

As Things Now Stand

by Lee W. Huebner

Often these days I recall a conversation I had with a leader of the Draft Goldwater movement just after the Senator's defeat in 1964. "Who will you go with next time?" I asked him, for it was an article of faith among moderates in those months that the 1964 election had discredited the only man around whom the right wing could effectively rally. "Will it be Tower in '68? Or Dominick? Will you try Barry again?" His answer, quick and sure, was "Ronald Reagan." And then — amid astonished silence: "And you just watch us nominate him."

At the time, a year before Reagan announced as a candidate for Governor of California, this seemed no more than a bold conversational ploy. But somehow, in the 36 months since the Johnson landslide, conservative Republicans have promoted Reagan from actor to Governor to serious presidential contender. They have demonstrated the bravado to play an unlikely long shot and the resources to play it well.

THE REAGAN STRATEGY

The Reagan drive may still be blunted, most probably by the strong resurgence of Richard Nixon. Built largely on conservative bases, the former Vice President's comeback would almost certainly bring him a first ballot nomination were it not for the primaries. Here, say Reagan advisors, Nixon will stumble. Until he does, they will keep their own troops under cover; their assault on Nixon delegates will be decentralized and low-key. "We want Nixon's people with us later," says a Sacramento strategist. "They'll come over when the time is right. We'll move in as he moves out."

When they can, Reaganites will help move Nixon out. They will continue to parade their hero about the country; they will do their best to incite a grass-roots stampede to his cause. His name will appear in several primaries (probably Wisconsin, Oregon, Nebraska, a favorite-son listing in California, and possibly others); he has spoken and will speak again in all of those states. But Reagan will need not campaign all-out to win these tests. Whatever his vote, it will damage Nixon and enable Reagan to claim a surprise endorsement for one who did not really seek it. He will disown a write-in project in New Hampshire, but conservatives there insist it will succeed anyway and they will bill it as the first surge of an irreversible tide.

While quietly reactivating some of the machinery which controlled the nomination in 1964, Reagan will do everything he can to avoid looking like another Goldwater. He will talk party unity and party victory above all else. Criticizing no one, he will give no one pretext for criticizing him. He will encourage potential combatants to echo Senator Edward Brooke, who

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said this fall that the Californian is "becoming more and more of a moderate all the time." Polls show that the Governor's image is far more moderate than Goldwater's, though his record is not and though he retains close ties with advisors and fund raisers of John Birch persuasion.

More excitable members of the Reagan team have disputed his "cool" strategy. Their impatience has grown as the weeks pass with no clear sign that Nixon is crumbling and they may yet prevail on the Governor to push harder for primary votes. Yet, they are reminded, Nixon's support is already soft in many areas. South Dakota, Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Indiana, Georgia, South Carolina all report significant Reagan inroads. In both Washington and New Mexico, liberal Republican Governors are battling even to retain membership in what could be solid Reagan delegations. An aggressive Reagan committee will take on Governor John Love in Colorado. In Illinois, where Reagan grew up, many moderates already concede him twenty delegate votes, regardless of what Senators Dirksen and Percy recommend. In Oklahoma and Nevada Reagan workers are beginning to mobilize. "It's like a prairie waiting for a match" a liberal GOP observer remarked in early November — echoing Reagan's own set speech of last winter in which he suggested over and over that what he was beginning in California would soon sweep the country like "a prairie fire."

Nixon himself has said that if he is beaten in the Wisconsin and New Hampshire primaries he will pull out of the presidential race altogether. "If that happens," said an Ohio Reagan organizer in September, "I can count 630 first ballot votes for us right now." He may be right. Even carefully neutral National Chairman Ray Bliss is said to have told friends that he foresees the nomination of a Reagan-Percy ticket at Miami Beach next August.

NIXON STILL DOMINANT

Then again, the prairie may not catch fire. Nixon may very well win the key primaries, or enough of them to keep Reagan momentum from developing. His still unofficial campaign is proving to be more effective than some expected. Nixon himself has projected a more relaxed and thoughtful image and has received a good press, including favorable appraisals from one-time critics such as James Reston and Hugh Sidey. His organization has been tough without being impatient and, though threatened, has thus far held its own in the battle for conservative delegates. Contrary to the expectations of some, the former Vice President has not moved left to pick up drifting moderate support but has worked to secure his base on the right, sensing that power lies in that direction. Thus the rumors (recently denied) of

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
LETTER: Duncan Foley's Paradoxes

Dear Sir:

The progressive Ripon FORUM presents a daring new reactionary proposal ("Private Contracts for Public Education," September, 1967): "Why shouldn't an organization which is running good schools in Detroit branch out to Chicago or New York?" Think of it, Mr. Foley asks, the market "would run to many billions of dollars a year." Cost-benefit analysis reveals, first, that good old entrepreneurial education would be more efficient (remember: the most efficient education is the best education. The most efficient education is the best education. the most efficient . . .); second a thousand flowers would bloom under free enterprise education; third, business would hustle up results.

Mr. Foley is trying to take one step by falling down a flight of stairs. The ultimate effect of his decentralist plan could be Evergreen Academe Amalgamated versus The Three R's Plus, Inc. ("Efficient Education is Our Most Important Product") as competing education corporations. If Mr. Foley is going to use private contractors for his public schools, he had better admit it will become Big Business. P.S. 109 will be a slick, standardized factory run on the best laws of efficiency and dedicated to turning out that bland creature The Average American. Can a thing be made smaller by making it bigger? Zeno's paradoxes must now bow before those of the new master, Duncan Foley.

H. H. LEON
Iowa City, Iowa



1430 MASS. AVE.: Southern California

Dr. Thomas A. Brown, a former Rhodes Scholar, has been elected President of the Ripon Society of Southern California for 1967-68. Brown did his undergraduate work at Iowa State and received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University. He also holds a B.A. with First Class honors from Balliol College, Oxford. A Major in the Active Air Force Reserve, Brown is Associate Head of the Mathematics Department of the RAND Corporation.

The new Executive Board for the Los Angeles group for 1967-68 includes: Brown, Chairman; J. M. Fisher, Vice Chairman, Assistant Professor of Political Science, California State College at Fullerton; Edward J. McAniff, Past President and General Counsel, Attorney-at-Law; Owen J. Sloane, Treasurer, Attorney-at-Law; Michael R. Dohan, General Secretary, Assistant

Professor of Economics, Cal Tech; Melvin H. Bernstein, Research Director, Attorney-at-Law; and Maggie Nichols, Forum Correspondent, financial executive.

Los Angeles members heard Professor Charles G. Bell of California State College analyze the "Southern California Voter" at the Chapter's October general meeting. Dr. Bell is a noted authority on California voting behavior. Two weeks later, the members met with Representative Alphonzo Bell, a leading California moderate Republican and member of the Wednesday Club. Congressman Bell discussed Executive-Congressional relations with Ripon Board members, Los Angeles Research Director Mel Bernstein recently addressed the Pasadena Chapter of the California Republican League on "The Impact of the 1968 California Presidential Primary."

The National Governors' Conference 1967

The National Governors' Conferences have become great political bazaars. They occasion an intensive annual exchange of information and commitments among governors and their aides, federal officials, the press, and assorted hangers-on. In recent years the politics has reduced the official program of the Conference to a boring ritual. The Glacier National Park Conference of 1960, for example, was critical in clinching the Democratic nomination for John F. Kennedy. The Cleveland Conference of 1964 sealed William W. Scranton's image as the Republican Hamlet.

The 1967 Governors' Conference, aboard the S.S. *Independence*, differed from others since World War II. There was the obvious novelty of having the Conference on a ship. The participants were more closely confined, but they also seemed more inaccessible in their staterooms or comfortable deck chairs. The chief difference, however, was the reduction of politics to a subordinate role.

Politically the 1967 Conference was uneventful. Governor Ronald Reagan's political star soared a little higher, but the Conference brought no significant change in the 1968 Republican presidential race. The Democratic governors presented a solid front in support of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Substantively, however, the *Independence* Conference may have marked a historic tipping point in the federal-state relationship of this country. In past years the Conferences had focused on such areas as tourism, highway planning, and conservation. The governors had steered away from serious consideration of critical social problems. Civil rights was a political football tossed around by moderate Republicans to exploit the predictable reaction of the Southern Democrats. Washington officials would come in droves to present the annual offering of federal largesse.

The 1967 Conference theme was "Strengthening the States in the Federal System." No federal officials appeared on the program. The governors made dramatic commitments of state resources to attack the most critical domestic problems. These commitments, if followed by action, may symbolize an historic tipping back to the states of principal responsibility for social problems.

FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEES The Conference program was greatly strengthened by a series of special studies by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. Previously the Governors' Conferences had relied heavily on federal and state agencies to provide study papers and recommendations. For the 1967 Conference, the governors abolished most of their standing committees and replaced them with a half dozen study committees of functional importance:

1. *State Constitution Revision and Government Reorganization.* This committee produced a comprehensive report analyzing in detail the major trends in constitutional reform and executive reorganization in all states over the last five years.

2. *Regional and Interstate Cooperation.* This committee inventoried the various legal and administrative arrangements (such as interstate compacts, reciprocal laws, etc.) for interstate cooperation and reviewed the application of these arrangements in such areas as natural resources, development, air pollution control, transportation, and education.

3. *State and Local Revenue.* This committee reached the unexpected conclusion that federal revenue-sharing may have become an obsolescent concept. The revenue-sharing concept had been developed on the assumption that the northern urban states had a surplus of funds which could be channeled through the federal government to aid the poorer southern and western states. The urban crisis of 1967 led the committee to the broader recommendation of "a vast enlargement in the amount of resources channeled toward alleviation of [urban] problems."

4. *State Planning.* This committee supervises the longer-range program of the new Institute on State Programming for the '70's, located at the University of North Carolina. The committee's report at this Conference described the potential of systems analysis in enabling governors to sort facts, face issues, develop options, set goals, and make decisions affecting the state for years in advance of their own administrations.

5. *State-Urban Relations.* The recommendations of this committee give hope that the current competition between states and cities for federal largesse will yield to state-urban cooperation in grant programs; and suggested state agencies to deal with metropolitan community problems; and special state efforts to strengthen urban education, housing, employment and welfare programs.

6. *Federal-State-Local Relations.* This committee supervises the new Office for Federal-State Relations opened in Washington, D.C. early this year. The office has lobbied well for the states, though its annual budget is relatively small (\$265,000 assessed on the state on the basis of population). It provides continual rapid information to all governors of pending action by federal agencies and congressional committees. Through this office, moreover, the governors have provided a remarkable amount of support for the Model Cities bill, OEO Information Centers, health planning, and other programs involving the federal-state-local partnership.

7. *State and Local Government Labor Relations.* The report of this task force faced up to the tough problems of collective bargaining by public employees. It went beyond the question whether public employees have a right to strike and discussed how to avert stoppages in public services.

To complement their Washington office, the Governors' Conference expressed support of the new States' Urban Action Center. Although the Action Center was the brainchild of former Governor Terry Sanford, it was first expressed publicly by the Republican Governors' Association in August, 1967. But the idea of the Urban Action Center was too good to have remained partisan. The Center will:

- * provide teams of experts to design urban programs for individual states;
- * provide "trouble shooting" assistance for individual states to solve special problems; and,
- * establish a clearing house to disseminate information on successful urban programs.

—J. Eugene Marans

The Education Commission

The governors' favorable experience with the Education Commission of the States exemplifies the great promise of national-state action centers. The National Governors' Conference of 1965 approved the formation of an education compact among the states. The compact now has a membership of forty-two states and three territories. It is administered by an Education Commission of educators and state officials. The Commission has established headquarters in Denver with a professional staff devoted to action — providing continual information and special planning and administration.

The Commission provides all the states with current information on the best education ideas being considered in each state — by interim committees and professional consultants, as well as by administrators and legislators.

The special services supplied by the Commission include the development of school-aid formulas, student loan programs, and overall planning for higher education. The Commission is making comprehensive studies in such critical areas as educational financing, early childhood education, and vocational training. It is now contemplating a survey of teacher strikes and walk-outs and of possible legislative solutions to this problem.

In addition the Commission has begun to articulate in a responsible way state views on the role of federal financial assistance to education. At the Independence Conference, the Steering Committee of the Commission expressed unanimous approval of federal block grants, supplemented by a carefully defined system of categorical aids. The Committee's report indicated the strong desire of the states to participate more fully in the early formulation of national educational policy.

The success of the Education Commission is a leading manifestation of the shifting back to the states of important social responsibilities. The commission is making available to all the states, particularly those with smaller populations, far more information and expertise on education than any single state could command alone.

A Note on the Press

A friend in the working press the other day observed that members of his profession now occupy a role analogous to that occupied by the bankers in the early nineteenth century: while themselves of uncertain social standing, in this age of affluence, they determine the social standing of their betters.

The press is a relatively new and unstructured profession. The members of the press discharge a vitally important role in our system of government. They are the eyes and ears of the people. They observe our leaders and those who would lead us. And they must condense into communicable form what they observe.

As a group members of the press do not look behind the surface. They take each day, each occurrence, each statement as it comes, and rarely seek to place what happens in context. They think in terms of headlines and even the in-depth columnists think in 1000 word bursts. In addition the members of the press are governed by a herd instinct. By some mysterious process, the word is passed that this man is a "good guy" and that a "bad guy."

The standards a man must meet to be adjudged a "good guy" are those of the press, not the public. The press' hero must cut a figure with the girls, it helps if he drinks with the boys on occasion, and, above all, he must speak clearly and concisely — posture convincingly, if you will.

George Romney does not meet these tests. He is not one of the boys. He gets up earlier than the working press and he works harder. And, despite what some press men say, Romney is a bright, tough-minded man. He does his homework and, because he does, because he is not particularly glib, he is unable to deal with complex issues in a simple manner.

Ronald Reagan is both glib and colorful. He has style and glamour and despite the admonitions of editors from Portland to Los Angeles, the working press tends to favor him.

Both Romney and Reagan held press conferences aboard the *Independence* during the recent Governor's conference. Romney's advisors thought he had rarely been in better form as he faced the usual tough and even bitter press grilling. Governor Reagan's conference was a gentlemanly exchange of jokes and pleasantries in comparison. Mrs. Romney attended the Reagan conference. When it was over, she asked several members of the press, "Why weren't you as tough on him as you are on George?" They knew she had a point and some admitted it.

With the press the premium is on style. That is one of the reasons Reagan may be the Republican nominee and why he stands a good chance of being our next President.

—T.E.P

The Telegram

The press has described in some detail how a White House telegram on Vietnam to former Governor Price Daniel found its way into the hands of Ronald Reagan. Governor Reagan's role in intercepting the telegram probably has been overstated. The procedures in the teletype shack were not quite the same as in the usual telegraph office.

Reagan has conceded that a xerox copy of the White House telegram found its way to him. The more significant question is how the xerox copy was made. It was easy for anyone on board the ship to make copies of incoming messages. Access to the teletype shack was largely unrestricted. The machines, especially installed for the trip in a dining room of the ship, were set up like the news tickers in the city room of a newspaper. Governors' aides and press representatives frequently walked along the bank of machines and peered at incoming messages; the press messages were interspersed with private and official ones. Governor Reagan's aides often visited the shack to check on the numerous messages that he was receiving regarding the anti-Vietnam demonstrations in California. The teletype messages were usually produced by the machines in manifold sets, and copies were piled rather informally in boxes in the room. The access and the filing procedure in all likelihood were even more informal at the early morning hour when the White House message supposedly arrived. Xerox machines were in the teletype shack, and copies often were made of incoming messages for governors' aides. None of the other messages coming through this informal net of unauthorized observers attracted any special attention. As Governor Reagan aptly put it, "This one just happened to be Big Casino."

As Things Now Stand

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a Nixon-Reagan "deal" whereby the Governor would receive Nixon's endorsement if the latter failed. Thus the successful effort to re-emphasize Senator Goldwater's support for the former Vice-President. Thus the nearly-successful effort to secure Texas Senator John Tower as Nixon's next campaign manager. But it is very significant that Tower was forced to refuse the job by strong pro-Reagan pressures in Texas.

The Nixon structure may have its soft spots but it is extensive. With a generally successful primary record behind him, Nixon could sweep the convention next summer without too much trouble. If he fails, the most likely beneficiary would appear to be Ronald Reagan. If the convention were held today, the two together would probably command over three fifths of the delegates.

I. Three Moderate Strategies

Moderate Republicans, meanwhile, are uncertain about what all this means for them. Three lines of thought seem to have emerged, but none is about to rally general support and no single strategy seems genuinely promising.

1. The first strategy calls for moderates to join the Nixon bandwagon in order to insure that there will be no opening for Reagan. The plan calls to mind the 1964 effort of some moderates to launch a Nixon boom which would block Goldwater. Some Nixon staff members have vigorously encouraged this approach, fanning rumors that their candidate would soon move leftward on certain issues. But this would at present seem unlikely. On a matter like Vietnam, for example, the Nixon position is well established and rooted in repeatedly announced principles. Moreover the decision to fight against Reagan inroads necessitates a basically conservative appeal. Nixon will obtain some moderate support in any event and can count on most moderates to back him if it comes to a showdown with the Governor of California. In short, the Reagan threat, whether it succeeds or not, has pulled the party and Nixon toward the right. Some shift in that direction is the necessary cost, right now at least, for moderates who accept a join-Nixon strategy.

2. A second moderate tactic stresses united support for Michigan's Governor George Romney, an approach which has had limited success in the spring and summer but will probably win converts daily as the hour of truth approaches. Proponents of the Romney strategy argue that it is the only way to stop Nixon or Reagan. Unless *some* moderate candidate wins in early primaries, they say, the ballgame is over; that point seems to be unanswerable. Somewhat more debatable (but not much) is their second point, that Romney is the only candidate with a real chance of winning the New Hampshire and Wisconsin primaries. If a Rockefeller or Percy or Gavin or Hatfield is to have *any* room for maneuver, the argument runs, they must first help Romney "reopen" the competition. At an absolute minimum this will require victory in either New Hampshire (where Romney trails Nixon two to one) or Wisconsin (where Reagan will probably be in the race and some polls now show Romney

winning). The situation would seem to be parallel to the California primary in 1964, only this time the last chance is coming earlier. But Romney is a great campaigner and could turn the trick.

3. The third strategy is offered by those who see real hope only in a "new figure" who can generate on the GOP left the excitement and enthusiasm which Reagan has developed among some conservatives. Governor Romney has produced no emotional commitment and inadequate organizational support, says this group. He cannot be nominated and new faces should therefore be tried out immediately. More importantly, they predict a poor Romney performance in spring contests, an argument which speaks to the critical issue, not whether Romney can be nominated but whether anyone can do better than he can in the early primaries. Only if a Hatfield or Gavin or Morton or Percy can outpace Romney would the "new face" advocates appear to have a strong case for entering them in early primaries. If not, they would probably divide moderate strength there and insure Nixon or Reagan victories.

How can this potential be assessed? It must be largely a matter of guess work. For, unfortunately, no new candidate has become visible at an early enough stage to even make meaningful poll data possible. As in 1964, no moderate candidate other than the front runner has seriously tested sentiment with potential delegates in non-primary states. Moreover, there is even less time this year for sifting out various moderate candidates. Conservative pressures and early filing dates in primaries have significantly narrowed the margin for moderate experimentation.

There is one proven candidate who could be expected to run well this spring, Nelson Rockefeller. But Rockefeller has decisively removed himself from primary competition and, unless he does a dramatic reversal, cannot conceivably emerge as a candidate before the very late spring or summer. If he should become interested then, and if his amazing poll ratings hold up, the New York Governor could do on the left what Reagan's strategy of patience might accomplish on the right: command wide factional support without the risks of primary competition.

But Rockefeller — as his associates realize — would have no chance unless *someone* holds the line in the primaries. "Wide factional support" is meaningless if the faction is small and impotent. The nation may be desperate for an acceptable alternative, the party may be hungry for a winner, but Republican National Conventions are not always ruled by the wishes of either nation or party. In 1964, it should be remembered, Governor Scranton held a two-to-one lead over Senator Goldwater in polls of Republican voters as he arrived in San Francisco. The wishful thinkers dream of far-off events, ignoring the fact that for such dreams to come true, someone other than Rockefeller must develop a viable moderate campaign in the meantime.

**TAKE
YOUR
PICK**

Which of these three roads then should a GOP moderate travel? The decision depends on temperament and there is no way of guaranteeing a satisfactory result from any. Most moderates

supported Nixon in 1960; he is a skilled and able man. If they wish to support him now, that is clearly the safest course. If a moderate is determined to back a more liberal candidate, the odds that Romney can keep the door open are long but they are not impossible. And if the moderate Republican really wants to test his luck, he can jump on a new candidate's bandwagon right now; conceivably this is the most promising course but it is also clearly the most dangerous.

So take your pick of strategies. The purpose of this essay is not so much to endorse certain moves as to discuss how and why the GOP moderates get into these defensive situations in the first place.

One problem is that moderate Republicans are only now looking seriously at the full range of their options. Rather than starting with several candidates and narrowing the field to one, they have again, as in 1964, done just the reverse. They begin with a single favorite, run him long and hard, and then use the primaries to expand the field rather than to narrow it. Potential rivals early in the game are persuaded to cooperate with the frontrunner. "If he goes down, you get your turn," they are told, "but we don't want to find your fingerprints on the body." Rather than competing for public favor moderate GOP candidates have learned to wait in line.

This political non-proliferation treaty has made it difficult for the progressive wing to develop and test its presidential possibilities, to find a man who can light an emotional spark. While Reagan has come from nowhere to replace Goldwater, the moderates have lost Scranton and Lodge, retained Romney and Rockefeller and added no one new, with the possible exception of Percy. That a Reagan can move so far so fast while a Lindsay or Percy does not says a great deal about the current state of the GOP.

EARLY FILING DATES

Still, what is done is done, and the time for experimentation may already be behind us. This is not only because of the progress on the right but also because the primaries are *not* structured to provide the opportunity for trial and error that most people associate with them. Everyone thinks of New Hampshire as the beginning of a long trail; actually in terms of the decisions candidates must make it comes past the halfway mark. The reason, one which many professional politicians do not seem to understand, is early filing deadlines. For eight of the fifteen primaries the filing deadlines come before the New Hampshire election (New Hampshire, Feb. 1; Wisconsin, Feb. 29; Pennsylvania, Feb. 13; Massachusetts, March 5; Ohio, Feb. 7; West Virginia, Feb. 3; Florida, March 6; and Illinois, March 11). This means, for example, that if a Percy or Morton or a Hatfield is to enter the Wisconsin primary in April (and aides to all three have sent up trial balloons on the possibility) he must make the decision in late February on the basis only of poll data as to what might happen in New Hampshire two weeks later. Three more important filing dates pass between the first two primaries (Indiana, March 28; Nebraska, March 15; and Oregon, March 19). The only primaries one can enter if he waits to see the results from New Hampshire and Wisconsin are in the District of Columbia (filing date April 6), Cali-

fornia (April 5), New Jersey (April 25), and South Dakota (April 20). None of these are likely to provide important contests in any event.

Still moderates talk about someone "emerging" in the primaries. The notion is even more dangerous because most of the crucial decisions in non-primary states will also be made in late winter or very early spring, again before the Wisconsin primary. It should always be remembered that most delegates to next summer's convention will not be selected in primary races. New Hampshire and Wisconsin will get the headlines, but Georgia is a far more typical state. There, in school houses and living rooms next March 2, precinct caucuses will select delegates to county conventions. County conventions will meet on March 16 and they will be followed by Congressional District meetings on April 20 and the State Convention on May 4. Each District will select two delegates to the National Convention; the State Convention will choose the rest. In 1964, states like Georgia made the primaries irrelevant. Goldwater won only one major contest that year (California) and he would undoubtedly have been nominated even if he had lost badly there. A grass-roots moderate who wants to influence the nomination would be well advised to lay down this article, pick up his telephone, and find out the date of his next precinct meeting. While primary elections could launch some candidates and finish others, the Republican nominee will finally be chosen in the living rooms and school houses of the non-primary states.

At present this process heavily favors conservative Republicans, whether they run intensive delegate hunts or not. Moderates may win elections and dominate polls, but conservatives control the machinery which produces nominations. That is how it is and there are no two ways about it. Wishful thinking and banner headlines and magazine cover pictures cannot change it. It is the most important single fact about Republican politics in 1968.

This fundamental principle explains the defensive inclination of many moderates to put all of their eggs in one candidate's basket so early in the game. It accounts for the fact that an untested newcomer like Reagan can afford to be so patient and subtle. It is what persuades Richard Nixon to build his campaign on conservative foundations, though more than one liberal governor insists he cannot distinguish Nixon's overall philosophy from Romney's.

II. The Conservatives' Upper Hand

Why, given the talent, resources and popularity of the Republican progressives, do conservatives enjoy the upper hand? To begin with, because they took it in 1964.

I will never forget a liberal New England college chaplain who berated a group of us one afternoon some years ago for even associating with the Republican party. "Those who play in the mud get their hands dirty," he announced. In answer we spoke of responsible alternatives, of the fact that a two-party system cannot abide one irresponsible party, that a nation in crisis requires the best possible leadership from both

the "ins" and the "outs."

We were not persuasive, No, we were told — and such conversations must have occurred a million times across the country that spring — a Goldwater candidacy was just what the liberals needed most. It would produce an overwhelming Johnson mandate and a revolutionary wave of social legislation. And, hopefully, it might incapacitate the Republican party for a generation to come.

Well, our friend got his Johnson mandate and some of his social legislation. This fall he was among those who backed the ADA resolution offering support to an acceptable Republican in 1968. Perhaps he will still have that choice. But the chances are better that he will be choosing among Lyndon Johnson, George Wallace, and Ronald Reagan when he enters the election booth next November 5.

Conclusion one: in politics, unlike football, the score is not even at the beginning of a new game. The success of 1964 gives conservatives a tremendous leg up on 1968. Conclusion two: the health of each political party should be the concern of all. The struggle between Republican moderates and conservatives is the vital business of all those whose range of choice will eventually be shaped by its outcome.

III. Conservatives Building

Just as many underestimated Goldwater in January of 1964, so did many overestimate the ramifications of his defeat in November. Most conservatives saw the experience as a mere first step, "We learned each other's phone numbers this year," said one young man as the vote came in. "We'll build from here."

Conservatives have been building, within and without the official party organization. At the National Committee, Ray Bliss replaced Dean Burch as chairman, to the delight of countless moderates who concluded that their bad dream was over, that all was well. But Bliss himself was the first to insist in early 1965 that his accession should not be considered a moderate victory. He would tend to nuts and bolts; he would work equally hard for Strom Thurmond as for Jacob Javits; he would be strictly neutral. "We'll bend him like a ruler," one Goldwater aide boasted privately. He, too, was wrong; no one controls Bliss. But conservatives do hold important staff positions under him and much National Committee literature bears a strong conservative imprint. The new public relations director, for example, came to his post from the right-wing radio program *Three Star Extra*. While the Democratic National Committee goes to extraordinary lengths to insure integrated delegations at its convention next year, Bliss has announced that the Republican National Committee will not even consider the matter.

The right wing commands most party auxiliaries. The Young Republicans is a notable case. The organization is controlled by what is known as "the Syndicate," a group which spearheaded the Draft-Goldwater effort and seems firmly committed to the Reagan candidacy today. The original Syndicate leader, F. Clifton White, cites a rule of thumb which says that

the YR convention during the year preceding a presidential race "is a tell-tale barometer for GOP Presidential nominations." Reagan completely dominated last summer's YR convention at Omaha. That gathering also went out of its way to repudiate National Chairman Bliss and to vindicate a racist coterie which called itself "the Rat Finks." Bliss has since achieved something of an understanding with YR officers and the group continues to receive over \$90,000 in senior party funds.

Even more extreme are the Teen Age Republicans, headed by Fulton Lewis III. Among other things, the TARS sponsor widely-advertised summer training camps to which adolescent Republicans are sent to study communism, law enforcement, and economics with such teachers as Strom Thurmond, Herbert Philbrick, and F. Clifton White.

The Party's women's auxiliary is headed by Mrs. Gladys O'Donnell, one of the original Reagan backers in California. Senator Goldwater describes her as "a long-time worker in the conservative cause." Her only opponent for the post last spring was Phyllis Schafly, author of the far-right tract, *A Choice Not an Echo*. Schafly supporters charged that they lost because "the Rockefellers bought out the convention," a charge which caused one New York lady to sigh, "If only we liberals were half the conspiracy they say we are!" Until there is a lot more will and muscle, she observed, moderate women will have to be content with voting for "the more responsible conservative."

Two of the most important power centers in the party are the Campaign Committees of the House and Senate which raise and spend large sums electing Republicans to Congress. Their chairmen can acquire considerable political leverage. Barry Goldwater parlayed his work in the Senate post into a presidential campaign; he also was able to legitimately channel about \$4000 of committee funds each month into salary and expenses for his ghostwriter. Significantly, as the watershed elections of 1968 approach, both the Senate and House Campaign Committees, like the women's group, are headed by California conservatives.

The Senate and House leadership itself remains largely in conservative hands. And even the Republican Governors Association, widely regarded as the one center of real progressive strength in the party, has elected a conservative majority to its five-man executive committee. That majority now includes Governor Ronald Reagan of California.

The right wing then has put the right men in the right places. And at the state and local level the story is most often the same. Moreover, conservative dominion within the party hierarchy is supplemented by a vast extra-party apparatus. Consider the number and influence of right wing groups.

The Young Americans for Freedom, for example, spends over \$25,000 a month out of its national office alone and, in addition, runs over 340 high school and college chapters. The American Conservative Union raised over \$200,000 when it was launched three years ago. An older group, the Americans for Constitutional Action, also spends in the \$200,000 range each year;

it is famous for its ratings of Congressional voting records. A smaller group called the United Republicans of America works at the congressional district level; its declared aim: "to capture the GOP by nominating conservatives and only conservatives to office." The Free Society Association was set up for educational purposes by Senator Goldwater and his associates after the 1964 defeat and raised over half a million dollars in its first two years of operation. Other groups range from the scholarly research-oriented American Enterprise Institute all the way over to fringe groups like the John Birch Society and the Christian Crusade. All have influence in Republican politics.

Then there are the propaganda tools, *National Review*, *Human Events*, *The New Guard*, and, particularly in the South and West, a collection of exhortatory radio programs. All help to educate and to motivate; they create the sense of a nationwide conservative movement to which every individual can belong and to which every lonely deed and donation can contribute.

ON THE LEFT A VACUUM

It is true there are similar institutions on the left. But virtually none are involved in Republican politics, where lies the first responsibility for checking the momentum of the right. While conservative groups battle to possess the soul of the GOP, most liberal organizations and periodicals ignore it. Nor have the all-too-moderate Republican moderates put together any competitive organizational apparatus of their own. In fact, they have slipped backward since 1964. Their most prestigious group at that time was the Republican Citizens Committee, honorarily chaired by General Eisenhower. It has since been forced to close its shop. Its successor as moderate nerve center was Republicans for Progress, headed by former Mayor Charles Taft of Cincinnati. RFP issued a newsletter and did important public relations and research work on Capitol Hill. But it has had trouble raising even a modest \$50,000 budget and has tentatively closed its Washington office after losing its first and only full-time director this fall.

The only moderate GOP periodical four years ago was *Advance Magazine*; it, too, has gone out of business. Even the New York *Herald Tribune*, which once gave dispersate GOP moderates an occasional sense of community, is no more.

The Council of Republican Organizations is a coordinating committee for several moderate groups and, potentially, an important GOP voice. But it operates at this stage with no budget, no office, and no employees. Some of its member groups exist only on paper, others are very local or very specialized in their concerns. One exception is The Ripon Society, five years old this December. Originally a small discussion group of Boston-area Republicans, Ripon's rapid growth throughout the country is a portent of the enormous potential of progressive Republicanism. Yet the Ripon budget, about \$20,000 in 1965 and scarcely twice that today, is a mere fraction of what groups like the ACU pay out in salaries alone. And Ripon is now the *only* non-candidate group on the Republican left which is national in scope and operates a full-time office. If the Ripon Society has succeeded with small resources, it is party because of an

organizational vacuum on the Republican left.

BLUEPRINTS FORGOTTEN

And yet there is so much that could be done! Just exactly what has been detailed often and at immense length. The best blueprints came during a period of soul-searching just after the election of 1964 when various *ad hoc* groups presented what one of them labeled "comprehensive political structures for the creative Republican majority." These various *prospecti* outlined plans for an information clearing house, a private newsletter, and a public journal. They spoke of workshops and seminars and campaign committees. They called for political field men, a Congressional study group, a speaker's bureau. They charted proposals for research and education projects, for candidate recruitment, and for the use of electronic media. One group estimated the annual cost of its package at \$425,000.

These documents were widely circulated in late 1964 and early 1965. Then they were forgotten. No part of the package was picked up. Moderate energy and dollars were focused almost exclusively on personal campaigns. Today the progressive wing of the Republican party remains a loose and sometimes jealous coalition of highly personal candidate groups.

This is not to say that the conservatives are free of personal considerations or internal disputes. But their party and extra-party apparatus allows them to build a movement which transcends individuals, to develop the psychology of a crusade. It also provides salaries and positions so that clusters of activists can give full-time attention to a strictly conservative machinery. From such a power base men can move without any candidate at all, as the White operation did in 1962 and early 1963. Or, significantly, they can advance the interests of several candidates at once, which is what moderates may well want to do in non-primary states this spring.

Some kind of organizational infrastructure is essential if moderates are to have long range influence in Republican affairs. "Good men must associate," wrote Edmund Burke, "else they fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle."

IV. Ideas and Ideals

The sense of crusade is an effect of organization and propaganda, but it is also its cause. Men work long hours and write large checks in order to advance ideals. In the end it is the simple and beguiling conservative philosophy which powers its machinery.

Governor Reagan is one who participates in this ideological appeal; those who write off his strength as a matter of mere glamour or TV technique are making a great mistake. So are those who think he will be easily discredited, as Goldwater was, by eccentric rhetoric, for Reagan gives sophisticated expression to some of the most powerful impulses in American life. He represents those who fear social change, particularly in the realm of race relations. He speaks for millions who are anxious about impersonal government and who are angered by moral drift. And the London *Observer* spoke to an additional point in October:

His appeal is to a strongly rooted tradition in American life, a tradition that suspects intellectuals, distrusts experts and professionals and firmly believes that if only a regular guy were in charge of everything all would be well.

The article then adds, ominously: "The last man to appeal directly to this strain in the American psyche was Dwight D. Eisenhower."

But there are *other* strongly-rooted traditions in American life, *other* strains in the American psyche, and it is out of these that Moderate Republicans must now fashion their own crusade. The impatience of youth, for example, goes as deep and is as old as any national impulse. A Kennedy once touched this force; John Lindsay rallied it two years ago, but it has few outlets in national politics today. Respect for intellect and expertise is as American as Franklin and Adams and Jefferson, but intellectuals are also waiting for a leader they can applaud and a banner to which they can rally. An eagerness to grapple with the passions and tumult of the city has lured Americans for well over two hundred years. But it, too, has been inadequately expressed by those who talk more easily of Illinois homesteads and Texas ranches. Republican moderates for a while at least, will have unusual access to youth, to intellectuals, and to urban dwellers. No progressive Republican movement will be successful until it begins to *systematically* involve the emotion, the commitment, and the energy of constituencies such as these.

This will not be done by token measures, nor will it be the work of a few months or weeks. To involve such constituencies — and to win the confidence of a country — will mean doing something that people can get excited about. For this more than anything else the nation now waits. "People feel helpless and do not know what to trust," James Reston wrote this summer. "There has been no American political season since World War II as wrenched and snarled as the present," echoed Emmet John Hughes. The people "no longer feel whole." "The outstanding impression," Howard K. Smith reported after a nationwide tour in the spring, "is one of a great hunger for persuasive leadership." And the English historian J. H. Plumb concluded last winter, "More perhaps than at any time in human history we need a voice."

The ranks of the progressive Republicans could provide a leader for such times. On the other hand the hunger for a hero could favor a man from California whose amphitheatre addresses resemble revivals and whose campaign pictures show him riding a white horse.

NOT HEROES ALONE

A progressive Republican movement then must develop political heroes. But it is important that moderates not rely on heroes alone. For the achievement of long-term influence will also require those who can pursue alliances and develop strategies without the distractions and restraints of public office. It is this cause-oriented, non-candidate

work which the conservatives have done so well and which gives them their present competitive advantage in party ranks.

Finally, a successful progressive revival must generate aggressive and creative positions on issues. One good example is what many are beginning to call "the New Localism," a commitment to vigorous, inventive government on a highly autonomous local level. Former New Frontiersmen such as Richard Goodwin and Daniel P. Moynihan have recently joined the ranks of its advocates; it should be a natural for development by thoughtful Republicans.

A number of other issues could help produce basic political realignments. But no issue is as powerful or as important as that of Viet Nam. If moderate Republicans can channel public frustration with the war into responsible paths, they can harness an immense source of political energy while serving this country well. They could even make a far more serious bid for the presidential nomination next year. The odds may be against success, but a new look at Viet Nam could significantly improve them.

Polls show that this same issue constitutes Governor Reagan's greatest weakness. His inexperience and his call for total military victory disturb a majority of Americans. His reported comment that the U.S. could pave North Viet Nam over "like a parking lot" will haunt him all spring. Foreign policy, it should be noted, has always been the Achilles heel of the Republican right; it was Eisenhower's internationalism, for example, which keyed his drive against Taft in 1952.

This does not mean that the GOP will, or should, call for unilateral withdrawal from Viet Nam. But it was a Republican administration, after all, which delivered on its promise to honorably disengage from Korea in 1953. If moderates can articulate a responsible alternative to the President's position in 1968, they might be able to mobilize somewhat faster than most people now expect.

Even if the progressive resurgence falls short of the presidential nomination next summer it is still essential that an extensive effort be made. For the spring of 1968 will offer the most favorable time and circumstances for beginning to build a progressive Republican movement which will be viable in the long run. This both nation and Party badly need.

The American political system has performed erratically over much of our history, but in moments of crisis it has usually been at its best. Whether it will be equal to the challenges of this trying time is at present by no means clear. But one can say that an age of brutal power and bewildering change will tax every political resource at our command. Among those resources are the capacities and traditions of the progressive Republicans. Mobilized effectively, they can contribute much to our nation's troubled search for meaning and for control.

Vietnam Notes

● Rumors in South Vietnam claim that the United States has taken out a 99-year lease on Cam Ranh Bay, despite its declared intention at the Manila Conference to leave Vietnam within six months after a settlement. The truth is that although no lease has been signed, an exchange of letters between the United States and South Vietnamese governments has given the United States the right to stay in Cam Ranh Bay as long as we wish. Since Cam Ranh is the best deep water port in Southeast Asia and since the American investment in it is enormous, there is little chance of us leaving. No matter how you read it, Cam Ranh Bay and Manila add up to double-dealing and hypocrisy on the part of the Johnson administration, and this has not gone unnoticed either in Congress or in South Vietnam.

● Don Luce, the International Voluntary Services official who left Vietnam in protest after nine years in the countryside, has impressed many in Congress with his close knowledge of conditions in rural Vietnam. Among his most telling points in interviews with legislators: U.S. bombing, defoliation, and refugee-generating activities within South Vietnam are making new converts for the Viet Cong at a rapid rate. Luce calls for a cessation of American bombing within South Vietnam and a program of local authority similar to that proposed by The Ripon Society to shore up the fading Vietnamese support for American involvement.

● Congress is becoming increasingly restive over the Administration's disregard of Congressional opinion on the War. One important sign of a new awakening was a Vietnam debate on the floor of the House led by Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois. Findley listed 25 separate alternatives which the Administration has ignored and called on Congress to set clear aims for the conduct of the war.

● At least two seasoned observers seem to feel that the Southeast Asian conflict may be getting out of hand. Speaking in Birmingham, Alabama, in late September General Maxwell D. Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to Vietnam, warned that "a full-scale assault" on North Vietnam would cost 500,000 additional American troops. Taylor expressed doubts that the American people would accept this price. Soon after, in an October interview in *Newsweek*, General James M. Gavin revealed that he and General Matthew Ridgeway had narrowly prevented an invasion of North Vietnam in 1956 by going directly to President Eisenhower to counteract a plan which would have sent eight combat divisions and thirty-five support battalions to Vietnam.

● Those who read between the lines of Congressional hearings believe that the Johnson administration has really committed 100,000 additional troops to Vietnam instead of the 45,000 announced to the public.

● Are Con Thien and Gio Lin, the two strongpoints on the DMZ, worth the great cost in American life needed to hold them? Marine officers at the front say that the points are essential to defend the city of Quang Tri. But disinterested military analysts have their doubts. These two hills, they argue, are really important for *offensive* reasons, since they control one of the few stretches where U.S. tanks could cross the DMZ into North Vietnam.

Georgia

Three factions seem to be forming in the Georgia GOP around 1968 possible presidential nominees. The most conservative elements in the Party, led by National Committeeman Roscoe Pickett, and most of DeKalb County's (Atlanta suburbs') legislators are backing Ronald Reagan. The Central Committee of the De Kalb County Party went so far as to endorse Reagan and thus became the first such group in the nation to do so.

Richard Nixon is not without prominent backers in the state. Georgia's best-known Republican leader, Howard "Bo" Calloway, is reported to be in the Nixon camp. And G. Paul Jones of Macon, the state chairman of the Party is leaning toward the former Vice President as well.

Governor George Romney's supporters, state representative Kil Townsend of Atlanta and a number of other Fulton County (Atlanta) legislators, make up probably the smallest of the three groups at the present time. Richard Nixon would receive a clear majority of Georgia's votes at the National Convention if it were held today.

Reagan in Iowa

Gov. Reagan attracted enormous attention and an immense crowd when he came to Iowa on Oct. 25 to speak at an Iowa GOP \$100-a-plate fund-raising banquet. 1700 paying diners attended the Reagan event and 7,000 non-paying fans packed the balconies in Des Moines' Veterans Memorial Auditorium. Reagan far outdrew George Murphy, who spoke at a similar dinner in 1966, and came close to doubling the less than 1000 \$100-a-plate tickets sold in 1965 when Nixon was the attraction. The outpouring of interest in and sentiment for Reagan is quite significant. The *Des Moines Register* gave Reagan's visit enormous play. The Oct. 26 *Register* carried a full-width front page headline proclaiming: "9,000 Turn Out for Reagan." More than eight full columns inside the paper were devoted to the Reagan visit. In addition Reagan's speech was broadcast live over Des Moines television and radio stations. Part of the interest in Reagan is attributable to the fact that he is a former Iowan. He got his start in show business as a sportscaster on WHO, Iowa's most popular and powerful radio station. He was immensely popular in that role during the years 1933-1937 and many Iowans have followed his subsequent rise in show business and politics with special interest.

More Than a Spoiler

George Wallace will be more than a spoiler — he has a good chance to carry a northern state like Indiana, political observers now say. November voting showed a very strong backlash vote — accompanied by much personal violence and intimidation. Anti-Negro sentiment almost defeated Democratic mayoral nominee Andrew Hatcher in overwhelmingly Democratic Gary.

Wallace carried 34% of the vote in the 1964 Democratic primary and he would be much stronger in Indiana today, politicians there feel. In a three-way race where Democrats and Republicans split the non-Wallace vote, the Alabamian could well walk off with Indiana's support in the electoral college.

Dirksen in Trouble?

Senator Everett Dirksen's recent acquiescence in allowing Senator Charles Percy to head the Illinois Delegation to the 1968 National Convention was a practical decision. Dirksen will have difficulty winning re-election next year and badly needs Mr. Percy's support. Despite enormous power in Washington, Dirksen is weaker with the Illinois electorate. In 1962, the last time he faced the voters, Sen. Dirksen had a difficult time defeating Rep. Sidney Yates even though he enjoyed the tacit support of President Kennedy. This time around Sen. Dirksen cannot count on support from his friend, President Johnson, who himself is up for election and needs Illinois electoral votes. Then there is his age. Senator Dirksen is 73, in uncertain health, and unable to conduct a vigorous campaign. In 1966 when another aging national institution, Senator Paul Douglas, sought reelection, Illinois voters rejected him for a younger man. Should the Democratic party nominate one of the three men whose names are frequently mentioned — Gov. Otto Kerner, Adlai Stevenson, III, or Sargent Shriver, the state's electorate could easily decide that its interests can better be served by the younger man. To counter this threat Senator Dirksen will have to work for a Republican platform and moderate Presidential nominee attractive to independent voters.

Death Watch on the Potomac

The mood on Capitol Hill increasingly resembles a political deathwatch for the Johnson Administration. Democratic legislators are privately expressing the view that President Johnson can no longer save himself; only the Republicans can.

New York Mayor John Lindsay recently remarked that anybody, even Mickey Mouse, could defeat the President in 1968. Yet, some wags observe, if the Republicans feel that Mickey Mouse can defeat President Johnson they will nominate him, or a candidate of similar ability and appeal.

Democrats in the nation's capital, having lost faith that Lyndon Johnson can reverse his fortunes, are trying unconvincingly to reassure themselves that the Republicans will bail him out. Few knowledgeable observers here feel that support for President Johnson's Vietnam policies will grow between now and November 1968. Moreover, racial unrest, inflation, urban decay, and crime all are likely to plague the incumbent Administration. Most important, however, is the intense personal dislike of Lyndon Johnson that pervades the nation.

Congressional Democrats, sensing the President's unpopularity, are unsure which way to turn. Some down-the-line Administration supporters have begun to differentiate themselves from LBJ by joining the dovocote on Vietnam. Other formerly harsh Johnson critics who face reelection next year, such as Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, and who are reconciling themselves to the probability that Lyndon Johnson's name will head their party column next November, have begun to soften their criticism of the President.

Probably the most demoralized Washington Democrats are the younger Northern House liberals. In addition to the dissatisfaction which many feel with the Administration's Vietnam policy, a number of these Congressmen suspect that the President's preoccupation

with the War has drained his interest in lobbying for even the scaled-down domestic program. Furthermore, strong resentment is evident against House Speaker John McCormack, whom numerous Democratic liberals consider to be a hopeless anachronism. —J.C.T., Jr.

Percy for Vice-President?

GOP circles are a-buzz with talk of a Nixon-Percy ticket and one informed source says an offer has already been made from the senior man to the junior. (There are, of course, reports of Nixon overtures to several possible running mates.) Such a ticket would serve many interests — and it would help Nixon secure party unity, and it would enhance his appeal to Vietnam moderates, to intellectuals, and to the younger voters. Percy, even if the ticket loses, would gain important exposure with Democrats and independents and would have a perfect means for building the grass roots GOP contacts which Nixon has nurtured so successfully. The Illinois Senator would thus become a leading contender for the 1972 presidential nomination. Finally, it would fit the plans of another very important Republican, Senator Dirksen, who must have a ticket which runs strongly in Illinois and one which unifies that state's Republicans. Percy came into politics at Nixon's urging in the 50's and the former vice president is known to greatly admire the Senators' abilities. One problem is that Nixon may have to pay a still greater price for conservative support between now and next summer. —B.F.J.

Vietnam and Elections

"One of the most exciting young Republican leaders in the West," said a letter received by the Ripon office in September. "He trails in the polls, but just watch him beat Shirley Temple Black in November." Our correspondent was right. Korean War veteran "Pete" McCloskey won the GOP Congressional nomination over the former child-star with a progressive campaign keyed to an imaginative, liberal Vietnam position.

Boston Red - White - and - Blue Sox

William Loeb, the extreme right-wing publisher of the Manchester N.H. *Union Leader*, is increasingly in evidence because of his vitriolic attacks upon Governor George Romney. Earlier this fall Loeb suggested that the thousands who attended performances of the Russian Circus in Boston were guilty of high treason. And in October he was so upset when a St. Louis Cardinal pitcher hit Boston Red Sox hero Carl Yastrzemski in the leg with a pitched ball that he insisted the game be declared a forfeit, with Boston the winner, "as an indication that the great American sport of baseball will not allow itself to be besmirched by anyone who wants to play dirty ball."

Dan Evans

Governor Daniel Evans of Washington was nominated by the Republican Governors Association as its choice to deliver the keynote address at next year's national convention. Governor Evans would be an excellent keynoter but the Governors nomination represents more than a tribute to his oratorical abilities; it was also an effort to increase the Washington Governor's influence over his state delegation to the Republican National Convention.

SPENDING FOR SECURITY

One of the reasons that America is such a powerful and successful nation is that Americans are in general very good at recognizing ratholes, which is important when you are looking for someplace to throw your money. If you know a rathole when you see it, you don't throw your money down it, and the chances are that you'll spend it instead in some productive way and become more successful and powerful as a result.

Since the last war, though, we have developed a strange blindness to any rathole that goes under the name of Defense or National Security. I don't mean to imply that none of our Defense expenditures have been worthwhile, only that we have been willing and even eager to waste money on useless projects labelled Defense that we wouldn't look at twice if that magic word were left off. There are arguments for spending a lot of money on National Security; there is no reason to spend it more carelessly or foolishly on Defense than anywhere else. A prudent concern for safety does not exclude a tough-minded determination to get our money's worth.

We are wasting money in three ways by being easy marks for Defense and Aerospace program proposals. First, we are spending money on programs that are ineffective, irrelevant, or costly out of all proportion to the amount they add to our security and well-being. Second, even in programs that are worthwhile, we let contractors pad their costs with overhead charges and encourage inefficiency and waste by using cost-plus contracts and allowing frequent re-negotiation of bids. Third, our slackness in watching how our money is spent has produced carelessness in the producers, so that we get products that are of low quality, dangerously ill-designed; or defective.

An example of the first kind of waste is the light anti-ballistic missile system which Secretary MacNamara proposes to build for five billion dollars. People who have worked on this problem in previous years are going around Washington asking each other why he did it. But, given the facts, it doesn't take a Ph.D. in physics to recognize this particular waste of money. The facts, as set out by the Administration itself, are as follows. The system we plan to build is very specialized. It will protect only a few major cities against a small attack of a particular kind of technically unsophisticated missile shot at us from China across the Pacific. Against many missiles, or against even moderately advanced missiles, or against missiles coming from another direction, it will be useless. What's more, the system cannot be built in less than five years. Even by our own projections which have consistently *under-es-*

timated Chinese technical capabilities, the Chinese can build enough missiles of an advanced type to make the proposed system obsolete in nine or ten years. The only contingency we are protecting ourselves against is the possibility that some day in the middle 1970's a mad Chinese leader will shoot his few missiles at our West Coast cities. By spending five or ten billion dollars we can avert this very improbable catastrophe. What bothers the expert most of all is that there is no protection against bombs delivered by submarine to our harbors, which would do precisely the same job. The Chinese already have submarines that can do this.

This is not a case of better safe than sorry. If we were both five billion dollars poorer and a little safer, there might be some argument. But in fact we are going to be just five billion dollars poorer and not one iota safer. The only consolation is that the ABM is a fascinating technical problem for the engineers and scientists who will build it, and they presumably will have some fun.

The abuses of cost-plus contracts are well-known, but the common practice of charging a dollar of overhead for each dollar of real costs on Defense contracts is not nearly so notorious as it ought to be. No firm producing for the private sector tolerates such overhead costs.

The high prices we are paying might be justified if we were getting an unusually good job as a result. Unfortunately that is not true. A tragic instance of gross sloppiness in design was the Apollo fire. Again, technical personnel outside the program could hardly believe that a locked compartment was pressurized with oxygen without either a quick escape or an effective fire-fighting system available.

We must start applying our famous Yankee shrewdness and skepticism equally to all our expenditures, not excepting those which are technologically seductive or which advertising copy-writers can sell as "protection." Our technological resources are perhaps our most valuable national treasure. As much of it as we can use productively to increase what we hopefully call our "security," let us spend prudently and demand a high quality product in return. But we have desperately pressing problems for technology to solve, some of which technology has created, not on the other side of the moon or Mars, but in the streets of our cities and in the air of our countryside. We cannot afford to pour our technological treasure down the ratholes of defense systems that don't defend, of super-sonic transports that no one wants to buy, of space programs that bore everyone. I hope that Congress in its heroic struggles to cut spending will muse a little on ratholes.