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Foreign Policy:
Will the Real Ronald Reagan Please Stand Up?

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C A R L E Y
Editor's Column

Many analysts believe that President Reagan's foreign policies will play a critical role in his 1984 re-election prospects. This very well may be the case as the crises in Lebanon and Central America join several other international concerns, such as our relations with the Soviet Union and the status of arms negotiations.

To assess the impact of President Reagan's foreign policies, as well as to understand the perceptions of our allies, we have asked two Europeans—Simon Mabey of the British Conservative Party's Bow group and Horst Bacia of the West German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung—to evaluate the Reagan presidency. We also offer our own review of the Reagan White House, while Ripon Society chairman Jim Leach contrasts this administration with John F. Kennedy's. Historian Frederick Marks presents another parallel when he compares President Reagan's tenure to Theodore Roosevelt's. Marks should know; he is the author of a diplomatic history of the Roosevelt administration. In giving us glimpses into the life of that charismatic leader, he reminds us that while Roosevelt did carry a big stick, he also achieved a considerable number of diplomatic advances. This, in fact, may be Teddy Roosevelt's greatest legacy in that it provides us with a standard by which all presidents can be judged.

—Bill McKenzie

MEMO

To: The Editors

I just read the November 1983 Ripon Forum. I had not seen your magazine before, though I have heard of it. I found it very enjoyable.

As a moderate Republican raised not too far from Ripon, Wisconsin, I have often found my commitment to what the Right calls "the movement" questioned. Thank you for standing up for the spirit of free men and free inquiry which moved the gathering at Ripon.

Mark G. Michaelesen, Hillsdale, Michigan
Frederick W. Marks III is the author of *Velvet on Iron*, a review of Theodore Roosevelt’s diplomacy, and a frequent lecturer on the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. In addition, Marks is the author of *Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution* and has just completed a manuscript on the diplomatic history of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. This thorough view of the past and present allows him in this interview with *Forum* editor Bill McKenzie to describe with an historian’s eye the life and focus of one of America’s most illustrious presidents — Theodore Roosevelt. Marks also provides an engaging comparison between Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, reminding us of the Russian proverb: “Dwell on the past and you’ll lose an eye. Forget the past and you’ll lose both eyes.”

**A Conversation with Frederick Marks**

“*There were, and in fact still are, two Theodore Roosevelts. There is the popular image of a Rough Rider who served as deputy sheriff in the Dakota Badlands. The real Roosevelt was, of course, rather more subtle, far more sophisticated, and a great deal more interesting.*”

in England and, as an author, was so fair to the British side of the War of 1812 that he was invited to contribute to a history of the Royal Navy. He read Japanese poetry and studied *bushido*, the Samurai code of chivalry. In one of his annual messages to Congress, he lectured his countrymen as they were never lectured before or since, insisting that we have as much to learn from Japan as Japan has to learn from us. He knew the German *Nibelungenlied* and the French...
"Roosevelt made certain that the American military posture was brought up to a level commensurate with national goals. At the same time he made sure that American forces were not overextended."

Song of Roland well enough to give points to the German and French ambassadors. And while on a visit to South America, he wrote articles for American consumption which extolled the virtues of the local culture. He felt, for example, that our neighbors to the south had dealt far more effectively than we had with the incubus of slavery.

Ripon Forum: Do you think that America has moved forward or backward in recent years with its respect for the cultures of other nations?

Marks: I would say the direction is quite definitely forward. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, our ambassador to the U.N., has written a book, Dictatorships and Double Standards, which does well to distinguish between various shades of authoritarian government. Such a book is long overdue. A short while ago, a government-sponsored conference was held in Washington in which the challenge of upholding democratic values in other regions of the world was discussed by representatives of areas where the social and political context is altogether different from our own. President Reagan greeted Mexico's Portillo with the words, "mi casa es su casa." He showed the same spirit of gracious respect when he addressed the OAS and quoted the Cuban patriot, Jose Marti. It may also be a sign of the times that the administration went out of its way to cite the great 14th century Islamic scholar, Ibn Khaldun, on behalf of supply-side economics. Khaldun, who wrote classical treatises based upon a unique mastery of historical patterns, found that "great tax revenues were gained from small assessments." Call it the cosmopolitan outlook, if you will. It is very encouraging.

Ripon Forum: But does your basis for comparing Theodore Roosevelt and what we are seeing today extend to something more tangible?

Marks: Indeed it does. There are any number of bases for comparison. Both Roosevelt and Reagan have made frequent use of the multilateral approach to world problems. When Roosevelt mediated disputes involving nations south of the Rio Grande, he enlisted the cooperation of Mexico. He was one of only two presidents to win the Nobel Peace Prize, owing in part to the fact that he resolved conflicts between Guatemala and El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras. He enlisted the aid of Germany when he sent his battleships into the Pacific as a signal to Japan. This was when Tokyo, you will recall, was allied with London.

In another instance, he was faced with the possibility of having to land troops to rescue an American kidnapped by the Moroccan bandit, Raisuli. He was particularly careful to act in conjunction with the French and British. During the last couple of years, of course, we have witnessed a series of regional groupings, all of them formed with the encouragement of the U.S. The Gulf Cooperation Council seeks to halt the spread of Soviet influence from its current base in South Yemen. The situation in Grenada was redressed by the collective initiative of a band of Caribbean nations. In Central America, you now have states in the vicinity of Nicaragua acting in the same way with similar support from the U.S. Beyond the purely military, one can recognize a parallel in the Contadora Group, which seeks to foster compromise and harmony in the wake of Nicaragua's political upheaval. Moreover, the United States is not alone in Lebanon. It is working side by side with allied nations just as it works closely with such countries as Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Canada to see that Latin America aid packages, along with other instruments of economic development, are channeled toward the attainment of genuine justice and stability.

"No American president has ever been as much admired or respected around the world as Theodore Roosevelt. And why not? He racked up the best of all peace records."

Ripon Forum: I suppose the very idea of the Big Stick suggests a counterpart today.

Marks: Yes, this is certainly true if the phrase "Big Stick" is properly understood. Roosevelt made certain that the American military posture was brought up to a level commensurate with national goals. Our fleet shifted from a ranking of fifth in the world to second. At the same time — and I think this is vitally important — he made sure that American forces were not overextended. He refused to be drawn into an Asian land war. He shunned any conflict which would pit the U.S. against Turkish or Russian armies. He resisted the temptation to take on additional naval bases along the coast of China or on the rim of the Caribbean. When he did act, he acted decisively and in areas where he held the upper hand. Take, for example, his assembling of an entire battlefleet in the Caribbean as backing for a sharp ultimatum to Britain and Germany. The Europeans were told that they had exactly ten days to resolve a dispute with Venezuela. Venezuelan debt default had driven them to clamp a naval blockade on the Caracas coast. They were sinking Venezuelan gunboats, bombarding her forts, and commencing to land small contingents of troops. Roosevelt sniffed the possibility of a German naval base which could obstruct control of a future isthmian canal and punch a hole in the Monroe Doctrine. I needn't add that his ultimatum succeeded, accompanied as it was by overwhelming force and a smooth exercise in diplomacy.

But to return to the present and the record of the Reagan administration, we see much the same type of pattern. The president has secured legislation for his B-1 bomber and MX missile programs. A new generation of missiles is
going into Europe, and he is building steadily toward his goal of a 600-ship navy. At the same time, he has shown marked restraint in the use of the force already at his disposal, choosing areas of confrontation with discretion. The U.S. shot down two Libyan jets after they scrambled within range of the Sixth Fleet. American naval units stopped a Soviet freighter bound for Nicaragua, affording still another signal of our determination to prevail in matters of vital national interest. The Grenada landings, once again, were not likely to involve the nation in a situation which would overtax its patience or capacity to follow through.

**Ripon Forum:** Let me stop you there. About Latin America, do you think we are seeing Theodore Roosevelt’s legacy at work today in Central American nations such as Grenada and Nicaragua?

**Marks:** It depends on what you mean by Roosevelt’s legacy. The help that he gave to Panama in its struggle to break away from mother country Colombia is often singled out by historians as a black mark on our diplomatic record. You will find, however, that Panama’s neighbors generally applauded its revolution, along with the support given by Washington. Roosevelt, who was already popular south of the border, became even more popular after Panama gained independence. It was thought, and rightly so, that Colombia had not done well by its remote province. The relationship had been one of exploitation. There was thus no lack of moral justification for American intervention. One is reminded of the aid we received from France during our own revolution in 1776. Roosevelt also went out of his way to champion the Drago Doctrine, which condemned military intervention for the collection of debts. He won an unprecedented berth for Latin American nations at the Second Hague Peace Conference, and he withdrew American troops from Cuba as promised (unlike similar promises made and broken by other great powers). Should we be surprised that he was voted a special commendation by one of the Pan American congresses held during his presidency? A convention hall built to house another of the inter-American congresses was named the Palacio de Monroe, and when he traveled to Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, he was received with great enthusiasm. It is true, of course, that he landed troops in the Dominican Republic, but this was at the request of the host government; our marines proved to be highly popular with the local populace.

It is absolutely erroneous, then, to suppose that Theodore Roosevelt somehow put us in badly with Latin America. Suffice it to say that no American president has ever been as much admired or respected around the world as Theodore Roosevelt. And why not? He racked up the best of all peace records, bringing an end to the Russo-Japanese War which threatened to upset the Far Eastern balance of power. He also helped substantially to ensure the success of the Algeciras Conference of 1905 which averted the coming of World War I, at least temporarily.

**Ripon Forum:** So you would say that his policy of “speak softly and carry a big stick” proceeded according to some degree of civilized restraint — that while the popular image of Teddy Roosevelt is that of a gunboat diplomat, he complemented this with a very deep search for peace?

**Marks:** Absolutely. During the nearly eight years of his presidency, not a single soldier or sailor was ever ordered to fire a shot at a foreign foe. He signed some 24 bilateral arbitration treaties and became the first world leader ever to submit an international dispute involving his own country to the Hague Court of Arbitration. He never believed that peace could be had by sitting impassively behind a wall of battleships. On the contrary. One had to exhaust the full range of expedients, all the way from international tribunals to multilateral conferences, to the subtlest and most adroit diplomacy on a one-to-one basis. It is here, perhaps, that we discover the meaning of the phrase, “speak softly.” The expression must not be taken to mean any mincing of words. Roosevelt spoke straight-from-the-shoulder with an eye to reducing the margin of misunderstanding. But his words were uttered behind closed doors so as to afford opponents a graceful exit from awkward confrontations.

**When you ask about the difference between national and individual morality, the example that comes to mind is charity. As individuals, we are exhorted to give until it hurts, and to give anonymously. With nations, this could never work.**

The entire episode, by the way, was conducted in such a fashion as to keep it out of the headlines, again in the interest of face-saving and strong, undiluted executive leadership. In his annual message to Congress, delivered during the crisis, Roosevelt declared that there was not a cloud on the diplomatic horizon. He went out of his way to tell reporters that he did not believe the situation to be especially critical — this at the height of the crisis, just after he had ordered Dewey to sail into the actual blockade zone! Finally, his friend Henry Cabot Lodge ran interference in Congress as he managed to ward off extended Senate debate prior to the Christmas holidays.

**Ripon Forum:** President Roosevelt was a deeply moral man with a deeply moral foreign policy. Can a nation be bound by the same moral code as that of an individual?

**Marks:** Theodore Roosevelt was indeed a moralist, though he can lay equal claim to being on the side of realism. Beside his gravesite in Oyster Bay you will find the words, “Keep your eyes on the stars and your feet on the ground.” He
never tired of saying that one must have "realizable ideals." Long before he reached the presidency, he poured his life's blood into the kind of public service which highlighted a special passion for the straight and narrow. His target in the New York State Assembly was graft. It was crime that he fought as New York City Police Commissioner, while, as Civil Service Commissioner, he labored for gradual extension of the merit principle. The name that is attached to his presidency is the "Square Deal" and by and large his administration lived up to its billing. In the field of foreign affairs, he did believe that a nation is bound by the same moral code as the individual. In his famous tilt with Colombia over Panama, as well as in the Alaskan boundary dispute with Canada (actually Britain), and the World Cruise of the Great White Fleet involving Japan, there was a thread of principle running through the entire fabric. In each of these cases, he clearly viewed himself and his country as the injured party. National security was a key factor in Roosevelt's thought, but the combination of interest and morality is what gave him his most striking victories.

Ripon Forum: There has been, then, little change over the years with respect to the proper function of morality? 

Marks: Yes, I would imagine this to be true, depending on what you mean by morality. Principles of honesty, fair dealing, respect for life, and loyalty to one's allies are still at the root of whatever hope we may cherish for enduring peace. A nation's leadership must retain its credibility. It must inspire trust. Theodore Roosevelt believed, as we do today, that a powerful nation must be patient in asserting its rights against a less powerful nation. At the same time, he refused to accept weakness as an excuse for wickedness.

When you ask about the difference between national and individual morality the example that comes to mind is charity. As individuals, we are exhorted to give until it hurts, and to give anonymously. With nations, this could never work. Altruism on the international level is bound to be suspect. Instead of a neutral result, as far as the donor is concerned, such a policy would backfire — even on the domestic front. Anonymity is impossible. National interest must be the polestar of any foreign aid program. But having said this, the main point to be made about Roosevelt's code of morality is that he managed to avoid cultural imperialism; that is to say, he refrained from dogmatism where inappropriate.

Ripon Forum: How, then, would you view the American record today when it comes to the area of international morality?

Marks: Well, let me say this. President Reagan, when asked how he could authorize the sale of advanced weapons to countries failing to measure up to the American standard of human rights, replied that his choice was not between imperfection and perfection, but rather between imperfection in the area of human rights and the virtually total disregard which exists under a totalitarian, communist-style regime such as we have in Cuba. Time and again, Washington must choose the lesser of evils. Where once the State Department adhered to a so-called "leprosy rule" regarding munitions salesmen who requested official help in the opening of markets, the U.S. now lends qualified support. Moscow ranked first in this area as recently as 1980. Obviously, whatever handicap we impose upon ourselves will mean a setback in American arms development. We cannot continue to produce weapons of high quality and at competitive prices if, in the long run, we abdicate the sale of arms to foreign countries. Nor does this begin to take account of factors such as national prestige and international influence which are of no mean importance.

"There is a winsome, self-deprecating quality about the first Roosevelt that is reflected in his simple answer when reporters asked him to sum up his action packed term in office: 'I enjoyed myself immensely.'" 

But you ask where we stand today. For the first time in its history, Washington is selling its most prized aircraft, the F-16, to a sister nation of the Western Hemisphere. It is also selling these planes to Pakistan in spite of Karachi's charting of an independent path to nuclear capability. Brazil, once again, is receiving American technological aid in the development of nuclear power, despite its refusal to subscribe to any non-proliferation treaty. If the U.S. declines to lend a hand in these and similar instances, the opportunity will pass to Moscow or Paris, London or Bonn. The same applies to foreign trade. History shows that trade, when used as a diplomatic weapon, is seldom if ever effective, especially against a powerful nation. Nearly always, the nation imposing the embargo will wind up suffering while other nations (in the case of wheat, Argentina, Canada, Australia, etc.) take over our market by developing the means to produce more economically. This "cut off the nose to spite the face" policy was employed when President Carter ordered a grain embargo against Moscow for its invasion of Afghanistan. It carried over into an equally futile effort to prevent European allies from selling specialized items for the building of a Siberian gas pipeline. In neither case was the game worth the candle, except for short-run political gains at home. President Reagan and Mr. Shultz have wisely executed an about-face. The Soviet Union's brutal downing of a KAL airliner, with its tragic loss of civilian life, did not lead our policy-makers into another fool's paradise of economic sanctions. Mr. Reagan used the

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incident for all it was worth in terms of world opinion and U.N. leverage, but this is as far as it went. Secretary of State Shultz is particularly knowledgeable in this area on account of his wide experience in international trade and business.

Ripon Forum: Theodore Roosevelt was a man who seemed to love power. Did he disprove Lord Acton's theory that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely?"

Marks: Roosevelt may be the exception that proves the rule. He adhered to the two-term tradition set by Washington not because he had to, but because he agreed with Acton. There is a winsome, self-deprecating quality about the first Roosevelt that is reflected in his simple answer when reporters asked him to sum up his action-packed term in office: "I enjoyed myself immensely!" This was a man who spent much time with his wife and children. You may have run across the delightful letters he wrote to his son, Kermit. Some of them are illustrated with sketches in his own hand. Here was a man who played "bear" and threw pillows on the second floor of the White House, a man who averaged a book a day and became president of the American Historical Association. He even contributed to scholarly journals of science while in the White House! Few presidents, if any, have had as many outside interests. One might almost say the presidency itself was, for him, only one of many compelling interests.

"I cannot imagine the time when there will not be a place in public life for a renaissance man of the Roosevelt mold."

Ripon Forum: As you mentioned in your book, Velvet on Iron, Roosevelt was a man of tremendous energy. He was an avid conservationist, prolific writer, constant reader, naval historian, and a Dakota rancher. Is it still possible for renaissance men to become president?

Marks: I should leave this one to the political scientists, but one thought does come to mind. I cannot imagine the time when there will not be a place in public life for a renaissance man of the Roosevelt mold. By definition, he would be a powerful orator, widely enough read and broad enough in experience to get along with any group, either at home or abroad. Theodore Roosevelt was one who worked with ranchers and cowboys. He knew fishermen, hunting guides, and soldiers much as he knew diplomats and intellectuals. Yes, I think he would be electable today. Eminently so. There is more to be said for his style than ever. He framed a diplomatic decalogue complete with an eleventh commandment, "Thou shalt not slop over" (or, rely not upon atmospherics), and he warned against one cardinal sin, that of bluff. Such precepts as "do not draw unless you mean to shoot" and "never strike unless you are prepared to strike hard" are as applicable today as ever—and they are vintage Theodore Roosevelt. As far as the Big Stick is concerned, history demonstrates that America has been most successful in keeping the peace when it has been best prepared for war. Roosevelt's resort to secrecy and face-saving has not gone out of style either. How else could Henry Kissinger have escaped to France so many times, not to mention his exploratory trip to China, without ever a word appearing in the press?

Ripon Forum: In your book, you also describe the fears America had about an aggressor in Central America and Western Europe during Roosevelt's presidency. That aggressor, it turns out, is now one of our most essential allies: Germany. Since history is filled with such ironies, can we avoid repeating its blunders? Especially as Soviet-American relations worsen.

Marks: First of all, I am not sure that Soviet-American relations have actually worsened in the last couple of years. To be sure, there was an air of bombast during the initial days of the current administration. This had to do with Soviet moves in Poland, and nothing very effective was done. Ambassador Dobrynin, if you recall, was made to enter the State Department through the front door and run a gauntlet of reporters instead of being accorded his customary privilege of private entry. Since then, however, things have gotten onto a different level. Secretary Shultz, in his soft-spoken style, is keeping rhetoric in its proper place. East-West trade seems to be on a positive track. The arms talks, it is true, are in temporary abeyance. But I believe we can expect a more meaningful exchange after this country has demonstrated its resolve to match the Soviet military build-up, missile for missile. You will agree, I think, that there is nothing these days to compare for crisis atmosphere with President Kennedy's Bay of Pigs debacle or the Cuban missile crisis, along with the building of a Berlin Wall. We have none of President Truman's eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations with the Kremlin over the Berlin blockade or the war in Korea. We are not pouring thousands of men into an Asian quagmire. We are not face to face with major Soviet expansion in the direction of the Persian Gulf, as we were under Carter, nor are we witnessing an explosive hostage crisis. President Reagan is clearly aware of the possibility of Soviet miscalculation based upon misunderstanding. He has gone out of his way to make our intentions plain. Following the assassination of Korean cabinet members, he appeared at the demilitarized zone and assured our ally of additional support. His address to the OAS was charged with similar determination regarding our position in the hemisphere. Our steady support of Israel, balanced with equal perseverance in the selling of AWACs to Saudi Arabia and otherwise maintaining ties with the Arab world, is an example of balance of power strategy which can also be seen in the handling of delicate relations with Peking, Tokyo, and the government of Taiwan.

As George Santayana once said "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." With history at our side, we should indeed be able to avoid blunders, as well as profit by the example of those whose statecraft bore positive fruit. Let us hope that those who continue to shape American foreign policy will be able to resist the temptations of an election year and steer a course based on principles which Theodore Roosevelt enunciated better than any other American and which he put into practice with such telling effect.

FEBRUARY 1984
The Presidency of Ronald Reagan: The Man and the Issues

When Ronald Wilson Reagan was elected president in 1980, many moderate Republicans wondered whether his vision of the world would be capable of governing the whole of American life, not just a thin slice of it. They worried whether his ideology — with its combination of drastically reduced government spending and an equally drastic increase in the defense budget — was overly simple and contradictory or whether it would be capable of leading us forward and not backward into an era which never really existed. If it could not, then many moderate Republicans feared the nation would be splintered and the hopes of a greater of the nation would be dashed.

Another election year is now upon us and many moderate Republicans still wonder whether Ronald Reagan and his vision of what should be are capable of good government. By good, we mean a government that not only stimulates the economy, but also creates the structures and fosters the values that a democratic republic should desire. George Will calls this “statecraft as soulcraft,” and so it is. In fact, the 1984 election will not be so much about how much better off we are than four years ago, but about values like justice and fairness, and, on the darker side, inequity and greed.

On the issue of developing basic democratic values, the Reagan administration has a very bad track record. While many supporters of the president argue this is merely a perception and not reality, remember that which proceeds out of the mouth comes from the heart. Consider, for example:

- White House counselor Edwin Meese casting doubt on America’s hungry, saying that he has not seen any “authoritative figures” on the number of America’s hungry children and that some go to soup kitchens “because the food is free and that’s easier than paying for it.”
- Ronald Reagan, in replying to former Republican Governor Meldrim Thompson of New Hampshire who wrote him complaining of Martin Luther King’s “immoral character” and “frequent associations” with leading agents of communism, stating: “I have the same reservations you have, but here [Washington] the perception of too many people is based on image, not reality.” In addition, the president responding when asked whether FBI documents on King, which won’t be released for 35 years, would show that the civil rights leader had communist sympathies: “We’ll know in about 35 years, won’t we?”
- James Watt, the now departed secretary of the interior, telling an audience that a new coal-leasing commission would consist of “a black, a woman, two Jews, and a cripple.”
- Deputy assistant attorney general Robert J. D’Agostino remarking in a memo to Justice Department civil rights chief William Bradford Reynolds that “Blacks, because of their cultural and economic background, are more disruptive in the classroom on the average. It seems they would benefit from programs for the emotionally disturbed.”
- President Reagan replying to a group of out-of-town editors when asked about U.S. nuclear strategy: “I could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button.”
- Deputy undersecretary of defense T. K. Jones claiming in a Los Angeles Times article that should there be a nuclear attack on the U.S., “everybody’s going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around.” Jones added his recommendation for protection in the event of such a war: “Dig a hole, and cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It’s the dirt that does it.”

Such remarks, unfortunately, are not anecdotal. They reflect a pattern which perhaps represents the heart of this administration. If nothing else, they reflect a trend on two issues which may determine the outcome of this year’s election: the issues of justice and peace.

And Justice For All?

Justice, of course, is related to fairness and, for starters, many resent the president’s stand on a number of issues relating to sexual discrimination. These dissenters include one former co-chair of the GOP, Mary Dent Crisp. Recently Crisp wrote:

“President Reagan is the GOP’s problem and I have no intention of perpetuating the problem. President Reagan reneged on a 40-year commitment to equal rights, opposed the ERA, and advocated a constitutional amendment to ban abortion. He continues to pursue economic policies that disproportionately and severely hurt women and a confrontational foreign policy. The gender gap grows for the president and the Republican Party.”
Not all Republicans, of course, share Crisp's perspective. But there have been enough, like Rep. Claudine Schneider, R-R.I., who have warned the administration that its policies concerning women are not only a reversal of the GOP's heritage of promoting equality of the sexes, but also politically damaging.

In the face of such criticism, however, the White House continues to advocate the weakening of federal anti-discrimination policies, such as it has with its ruling in the Grove City College case. Here, the White House has argued that an educational institution can discriminate on the basis of sex in one of its programs while retaining partial federal funding. (Schneider, however, introduced a resolution which passed the House of Representatives by a near unanimous margin, requiring Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the act questioned in the case, to be applied broadly to any institution receiving federal assistance.)

The administration's commitment to justice for all has also been shown to be problematic by its handling of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission compromise. President Reagan's attempts to remove every member of the Commission was met by congressional uproar and a tug-of-war soon ensued between the White House and Capitol Hill over the Commission's independence. But the administration has blocked or violated every bi-partisan agreement, even those allowing it to appoint sympathetic members. Furthermore, it has insisted upon removing two GOP members — Jill Ruckelshaus and Mary Louise Smith — whose votes the White House apparently feared it could not control. Although some efforts have been made recently to appoint Republicans concerned with the promotion of equal and civil rights, the White House's performance has done nothing but aggravate its battle with civil rights constituencies. This was summed up best by Ralph Neas, executive director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and a Republican, during a December press conference:

"Mr. President, let there be no doubt that while you have removed some of the Commission's conscience, you have not, and will not, silence those who are pointing out how horrible your civil rights record really is. For, believe me, those who are committed to civil rights are now more determined than ever to explain the unfairness of your civil rights policies."

These most recent debacles are only the latest in a long line, which includes the administration's soft-peddling of the Bob Jones University case, its lukewarm support for the extension of the Voting Rights Act, and its failure to back the Economic Equity Act; all acts which make many wonder whether this administration is a captive of its own narrow perspective.

Securing the Common Defense?

Although the showing of the controversial movie "The Day After" crystallized attention on the possibilities of nuclear war or, better yet, the sheer hell of surviving such a war, the fear raised from the issue of war and peace has been with us and growing for some time. Catholic bishops deliberated at length in 1982 on the morality of nuclear weapons and their deterring power, finally declaring them immoral. The House of Representatives also passed a nuclear freeze resolution in 1983, and similar legislation has been introduced by Mark Hatfield and Ted Kennedy in the Senate. While these resolutions have yet to halt the development of either superpower's nuclear weapons, they have fanned the flames of healthy debate among citizen groups in far reaches of the land.

"There is another issue, however, that may be the president's saving grace. That issue, strangely enough, is Ronald Reagan himself and what can be termed 'the Reagan factor.'"

The turbulence in the Middle East and Central America has created additional fear, causing many Americans, conservatives and liberals alike, to question the wisdom of our military presence in those regions — peacekeeping or otherwise. Judging from the volatility of each key geopolitical spot, circumstances could change so rapidly that many wonder if we can actually expect to deter a war, much less our involvement in it.

In addition, our allies have registered skepticism about our actions in those strategic areas of the globe. President Reagan's staunchest comrade, Britain's Margaret Thatcher, has even squabbled with her fellow conservative over the detachment of U.S. marines to Grenada. And elsewhere in this Forum, we are reminded that while American policies cannot be made in foreign capitals, the opinions of our allies are a very important commodity, worthy of our considerable attention.

This concern rests on top of the president ill-advisedly calling the Soviet Union "an evil empire," failing to meet with either of his Russian counterparts and exempting his understandable desire to make America strong again from the standards of efficiency and accountability.

The cumulative effect of all this may make the campaigning of Ronald Reagan very difficult in 1984. It could also make the campaigning of many incumbent and prospective GOP candidates quite unpleasant.

Reagan the Man

There is another issue, however, that may be the president's saving grace. That issue, strangely enough, is Ronald Reagan himself and what can be termed "the Reagan factor."

An aside can help explain this. Earlier this year, the Forum received a not-so-unexpected letter from one of its former editors. This letter read:
"I am astonished that you have made no direct criticism of the Reagan administration. Reagan makes Nixon look like a left-winger, but the Forum was far more candid about the Nixon administration's failures than it has been about the Reagan administration's."

Our reply to that editor? In part, you're right. We have tried to point out in various editions that rights do matter, that the perception of inequity is just as disastrous politically as inequity itself, and that some social services taxpayers pay for are worthwhile. But President Reagan is not President Nixon. Quite the contrary. Richard Nixon did not possess "the Reagan factor," which, put simply, is this president's talent for diffusing his critics. It is a politician's dream and something many once-and-future leaders covet.

President Reagan's communicative skills comprise another part of this factor, and since they have been chronicled adequately elsewhere, suffice it to say they are enviable as well as singularly responsible for his ability to market his ideas.

Yet some will argue that this may not be leadership, but rather demagoguery. Possibly. But what voters think will be a critical determinant in this year's election. Whether voters place personality and leadership above extremely troubling issues, or vice-versa, will be key in deciding the next occupant of the White House.

The verdict, however, is still out. But perhaps some White House advisers should take stock, recognizing that some voters think their ideology is limited and, unless some changes are made, it could spell the undoing of the GOP Senate majority in 1984."

"But perhaps some White House advisers should take stock, recognizing that some voters think their ideology is limited and, unless some changes are made, it could spell the undoing of the GOP Senate majority in 1984."

In Search of Foreign Policy
Global Relations and the Reagan Presidency: A German Perspective

by Horst Bacia

During the last few years West Germany and the United States have gone through the most troubled period of their partnership since the Federal Republic was founded in 1949. The worst may be over now, as the first Pershing II missiles are deployed in spite of Soviet pressures and growing protests of the West German anti-nuclear movement. It is, however, hard to believe that misunderstandings and mutual distrust which have grown during the missile-debate on both sides of the Atlantic can easily be overcome in the near future. No doubt, the relationship between Bonn and Washington has changed for the better after Helmut Kohl took over from Helmut Schmidt as chancellor in October 1982. But public opinion in the United States still seems to be concerned about whether the Federal Republic will be able to remain a reliable partner in the Western Alliance. And at least an influential part of the West German public opinion looks with reservation or criticism at the political record of the Reagan administration.

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Foreign countries are often identified with their leaders. What looks like growing anti-Americanism in West Germany to some observers is, in most cases, only dissent from the political beliefs and goals of the present government. President Reagan never managed to make himself popular with the majority of Germans. Public opinion polls of the Allensbach Institute show that in several surveys in 1982 and 1983 only between 18 and 24 percent of those questioned had a high opinion of the president, whereas a majority of between 45 and 52 percent gave him a low rating. Only shortly after President Reagan's visit to Bonn and West Berlin in June 1982, when people became aware of his personal charm, the polls were more favorable. According to Allensbach, President Reagan's political course is judged — again in 1982 and 1983 — as being "too hard" by 47 or 40 percent, as "too weak" by four and six, as "just right" by 18 and 24 percent respectively. Maybe the image of the "trigger-happy" cowboy, depicted by Jimmy Carter, still sticks, at least with the ill-informed.

Another poll, sponsored by the Atlantic Institute in Paris and others, reveals how public opinion in Europe has changed during the debate about NATO's two-track decision and American-Soviet negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in Geneva. In 1983 Europeans believed to a much higher degree in the importance of contacts with the Soviet Union as a means of achieving security for the West. In Germany cooperation between Europe and the United States, which ranked at the top of the list in 1982 with 53 percent, dropped to 34 percent and the third place in October 1983 behind continued dialogue with the Soviet Union (42 percent, up 11 points) and productive arms control talks (36 percent). The most striking change took place among Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats, where confidence in cooperation with the United States dropped by 24 percentage points (Social Democrats 12), whereas importance of contacts with the Soviet Union went up by twelve points (Social Democrats seven).

Differences over how to deal with the Soviet Union are obviously the main reason for the present alienation within the Atlantic partnership. Of course Europeans, and Germans in particular, are well aware that ultimately their security is guaranteed only by the United States and their strategic forces. But in spite of the Soviet military build up with conventional and nuclear forces during the last decade, the new arms program of the Reagan administration appears to be more frightening than convincing to many people — especially among the young.

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taking in pursuing its global interests. Doubts are growing, however, as to whether President Reagan's approach to foreign policy takes into account different interests and views of America's allies in Europe.

Although disappointed and less optimistic than a few years ago, many Germans still believe in some sort of detente or whatever term one might apply to a working relationship with the Communist world. So does the present government in Bonn. Soviet misdemeanor during those years when the concept was shared by American presidents, security advisers, and secretaries of state has not been forgotten. But there is a strong feeling that things will get worse if the relationship between the superpowers deteriorates. During the decade of detente when Chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt led a coalition of Social Democrats and the Liberal Free Democrats, contacts were developed with the Soviet Union, the East European countries, and, last but not least, the German Democratic Republic — the other German state.

When Helmut Kohl became chancellor he promised continuity. So far his attitude towards Moscow and the communist leadership in East Berlin is similar to that of his predecessors. No wonder Hans Dietrich Genscher, the leader of the Free Democrats, whose party switched alliances in 1982 bringing about the change of power in Bonn, was Schmidt's foreign minister for eight years, as he now is Helmut Kohl's. Apart from this, the continuity in vital matters of interest is decisive. This means: do not endanger the agreements with East Berlin. These are important first of all because they ensure that Germans in the West can visit their friends and relatives in the East; that East German pensioners can visit the West. That is why Kohl and Genscher were more reluctant to join the United States in taking a tougher stand against the Soviet Union than one might have hoped in the White House.

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On the issue of deploying modern American missiles in Europe — which haunts NATO since its ominous two-track decision was taken in December 1979 — the new coalition in Bonn again fell short of Washington's expectations. When it finally confirmed its mandate in the general election in March last year, Kohl's victory was interpreted by many American observers as a referendum on the missile question. But the issue did not disappear. Growing numbers of protesters in the peace movement stirred up a public debate, which no government could ignore. Kohl, like Schmidt, urged President Reagan to show more flexibility in the Geneva negotiations and even shortly before the talks broke down, he claimed an American-Soviet agreement to be possible. He went to Moscow to see Andropov, and tried to suggest in Washington that both leaders should prepare for a summit meeting. The deployment of new American missiles was eventually confirmed by the government parties in the Bundestag. The Green Party, which is against NATO, and a large majority of the Social Democrats, however, voted against it just days before a special party congress held by the Social Democrats turned down Helmut Schmidt's advice to approve deployment by a margin of 384-14. The argument used was that the superpowers had not explored all opportunities to reach a compromise in Geneva, because the Kohl government had stopped putting pressure on the United States.

The arrival of the first nine Pershing II missiles on an American base in Mutlangen near Stuttgart has not put an end to the debate, either. The number of active demonstrators may go down, but a hard core could be mislead to engage themselves in more violent actions. In East Germany, too, the small independent peace movement, which is closely linked to the Protestant Church, will proceed with careful manifestations against new nuclear missiles in East and West, although its members are threatened by imprisonment or expulsion to the Federal Republic.

One example for the arguments of those against deployment of new American nuclear missiles in West Germany is the resolution which was adopted in mid-December during a meeting of German writers in Heilbronn (25 miles from Stuttgart) where Pershing II's are expected to be set up as well. The somewhat clumsy text was put forward by Gunter Grass, one of the most prominent post-war writers in Germany. It states: "With deployment of new weapons for mass-destruction the Bundeswehr (the West German Army) is becoming part of an offensive concept which perverts the idea of defence as it is laid down in our constitution. We must put up a resistance against this. We must oppose the 'strategy of decapitation' which the Pentagon discusses openly. This new strategy abuses the Bundeswehr, because its soldiers are simply written off in plans bearing the stamp of a crusading mentality." For this reason, Grass argues, a young man should refuse to do military service which is compulsory in the Federal Republic.

This view, of course, is held by a minority. But it shows to what extent opposition against the new nuclear weapons, 99 more Pershings and 96 cruise missiles are yet to come, is engendered by crude and false perceptions of American objectives. The argument that these missiles would form a more credible link between the defense of Western Europe and American strategic forces in the context of nuclear deterrence is no longer accepted by active members of the peace movement and many others influenced by their polemics. Many people don't feel more secure, instead they are more afraid. Certainly talk in Washington about winnable and limited nuclear wars had a formidable impact

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on the European public as it was interpreted to mean a war limited to Europe. There can be no doubt that East and West Germany would have nothing to win and everything to lose however "limited" a conflict ever might be.

The prospect of a military confrontation on NATO's central front — which would probably lead to the destruction of large parts of Germany within days or even hours — even upset those who support the two-track decision and the arrival of new nuclear missiles after talks in Geneva failed to produce an agreement within the given deadline. There is a certain uneasiness about a government in Washington whose principle political aim is to counter Soviet activities worldwide, which seems to concentrate on military power without placing much trust in diplomatic activities, which talks of "horizontal escalation" and "war-widening strategies," describes the Soviet Union as "the evil empire" and often does not appear to calculate the effects of its rhetoric abroad. So relations between Washington and Moscow have reached their lowest point for years. But arms control seems to be impossible without a minimum of trust and mutual understanding.

"Of course, Bonn does not expect to be consulted on everything: sometimes it may even wish not to be consulted."

Although the Reagan administration has been much more cautious in its actions than in its speech, people in Europe are worried by the dangers of a new arms race. They are bewildered by what they see as bureaucratic infights, conflicting signals being given by the administration, and the shift in policies sometimes from one extreme to the other. Within three years President Reagan has had two secretaries of state and three national security advisers. "Und da soll uns nicht bange werden" (How can we help being alarmed?) wrote Marion Graffin Donhoff — who has commented on American affairs for more than thirty years — in the liberal weekly "Die Zeit." In Germany and everywhere in Europe, she writes, the former natural confidence in Washington's political judgment has disappeared: "The Reagan administration does not have a concept; to remedy this it seeks military action and seldom diplomatic or political solutions; on principal it applies two different standards: military dictatorships, as far as they represent only a bulwark against communism, are supported, communist dictatorships are opposed without differentiating; every crisis, even regional ones, is put into a drawer labeled East-West conflict; anti-communism is the only criterion with which American foreign policy is familiar."

Ronald Reagan's administration lacked experience in foreign affairs when taking office, and even the president may admit that some mistakes were made during his first two years of his presidency. Europeans were asking themselves how Washington could make new grain deals with the Soviet Union while European companies were penalized for keeping their contracts to provide equipment for the Siberian gas pipeline. Was it really necessary to put pressure on the allies to join the United States in imposing sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland after the military regime of General Jaruzelski took over in Warsaw? Had Jimmy Carter's problems already been forgotten, when after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan his course got only half-hearted support? Was it not possible to understand that European countries sometimes have different views and different interests? Is consultation incompatible with leadership?

The present government in Bonn regards the process of consultations which developed within NATO during the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces in Geneva as being exemplary. No doubt the good personal relationship between President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl helps a great deal. They have exchanged dozens of letters and seem to be on the same wavelength. It is Kohl's conviction that friends should speak their mind. He said in Washington, friendship meant partnership, not dependence: "In American-German relations no one gives orders and no one takes orders."

Of course, Bonn does not expect to be consulted on everything; sometimes it may even wish not to be consulted. Germany has to acknowledge (and acknowledges) that the interests of a world power are different and have their own logic. American policies towards China, in the Middle East, in Central America and elsewhere don't have a direct impact on Europe, they don't affect their governments in terms of public opinion and voting behavior. If the German government had been asked for its opinion before the American invasion of Grenada, it would have advised against it, an early statement in Bonn said.

Bonn is less reticent when it comes to the relationship between the superpowers. Although Helmut Kohl rejects the role of "interpreter" between Washington and Moscow claimed by his predecessor Schmidt, his government tries to make its voice heard in the Western Alliance. Bonn among others was eager to convince Washington that the follow-up meeting of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid should be brought to an end successfully by signing new declarations. And it was Genscher who suggested that all NATO foreign ministers should take part in the opening session of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures which began in Stockholm on the 17th of January. In an article recently distributed by the ministry for foreign affairs, the German foreign minister wrote: "Time is ripe for a new effort to bring about a broad and long-term arrangement of detente with the Soviet Union on the basis of balance of power and equal status."

When Secretary of State Shultz was in Bonn last December, Kohl and Genscher tried to convince him that after the beginning of deployment of the new American missiles the West should stress its interest in cooperation with Moscow. The new formula in Bonn is: "Security where necessary, cooperation where possible." Time will show to what extent this concept is shared in Washington.

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The President You Deserve?
A Personal View

by Simon Mabey

The current president of the United States generates a cocktail of emotions and reactions in a British heart. Fear, surprise, admiration, bewilderment and respect all have their place. It is difficult, however, to distinguish between these more general reactions to America from specific reactions to President Reagan.

We Europeans tend to take a complacent and arrogant position, resting on our laurels of histories and cultures reaching back thousands of years. We take a paternal view of the country on the other side of the Atlantic and, with the benefits of either wisdom or senility, view the activities of a nation in relatively early manhood.

In foreign affairs we view the administration with the hindsight of our former experiences as a dominant world power. If the British Empire no longer exists as an institution, on which the sun never sets, with the object of promoting freedom, justice and Pax Britannica, then it must be because such an organization was an anachronism in a developing world. If the British Commonwealth replaced it as an institution where British influence is far less direct and more limited then that must be because a reduced level of British influence was an inevitable development. If our long and painful experience in gaining an empire and then losing it cannot be an example from which to learn, then that is a cause for paternal grieving. We thought the United States had finally gone through its adolescence growing pains with Vietnam and the then long march from Saigon. The move to a moral approach to foreign affairs with human rights to the forefront was one we could understand. However, we now exhibit some fearfulness as the foreign policy objectives appear to be perceived short and medium term self interest.

"What we fear most is that your president sees issues in a clear cut way, in terms of black and white, in terms of right and wrong. It is not difficult to also perceive in your president's policies a crusade against world communism. We may share your objectives. We, however, express great misgivings over methods."

We understand that American foreign policy objectives will not always be the same as ours. We understand the focusing of attention on Central and South America. We understood that when a militant Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and we had a battle to recapture them that America and Reagan would be pulled to two directions. However, because of the consistency we expect from your president, we never doubted as to which way his even-handedness would tilt.

We learn that there is dismay over the British attitude to the U.S. invasion of Grenada. I believe the attitude is rooted not in the rights or wrongs of the Grenada case. Hurt pride, in that a country which shares our Queen was taken over by U.S. Marines and Rangers is only part of the story.

"In a country which chose John F. Kennedy as its president, we wonder why it should have chosen such an aged leader. I think one of the answers is that with age come some of the perceived qualities of your president: experience, maturity and consistency."

If we believe in freedom and democracy in this case the ends seem to justify the means. We are however fearful of the consequences for future American foreign policy. What we fear most is that your president sees issues in a clear cut way, in terms of black and white, in terms of right and wrong. It is not difficult to also perceive in your president's policies a crusade against world communism. We may share your objectives. We however, express great misgivings over methods.

We have had our differences with your president over the German pipeline and questions of transfer of technology. But our concern here was not so much of the man or the policy but of your legal system with its claims for extra territorial jurisdiction.

We also had close links with the Polish people, in our case forged during the Second World War, and have a Polish community in the United Kingdom. Yet we were bewildered by the presidential campaign waged through the media and culminating in the television spectacular "Let Poland be Poland." We feel that politics are serious and show business is vulgar and never the two shall meet.

When the supply-siders came into the ascendancy as the latest economic fashion we looked at them long and hard. Reducing taxation is always a popular cry and most popular amongst those who pay most taxes. If you can construct an intellectual case that reduced taxes raise government revenue then you have a popular formula for the responsibilities of government. We would not censure Reagan for his support and perhaps his greatest crime would be that of opportunism. We do, however, consider him short-sighted, for if reduced taxes do not raise revenue within a relatively short timescale then a little foresight would indicate that the problems of budget deficits will inevitably follow.

Simon Mabey is a member of the British Conservative Party's Bow Group Council, and was asked by the Forum to give a British perspective on Ronald Reagan and his presidency.

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In Britain we have had a very different trade union movement from that in the United States. We have seen them exert significant power, and in post-war years they have wreaked a series of increasing humiliations upon governments. Since 1979 in Britain the tide has turned and the movement is in retreat before a determined government. We wish a government to retain its democratic authority over that of subordinate institutions. We therefore admired the determination with which your president acted to crush the strike of the air traffic controllers from their supposed impregnable position of monopoly power.

"If, as it is said, every country has the government it deserves, if Reagan personifies the national character, if you elect and re-elect him, then he must be the president you deserve."

We look at your president’s age and smile in puzzlement. We expect the members of the Politburo to be sexagenarians, septuagenarians or octogenarians. In the West we tend to believe in younger leaders to provide a greater guarantee of energy, health and continuity. In a country which chose John F. Kennedy as its president, we wonder why it should have chosen an aged leader and shows every likelihood of so doing again. I think one of the answers is that with age come some of the perceived qualities of your president: experience, maturity and consistency.

In Europe we expect our political leaders to have many talents. We expect them to be drawn from amongst the cleverest, most articulate, courageous and charismatic people in the country. After you elected your president, unkind stories were told at cocktail parties as to how the conversations would go when he took tea with Margaret Thatcher or coffee with Giscard D’Estaing. When the television cameras and photographers had gone, when the reporters had left, when the aides and speechwriters had been shuffled out with the Secret Service men, would there be anything serious left to talk about? We doubted it.

We formed the view that you had not chosen one of the cleverest, most articulate and charismatic leaders possible and wondered whether it mattered. It would not matter if he was a good judge of people, if he could choose clever and articulate advisers to surround himself. Then we learned how the California Mafia had replaced the Georgia Mafia. And we feared for the future of the western world.

We were most astonished that a former Hollywood actor should be elected as the leader of the most powerful nation on earth. Perhaps this astonishment was only due to our misunderstanding of the importance Hollywood and the world of razzle dazzle plays in American elections. With time we have learned how valuable it could be if our leaders were also able to act. Acting assists in communication, which is a prerequisite to general recognition of that elusive quality known as leadership.

The positive qualities we see in Ronald Reagan are those of leadership and courage, consistency and loyalty. The deficiencies are those of defective vision, blinkered and short-sighted, more of a concern in an intellectual lightweight.

We have experienced an American diet of cowboy films where the goodies and baddies are clearly defined. We caricature Americans as having a burning hatred for communism, the more surprising as they have not experienced it. We portray them as people seeking the next frontier. We have seen American soap operas where superficiality is the common theme. If there is any truth in our general perception of the American people, then perhaps Reagan is truly a man of the people.

If, as it is said, every country has the government it deserves, if Reagan personifies the national character, if you elect and re-elect him, then he must be the president you deserve.

EDITOR’S NOTE: The following is the result of a two day conference held in Madison, Wisconsin. Over one hundred participants from seven midwestern states unanimously voted to accept the proposed redirection of the Republican Party goals.

Statement of the Midwest Moderate Republican Conference

To ensure Republican victories in 1984, a strong showing in the Midwest is essential. To reverse the declining fortunes of the Republican Party in this region, we must reach out to the broad mainstream of the electorate. In order to succeed, this effort will require an adjustment in Republican policies and rhetoric.

Specific issues we feel the Republican Party must address immediately are:

Women’s Rights. The Party should reestablish its historic commitment to the Equal Rights Amendment and to economic equity for women.

Civil Rights. The Party of Lincoln should make clear its commitment to economic opportunity and quality education for all, and to enforce civil and voting rights laws.

Federal Budget. To insure continued economic recovery it is essential that hard choices be made to deal with the Federal deficit. In enacting any reductions in expenditures, all agencies of government, including the Defense Department, should be subjected to the same standards of accountability.

Environment. The Republican Party must acknowledge government’s role as the steward of the environment for future generations, which will require addressing pressing concerns such as clean air, clean water, acid rain and soil conservation.

Arms Control. Arms control is the overwhelming issue of our time. We urge the Administration to place the highest priority on negotiating verifiable reductions in the level of nuclear armaments.

Adopted, November 20, 1983, Madison, Wisconsin
Foreign Perspectives
Taiwan: An Experiment
in Pluralism
the U.S. Should Support

by Thomas Abbott

With this issue of the Forum, we introduce a new category, “Foreign Perspectives,” which will present examinations into the political cultures of different lands. In this edition, Thomas Abbott, a free-lance writer who covered Asia for several years, gives a first-hand account of political life in Taiwan and the factors which direct that nation’s course. Other issues will carry similar reports, reminding us that ours is an interdependent world and for global relations to improve, the right hand will have to know what the left hand is doing.

Confucius said: “Good government obtains when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far off are attracted.” Unlike the People’s Republic of China, where Confucius’ thought has been obliterated by political hate campaigns, the government of Taiwan has sought to associate itself with the memory of the “Paragon of All Ages.” But the island’s ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), has not been as successful in living up to Confucian ideals, as in commemorating them. A growing number of the 18 million people on Taiwan, who “are near,” are not happy with their lot, and those who “are far” — the 140 nations who have no diplomatic relations with the island — are not attracted to it.

The Taiwanese’ unhappiness is caused by anxiety about their future. Largely denied a voice in both their international and domestic affairs for the past three and a half decades, the Taiwanese today fear that they risk permanently losing not only their right to exist as free people but also their very cultural, political and historical identity. This anxiety is growing, as their near-total lack of representation in world bodies and the slow pace of political modernization at home are contributing to a new crisis: deterioration of the ever-fragile bond of social trust that has helped Taiwan weather past setbacks. Such disunity could threaten the country’s security from intervention by an outside power, China.

It is common knowledge why foreign nations do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. With one billion people, just enough animosity toward its aggressive neighbor to the north, and an allure that few Westerners can resist, the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) has masterfully managed to win world complicity in its effort to thrust Taiwan into pariahdom. Now only a handful of countries recognize Taiwan as a nation.

Today many KMT leaders pine for the good old days, when they were recognized as the sole government of all China and could have dictated a long-term solution to the Taiwan problem. But such contrition does little to assuage bitterness among the Taiwanese people, who blame the KMT for their non-identity and non-representation in the international community. The Taiwanese hold the KMT

Thomas Abbott was a free-lance writer in Asia for several years.

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responsible for the burning embarrassment they suffer each
time a foreign immigration officer scoffs at their “Republic
of China” passports or requires them to sign humiliating
statements to the effect that they are citizens without a
country.

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Roots in Domestic Politics

The roots of Taiwan’s international identity problem,
Taiwanese say, are in their identity crisis at home. Neither
“native” Taiwanese (those on Taiwan before 1945, when
Japan ceded it to China after 50 years of colonization) nor
“mainlander” Taiwanese (arriving with the KMT after
World War II) have been permitted by Taiwan’s domestic
political situation to develop the constructive identities and
roles — political as well as social — needed for the smooth
functioning of a pluralistic society.

The “natives,” who make up 87 percent of the population,
for many years were totally denied substantive political
power. The president, premier, most cabinet members,
most high-ranking military officers, and the vast majority of
members of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan
have always been “mainlanders.” In fact, not only have
most central government officials been of mainland extrac-
tion; many to this day actually claim that they still represent
constituencies on the Communist-held mainland.

Most “mainlanders,” for their part, have not felt
comfortable with arrangements on Taiwan either. They
have failed to fully merge with the “natives,” though since
the 1950s they have suspected that a return to China is
impossible. This is partly due to the barriers posed by
different cultural and linguistic backgrounds (Taiwanese is
as different from Mandarin as English is from German), as
well as to the government’s practice of perpetuating
distinctions between the groups by identifying citizens by
province of ancestral heritage rather than of birth or
residence.

But the greatest distance between the “natives” and
“mainlanders” was initially created by KMT policies on
the island in the late 1940s, when Chiang Kai-shek was still
fighting Mao Tse-tung and the Communists. Convinced
that the Taiwanese were Communists or at least sympathetic
to communism, KMT martiments overreacted to minor civil
disturbances, upping the ante each time to the point that
major violence eventually resulted in thousands of deaths —
and the poisoning of any nascent trust in KMT ability to
govern.

This problem was not new to the Taiwanese. Centuries of
colonial ties with an avaricious court in Beijing and 50 years
of tough rule by Japan had already so battered citizen-
government trust on Taiwan that only the most benign of
authorities, let alone a clique of “outsiders” with paranoid
tendencies, could have won quick popular acceptance.
Horrific human rights violations in the 1950s and 60s,
including torture by overzealous secret police and life
prison sentences on the basis of rigged evidence or forced
confessions, did little to endear the KMT to the Taiwanese.

“As a result of this bad start, the KMT (and most
“mainlanders” for that matter) never have felt confident of
popular acceptance by the “natives,” not even in the years
of economic progress that tangibly benefited the majority of
the population. Had they enjoyed such confidence, perhaps
Taiwan would not have become entrapped in a vicious
circle of doubt over the years — government distrust of the
people fueling greater popular suspicion of the government.

Today, all the people on Taiwan are Taiwanese, whether
they themselves chose that identity or history determined it
for them. The gap between most “mainlanders” and
“natives” is narrower than in the past, as the former group
and their children realize that their fate is inseparable from
the latter’s. But that gap has been replaced by gaps based on
political, generational and economic differences which,
when combined, could present a more ominous challenge to
the Taiwanese people — breakdown of the trust bond that
holds their society together.

A boom in counterfeit products, an increase in economic
and violent crime, diminution of the Taiwanese’s traditional
“public morality,” a rise in the number of foreign bank
accounts, and a sustained increase in immigration all
indicate an unabated erosion of social trust. Though this
breakdown affects and is affected by many facets of
Taiwanese life, its causes and impact are most clear in the
political realm. Political alienation is both a cause and
effect of the problem. Though not manifested in violent
ways, it has instead transformed into a gradual withdrawal
of popular support for the “system,” into apathy, allowing
trust and expectation atrophy into cynicism.

The popular apathy is not, as some observers may claim,
the boredom of a satiated people. Three decades of
accelerated economic, social and educational progress has
made human and political rights a universal concern. So
though the number of gross human rights violations has
decreased, and a loosening of restrictions on speech has
permitted broader public knowledge about them, the number
of citizens outraged by government abuses has grown from
being a tight group of dissidents into a massive group of
ordinary citizens. Throw a dissident in jail 20 years ago,
and the KMT embittered a family and small group of friends; deprive the Taiwanese of their hard-earned political rights today, and the government alienates millions.

"It is time for Americans to realize that Taiwan — larger in population and more significant in trade than most members of the United Nations — must be understood and consulted about its own future."

Conflicting Indications About the Future

Events in Taiwan over the last few years yield conflicting conclusions about the long-term direction of KMT policy. On one hand, it appears that the party has not yet resolved to carry out a comprehensive program for the gradual modernization or "Taiwanization" of the government. For example, in the wake of a December 1979 human rights rally which degenerated into a minor riot, the KMT reversed several years of political progress by imprisoning on trumped-up charges of sedition many of Taiwan's preeminent democrats. The ruling party's unwillingness to investigate several murders of great political importance to the Taiwanese has also been a source of alienation.

Since Taiwan's 35-year-old martial law precludes formation of an opposition party, political journals are key to the democracy movement as vehicles of expression and organization. The KMT in 1982 banned or confiscated 19 issues of democratic journals and suspended four opposition magazines for one full year. Last year they banned 20 and suspended at least five.

The KMT has also caused public concern by ramming through the national legislature two bills aimed at restricting the political influence of two major groups it perceives as foes. The "Law to Protect Religion," which grants the government authority to shut down churches that fail to comply with an exhausting variety of regulations, can be used at any time to cripple the powerful democratic, human rights-oriented Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Also, a new election law put at a severe disadvantage in December's elections any candidate not affiliated with an official party, i.e., all non-KMT politicians.

On the other hand, by no means is all dark in Taiwan today. Many apparently insignificant events are, in the Chinese-Taiwanese milieu, actually good news for Taiwan's domestic political development. For example, the appointment as ambassador to Paraguay of General Wang Sheng, notorious former chief of Taiwan's secret police and a close friend of President Chiang Ching-kuo, ensures his non-intervention in Taiwan's upcoming succession process (Chiang is 72 and infirm). A proposed "National Security Law," while not in itself desirable, is also rumored to further move power away from the military and security forces.

Despite the arrests noted above, treatment of opposition politicians has improved in recent years. Though the government has been closing down an unprecedented number of democratic journals, it has been doing so only after allowing them unprecedented freedom in content and criticism. While the imprisonment of opposition leaders continues, there's no denying that the number of arrests, especially secret arrests, has dropped and the treatment of prisoners improved. Also, in the Legislative Yuan, where Cabinet members are queried on administration policy, opposition probing has been permitted to the point that hearings have been beneficial for the first time in the Yuan's history.

Without making a spectacle, the KMT has also gradually been introducing a new foreign policy that is more pragmatic and more representative of the Taiwanese people than in the past. For example, in an interview with an Amsterdam newspaper in 1982, one of Taipei's foremost economic planners said that Taiwan hopes to take a seat in the United Nations as a sovereign state, "recognized as a nation with its own identity." Because of KMT adherence to the pipedream of unifying China, until recently such an utterance would have landed the speaker in jail on charges of sedition.

Supporting the Taiwan Experiment

As inconsistent and complicated as Taiwan's political development may be, Taiwanese efforts — by both the ruling party and opposition — should have the support of the U.S. for our own strategic, economic and moral reasons. Indeed, the U.S., as the nation most directly responsible for the creation and nonsolution of the Taiwan problem, has a profound obligation to work for a peaceful, equitable solution.

One difficulty Americans have with this issue, however, is defining Taiwan. The pro-KMT "Old China Lobby" succeeded in convincing many Americans that Taiwan was a province of the Republic of China, just a staging ground for the KMT to prepare for recovery of the Chinese mainland over which it retained sovereignty.

A progressive "New China Lobby" has emerged in recent years that maintains that Taiwan is a renegade province of the People's Republic of China. They believe that the U.S., by continuing broad-ranging ties with Taiwan, is obstructing the path of history and meddling in China's internal affairs — much to the detriment of American business interests on the mainland.
Sincere as their adherents may be, both lobbies' arguments are specious. They have taken advantage of American ignorance about who the Taiwanese are and what they want, as well as the fact that they have no democratically elected representatives to speak for them in international fora. (One billion Chinese do not have such representation either, but some Westerners do not think they need it.)

It is time for Americans to realize that Taiwan — larger in population and more significant in trade than most members of the United Nations — must be consulted about its own future.

The Taiwanese face three major options with respect to their future: an arrangement proposed by Beijing by which Taiwan is federated into the P.R.C. but supposedly allowed considerable autonomy; declaration of independence; and maintaining the status quo, waiting for the old guard in Beijing and Taipei to die off in the hope that a new generation will put aside old civil war battle cries and be more modern, pragmatic in their thinking.

With respect to the first alternative, unification with the mainland, popular sentiment in Taiwan as articulated by both the KMT and the island's democratic leaders is today clarion: nothing about the P.R.C. — not its ideology, backwardness, nor xenophobia — is attractive. The average Taiwanese has enjoyed more freedom, prosperity and international exchange than even the New Class elite in China.

They will not choose the independence route either. Glamorous on paper, an immediate declaration of independence would incur P.R.C. wrath the likes of which little Taiwan could not resist without more solid U.S. and Japanese support. Despite the fact that Taiwan has been separate from China for almost a century and that formalizing that independence may be wholly justifiable, the Taiwanese know it would not be strategically judicious at this time. China's grip of friendship on countries like the U.S. and Japan is so strong, and those nations' fear of causing the "ultimate crisis" in bilateral relations with Beijing is so deep, that the Taiwanese reluctantly concede that only one option is viable for them — maintaining the status quo. Their fate is thus effectively postponed, but their anxiety is not diminished.

In view of this, U.S. actions with respect to the Taiwan problem appear ambiguous. This country is both a source of security to the Taiwanese as a supplier of arms and, possibly, their ultimate defender against Chinese Communist aggression. At the same time it is a source of anxiety as a former ally who has made unnecessary concessions to Beijing about their future. The Reagan administration's agreement with Beijing to cut back arms sales to Taiwan and subsequent moves to actually boost sales are a vivid example of this country's ambivalence.

A number of Americans advocate a total hands-off U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue. Pointing out that the KMT is "Chinese," they play a cute semantic game in saying the Taiwan issue should be worked out "by the Chinese themselves" — in denial of the reality that Taiwan is different from China historically, culturally and politically. American ambiguity over Taiwan's domestic politics and human rights makes this sort of vacuous argument possible.

The U.S. has pulled the rug out from under the Taiwanese's efforts to make domestic political progress many times. President Jimmy Carter severely set back democracy and human rights development by callously announcing just one week before crucial elections that the U.S. was going to establish relations with Beijing. News of American derecognition of Taipei was a shock to Taiwanese society, and the election campaign, which was unprecedented in the breadth and depth of its issues, was immediately terminated. President Reagan's announcement that he would reduce arms sales initially had a similar effect.

Instead of disrupting democratic progress, the U.S. should support it. By urging the KMT to lift martial law and release democratic political prisoners, the U.S. can contribute to the healing of festering social sores and help rebuild the trust bond Taiwan needs for survival. No political system can withstand the kind of challenges Taiwan faces unless it is strong, and no system is strong unless it has broad popular support unpoisoned by human rights violations and rancorous political trickery.

"China's grip of friendship on countries like the U.S. and Japan is so strong, and those nations' fear of causing the 'ultimate crisis' in bilateral relations with Beijing is so deep, that the Taiwanese reluctantly concede that only one option is viable for them — maintaining the status quo."

But just as the U.S. must encourage the KMT to abandon its long-standing distrust of Taiwanese "natives" and their cultural, religious and political leaders, we have a responsibility to teach our fellow democrats in Taiwan the full meaning of democracy. Some embittered opposition leaders at times have unnecessarily sought confrontation with the ruling party. If the KMT must overcome its fantastic notion of government without the give and take of fair politics, so must the opposition.

Failure to grasp this has already taken its toll on the democratic movement itself, as a dangerous split has developed between young radicals and more mature moderates in the non-KMT ranks. Also, to their discredit, some opposition figures have allowed their expressions of disrespect for the ruling party and its policies to lead to a deterioration of the public's concept of rule of law.

To help instill the sense of long-term security needed for domestic political progress, the U.S. should also free the Taiwanese from the P.R.C.'s increasing pressures by ensuring that arms sales will continue at an appropriate level as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act. No American action would be more harmful to the building of democracy and trust in Taiwan than causing the island to feel insecure about its national defense.

As early as 1966, six years before President Richard Nixon's trip to China, the Ripon Society published a paper stating that peace in Asia required an improvement in U.S.-P.R.C. relations. Now that Washington-Beijing ties are fully established and on track, the United States should show equal wisdom in supporting Taiwanese democracy as a means of reaching a solution to the Taiwan problem consistent with the causes of this nation.

America should take the lead in letting Taiwan be Taiwan.
The Chairman's Corner
Profiles in Potential:
Kennedy and Reagan — 1,000 Day Assessments

by Jim Leach

America has been thrown into emotional tilt in recent months as television confronted the public with a remembrance of things nostalgic, the Kennedy 20-year legacy, and a reminder of things cataclysmic, the depiction of nuclear war in "The Day After."

Seldom has there been such a juxtaposition of perspectives. As a viewer, I was left with the chilling thought that John Kennedy's Camelot of the Left represented the week before Ronald Reagan's Camelot of the Right, and that the 1,000 days of both presidencies ought to be reappraised in light of the peril faced today by the citizens of Lawrence, Kansas.

Academics have generally been kind to Kennedy. A recent poll of 1,000 historians ranks him in the top third — 13th of 39 — of American presidents. A Reagan assessment is premature, partly because the perspective of time is lacking, partly because his record is still in the making. It is doubtful, however, that historians would be as kind to him as they have been to Kennedy if tragedy were to cut his term short. But a great mistake is made to assess too sternly a presidency before it fully unfolds. If opportunity in any measure defines potential, Ronald Reagan's is still extraordinary.

Before outlining Reagan's prospects for greatness, some comparisons with the Kennedy years are in order. For all of their dissimilarities in philosophy and constituency power bases, it is striking how analogous their personalities and approaches to crises have been. While one symbolizes the vigor of youth and vision of new frontiers and the other an older authority and a return to values past, both have given the nation an inspiration as well as a president. Both understood the media and combined the actor's command of word and cadence with the political leader's understanding of power and how to obtain it. If anything, Kennedy's ability to act the role of president has been underestimated just as Reagan's alleged inability to understand the nuances of power have been overstressed. But the inability of real actors to play well in film the role of the martyred president and the inability of real politicians in Congress to defeat the actor-turned-politician in the White House should provide cause for reappraising commonly held stereotypes. Both presidents — John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan — loom as personalities larger than the decisions they have made and the programs they have advanced.

On domestic issues, a conservative would probably rate one low and the other high and a liberal vice-versa, but I would like to dwell in this column on the parallels of hope and folly that have emerged in their respective foreign policies that in the main defy conservative-liberal distinctions.

"A great mistake is made to assess too sternly a presidency before it fully unfolds. If opportunity in any measure defines potential, Ronald Reagan's is still extraordinary."

Starting with their campaigns for office, each propagated a dangerous myth. In a considered effort to dispel the public image that a Democrat in the post-McCarthy era might be soft on communism, candidate Kennedy alleged the existence of a "missile gap" and called for the dedication of massive new resources for missile development. Few political appeals contained less basis in fact and more seeds for nurturing a destructive arms race. It was only after taking office that the new administration acknowledged the then-dramatic U.S. technological superiority.

"For all of their dissimilarities in philosophy and constituency power bases, it is striking how analogous Kennedy's and Reagan's personalities and approaches to crises have been."

Jim Leach is a member of Congress from Iowa and chairman of the Ripon Society. 20
Twenty years later Ronald Reagan modeled his campaign on the Kennedy 1960 effort. Alleging the existence of a "window of vulnerability," the Republican nominee criticized the SALT process and said the U.S. must build up its nuclear capabilities before it could prudently consider negotiating arms restraints with the Soviet Union. The fact that the U.S. possessed more nuclear warheads and a far superior sea- and air-based second-strike capacity than the Soviets was lost on a body politic grown weary of Carteresque indecision.

Now, even the head of the president's Commission on Strategic Forces, General Scowcroft, has admitted the fallacy of the "window of vulnerability." When we have the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union, if not the globe, many times over, there is no such notion as strategic force inferiority. At least in a biological sense, a human being can die but once. The lesson, however, would appear to be that appealing to fears, no matter how unjustified, wins elections. The question remains whether more restrained appeals to the public can be made by presidents than by presidential candidates.

"The 1,000 days of the Kennedy and Reagan administrations contain many parallels, some reflecting better on one, some the other."

In terms of record, the 1,000 days of the Kennedy and Reagan administration contain many parallels, some reflecting better on one, some the other. In violation of international law and military logic, Kennedy sent Hessian-like forces on a fruitless foray at the Bay of Pigs. Also underestimating the power of 20th century nationalism, the Reagan administration has funded a covert war of terror against the Sandinista revolutionaries in Nicaragua. Now as the administration hints of the possibility of direct American troop involvement, the most popular of the counterrevolutionaries we are assisting, Eden Pastora, warns he would join the leftist Sandinista government and fight any foreign troops, including American, inserted onto Nicaraguan soil.

Perhaps the greatest blemish on the Kennedy record is Vietnam. In an effort to put behind what right-wing strategists term the Vietnam syndrome — the alleged paralysis of leadership on issues of use of force abroad — the Reagan administration has sent advisors to El Salvador, a "peace keeping" force to Beirut, and overturned a Cuban-sympathizing insurrection in Grenada.

While the viability of great power interventionism in the last half of the 20th century is in increasing doubt, the Reagan administration at least has not fallen prey to the domino theory of decisionmaking that caused the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon administrations to seek antidotes for failed policies in doubling of the ante. Just as increasing doses of bad medicine does not cure a patient, so escalating bad policy does not assuage anything except the pride of politicians.

An overemphasis on a military solution in El Salvador has caused the U.S. to become complicitous in the terror that hallmark life in much of Central America today, but one lesson of Vietnam appears to have been learned: American troops cannot win civil wars for parties which refuse to provide human rights protection for their populace.

Fifty American soldiers in El Salvador, while profoundly counterproductive, is far better than the 550,000 that once served in Vietnam. As a percentage of the population, the carnage of killed and missing in El Salvador in the last few years rivals the worst periods of the Vietnam conflict, but none are American combat troops. The Vietnam Memorial, which has come so hauntingly to grace the mall in Washington, is testament enough to the need to avoid the erection of new marble slabs to young men and women asked to give their lives for inexplicable causes.

The intervention in Grenada, while still underway and too fresh to appraise definitively, appears likely to be a footnote to the history of the region, similar to Lyndon Johnson's dispersal of troops to the Dominican Republic. So, hopefully, will the Beirut involvement, but in an area of millennia-long conflict, the reminder is omnipresent that World War I was sparked by a terrorist act in a rather obscure part of Europe. The conflict in Lebanon is "sui generis," but analogies to the Balkans are great enough for the utmost caution to be urged on all parties, especially the superpowers.

In strategic terms, the first blink in the nuclear age occurred with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Because, in partial measure at least, there was no missile gap, Khrushchev backed down. Now, and for the foreseeable future, effective U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity is likely to be the norm. No matter how much we devote to defense spending, we can never return to a wishful world where U.S. forces are invulnerable to nuclear countermeasures. The prospects of one side or the other winning eyeball-to-eyeball showdowns is thus miniscule. Mutuality of interest rather than displays of coercive will is the "sine qua non" of arms control as well as of effective conflict resolution. Brinkmanship of the type that occurred over Cuba in 1962 is unlikely to be repeated again. Accordingly, the escalation in the arms race implied in the decision of the administration to accelerate rather than decelerate deployment of the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe appears unprecedented in its potential madness.

The full implications of the Soviet walkout of the INF talks may be unclear because the prospect for reasoned compromise is still real. But the question must be asked: why the hurry to deploy? John Kennedy's frequent reference to Clausewitz's warning about the danger of backing an adversary too far into a corner demands heed today. The Russians should not be asked to blink but, on a respectful basis, to shake hands. On the merits of the issue, com-
promises would appear possible on both sides. But the rhetoric must be reframed. Name-calling may satiate the lower instincts of constituencies at home, but it endangers civilization. Arms control is too important to be played like poker. In the nuclear age there is neither a time nor a place for bluffs.

Issues of war and peace have never carried more profound implications. As the first generation in the history of the world capable of not just winning wars but destroying civilization, we must recognize that arms control issues are, above all, time-sensitive. The arms race simply cannot be left for future generations to solve. Political leaders do not have the luxury of putting their and our collective heads in the sand. Too many mistakes have been made in the near past and appear likely to be made in the near future. Just as President Kennedy missed a dramatic opportunity to negotiate a comprehensive test ban in 1963, hung up on whether the Soviet offer of three on-site inspections per year instead of the seven we demanded was sufficient to risk Senate ratification, so President Reagan appears bent on refusing to pursue a comprehensive ban on space-based and anti-satellite weapons systems.

"If the party which emphasizes military preparedness also proves to be the party prepared to negotiate military restraint, the domestic opposition would be left with meager issue material."

Reagan’s problems with the Senate, in one regard at least, are not likely to be the same as his immediate predecessor’s. As has been noted often, he has the confidence of that sector of American public opinion which has historically been skeptical of arms control agreements. Having opposed at one time or another all arms accords that have been signed with the Soviet Union, including Kennedy’s Limited Test Ban and the strikingly modest approach contained in Carter’s SALT II, President Reagan would seem well positioned to argue he is not about to give away the store. Any agreement he deems worthy of signing would almost certainly receive the two-thirds vote necessary for Senate ratification. Like Nixon going to China, Reagan can go to Leningrad and initiate a new era in East-West relations. By so doing, he could carve out a unique place in American history for himself and make his political party invulnerable to serious foreign policy criticism. If the party which emphasizes military preparedness also proves to be the party prepared to negotiate military restraint, the domestic opposition would be left with meager issue material. The peace platform would be usurped, leaving stunned opponents the option only to quibble that the president’s heart was not in his actions.

Such a scenario may seem unlikely to presidential critics, but assuming sincerity in the Soviet claim that they will not play politics, at least American style, with arms control, it is not outlandish to think that Ronald Reagan could pull off a series of arms control agreements before the 1984 election. If, for instance, the president signed a comprehensive test ban, the oldest but paradoxically the most ignored nuclear arms control issue, and was successful in initiating an INF accord limiting or precluding new missile deployments by both sides in Europe, even a critical press would have to acknowledge a substantial achievement. And if these agreements became a prelude for serious discussions on reducing warheads as well as launchers overall and ushered in an era of new space restraints, who could deny the greatness of our sitting president?

"The first president who recognizes the merits of the ultimate populist cause — peace — and gives the world real progress in arms control will receive the gratitude and appropriate recognition of posterity. There is no reason Ronald Reagan cannot be that president."

In one of his eloquent speeches, John Kennedy asked, "What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave ... not merely peace in our time, but peace for all time. Let us re-examine our attitude toward the Cold War, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate ... We must deal with the world as it is."

There is no denial to the paradox that in some circumstances preparation for war can play a role in avoiding conflict; but the world community, not just the superpowers, is maddeningly increasing weapons purchases for wars that need not be fought. New perspectives must be wrougth.

The United Nations, for instance, must be led, not simply denigrated. For the greatest country in the free world to walk out of UNESCO and torpedo the Law of the Sea negotiations and advance a foreign policy which relies excessively on the gun in settling international disputes is to invite the spread of anarchy, at home as well as abroad.

"Civility," John Kennedy said, "is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

Dwight Eisenhower once commented that people want peace so badly that some day their elected leaders might have to get out of their way and give it to them. The only thing political leaders seem to fear more than negotiating with an adversary is leading the very people who elect them. Politicians by nature fear leading; they don’t want to take the risks implicit in shattering the status quo. That is why leadership in America has a growing tendency to spring from the bottom up, not the top down. Kennedy, we will recall, was slow and excruciatingly reluctant to identify with the populist cause of his day — civil rights — but finally after the black-led marches and sit-ins he did, and as president he was in the end able to preempt leadership of a signally significant movement.

On arms control, John Kennedy gave us the rhetoric but not the substance of peace. Death cut short his promise. The first president who recognizes the merits of the ultimate populist cause — peace — and gives the world real progress in arms control will receive the gratitude and appropriate recognition of posterity. There is no reason Ronald Reagan cannot be that president.
In Wisconsin people are still talking about the very successful Midwest Moderate Republican Conference that took place in Madison during the third weekend of November. Jointly sponsored by the Ripon Society, the Wisconsin New Republican Conference and the Minnesota New Republican League, the three day conference attracted over 125 participants from Indiana to North Dakota. The gathering featured a series of panels and dinner speakers, including Representatives Jim Leach, Bill Green, Tom Tauke, former GOP co-chair Mary Dent Crisp and former Wisconsin Governor Lee Sherman Dreyfus. The conference was the first of several planned for moderates this year . . .

In Minnesota GOP Senator Rudy Boschwitz will face very substantial re-election competition this year from former Minnesota Governor Wendell Anderson, Representative James Oberstar and Secretary of State Joan Anderson Grove. There is also speculation that Hubert H. Humphrey III, the best political name in the state, may run for the seat. Elsewhere in Minnesota, the New Republican League is planning an issues forum, featuring Senator David Durenberger and Representative Bill Frenzel, this spring in Minneapolis . . .

It is now definite that Peace Corps Director Loret Ruppe will not be a candidate for the U.S. Senate in 1984 against Michigan Democrat Carl Levin. This leaves former Congressman Jim Dunn the only announced GOP challenger. There are, however, some indications that former Sky-Lab astronaut Jack Lousma is considering entering the race. In fact, Lousma has met with state party officials and fundraisers to determine whether or not he could run a viable campaign . . .

Republican businessman Ray Shamie, who ran a respectable Senate race against Ted Kennedy in 1982, recently announced his candidacy for Massachusetts' other Senate seat, currently held by Democrat Paul Tsongas. Tsongas, however, will be retiring at the end of 1984 due to a recently diagnosed illness. Former U.S. Attorney General Elliott Richardson, a long time Ripon supporter, also is considering a bid, but has yet to indicate his plans . . .

Representative Sherwood Boehlert, R-N.Y., a new member of the Ripon Congressional Advisory Board, was the subject of a recent profile in the Empire State Report, a magazine of politics and government in New York. The article noted Boehlert's support of urban development action grants, senior citizens' meals programs, the nuclear freeze and "the federal government's major responsibility to finance education." . . .

Another Ripon CAB member, Mark Hatfield of Oregon, recently made it official that he will seek re-election to the Senate in 1984. That fact, coupled with Dan Evans resounding triumph in Washington's U.S. Senate race and Charles Percy's growing strength in his Senate re-election bid in Illinois, is encouraging news for moderate Republicans, especially with GOP control of the U.S. Senate at stake this election year.

Ripon News

New York Ripon president Bill Lithgow reports that the Ripon chapter there has been active in a number of areas. On November 22 the chapter co-sponsored a speaker's forum with the Ivy Republican Club, featuring J. Morton Davis, president of D. H. Blair & Co. and author of Making America Work Again. The group also sent the White House a telegram praising President Reagan's policy decisions in Grenada and the Middle East, while continuing its work with the Society on its GOP delegate selection project. In addition, legislation has been introduced to declare February 12 "National Abolitionist Day." Ceremonies in support of the Leach-sponsored resolution will take place on that date in Washington at the Lincoln Monument. Already several members of the New York chapter have made plans to join the Freedom Republicans, a group of New York black Republicans, to attend this historic gathering . . .

The Washington, D.C. chapter has been equally active with chapter activities. Aside from its monthly meetings, the chapter is currently preparing two policy papers — one on Central America and the other on the budget deficit, as reported in “Washington Notes and Quotes." In addition, the D.C. chapter is helping to coordinate the annual fundraising reception at the Washington home of Congressman and Mrs. Jim Leach on February 2, 1984 . . .

Also in February, the Society will host a major fundraising event in New York on the 27th featuring, among others, Congressmen Jim Leach, Bill Green, Hamilton Fish, Jr. and Sherwood Boehlert. For more information, please contact the Ripon national office in Washington . . .

Finally, the Ripon Society wishes to extend its sympathies to the family and friends of Clyde Ferguson who died on December 21, 1983. Ferguson, an attorney, was an adviser for the Ripon Harvard chapter and was instrumental in providing leadership and direction for the group. ■
Editor's Note: “Washington Notes and Quotes” is a regular section of the Forum designed to provide readers with news of recent legislative happenings and highlights of moderate Republican activity in Congress. As we move into the second session of the 98th Congress and the presidential election year, we believe it is important to highlight several issues which will continue to be in the forefront.

Industrial Policy

The August edition of the Ripon Forum included an article on industrial policy. In November of 1983, several House Democrats presented another approach to a national industrial policy aimed at restoring innovation and competitiveness in American industry. Their plan proposed a “council of industrial competitiveness,” which would provide an investment strategy and a bank of industrial competitiveness. Through the council, funds would be channeled to “targeted” industries.

Several House Republicans, led by Ripon Congressional Advisory Board member, Tim Petri, rebutted their colleagues on the floor of the House. Ripon CAB member Bill Green, for example, claimed that “While manufacturing industries have come upon difficult times during the past few years, it is clear that America is not deindustrializing to the extent that so many of our colleagues believe.” In addition, many Republicans also objected to the notion that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has guided industrial transformation. They doubted whether such a federal body would be appropriate for our system.

Rep. Tom Ridge (R-Pa.) summed up the debate by asking the question which underlies any industrial policy, one also asked by Ripon Society policy chairman, Mark Uncapher, in the August Forum article: “How shall we live in the 21st century?” Ridge responded: “In essence it comes down to whether we want the economy to continue to be guided primarily by market forces, as we have for the 207 years of our independence, or whether we are not going to make a fundamental change within our system of government, enabling it to decide which sectors of the economy will prosper and which will be curtailed.”

Budget Deficits

The issue of whether or not the recovery will be sustained ultimately comes around to a discussion of the huge and unmanageable budget deficit. This is truly a creeping crisis — one which must be dealt with soon. Ripon is in the process of completing a paper outlining a feasible approach to solving the problem. The paper states that the deficit is a major problem and will significantly inhibit recovery. It also says that a joint effort is needed to reduce the deficit and that while the solutions are long-term, they must be acted on before November 1984 . . .

One other financing issue which will be in the forefront during 1984 is the funding of Medicare. The congressional advisory panel created to make recommendations for easing Medicare’s financial woes has already issued its report. But it is unlikely that during this election year Congress will bite the bullet and take action on the various proposals presented to it.

Civil Rights

As reported in the last Forum, quite a battle has ensued over the reauthorization of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. A compromise was finally reached, replacing the six-member, presidentially appointed panel with an eight-member commission. The president makes four of the appointments and Congress makes four — two each in the Senate and the House. The flap came over whether or not the administration had agreed to keep Mary Louise Smith and Jill Ruckelshaus on the Commission. It is widely believed by civil rights groups that the president didn’t keep Mary Louise Smith because of his inability to control her vote. However, Tennessee Labor Commissioner and Ripon member Francis Guess was appointed to the Commission by Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker in December, a move which possibly could ease some of the friction between Congress and the White House over the Commission’s partisan composition.

Finally, the House vote on the Equal Rights Amendment was clearly a ploy by the Democratic leadership to give Republicans a negative record on the ERA. They tried to pass the Amendment by using a tactic which angered many members of Congress. Moreover, it appears the Democrats did not have the votes to defeat a proposed anti-abortion amendment. The unfortunate consequence was that the amendment failed to achieve the needed two-thirds majority by just six votes. This means that while ten of Ripon’s eleven House Congressional Advisory Board members and 53 Republicans in all voted for the Amendment, the Democratic leadership has, most likely, doomed passage of the Equal Rights Amendment for this Congress.