested	—	—	—	90	90	80
No response	—	—	1	—	—	—
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*This category had a variety of scattered responses with no particular pattern.

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liable with T.V. and radio second and third, respectively. (See Table 6.)

Both samples were also asked to choose those campaign techniques they thought to be least effective. Table 7 illustrates an inverse ratio for voters to the preceding tables. It indicates that a majority of voters chose direct campaigning techniques as most ineffective. For simplicity, percentages for mass media techniques are not shown except to note that voters' perceptions on the least effective techniques were only important in two areas: sound trucks, 10 percent, 17 percent, 16 percent, and political mail, 9 percent, 11 percent, 14 percent.

Perceptions of politicians on the ineffectiveness of campaign techniques indicated no particular pattern. This would tend to suggest that while politicians perceived the overriding importance of mass media techniques, they refused or failed to discount the possibility that other techniques might yield significant additional votes. This eclecticism may suggest that the politician finds reassurance in "saturation." Perhaps he may add new tricks like T.V. but not disregard old ones.

Thus, while politicians were generally aware of the importance of mass media in reaching voters, they tended to reinforce their predispositions with no significant change. Their assessment generally proved correct in this respect obviating the need for "learning." However, their assessment of voter reaction to the utility of personal campaigning proved incorrect to the extent that the politicians, particularly the Republicans, still continued to utilize and failed to evaluate this form of campaigning. Previous studies have reported that voter contacts by political workers do prove effective. The evidence of this study suggests that these findings may need re-examination, at least in terms of a city-wide candidate engaging in personal "press the flesh" campaigning. Considering the limited time and resources of the politician, this type of campaigning may lead to diminishing returns, although it may generate publicity (useful for the media) and provide assurance for the candidates and their supporters.

Politicians tend to communicate with fellow politicians in generating enthusiasm among themselves sometimes ignoring voter reaction and apathy. When asked after the campaign, from whom they most frequently sought advice and information during the campaign, most politicians said from fellow politicians.

The final irony, however, rests in the dichotomy suggested by Table 8: It may be significant that no voters thought the campaign was "going well." However, the politicians seemed totally oblivious to the apathy and disdain with which the voters greeted their partisan ploys.

The evidence suggests that the politicians engaged in a campaign, similar to the voter, experienced reinforcement rather than learning. The politicians experienced no significant change in their basic attitudes as a result of the campaign. Politicians appear to be groups of like-minded men and seem to receive most of their information and feedback from fellow politicians rather than voters. This raises serious questions as to the utility of one of the most important linkages of our political system between leaders and followers as a vehicle for political interaction and may tend to suggest that the function of the political campaign in our society is essentially ritualistic. ■

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
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## BOOK REVIEW

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# Filling The Literature Gap on Southern Politics

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### BIRACIAL POLITICS: CONFLICT AND COALITION IN THE METROPOLITAN SOUTH

By Chandler Davidson

Louisiana State University Press, 1972, \$11.95.

### THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THE SOUTH

Edited by William C. Havard

Louisiana State University Press, 1972, \$17.50.

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by Charles W. Hill, Jr.

There has been a gap in the literature on Southern politics ever since V.O. Key's *Southern Politics* (1949) began to show the signs of age. For this reason, *The Changing Politics of the South*, edited by William C. Havard, is destined to become a standard, if not definitive, addition to any self-respecting political science collection. Its authors aimed at an audience wider than academe, however, and largely have succeeded in producing a readable volume which will be useful to scholars, statesmen, militants, and klansmen alike.

The volume is organized in a logical fashion. Following an excellent introduction by Havard, each state is discussed by a specialist, then the South's considerable but diminishing power in the House of Representatives is evaluated, and finally Dean Havard articulately wraps it

all up by optimistically assessing the potential for inter-party competition in the South. If the book's authors have any observable bias, it is limited to the assumption that interparty competition is preferable to intraparty factionalism.

The strengths of the book are many. First, its authors realize that it is probably the last book anyone seriously will offer as a discussion of the politics of the South in general. Key could still do that, but the authors of *Changing Politics* do not attempt to duplicate Key and emphasize in every chapter how much the politics of each Southern state have begun to follow their own particular path. Second, *Changing Politics* offers a useful discussion of the impact of apportionment on Southern politics. In brief, it seems clear that the chief beneficiaries of reapportionment have been Republicans and blacks, in that order, since the political power of both is increasingly concentrated in the metropolitan South. Third, the essential validity of the classification of Southern Republicans into mountain, presidential, and metropolitan types is validated through the analysis of much, aggregate electoral data. It is the declining importance of the moderate mountain variety and the refusal of Nixoncrats to surrender congressional seniority and switch party loyalties at the state level, however, which is the cause for despair for Southern Republican moderates. Metropolitan Republicanism presently seems dedicated to the suburban preoccupations of busing, restrictive housing, and low taxes. Havard even goes so far as to take explicit issue with what he takes to be the Ripon Society's expectation that a biracial form of Southern Republicanism is possible.

The weaknesses of the book are what one might expect from its methodology, but the potential reader has a right to know what he will not find. *Changing Politics* contains very little discussion of the impact of growing party competitiveness on the quality of policies produced by Southern governments. Elaborate statistical analyses by Dye, Hofferbert, Sharkansky and others have suggested that little if any increase in governmental responsiveness can be attributed to reapportionment, but little light is shed on this by *Changing Politics*. Another drawback is the lack of information post-dating November 1970. The fact that some of the new faces elected to office since 1970 in the South are hardly mentioned is a measure of just how fast things are changing. For example, the statement that no black has yet been elected to a Southern congressional seat has been outdated by 1972 election returns from Georgia and Texas. A third drawback, which is less understandable, is the small amount of attention paid to the organizational techniques which Republicans have employed in increasing their numbers in the South. Although several authors concede that the Republican Party is the only organized party in the Rimland South, little use has been made of the many political recruitment and grassroots political organization studies which have been produced in recent years.

In contrast, Chandler Davidson's *Biracial Politics* reveals as much about the methodological wars rending the political science profession as about the politics of Houston which is its primary focus. This book appears to be an

example of the relevant research for which new left, political scientists have called in recent years. Unapologetically normative in his thrust, Davidson sympathizes with the black residents of Houston on every page of *Biracial Politics*. Yet, his tone escapes the pedantic didacticism so characteristic of most advocates of the new politics. Nor does he hesitate to take issue with fellow radicals when he feels it is warranted.

The strength of the book lies in the analytical chapters which document the apparent lack of impact of increased black participation. Several chapters describing the bias of "at large" elections, place voting, majority elections, and nonpartisanship are very good and deserve a wide reading. A more cursory evaluation of the lack of black progress in achieving such political rewards as officeholding, employment, integration, and legal services is also worth reading. A final set of chapters combines empirical data and the author's personal theories into a hopeful view of the possibilities for a biracial, working-class coalition. Davidson finds himself in substantial disagreement with the Black Power advocates who have attacked the possibilities of immediate coalition-building with whites.

The desirability of a biracial, working-class coalition is Davidson's chief theme, and every chapter of his book attacks the thesis that blacks must look to the sentimentality of the white middle-class for support. He uses secondary and primary evidence to argue that hard hats and blacks can cooperate if the issue of race can be suppressed. This is a thesis which deserves continued study and Davidson has provided a good start.

Republicans will be interested in the definition of conservatism used by Davidson. He distinguishes economic from racial conservatism, and both from civil libertarian conservatism. Armed with such sophistication, he is optimistic that economic conservatives who are racial moderates — such as George Bush — may hope for black support in temporary coalitions at the local level.

The Davidson study suffers from the same time problem as the Havard anthology. Things have changed greatly since 1967 when Davidson's field work was completed. Although he passes over Barbara Jordan's victory as a redistricting inevitability of little consequence, others may give it greater importance. Moreover, the Nixon majority of 1972 was scarcely a refutation of the Archie Bunker effect. If the emphasis of class over race should have united hard hats and blacks, McGovern should have done better. All of the evidence has not yet been analyzed, of course, and a correlation between black and working-class voting behavior in 1972 may yet be revealed. Until such a time, however, a working-class, biracial coalition seems a remote possibility on any wide basis.

In summary, both the Davidson and Havard volumes are worth reading. The Havard anthology clearly has more enduring qualities. Republican conservatives will be encouraged by the optimistic assessment of their prospects in the Havard book and enraged by Davidson's evaluation of their worth. Republican progressives will be dismayed by the diminishing influence moderates are coming to exert in the South at the state level, but slightly encouraged by the place Davidson makes for them here and there in local coalitions. ■

● **Kissinger: The Uses of Power**, by David Landau. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972, \$5.95) David Landau, who purports to have analyzed Henry Kissinger's views on foreign policy, really has written an attack on the "brutal and endless war against the people of Vietnam." Much of the book originally appeared as two series of articles in 1971 in the *Harvard Crimson*, and it has the flaws of the newspaper medium — disjointedness, lack of continuity, and a certain amount of repetition. Landau drew from five principal sources — personal interviews with such diverse personalities as Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Daniel Ellsberg (but not Henry Kissinger), as well as with persons who remain anonymous; journal and newspaper articles; popular books on the Vietnam War; "several hundred pages" of transcripts of Kissinger background briefings on American foreign policy; and the published works of Henry Kissinger. Regarding Dr. Kissinger himself, Landau makes three main points. First, Dr. Kissinger is insecure and needs "personal distinction." Moreover, his "strong sense of personal mission and intellectual self-duty" reveals a messianic complex (Landau does not use that phrase, however) which indicates the strength of his beliefs. Second, Kissinger's views reflect in part at least the kind of persons who have been his mentors and patrons — William Yandell Elliott, a "violent cold warrior," and Nelson Rockefeller, who believed in the strength and power of the United States and in the defense of principle. And third, Dr. Kissinger's views on foreign policy are based on "obsessive" fears of revolution, a belief that imperfect order is preferable to disorder, a desire to create "conceptual unity, balance, and co-ordination" between all parts of the nation's foreign relations, and a conviction that the kind of balance of power system which prevailed in the 19th Century could be made to work again in the 20th. Unfortunately, according to Landau's analysis, the efforts at conceptual unity and system in foreign policy fell to pieces against the stone wall of Vietnam. And the failure to end the War, a failure which has been caused by Kissinger's futile attempt to maintain American credibility, reveals Henry Kissinger as "an intellectual whose last vestige of independence in thought and judgment has been subverted by . . . Washington's giant propaganda machine." Landau is obsessed with Vietnam, and the developments elsewhere in American foreign policy — the improvements in Sino-American and Soviet-American relations, the lessening of tensions in the Middle East, and the quite hopeful beginnings of negotiations towards monetary reform — are all seen as insignificant beside the failure to end the War. The author's treatise on Vietnam is stimulating and provocative; as a sober analysis of one of the principal architects of American foreign policy it is not as successful. Reviewed by Thomas A. Sargent.

● **The Real World of the Public Schools**, by Barry S. Brouder. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972, \$8.95) In the preface to his book, author Brouder writes, "If one can be certain of anything, it is that this book will be tabbed as a defense of the public school establishment by an educationist." He is right. Brouder rejects the new "humanists" (the "Kozol-Holt-Friedenberg-Illich-Silberman kind of thing") who have attracted so much attention in the past decade. Since this reviewer is a Kozol-Holt-Friedenberg-Illich-Silberman partisan, **The Real World of the Public Schools** irritated as much as it enlightened. Brouder is himself an admitted partisan for "professional" educators as the solution for many of America's educational woes. He rightly condemns the fallacies inherent in trying to make the schools all things to all pupils, all parents, all critics, and all teachers without precipitating massive chaos. And he asserts that programs such as the voucher system, which would allow the schools to at least be more things to more people, would be counterproductive and elitist. Brouder devotes himself to explaining why the educational system is resistant to change or why it cannot change. Brouder does not claim

to know all the answers to America's pupil problems. There are, however, a multitude of popular answers that Brouder believes are wrong; he sometimes seems to have an unkind word for every proposed innovation in education from the open classroom to accountability. Indeed, Brouder often seems justified in his objections. In debunking popular theory, Brouder devotes himself as much to philosophy as pedagogy. But he too often seems to use glib phrases to gloss over the equally glib phraseology he criticizes. His tendency to be sympathetically snide (or is it snidely sympathetic) throws the reader off balance. His book deserves to be much more widely read, particularly among devotees of the "new humanism." But for the proposition that the salvation of teaching will come through the professionalization of its professionals, that is a doctrine whose plausibility this reviewer could only begin to consider after the doctrine of tenure was adequately interred — a subject Brouder never discusses. Reviewed by Dick Behn.

● **U.S. Health Care: What's Wrong and What's Right**, by Stephen P. Strickland. (Universe Books, 1972, \$2.45) **U.S. Health Care** represents the application of opinion analysis by Potomac Associates, a nonpartisan research and analysis organization, and is an excellent perceptive study of the present health care system. The author identifies, compares and discusses the opinions of the American public with the opinions of physicians on a series of basic questions in the area of national health. In general, both the public and the physicians surveyed expressed confidence in the present medical care system. However, both groups also felt that certain basic changes are required to improve our health care delivery system. This was apparent in the general agreement that the high cost of medical care, as well as the medical manpower shortage, are the most specific problems needing correction. The results of this survey also indicate that the health maintenance organization concept (HMO) is not accepted as the total solution to the nation's health delivery problem by either group. By evaluating the most important criteria used to choose a family physician, Strickland also studied the difficulty of a patient's choice of a doctor. This book should be required reading for all those public officials responsible for determining health policy, as well as for those physicians who are providing the medical care, because it presents the best available consensus of what the American public expects and desires the health care system to provide. Reviewed by Dr. Francis W. Parnell.

● **Inveighing We Will Go**, by William F. Buckley, Jr. (Putnam, 1972, \$7.95) When I was a member of Young Americans for Freedom, the spear carrier of the conservative movement, William F. Buckley, Jr., was our high priest and his publication, **National Review**, was the bible. On my college campus, YAF members proudly displayed their copies of **NR** as they walked from one class to another. Many of our members memorized certain passages from Chairman Bill's articles in order to be in constant communion with him. In New Jersey, there was even one YAFer who went so far as to imitate Buckley's speech and mannerisms. He became our sugar substitute. My school, however, was not alone as a large national cult grew around this multi-talented and charismatic man whom we considered the conservative answer to the Kennedys. The importance of Buckley to the right-wing in this country should not be underrated. No one, with the possible exception of Sen. Barry Goldwater, has earned the respect and admiration of conservatives that Bill Buckley has. More importantly, it is Buckley, through his television program, "Firing Line," numerous books, and a syndicated column, who enlists new recruits for the conservative cause. Buckley is Mr. Conservative in the United States and to understand the right-wing, political observers can ill afford to ignore his work. William F. Buckley's newest book, **Inveighing We Will Go**, is a well written collection of previously published essays compiled over the last three years and his May 1970 interview in **Playboy**. In this book, Buckley's writing runs the gamut from foreign policy to a critique of Helen Gurley Brown's **Cosmopolitan**. The highlights of **Inveighing**, however, are the author's impressions of traveling with President Nixon's caravan to the Peoples' Republic of China. In this series of essays, Buckley is at his cutting and witty best. On the play, **The Red Detachment of Women**, presented for Nixon, Buckley writes, "It was as if at a White

House conference of African presidents, we had taken them over to the Kennedy Center to see a ballet of Li'l Black Sambo." Needless to say, Buckley does not approve of Nixon's detente with Mao. No wonder, because in another essay printed before the trip on November 25, 1971, Buckley employs the Cold War rhetoric of the 1950's in calling the mainland Chinese "a race of madmen." Buckley, however, as he described himself in the **Playboy** interview, is a realist and after 23 years has finally given up the ghost that the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek is the legitimate government of all China. Old myths die hard. Reviewed by John Brotschol.

● **"Catch A Wave: Hawaii's New Politics,"** by Tom Coffman. (Honolulu Star-Bulletin, \$2.00) Honolulu Star-Bulletin reporter Tom Coffman's book is a fine, journalistic, blow-by-blow account of money and the media in our youngest state's 1970 gubernatorial election. It provides some new observations of what helped to make this election one of the most fascinating in Hawaii's history and one selected for study by the American Association of Political Consultants. Like a critic sitting in the front row, Coffman does well in recounting the general story and much of the important dialogue and anecdotes on Hawaii's unique political stage. He describes in an easy-to-read and fast-moving manner many of the events and characters surrounding incumbent Democratic Gov. John A. Burns and his primary victory over challenger Tom Gill, the state's former lieutenant governor and an ex-Congressman, and the ultimate defeat of GOP candidate Sam P. King. Coffman disappoints some of his friends in the news business and in government, however, by failing to report or reveal anything new about the events leading up to the battle of the two Democratic heavyweights and some of the other preliminary bouts. Coffman does little to provide us with the reasons why the governor of a small state had to gather, collect and spend more than one million dollars, and retain Joe Napolitan in order to stay in office if his record was as good as his image-makers claimed. Coffman does even less to tell the reader where he thinks the funds came from. And Coffman also fails to try to provide any answers for the serious charges and countercharges which made the 1970 election (in Coffman's own words) "one of the most extraordinary campaigns ever waged for control of a state capitol." Although he tries to hide it under the guise of bend-over-backwards objectivity, Coffman's disdain for Hawaii Republicans seeps through at times. For example, he virtually ignores the 1966 study that showed that Hawaii's diverse ethnic population is better represented racially by the Republicans than the majority party in the state legislature. Coffman also quickly dismisses the near defeat of Gov. Burns by Republican Randolph Crossley and his part-Hawaiian running mate, Dr. George Mills, in 1966. In addition, Coffman appears to be overly fascinated by polls and particularly a young, politically opportunistic polltaker who gauged some of the ethnic voting patterns. But Coffman misses the chance to make some telling points when he fails to mention that the pollster was a former chairman of the Teen Age Republicans whom the GOP paid to train on the mainland before he decided to switch rather than fight. Coffman is also skillful in soft-peddaling the fact that his own **Star-Bulletin** polls were cited as a major factor in helping to bump off GOP candidate Hebdon Porteus when they showed Porteus badly trailing Judge Sam King in the GOP primary. (King eventually managed to squeeze by Porteus in the primary, notwithstanding Coffman's polls in the **Star-Bulletin**.) King was then clobbered by Burns in the general election. But all of these failings observed by a former **Star-Bulletin** colleague of Coffman's, now presumably biased by his employment by the Senate Republicans, should not detract from the overall worth of the book. It is must reading for any newcomer to Hawaii politics and a refresher course for the old pols and it gives a clue to some of today's rising figures — Democrat George Ariyoshi and Republicans Fred Rohlfling and Andy Anderson. Perhaps Coffman's book will pave the way for a more thorough and analytic picture; one which helps to give more clues to why men like John Burns and his politics have ticked for so many years, and to what we can expect in the way of alternatives in Hawaii in the next elections. Reviewed by Alf Pratte.

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# LETTERS

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## Sports Tax

In the hope that your ever-increasing influence may have potency in a new effort at fiscal innovation, I would ask your consideration of a proposition that I intend to commend to both Messrs. Edward (Brooke and Kennedy), our Senators:

The world of sports is surely one of the nation's most prosperous, as the attendance at sporting events persistently through the year, the prizes awarded, the salaries paid, etc., make clear.

Taxes imposed upon admissions to all sporting events would seem to involve a minimum of hardship upon the country: the revenues of organizers would be diminished, but these men could pass along the cuts to television enterprises and to the actual participants, the latter of which would surely avoid starvation, the tickets to events might not be changed, and probably only the promoters of additional events and clubs would suffer.

—  
ARTHUR H. COLE  
Professor Emeritus of  
Business Economics  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Mass.

## Premature Middle-Age

When I began to write this essay, I entitled it, "The Ripon Society: A Case of Premature Middle-Age Or Acute Opportunism." I meant by this that the leaders of the group had either succumbed to the oft-quoted cliché of becoming more *status quo*-oriented with age, or that the prospects of savoring moments of power within the Nixon Administration had warped Ripon beyond recognition. Possibly I felt that both forces were simultaneously at work within the organization.

The most difficult obstacle for the Ripon Society over the past four years was President Nixon. What should a Republican research and policy organization do when confronted by a Republican Administration? From November 1968 through 1970, the Society rather successfully hedged its bets on this question. While some Ripon leaders took positions in the Administration in order to directly influence decisions, other members stood back in order to offer the President new ideas, constructive criticism, and many well deserved broadsides. Examples of this approach were Ripon's ABM position paper; its approval of the Family Assistance and Revenue Sharing plans; and its attack of the Administration's Cambodian invasion.

After November 1970, something seemed to happen to Ripon. There was no complete turnabout in views, but for those of us on the periphery of the Society, the change was quite apparent. The group, through the pages of the FORUM, became more and more a sycophant of the Administration. Possibly the disarray of the eastern-progressive wing of the GOP as symbolized by Sen. Charles Goodell's defeat and Mayor John Lindsay's and Congressman Ogden Reid's defections to the Democrats gave Ripon the jitters. Ripon spokesmen seemed to cling to the coattails of John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman in order not to fall into the inferno below presided over by the Buckley brothers, John Ashbrook, Strom Thurmond, Harry Dent and Kevin Phillips.

When I joined the Ripon Society in 1966, it served a number of my political needs. As the product of a progressive Republican home, I rejected Goldwater in 1964, but I still held hopes that the party of Robert LaFollette and Theodore Roosevelt would revive. Once the Great Society lost out due to LBJ's preoccupation with a War that I opposed, I became even more restless for a political organization that would fight against this morally and militarily bankrupt policy. The Ripon Society was not only anti-Vietnam, but it sought to build a GOP that would support creative, foreign and domestic programs. I enthusiastically involved myself in the group's attempts to shape a coalition that would rally around positions such

as "The Negative Income Tax" (1967), "The Rights of the Mentally Ill" (1967), and an end to the War.

My faith that such a transformation could happen within the Republican Party was shaken in 1968. Although Ripon urged a coy Gov. Nelson Rockefeller onward and took pot-shots at Gov. Ronald Reagan, the real battle over issues occurred within the Democratic Party. Sen. Eugene McCarthy and the late Sen. Robert Kennedy confronted LBJ, and then Humphrey, over the War, and then Nixon, a hawk without a domestic program, squeaked by a candidate burdened by the last Administration's unpopularity.

The question, "Whither Ripon," needed to be asked in 1968 instead of awaiting the Society's tenth birthday. After Nixon's victory over Humphrey, Ripon began its tightrope walk between acceptance and rejection of the Administration, and after two years of creative tension between these two poles, the group gave in to the temptation of making the best of a rather mediocre Republican President. A recent example of this capitulation to Nixonism can be seen in Josiah Lee Auspitz's commentary in the December FORUM. According to Auspitz, the Administration has embraced just about everything that Ripon ever stood for, and that the Society, like Jonah, now sulks after the GOP heeded its prophecies.

Simply because it used to be more issue-oriented than party-oriented, my loyalty to Ripon was always much stronger than my loyalty to the GOP. Obviously, of late, leaders of the Society feel the need to justify the party at all costs. This is why my energies during the past two years were channeled more to efforts like Common Cause, Nader's Raiders, and finally to the McGovern candidacy.

I agree with John Gardner that we need less partisan politics and ideology in national affairs and more general citizens' concern and creativity. Although I am not as Cassandra-like as some public spokesmen today, I do feel that America cannot afford the luxury of bogging itself down in an ideological battle between Republican and Democratic approaches to environmental, urban and economic problems. Instead of promoting such an existential exercise while housing, transportation, race relations, public confidence in government, and the air deteriorate, I feel that the Ripon Society must aid people like Paul McCloskey, Allard K. Lowenstein, John Lindsay, John Gardner, and Ralph Nader as they seek to mold a broad coalition of the most concerned and intelligent men and women of both parties. Instead of helping Nixon-Agnew to create a political coalition based on fear, group polarization and the worst instincts of the American people, the Society should join the Naders and Gardners to put together a citizens' organization that will address the complex and difficult forces of the present and future.

Ripon's actions in 1972 were particularly disturbing to me. Instead of making Paul McCloskey's campaign into Ripon's campaign, the Society merely gave the Congressman a few favorable comments in the FORUM. Even if the group's leaders were determined to endorse the GOP nominee, it could have at least analyzed the failures of the Nixon Administration prior to the Miami convention. By constantly praising Nixon for Revenue Sharing and Family Assistance and by remaining mute on other issues, Ripon gave tacit approval to the Administration's myths concerning an end to the War; to the erosion of individual and congressional rights and powers under the Constitution during the Nixon years; and to the political tactics of further polarizing groups with stump oratory about amnesty, suburban housing and busing.

In the fall, the Society added little to the campaign. It failed to review, even critically, the array of position papers offered to the public by Senator McGovern, and it failed to challenge the aloof, polarizing, non-issue-oriented, rather Disneyesque campaign of the Re-Elect The President Committee. In short, the Society did not fulfill its stated aims as a research and policy group.

I hope that all this will change. This is why I again address myself to a group that has great potential to be creative in the field of public policy. Therefore, if Ripon wants my support, it will have to put up with a steady barrage of criticism concerning its drift not toward "firey moderation," but toward a mundane-middle that stands for hoola-hoops, 1950's nostalgia and a great big yawn toward the real problems that beset the country.

W.K. WOODS  
Wilmington, Ohio

## Ashamed

I have been a Republican all my life (am 67), a delegate to three national conventions. I am ashamed of my party and my country. I supported Pete McCloskey's candidacy and I did not vote for Nixon and am proud that I did not.

To see our great strong country of over 200,000,000 brutally and mercilessly bombing a weak, peasant country of less than 20,000,000 day after day, week after week ... sickens me. I am horrified that your magazine supports this policy and this party and I want nothing to do with it. I consider the barbarous death and destruction we pour onto North and South Vietnam immoral and wick-

ed ... and illegal. We have never declared war, Tonkin (Gulf) resolution has been rescinded ... upon whose authority then does Nixon order these cruel terror bombings? I urge you to read *Fire in the Lake*.

Your magazine just might be able to have some influence if you tried to editorialize and inform your readers, but you do not and you have not. You sold out just to win an election as have many other decent, nice people who are Republicans first. No victory could ever be sweet enough or valuable enough to win by approving, going along with our murderous policy in Vietnam, in my opinion.

Mrs. WALTER M. MAYER  
Santa Fe, New Mexico.

## 14a ELIOT STREET

● Good grief. More great organizational upheavals. New York NGB member **Richard Bahn** has joined the professional staff of the Ripon Society as the house magician in charge of solving progressive problems. **Richard Beeman**, whom we last identified as treasurer, has got a new title and new responsibilities — sort of the Ripon Society's **George Schultz**. Beeman has been named vice president for finance by Ripon president **Ron Speed**, who emerges occasionally from his Minnesota retreat to visit with the natives in Cambridge and Washington. And finally, **Anne Marie Borger** of New York City has been named director for public information for the Society, a post which is self-explanatory. Watch your local newspaper for more leaks and floods.

● Two members of the National Governing Board have resigned: **Emil Frankel** and **Martha McCahill**. Frankel was a founding member of Ripon, a former aide to Sen. **Jacob Javits**, and a former staff member of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. He presently practices law in Stamford, Connecticut. McCahill is a former Ripon staff member, the organizer of Ripon's Airlie House Conference in 1970 and a director of Operation Pursestrings. She is now on the staff of the Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Massachusetts.

● **Martha Reardon**, president of the Boston Chapter, was elected chairman of the Cambridge Republican City Committee on January 11. She was elected unanimously by all of the city committee members present. Other Ripon activists on the Cambridge City Committee include **Bob Behn**, **Evelyn Ellis** and **Doug Matthews**; however, none of the above were present or voting. The Cambridge committee is presently looking for ideas from city committees in other areas that would be useful in rebuilding the two-party system in Massachusetts.

● "Ripon Society" will be viewed February 2, 1973 at 9:00 p.m. on Channel 44 in the Boston area. The program was put together by Cambridge Chapter president **Bob Stewart** who implemented the slides from the Ripon Tenth Anniversary Dinner to their best advantage. The program is moderated by **Martin Linsky**; **Mike Brewer** and **Martha Reardon** take part in the discussion on Ripon's activities locally and nationally. Copies of the tapes can be obtained for a minimal charge through **Bob Stewart** if any other chapters are interested in such a program.

● The **Bob Behn Task Force** on the merger of the Boston and Cambridge Chapters is presently studying the situation and plans to make its proposal in the early spring, or as soon as Dr. Behn has completed grading his Harvard Business School WAC papers!

● "Damned good piece of election analysis in the November Ripon FORUM. One of the best I have read," wrote **Theodore White**, referring to "The Non-Emerging Republican Majority," by Notre Dame's own **Howard L. Reiter**.

● The Memphis Chapter of the Ripon Society recently elected their new officers for 1973. They are President, **Linda Miller**; Vice President, **Bill Robillo**; Secretary, **Susan Whitten**; Treasurer, **Ed Miller**; Research Director, **Hugh McKinnon**.

**THE RIPON SOCIETY, INC.** is a Republican research policy organization whose members are young business, academic and professional men and women. It has national headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, chapters in sixteen cities, National Associate members throughout the fifty states, and several affiliated groups of subchapter status. The Society is supported by chapter dues, individual contributions and revenues from its publications and contract work. The Society offers the following options for annual contribution: Contributor \$25 or more; Sustainer \$100 or more; Founder \$1000 or more. Inquiries about membership and chapter organization should be addressed to the National Executive Director.

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# DULY NOTED: POLITICS

● **"Laird Advocates Centrist GOP,"** by Paul Hope. *Washington Star-News*, November 23, 1972. "Melvin R. Laird, one of the most politically oriented members of President Nixon's Cabinet, says that the Republican Party needs to be restructured along a 'moderate-centralists' line if it is to become the majority party." Hope continued, "What Laird seemed to be saying was that the Republican Party has to shed its image of being a party of special interests and become a problem-solving party. He seemed also to be saying that it has to reject pressures from conservative elements to push it to the right, but at the same time not move too far to the left."

● **"The Republican White House, New Presidential Majority,"** by Richard J. Whalen. *The Nation*, December 25, 1972. Richard Whalen was the Nixon advisor during the 1968 campaign who resigned because he felt the GOP candidate was too much form and not enough substance and who subsequently authored the conservative GOP critique of the Nixon Administration, *Catch a Falling Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party* (see June 1972 FORUM). Now writing in *The Nation*, he states that consolidating his re-election majority into a Republican one "is attainable." He sees Agnew as the 1976 GOP standard bearer, the electorate dividing legislative and executive responsibilities between the Republicans and Democrats, the Wallace voters remaining Republican at the presidential level, and the Democrats being unable to coalesce behind any presidential candidate in 1976. In conclusion, however, Whalen warns: "Republicans would find their presidential-level prospects more cheering if they were not still licking their wounds from November's famous victory. They keenly appreciate the source of their good fortune — the disintegration of the Democratic coalition — and they worry that changing national circumstances might produce a swift change in 'mood' and a popular desire for affirmative government which they are unprepared to satisfy. Over the next four years, too, it is quite possible that defecting Democratic voters will realize that their revolt against an arrogant elite has delivered them into the hands of an incompetent elite."

● **"Is Ticket-splitting Fatal?"** Editorial in the *Minneapolis Star*, November 15, 1972. Responding to the Ripon Society's election analysis which warned of the dangers of extensive ticket-splitting for effective party government, the *Minneapolis Star* said, "...Minnesota's experience is that the degree of splitting now does not necessarily mean candidates take loyalists for granted." Continued the *Star*, "On the contrary, as the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party's success in winning both legislative houses for the first time shows, the key to victory is never to take the faithful for granted. If this is the rule on which we, as a democratic nation, can bank, the cynical, even chaotic, domino theory the Society projects need not happen." (See November FORUM, "Editorial: Now What?")

● **"GOP Fails to Follow Up Nixon's Appeal in the South,"** by Tom Littlewood. *The (Memphis) Commercial Appeal*, October 1, 1972. Commenting on the failure of Republicans to fully capitalize on Nixon's popularity in the South this past fall, Littlewood quotes Arkansas CRP campaign director George E. Nowotny who said, "We learned a valuable lesson when (former Gov. Winthrop) Rockefeller lost the governorship in 1970, and that is you can't build a party from the top — we've been struggling." Littlewood points to "the tie between the (Democratic) party and the economic and legal establishment in the typical Southern community" as the key to continued Democratic power in the South. "Young lawyers who want to go into politics and attract clients still run for the legislature as Democrats. As long as the statehouses are controlled by Democrats, a lawyer can represent his clients by keeping his contacts in the state government. The bar associations hold the Democratic Party together in the South as much as anything."

● **"Nixon Upsets Agnew Forces with Brock-Bush Support,"** by Dan Thomasson. *Memphis Press-Scimitar*, December 29, 1972. The appointment of United Nations Ambassador George Bush "was seen as a blow to (Vice Pres-

ident) Agnew, who privately wanted the job to go to Nebraska oilman and trucker Richard Herman, a GOP national committeeman." Thomasson reported that President Nixon told a party leader that "the appointment of Herman, despite his excellent organizational abilities, might give Agnew a boost." Similarly, Thomasson reported that Agnew backers were miffed by presidential support for Sen. Bill Brock for the chairmanship of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, a well-placed rung on the ladder of presidential ambitions.

● **"Republicans Still Weak in Politics,"** by Bruce Blossat. *Las Vegas Review-Journal*, December 7, 1972. "(The Republicans) have a positive genius for fielding lousy candidates. They don't seem, on the whole, to know how to build up good men for the great quest of office. They play at politics like college graduates who meet from time to time for reunions. A lot of them behave between election years as if politics were a distasteful exercise that had to be gone through periodically, but mercifully did not last long," says columnist Blossat. He alleges that President Nixon must share the blame for the GOP's lack of "talent for party-building." But even within the GOP are exceptions to the political blahs, according to Blossat: Governors Daniel Evans (Washington), Robert Ray (Iowa), William Milliken (Michigan), and Francis Sargent (Massachusetts).

● **"At the White House; Tough New Policies Made in Silence."** This editorial begins by announcing that, "A strangely grim mood seems to have gripped President Nixon in the (last) two months," and goes on to denounce the bombing of North Vietnam as "a morally indefensible policy." It argues that the President "has no right to take so drastic a step as this and then wrap himself in the cloak of secrecy and isolation." As for the "abrupt dismissal" of Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, the editorial remarks: "The result of his rough handling is to serve notice on all officials that anyone who raises his head above the level of mediocrity is in danger of having it chopped off." Another editorial from the *Washington Post*? No. *Business Week*, January 6, 1973.

● **"Conservative Rockefeller Has Eye on Presidency,"** by Victor Ostowidzki. *Albany Times-Union*, January 7, 1973. "After a couple of years of flirting with the conservative ideology, Nelson A. Rockefeller took a giant step to the right last week to join the ranks of the nation's conservatives. Rockefeller sealed his 'marriage' Wednesday when he delivered his 15th 'state of the state' message which contained tough language calling for harsh law and order legislation." The *Albany Times-Union* political columnist concludes that Rockefeller has decided that he will have to appeal to the party's conservative wing to win the 1976 presidential nomination.

● **"Jackson and Evans Both May Be Contenders for The Presidency in 1976,"** by Phillip Bailey. *Argus* (Seattle, Washington), December 22, 1972. Writing in his "As I See It" column, Bailey suggests that if Gov. Daniel J. Evans is not "bitten" by the idea of running for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976, he might run for Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson's seat — if Jackson pursues the Democratic presidential nomination. Bailey suggests that Evans is "presidential timber" but may not have "the driving urge required for a bid for the nomination."

